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This book is about, among other things, the thrill of naming names. As I 
look back on the process of writing it, it gives me great pleasure to point 
my finger at the accomplices who made it possible: Cheryl Alison, Susan 
Bell, Lauren Berlant, Susan David Bernstein, Diana Fuss, Jane Gallop, 
Marjorie Garber, Helena Gurfinkel, Judith Halberstam, Janet Halley, Jon-
athan Gil Harris, Sonia Hofkosh, Carol Mavor, Meredith McGill, David 
McWhirter, Madhavi Menon, D. A. Miller, Leland Monk, Michael Moon, 
Paul Morrison, Mary Ann O’Farrell, Andrew Parker, Marilyn Reizbaum, 
James Rosenheim, Hilary Schor, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Ashley Shel-
den, Yonatan Touval, Henry Turner, and Rebecca Walkowitz.
Fellow travelers who continue to teach me about Jews, America, and 
show business include Joni, Larry, Dan, Ron, Ed, Greg, Doug, Brian, and 
Ben Litvak, Traven Rice, and Erica, Alan, Leah, Avi, and Sam Edelman. 
In the interest of full disclosure, I must reveal the special contribution of 
Doug Litvak, who at a very early age, and while this project itself was still 
quite young, described himself as “half-Jewish and half-American.”
Ken Wissoker is the savviest of editors. While it has not always been 
easy for me to take his advice and part with some of my favorite neolo-
gisms and puns, he knows how to make a book work, and this one has 
been significantly improved by his deft interventions. Courtney Berger, 
also at Duke University Press, has consistently given me invaluable help 
in putting the book together. Mark Mastromarino did an elegant job of 
copyediting the manuscript, and three anonymous readers for the Press 
offered incisive advice.
As Dean of Arts and Sciences at Tufts University, Susan Ernst pro-
vided financial support and leave time at a crucial moment. I would like 
to thank the Faculty Research Awards Committee at Tufts for a grant 
that afforded me an additional semester of leave. Thanks also to Hope 
Roth of the Tufts Computer Center, for assisting me in acquiring the 
images for this book.
Joan Miller made the Wesleyan University Cinema Archives available 
to me, and provided valuable information about Elia Kazan.
There is no more tender comrade than Lee Edelman, nor is there a 
more rigorous reader, a more perceptive listener, a more brilliant ques-
tioner, or a wiser confidant. In every way, these pages are better for the 
care he has lavished on them. In every way, they bear the trace of his 
innumerable and inimitable gifts. For the gift of his radiant presence in 
my life, I dedicate this book to him, with gratitude, with joy, and with 
love.
Passages from this book have appeared, in a condensed and elliptical 
form, in “Glad to Be Unhappy,” an essay written for After Sex?: On Writ-
ing since Queer Theory, a special issue of the South Atlantic Quarterly ed-
ited by Janet Halley and Andrew Parker (Summer 2007), copyright by 
Duke University Press.
A version of chapter 2 appeared in a special issue of Women’s Studies 





A sycophant will always say to himself that in biting 
what has some value he might thereby make a little profit.
—alain badiou, “The Word ‘Jew’ and the Sycophant”
Lillian Hellman recounts the following exchange with her lawyer just 
before what would become her famous “uncooperative” testimony—her 
refusal to name names—in front of the House Un-American Activities 
Committee (huac) in 1952:
“Don’t make jokes.”
“Make jokes? Why would I make jokes?”
“Almost everybody, when they feel insulted by the Committee, makes 
a joke or acts smart-aleck. It’s a kind of embarrassment. Don’t do it.”1
Hellman took her lawyer’s advice and maintained an impeccably digni-
fied, resolutely noncomic bearing throughout her appearance, the fame 
of which derives from her courageous refusal to “cut [her] conscience 
to fit this year’s fashions.”2 For all the deserved fame of her testimony, 
however, Hellman’s repudiation of mere show in favor of “the good 
American tradition” made her a fairly typical uncooperative witness.3 Ac-
cusing huac and its many informers—the “cooperative” or “friendly” 
witnesses—of a contemptible trendiness, Hellman pointed to a larger 
irony, whereby the congressional investigation of alleged Communist in-
fluence in show business itself became an exercise in show business: a 
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media spectacle—one of the first of the postwar period—acted out be-
fore newsreel cameras and then, a little later, with the triumph of a new 
technology, under television’s menacing (if distracted) gaze.4 The con-
verse irony is that Hellman, like so many other left-wing figures from 
Hollywood and Broadway, emphatically identified herself with the very 
Law that was investigating and ultimately persecuting her. To put one-
self on the side of this Law, to align oneself with a certain righteous left, 
moreover, one did not need to avoid the comic as rigorously as did Hell-
man. Even those uncooperative witnesses who “ma[d]e jokes” and “act[ed] 
smart-aleck” did so, as Hellman’s lawyer explained, because they felt 
“insulted” or “embarrassed,” their “embarrassment” and their wounded 
pride testifying to a seriousness, at least about themselves and their rep-
utations, that in turn bespoke an underlying respect for the norms of 
self-presentation in the postwar American public sphere.
Not that huac was appeased by these displays of respect. The com-
mittee itself, I propose in this book, was so enraged by jokes and other 
manifestations of the comic that it was prepared to end the career of any-
one who used them, or who might have used them, to “act smart-aleck,” 
even if that behavior, originating in embarrassment, revealed a funda-
mentally law-abiding disposition. In its investigative, and punitive, zeal, 
huac deployed a hermeneutic of suspicion too implacable to be taken 
in by mere assertions of patriotic probity, or by the kind of joking that 
pays tribute to seriousness by dreading the loss of its own face. Behind 
both straight seriousness and comic seriousness, huac detected the 
clear and present danger of forces whose radicalness consisted in their 
lying beneath and beyond the saving disciplinary reach of insult and em-
barrassment, and that, since they could not be rehabilitated, had to be 
destroyed. It was just such destruction, in fact, that the practice of black-
listing attempted, and in large part achieved. Imposed by the committee 
on the film and television industries, which proved all too eager to en-
force it, the blacklist, in effect from 1947 to the mid-1960s or later, con-
stituted a purge of all those who would neither discuss their politics with 
huac nor “give” it the names of their fellow Communists (names that it 
already had).5 As the following chapters will show, however, the commit-
tee’s official project, the investigation of Communism, served mainly as 
a screen for its even more obsessive and therefore much less avowable 
business: going after those smart alecks who, without even having had 
	 sycoanalys i s	 
to appear before it, embarrassed it by their very being—by embodying 
not just the comic, but the whole scandalous, indeed criminal, conspiracy 
of smartness, acting, pleasure, happiness, imitation, mobility, and play, 
centered in yet reaching well beyond Hollywood and New York, that I 
will be delineating here under the rubric of comicosmopolitanism.
huac was not about to be put off the scent of this conspiracy by the 
uncooperative witnesses’ frequent professions of patriotism, religiosity, 
and other forms of good citizenship. If comicosmopolitanism is more 
often a matter of unintended meanings and of performative implications 
than of explicit political and ethical belief, this covertness corresponds ex-
actly to the committee’s relentless suspicion that jokes were being made 
at the nation’s expense even when, as in the case of Lillian Hellman’s tes-
timony, or of her work as a playwright and screenwriter, nothing funny 
seemed to be going on. As far as huac was concerned, in other words, 
making jokes was not merely a tactical gaffe that uncooperative witnesses 
might have avoided if they had just not let themselves get so flustered, or 
if only they had had a lawyer as astute as Lillian Hellman’s. Rather, their 
making of jokes, or, more precisely, their quasigenetic propensity to make 
them, whether or not they ever did, was the reason the uncooperative were 
subpoenaed by huac in the first place. Once in front of the committee, 
they had to be made examples of, in the pedagogical sense, since they 
already exemplified the operations of an obscure and sinister interna-
tional network of comedians, next to which “Communism” itself might 
aptly be said to function as a Red herring, its legendary drabness and hu-
morlessness conveniently drawing attention away from the more driving 
preoccupations of those who made such a spectacle of investigating it.6
Even before the uncooperative witnesses arrived in front of the com-
mittee, in order to arrive in front of it, that is, they had to have been per-
ceived as insulting it, essentially and fundamentally, by representing the 
“un-American activity” of an intolerable enjoyment: an enjoyment that— 
insofar as it seems to bear the distinctive mark of the Jews, who have long 
been thought to have a particular gift both for the comic and for cosmo-
politanism, and who have almost as long been resented for “controlling” 
American mass culture—might as well be called en-Jewment.7 huac’s 
acting chairman, Congressman John Rankin of Mississippi, was less cir-
cumspect in his Jew-hatred than some of his colleagues on the commit-
tee (which included the by no means philo-Semitic Richard Nixon). In a 
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statement that has become a set-piece of blacklist historiography, Rankin 
revealed the “real names” of various Hollywood figures—not Commu-
nists, but merely liberals—who had signed a petition criticizing the com-
mittee’s encroachment on the First Amendment:
One of the names is June Havoc. We found out from the motion- 
picture almanac that her real name is June Hovick.
Another one was Danny Kaye, and we found out that his real name was 
David Daniel Kaminsky.
Another one here is John Beal, whose real name is J. Alexander 
Bliedung.
Another one is Cy Bartlett, whose real name is Sacha Baraniev.
Another one is Eddie Cantor, whose real name is Edward Iskowitz.
There is one who calls himself Edward Robinson. His real name is 
Emmanuel Goldenberg.
There is another one here who calls himself Melvyn Douglas, whose 
real name is Melvyn Hesselberg.8
When uncooperative witnesses make jokes or act smart-aleck in the course 
of their almost always bullying and unnerving interrogation by huac, 
these local transgressions merely confirm what the committee and other 
enforcers of Americanism suspect, and prosecute, as a prior degeneracy: 
a “subversive” tendency much broader and deeper than any particular 
political ideology, as Rankin’s attack on the Hollywood liberals shows; a 
“subversive” tendency, indeed, of an ontological or even racial kind.9
Madeline Gilford, the wife of a blacklisted actor and a blacklistee her-
self, relates how, posing as an nbc secretary, she called a Syracuse gro-
cer, then terrorizing nbc by threatening to boycott products advertised 
on shows with blacklisted personnel:
“We’re not gonna carry those products [Kellogg’s cereals and Pet Milk], if 
you’re gonna have those people on your shows. You people down there in 
New York may think it’s all right, but it isn’t all right with us up here in 
the country. I told him [the network executive] you can’t have those people 
on like George Kaufman and Sam Levinson,” and he proceeded to name 
only Jews, so “you people down in New York” was another euphemism.10
Kaufman and Levinson were hardly Communists, but they did not need 
to be: it was enough that they were comic denizens (one as an author, 
	 sycoanalys i s	 5
the other as a performer) of the New York–Jewish world of show busi-
ness. If the defenders of “the country” were insulting, this is because 
they felt insulted by the very presence, “down there in New York,” and 
in all sorts of less obvious cultural and academic nooks and crannies, 
of what they apprehended as virtually a race of jokers, far larger than the 
considerable parade of witnesses whom, in an exercise of synecdochic 
justice, huac summoned before itself.
For its part, the committee itself was as synecdochic as the justice it 
meted out, so fashionable, as Hellman perceived, was the anticosmo-
politanism it represented. Here, for instance, is Congressman George 
Dondero of Michigan, not a member of huac but what we might call a 
fellow non-traveler:
The art of the isms, the weapon of the Russian Revolution, is the art 
which has been transplanted to America, and today, having infiltrated and 
saturated many of our art centers, threatens to overawe, override and over-
power the fine art of our tradition and inheritance. So-called modern or 
contemporary art in our own beloved country contains all the isms of de-
pravity, decadence, and destruction. . . .
All these isms are of foreign origin, and truly should have no place in 
American art. . . . All are instruments and weapons of destruction.11
Like the Syracuse grocer, Congressmen Dondero and Rankin, less wary 
than most of their colleagues, come close to articulating the inarticulable 
fantasy behind the anti-Communist fashion show of which huac, before 
and after Joseph McCarthy, was the nation’s principal impresario: a fan-
tasy of revenge against those who had inflicted on it, and on the nation as 
a whole, the massively insulting joke—depraved, decadent, destructive— 
of comicosmopolitanism and en-Jewment themselves.
To be a cooperative witness, as I have noted, one had to do more than 
just renounce Communism: one had to recite for huac the names of 
one’s associates in the Party, thereby becoming what I will be calling a 
sycophant—literally and archaically, one who shows the fig, or, by exten-
sion, one who points the finger at fig-thieves, or, by further extension, 
an informer.12 In keeping with the more familiar understanding of the 
term, the sycophant, the object of sycoanalysis—the discipline introduced 
and unfolded throughout these pages—certainly flatters the committee, 
mitigating the insult that the uncooperative and their fellow-traveling, 
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indeed all-too-nomadic, kind have already inherently inflicted upon it. 
An uncooperative witness, of course, is one who refuses to inform. But 
behind this refusal lies the image of another refusal, even more outra-
geous in the minds of those who would avenge it: a refusal of that Amer-
ican seriousness that huac sees itself as both protecting and, since its 
members, after all, belong to the House of Representatives, represent-
ing. I have suggested that anyone capable of feeling insulted and embar-
rassed, as many uncooperative witnesses undoubtedly were, cannot have 
relinquished all claims to seriousness, at least in relation to him- or her-
self. But despite their often explicit endorsement of this value, and de-
spite their not infrequent recourse to the language of dignity, pride, and 
strength, the most uncooperative of the uncooperative witnesses—the 
least righteous of the left—incur the wrath of the committee by reject-
ing its very rhetoric of national self-presentation: by enacting a comedy 
grounded not in the anxious imperative to cover or to recover from em-
barrassment, but, on the contrary, in an indifference to embarrassment 
and therefore to the norms of citizenship that it presupposes.
Consider, for instance, this excerpt from the huac hearing of the actor 
Lionel Stander in 195:
mr. velde [the committee chairman]: Let me tell you this: You are a 
witness before this Committee—
mr. stander: Well, if you are interested—
mr. velde:—a Committee of the Congress of the United States—
mr. stander:—I am willing to tell you—
mr. velde:—and you are in the same position as any other witness be-
fore this Committee—
mr. stander:—I am willing to tell you about these activities—
mr. velde:—regardless of your standing in the motion-picture world—
mr. stander:—which I think are subversive.
mr. velde:—or for any other reason. No witness can come before the 
Committee and insult the Committee—
mr. stander: Is this an insult to the Committee?
mr. velde:—and continue to—
mr. stander:—when I inform the Committee I know of subversive ac-
tivities which are contrary to the Constitution?
	 sycoanalys i s	 7
mr. velde: Now, Mr. Stander, unless you begin to answer these questions 
and act like a witness in a reasonable, dignified manner, under the rules 
of the Committee, I will be forced to have you removed from this room.
mr. stander: I am deeply shocked, Mr. Chairman.13
The “subversive activities which are contrary to the Constitution” turn 
out to be those of the committee itself, whose members Stander charac-
terizes as “a group of fanatics who are desperately trying to undermine 
the Constitution of the United States by depriving artists and others of 
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” (64).14 Anticipating this punch 
line, Congressman Velde would avert its “insult” by threatening the wit-
ness. But this is an insult that pays a hidden compliment: implicit in 
Stander’s disapproval of the subversive activities perpetrated by the com-
mittee is a regard for the law and the nation, albeit a more benign law 
and a more democratic nation than those the committee purports to de-
fend. Stander was not the only uncooperative witness to accuse it of the 
very un-Americanism it claimed to be investigating. “You are the non-
patriots, and you are the un-Americans, and you ought to be ashamed of 
yourselves” (789), Paul Robeson would reproach his interrogators; after 
laughing during his testimony, and being warned, “This is not a laughing 
matter,” Robeson replied, “It is a laughing matter to me, and this [hear-
ing] is really complete nonsense” (774). However provocative and even 
antagonistic, Robeson’s attempt to shame the committee, like Stander’s 
attempt to charge it with subversion, or like Hellman’s tactic of smear-
ing it with fashionability, still plays by the rules of a national style of seri-
ousness that the committee itself enforces, far more aggressively and vig-
ilantly than any particular ideology, anti-Communist or otherwise. For 
Robeson to describe the hearing as a “laughing matter” is for him to dis-
miss it as “complete nonsense”—as though the comic were equivalent to 
the merely absurd. Similarly, for Stander to invoke the Constitution against 
the committee is for him to confront one earnestness with another.
The real insult to the committee is Stander’s refusal to “act like a wit-
ness in a reasonable, dignified manner.” The insult is indeed one of 
manner rather than of matter, of form rather than of content. What the 
committee can’t stand about Stander is his acting—not that he is acting, 
but how he is acting. Photographed by newsreel and television cameras, 
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broadcast on radio, conducted in “executive [i.e., closed] sessions” that 
the committee does not hesitate to publicize, huac’s investigations of 
show business are themselves show trials, with elaborate, if unwritten, 
rules about what one should “act like” and how one should carry out that 
performance.15 On the national stage presided over by the committee, 
Lionel Stander has the audacity to deviate from the decorum of a theatri-
cal orthodoxy that no Stanislavsky or Strasberg ever maintained more 
rigorously. For the conventions of testimony are nothing less than the 
conventions of citizenship: huac’s rules of testimonial etiquette rule 
over the performance of Americanness itself. Leftist and liberal theorists 
of citizenship value it as the potential basis of a democratic polity, a realm 
apart from and salutarily larger than the exclusionary circles of the tribe 
and the community.16 But even this inclusive democratic space cannot 
constitute itself without both collective assent to the sovereignty of the 
national, or transnational, order (citizenship as collaboration) and collec-
tive vigilance against “abuses” of the freedom of expression (citizenship 
as informing).17 Even in its most benign forms, that is, citizenship entails 
a perpetual readiness to bear witness in the name of the law, to give evi-
dence about oneself and others. Dispensing with the blandishments of a 
more civil or more civilized inflection of citizenship, huac has the rude 
merit of laying bare the irreducible complicities of citizenship tout court, 
whereby every citizen necessarily has within him- or herself at least a 
little bit of the collaborator and at least a little bit of the informer.18
In I Married a Communist, Philip Roth’s 1998 novel of the blacklist, 
one of the characters says of the epidemic of betrayal in the United States 
during the years between 1946 and 1956:
It was everywhere during those years, the accessible transgression, the 
permissible transgression that any American could commit. Not only does 
the pleasure of betrayal replace the prohibition, but you transgress without 
giving up your moral authority. You retain your purity at the same time 
as you are realizing a satisfaction that verges on the sexual with its am-
biguous components of pleasure and weakness, of aggression and shame: 
the satisfaction of undermining.19
I would modify this lucid account in two ways. First, I would argue, and 
do argue below, that, while the betrayal of which Roth’s narrator speaks 
was indeed “everywhere” during the immediate postwar decade, it has 
	 sycoanalys i s	 9
pervaded American life both before and after that decade as well. Sec-
ond, I would argue, and do argue below, that the quasisexual transgres-
sion of betrayal was and remains not merely permissible but obligatory. 
Enforcing the rules of sycophancy, huac put on display the rule of sy-
cophancy: a regime of transgression-as-moral-authority that has yet to 
show any signs of waning.
For now, let us note that when Lionel Stander deviates from the rules 
of American sycophancy, and defies its rule, he does not do so merely by 
“acting funny”: in that case, he would reaffirm the opposition between 
seriousness and the comic from which the former derives its power— 
including the power to distinguish between itself and its opposite. The 
witness’s offense, rather, consists in acting seriousness in such a way 
that his audience can no longer know whether to take him seriously 
or not: “I am deeply shocked, Mr. Chairman”; “Is this an insult to the 
Committee?”—or, a little later in the hearing, “I have never been more 
deadly serious in my life” (644). Not only does Stander thus contaminate 
seriousness with apparent mock-seriousness: he adds injury to insult 
by drawing Velde, the committee chairman, into a scene that, with its 
farcically interrupted dialogue, overlapping malentendus, and bad puns 
(“regardless of your standing in the motion-picture world”), plays like 
something from a Marx brothers movie—here lies the authentically per-
nicious Marxism—with Stander in the Groucho role and Velde as Mar-
garet Dumont’s dimly indignant dowager. Casting Velde as his straight 
man, Stander casts both his straightness and his manhood into ques-
tion.20 In the context of this travesty, the chair’s exhortation to “act . . . 
in a reasonable, dignified manner” can only call attention to his own 
acting, whose effects of reasonableness and dignity, nowhere more his-
trionically emblazoned than by indignation itself, thereby assume the 
campy guise of unwitting self-parody.
Velde does not, as it happens, make good on his threat to have Stander 
“removed from this room.” Instead, after their comical pas de deux to-
gether, he pronounces a more exquisitely indefinite sentence: “It is the 
order of the Chair and this Committee that you be continued under sub-
poena, and the investigation and hearing be continued in your case until 
a future date, at which time you will be notified by our counsel” (65). For 
Stander, who had never joined the Communist Party, “the blacklisting 
was complete,” and would last another ten years.21 He does not help 
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his cause when, near the end of his testimony, he says, “My name is 
Stander. It was adopted . . . because, unfortunately, in feudal Spain my 
ancestors didn’t have the protection of the United States Constitution 
and were religious refugees” (652). Velde’s reply: “I asked you a ques-
tion . . . which had nothing to do with religion” (652). The chair is only 
half-right: the “questions” put to Stander have to do not with his Juda-
ism but with his Jewishness. He has been summoned before huac, and 
will be kept dangling under its subpoena, not because of his religious 
beliefs but because of the racial difference that they stand in front of, 
as if to protect a refugee.22 They of course fail to protect that difference: 
that deviant performance style (as pungent as a strange perfume) that no 
adopted name or constitutional right can ever fully legitimate. Try as he 
might to seek dignifying cover in a democratic American tradition, one 
of “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,” Stander’s particular way 
of pursuing happiness—comically, by mocking the putatively reason-
able and the dignified—remains radically unassimilable, even to that 
necessarily capacious tradition, let alone to the far narrower American-
ism promoted, with a vengeance, by huac.
In making jokes and acting smart-aleck, Stander may betray an embar-
rassment, an insultability—which is to say, a pride—that in turn bodes 
well for his susceptibility to the essentially normal, normalizing charms 
of citizenship: not just to its rights but to its rectitude. Only those whose 
narcissism has been wounded, after all, can know what it means to want 
to protect it, even if protecting it means taking shelter within the hum-
bling apparatus of the state. “I stand here struggling for the rights of 
my people to be full citizens in this country,” Paul Robeson told huac. 
“And they are not” (778). Stander’s stand may be as patriotic, in its jok-
ing, smart-aleck way, as Robeson’s shaming laughter. But the very same 
joking, smart-aleck behavior may also, and simultaneously, betray a 
shamelessness that thwarts all efforts to bully the joker and smart aleck 
into conformity with the dominant national style: a shamelessness that 
Robeson, too, evinces when he says of the cameras documenting his 
appearance before the committee, “I am used to it and I have been in 
motion pictures. Do you want me to pose for it good? Do you want me to 
smile?” (774). While relying heavily on the respectabilizing discourse of 
rights, Robeson tropes on the figure of the black trickster; while accus-
ing huac of subversion, Stander practices it by making jokes and acting 
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smart-aleck in a way that aligns him with a strand of Jewish culture even 
harder to domesticate than the one represented by his religious refugee 
ancestors. Refugees, after all, seek refuge, whether they find it or not; 
and if they are religious refugees, they may hope for the special defer-
ence that American culture tends to reserve for religiosity (provided, of 
course, that it is the right kind of religiosity).23 Stander may stand instead 
with those insolently, incorrigibly comic Jews whom Hannah Arendt, 
after Bernard Lazare, calls “conscious pariahs”:
Modern Jewish history, having started with court Jews and continuing with 
Jewish millionaires and philanthropists, is apt to forget about this other 
trend of Jewish tradition—the tradition of Heine, Rahel Varnhagen, Sholom 
Aleichem, of Bernard Lazare, Franz Kafka, or even Charlie Chaplin. It is 
the tradition of a minority of Jews who have not wanted to become up-
starts, who preferred the status of “conscious pariah.”24
Not that the pariahs, according to Arendt, have an exclusive claim to 
comic Jewishness. The upstarts, or the parvenus, as she also calls them, 
have evolved their own repertoire of Jewish—or perhaps more accurately, 
non-Jewish—jokes:
It is true that most of us [refugees] depend entirely upon social standards; 
we lose confidence in ourselves if society does not approve us; we are—
and always were—ready to pay any price in order to be accepted by society. 
But it is equally true that the very few among us who have tried to get 
along without all these tricks and jokes of adjustment and assimilation 
have paid a much higher price than they could afford: they jeopardized the 
few chances even outlaws are given in a topsy-turvy world.25
Arendt is writing in 194. But even in the post–Second World War Ameri-
can scene that is the focus of the present book, the Jewish outlaws, the 
conscious pariahs, are an embarrassment to society. Indeed, a certain 
postwar American desire to forget European fascism—as if there had 
only ever been two antithetical political ideologies, Democracy and 
Communism—may have helped, if not exactly to reenact it here at home, 
then at least to replicate its regime of “adjustment and assimilation,” 
with all its attendant “tricks and jokes.” If, accordingly, most Jews in 
America in the 1950s were “ready to pay any price in order to be accepted 
by society,” one of the prices paid was, precisely, sycophancy, by which I 
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mean the betrayal of the outlaw relatives: a betrayal of the comic as well, 
not despite the sycophantic parvenu’s recourse to the tricks and jokes 
designed to win society’s approval, but because of it.26
Any parvenu by definition practices a kind of pseudocomedy: the tech-
niques of ingratiation obviously have the comic aim of pleasing; but ea-
gerness to please entails the triumph of eagerness over pleasure, where 
pleasure is always compelled to pay tribute to the tension, fear, and threat 
of displeasure driving the eager performer. But this book is not about the 
parvenu per se. It is about the category of parvenus—so large a category 
as to constitute a condition, by no means limited to Jews—who are best 
designated as sycophants in the “classic” sense of the term. And the sy-
cophant does more than just purvey an anxiously false comedy, a cring-
ing imitation of comedy. He or she does that, to be sure, but, as I have 
suggested, sycophancy is not mere flattery of the master: to qualify as a 
sycophant, one must also inform on the members of one’s own group—
inform on them for the purpose of destroying them. When Lionel 
Stander tells huac that he has never been more “deadly serious” in his 
life, his assertion, however sincere, is seriously compromised by the 
comic performance in which it is embedded. The uncooperative witness 
turns seriousness into comedy; the cooperative witness turns comedy 
into seriousness. For “tricks and jokes” that are indeed no laughing mat-
ter, so aggressively do they support a seriousness that well deserves to be 
called deadly, we must look, in other words, to the “friendly” witnesses, 
who, in informing on their friends, in effect helped the state to assassi-
nate them. “Get ready to become nobody”: thus did screenwriter Dalton 
Trumbo, one of huac’s first casualties, formulate the consequence of 
“unfriendliness.”27 No one who was blacklisted could work openly in 
Hollywood or in television; to be blacklisted (unless, as a writer, one 
could work, tenuously, behind a “front”) meant the death of one’s career 
in American film and television, and, in some cases, death itself.28
Watch this deadly serious pseudocomedy, this anticomedy, at work 
in the testimony of (in Ed Sullivan’s words) “ballet star and choreog-
rapher,”29 and soon-to-be director, Jerome Robbins, one day before the 
testimony of Stander:
investigator: You were at one time a member of the Communist Party, 
is that correct?
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mr. robbins: Yes.
investigator: For how long were you a member?
mr. robbins: I attended my first meeting in the spring of ’44. At one of 
the earliest meetings, I was asked in what way did dialectical material-
ism help me to do my ballet Fancy Free!
Laughter.30
This is the laughter of the comedicidal state: a state every bit as humor-
less as its mortal enemy, the Soviet regime echoed in the question al-
legedly put to Robbins; a state, moreover, that will not hesitate to rid 
itself of jokers and smart alecks, since its very existence is endangered 
by anyone whom it cannot intimidate into assuming the “reasonable, 
dignified manner,” which is to say, the petrified rigidity, that constitutes 
“acting like” a citizen.31 Acting that part to the hilt, distinguishing him-
self as a model witness-citizen, Robbins plays out his role in the national 
drama by proceeding to re-deliver to the committee the names of eight 
of his former associates in the Communist Party, including that of the 
actress-comedian Madeline Gilford, also known as Madeline Lee, the 
Party member who asked him the “ridiculous” and “outrageous” ques-
tion, as he explicitly characterizes it elsewhere in his testimony, of how 
dialectical materialism helped him to do Fancy Free.32 The anti-laughter 
that he dutifully elicits from his audience already colludes with him in 
the murders he will commit, or complete, by naming names: exposing 
the question’s “ridiculousness,” Robbins reveals as well the deadly se-
riousness, the vengeful bloodthirstiness, of this collective, this almost 
tribal derision.
At the same time that Hannah Arendt was bitterly marking the dismal 
fate that parvenus, for all their labors of “adjustment and assimilation,” 
had nonetheless come to share with pariahs, her fellow German-Jewish 
refugees, Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, had this to say 
about the genocidal hatred that had driven them all out of Europe:
The anti-Semites gather to celebrate the moment when authority lifts the 
ban [on pleasure]; that moment alone makes them a collective, constitut-
ing the community of kindred spirits. Their ranting is organized laughter. 
The more dreadful the accusations and threats, the greater the fury, the 
more withering is the scorn. Rage, mockery, and poisoned imitation are 
fundamentally the same thing.33
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Organized laughter, of course, is no more laughter than authorized plea-
sure is pleasure. Not just a Jew but a homosexual Jew—that is, doubly 
implicated in comicosmopolitanism’s lightness—Jerome Robbins may 
figure here as the exemplary sycophant, a virtuoso of betrayal: he performs 
and instigates, on cue, a “poisoned imitation” of the comic, a “mockery” 
of the comic, that is “fundamentally the same thing” as an annihilating, 
outraged “rage” against the comic.
Not only is Robbins the exemplary sycophant: sycophancy itself, this 
book argues, is exemplary. The sycophant is not merely a self-hating Jew, 
whose self-hatred is so advanced that it makes him betray other Jews to the 
anti-Semitic authorities. To be sure, anti-Semitism, and the systematic re-
cruitment and display of Jewish collaborators, were very much on huac’s 
only half-hidden agenda. huac’s anti-Semitism produced its most hys-
terical symptom in the “ranting” of its one-time chairman, Congressman 
Rankin; six of the Hollywood Ten, the first uncooperative witnesses— 
all of whom were imprisoned as well as blacklisted—were Jews; two 
of the four who were not, as we shall see in chapter , landed in front 
of huac in large part because their work on Hollywood’s first anti- 
anti-Semitic film effectively made them “honorary” Jews; a third non-
Jew among the Ten was accused of “writing like a Jew”;34 and Jews made 
up an overwhelmingly large percentage of the witnesses (both “friendly” 
and “unfriendly”) who appeared before the committee throughout its in-
vestigations of show business in the fifties. Yet the aim of this book is not 
to belabor the obvious (and well-established) point that huac, like many 
“anti-Communist” entities, was motivated by anti-Semitism.35 Its project, 
rather, is to show how the “friendly” witness’s murderous complicity in 
the war on comicosmopolitanism—the real Cold War, the one that has 
yet to end—illustrates, with pathological clarity, the normal functioning 
of both citizenship (in the political sphere) and mass entertainment (in 
the cultural sphere).
And while the book takes huac’s mission to be the staging and en-
forcement of a normative style of American seriousness, its implications 
are confined neither to “the blacklist era” that supposedly ended around 
1960, nor even to the American scene, over which the blacklist exer-
cised its particular reign of terror.36 Indeed, one of this book’s theses 
is that, at the very moment when huac and its partners are seeking to 
impose a xenophobic national (or nationalist) style, the “Americanism” 
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thus promoted paradoxically testifies to a foreign entanglement more 
complex than any Communist conspiracy: the entanglement of a proud, 
even truculent “Americanism” with the European fascism that the na-
tion had recently helped to defeat. Cold War American anti-Semitism is 
neither strictly “American,” nor strictly “Cold War,” nor, for that matter, 
strictly “anti-Semitism”: huac did not invent, but, rather, modified and 
expanded and presided over, a “community of kindred spirits,” a sys-
tem of sycophantic treachery, of “dreadful . . . accusations and threats,” 
of “fury” and “withering scorn,” that has roots at least as far back as 
nineteenth-century Europe, and that persists to this day. The ostensible 
“breaking” of the blacklist—mythically fixed at the moment when Dalton 
Trumbo was credited as the screenwriter of Exodus and Spartacus in 
1960—attests, rather, to its success: some (though by no means all) of the 
blacklisted would be openly employable once again, but only because the 
blacklist’s war on comicosmopolitanism had implanted itself so deeply 
in the culture as a whole that the blacklist—never acknowledged, in any 
case, by the Hollywood that was enforcing it—could appear simply to 
fade away. (Of his “post”-blacklist career, blacklisted screenwriter and di-
rector Abraham Polonsky remarked, in 1976: “Suddenly I realized I was 
just as blacklisted even when they wanted to hire me as when they didn’t 
want to hire me.”)37 With greater discretion than in the forties or fifties, 
but no less “poisonously” for all that, the sycophantic community of “anti-
Semites” continues to epitomize the deadly seriousness of American 
citizenship. It no longer even requires Jews as its objects—these days, 
in fact, “homosexuals,” “terrorists,” and “immigrants” usually do much 
better—as it continues, with the same anticomic rage, to shape not only 
the products of mass entertainment but the most refined and high-
minded cultural criticism as well.
Elsewhere in Dialectic of Enlightenment, the book in which the pas-
sage about anti-Semitic “laughter” appears, Horkheimer and Adorno, 
programmatically and ungratefully blurring the line between the Europe 
from which they have fled and the America in which they have taken 
refuge, predict the blacklist that is three or four years away. “The cul-
ture monopolies,” they write, “have to keep in with the true wielders of 
power, to ensure that their sphere of mass society, the specific product 
of which still has too much of cozy liberalism and Jewish intellectual-
ism about it, is not subjected to a series of purges.”38 The blacklist was 
16	 chap ter	one	
that series of purges, but it reflected less the failure of the Hollywood 
studios to “keep in with the true wielders of power” than their attempt 
to stay ahead of the game: to prove themselves more American than 
the Americans. All but one of the major studios was run by a Jewish 
executive; all of those executives endorsed the “Waldorf Statement,” the 
founding document of the blacklist, whose existence, as I have said, the 
studios nevertheless made a point of denying.39 Thus did the Jews who 
“invented Hollywood” think to divest their product of its “cozy liberal-
ism and Jewish intellectualism.”40 But what of the cozy liberalism and 
Jewish intellectualism represented by, say, liberal Jewish intellectuals? 
I am referring not to the screenwriters who figured prominently in the 
Hollywood Ten, or in the much larger, second group of blacklistees, 
but to writers and critics working outside the “culture monopolies,” in 
the more distinguished and presumably more disinterested worlds of 
the academy and high journalism. Lillian Hellman claims that she was 
not surprised by the sycophantic capitulation of the Hollywood moguls 
when huac came to town: “It would not have been possible in Russia or 
Poland, but it was possible here to offer the Cossacks a bowl of chicken 
soup.”41 Hellman’s disappointment came from another source:
I had no right to think that American intellectuals were people who would 
fight for anything if doing so would injure them; they have very little his-
tory that would lead to that conclusion. Many of them found in the sins of 
Stalin Communism . . . the excuse to join those who should have been their 
hereditary enemies. Perhaps that, in part, was the penalty of nineteenth-
century immigration. The children of timid immigrants are often remark-
able people: energetic, intelligent, hardworking; and often they make it so 
good that they are determined to keep it at any cost. The native grandees, 
of course, were glad to have them as companions on the conservative ship: 
they wrote better English, had read more books, talked louder and with 
greater fluency.42
Keeping the blacklist to keep in with the true wielders of power, Holly-
wood sought to dissociate itself from Jewish intellectualism. But Jewish 
intellectuals were just as busy dissociating themselves from Hollywood, 
and for similar reasons of self-preservation: each saw that the other was 
perceived as excessively “cozy,” as vulnerably soft; the intellectuals, be-
cause of their negative capability, and Hollywood, because of its frivol-
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ity. Hellman’s view of “timid immigrants” and their children no doubt 
evinces the snobbery of the more socially (though not more politically) 
assimilated American Jew. Yet disapproval of her attitude should not 
exempt us from considering the extent to which a certain timidity still 
informs the American intellectual landscape. I have argued elsewhere 
that contemporary Anglo-American criticism is dominated by the strict-
ness of conscience that Matthew Arnold called Hebraism—and that what 
this Hebraism excludes is less a “Hellenistic” free play than a “Jewish” 
levity.43 Even the academy’s theoretical interlude of the seventies and 
eighties, its encounter with a more or less French “playfulness,” seems 
to have left its most enduring legacy by congealing into a corpus of 
prestigious rationales for the practices of virtue and rigor that would 
have prevailed in American literary studies anyway. Notwithstanding 
the appearance (or the advertisement) of an almost total reversal of val-
ues since the timid hegemony of the “apolitical” New York intellectuals 
and the New Critics, today’s political, historical, and ethical criticisms 
rejoin the formalisms, aestheticisms, and moralisms of Hellman’s day 
in their profound “accommodation to the world,” to adopt a phrase of 
Adorno’s.44 Now as then, literary intellectuals, and not just Jewish ones, 
ground their authority in a repudiation of the irresponsible pleasure of 
the comic: of that comic “light-heartedness,” to use another Adornian 
term, still associated with Jewish entertainment at its most embarrass-
ingly impudent.45
The repudiation is not necessarily a matter of elitist disdain for Holly-
wood and mass culture in general. For while that disdain indeed con-
stituted something like an article of faith among Cold War literary intel-
lectuals, their postmodern heirs do tend to differ from them in treating 
nonelite culture at least with a certain tolerance, and often with outright 
affection and respect. But even the affection and respect typically stop 
short of that point at which cultural studies begins to assume the fea-
tures of its unreasonable, undignified object. That point, as we might 
try to imagine it, indeed as this book tries to illustrate it, is where critical 
engagement with the object ceases to be merely conceptual or interpre-
tative and takes on the character of stylistic mimesis: where the object’s 
unseriousness crosses over into the commentary on it. Since the mutual 
disavowal of Jewish Hollywood and the intellectuals, such mimesis has 
become virtually unthinkable: the very idea of it seems too “ridiculous” 
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to entertain. For a comparable “ridiculousness,” in fact, one would have 
to revert to the question Madeline Lee asked Jerome Robbins in the 
spring of 1944, about how dialectical materialism influenced him in his 
creation of the ballet Fancy Free. To be sure, the question is ridiculous in 
part because, aping a certain Stalinist ideological policing—“ironically” 
aped again by huac—it exemplifies all too well the left’s famous and 
often fatal humorlessness. But the question’s ridiculousness also has to 
do with its awkward mixing of registers, tones, and genres—indeed, of 
humorlessness with humor, of the heavy with the light. The Congres-
sional “laughter” that greets Robbins’s rehearsal of the question seconds 
him in his destructive rage not just against the comic, but against the pe-
culiar tendency of the comic, already demonstrated by Lionel Stander, to 
confuse the serious with the unserious. Just as the power of seriousness 
depends upon its ability to distinguish between itself and the comic—
to know, for example, when it is being mocked and when it is being 
revered—so must that power remain confident in its regulation of the 
boundary between the often dangerous gravity of Philosophy (“dialecti-
cal materialism”) and the mere gossamer lightness of Art, which a ballet 
with a title like Fancy Free seems destined to figure forth.
Not, of course, that ballet by itself seems much more likely than, say, 
Marxism to win the admiration of the House Un-American Activities 
Committee (although one committee member does thank Robbins for 
his testimony by plugging the Broadway musical he had recently choreo-
graphed: “I am going to see The King and I tonight, and I will appreciate 
it much more” [Bentley, ed., Thirty Years of Treason, 6]). What is most 
“ridiculous” about the confusion of dialectical materialism with Fancy 
Free, what most provokes the collective violence of Robbins and huac, 
is that the confusion reveals not how laughably incommensurable in-
tellectuality and levity are, but, on the contrary, how irritatingly similar 
they are: as similar as smart aleck and joker. Far from colliding with 
each other, they explain each other, and they do so all too well, as though 
calling undue attention to the un-Americanism, more precisely, to the 
comicosmopolitanism, that they share. “Outrageously” juxtaposed with 
each other in such a way that they seem to egg each other on, the baleful 
philosophical smart aleksei and the high-flying, light-hearted ballet “in-
sult the Committee” by repeating, in different registers, the same threat 
to its regime of national style. Dialectical materialism brings out the ele-
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ments of system and speculation in the work of art, even in a trifle like 
the ethereally titled Fancy Free; Fancy Free calls attention to the buoyant 
choreography of thought in any theoretical construct, even in the op-
pressively elephantine dogma that dialectical materialism seems to be. 
Put together by the “ridiculous” question, like improbable but some-
how magically congenial dancing partners, the heavy, earthbound phi-
losophy and the airy, evanescent ballet double and interpret each other 
as products of fancy indeed, where fancy implies imagination, caprice, 
ornament, and desire—all inimical to the petrifying rule and rules of 
American performance of which huac, by no means alone in this law 
enforcement, took particularly watchful custody.
Which is why, when the committee’s counsel imitates the Commu-
nist interrogation by asking Jerome Robbins to describe the ballet, “so 
that we may know what the Communist Party had in mind when you 
were asked that question,” the witness replies:
The purpose of it was to show how an American material and American 
spirit and American warmth and our dancing, our folk dancing, which is 
part of jitterbugging, part of jazz, could be used in an art form. The story 
concerns these three boys in New York for the first time, having a good 
time, trying to pick up some girls. It’s always been identified everywhere, 
[sic] it’s played as a particularly American piece, indigenous to America, 
and its theme has great heart and warmth, as far as representing our cul-
ture is concerned. (628)
This reply is obviously sycophantic in the familiar sense of the term. 
Bending over backward to demonstrate his patriotism—one can never 
say “America” or “American” often enough—Robbins strikes the well-
known pose of the servile underling desperate to placate his superiors by 
telling them what they want to hear: in this case, not just a fulsome pledge 
of allegiance, but a tribute, all the more gratifying coming from a homo-
sexual Jewish dancer and choreographer, to the red-blooded American 
male heterosexuality (“trying to pick up some girls”) that often simply 
is “America.”
In both popular wisdom and expert opinion, as we shall see, this will-
ingness to grovel before the master seems to give sycophancy not only 
a Jewish inflection (think of the eagerly assimilationist parvenu) but 
a distinctly homosexual coloring as well: a coloring evoked, in fact, by 
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expressions like “bending over backward,” not to mention more vulgar 
and more overtly homophobic ones such as “sucking up,” “kissing ass,” 
and so forth.46 Just as there were non-Jewish, heterosexual unfriendly 
witnesses, so, to be sure, were there non-Jewish, heterosexual friendly 
ones: this book’s most illustrious sycophant, Elia Kazan, is in fact neither 
a Jew nor a homosexual. But since I am discussing Jerome Robbins, and 
since he is not this chapter’s only Jewish and homosexual paradigm of 
sycophancy, let me make a claim here that I will develop later: that syco-
phancy in general is a mode of internalized anti-Semitism as it is a mode 
of internalized homophobia—that all sycophancy is a turning against a 
primary and universal “Jewishness,” from which an equally primary and 
universal “homosexuality” can never be stably differentiated. Far from 
being essentially Jewish or essentially homosexual, sycophancy is essen-
tially anti-Jewish and essentially anti-homosexual.47
In contemporary France, Alain Badiou has argued, the sycophant’s 
function is to restrict the signification of the word “Jew,” lest it assume, 
or recover, a revolutionary “vivacity” irreducible to “the tripod of the 
Shoah, the State of Israel and the Talmudic Tradition.”48 This book shows 
that, in Cold War America as well, the sycophant is the antithesis of the 
Jew: a semiotic cop, the sycophant works to strip the word “Jew,” as well 
as particular Jews in American culture, of the radicalness that would 
otherwise make Jews unlikely candidates for American (or any other) 
citizenship. If Jews and male homosexuals are nevertheless regarded 
as specialists in sycophancy, this is because they have been constructed 
as such, in order to conceal the sycophancy of all subjectivity—not least 
that of the Christian, heterosexual, American man, who can take shape 
only by subjecting himself to another Christian, heterosexual, American 
man, or to the idealized version of that figure. The Jewish homosexual 
sycophant worships the Christian heterosexual master—but so, as we 
shall see, does the Christian heterosexual sycophant. Only the comi-
cosmopolitan, as we shall also see, realizes the possibility that the Jew 
shares with the homosexual: the possibility of becoming a happy pervert. 
And this is why, in the period with which we are concerned, sycophants 
are often—but not exclusively—drawn from the sphere of Jewish and 
homosexual comicosmopolitanism.
In other words, if Robbins is to stand as an exemplary sycophant, we 
must note that he goes beyond the sycophancy of fawning, self-abasing 
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flattery: beyond the celebration of America’s straightness, in which the 
serious, the heterosexual, and normatively Christian coincide. His syco-
phancy, that is, works in two directions at once, both upward and down-
ward: to appease the “true wielders of power,” he must be seen “offer-
ing” them the names (and lives) of those jokers and smart alecks whose 
un-American fancies and fanciness henceforth condemn them to a 
comicosmopolitan underworld, with its suggestions of criminality and 
death.49 Denouncing those below to serve those above, the sycophant 
emerges as the quintessential middleman. And if he stands, or, rather, 
creeps, halfway between his masters and his victims, his attitude toward 
each is in turn split. That the sycophant resents those before whom he 
abases himself, and to whom he betrays others, is perhaps not news. 
Nor would it come as a surprise to learn that his love of the powerful, or 
of power itself, acquires, through its essential submissive identification, 
a considerable charge of “oedipal” hatred. Yet, his ambivalence toward 
the betrayed, if less well established in the repertoire of common sense, 
is in fact closer to the present book’s concerns. For the sycophant, I will 
be showing, depends even more crucially on the comicosmopolitanism 
that he puts beneath himself—as a ground to stand on—than on the 
patriotic seriousness to which, with the same gesture, he aspires. The 
informer resents those he informs on, of course, at least as much as 
he resents those he informs for: the informed-on, after all, remind him 
both of his own inferiority and of the price he was willing to pay to over-
come it. But if his desire for power in no way precludes resentment of 
power, his resentment of the “ridiculous” rationalizes an intense and 
envious attachment to them or to it. Better expressed, and estranged, 
as ressentiment, this ambivalent formation discloses itself, to cite Eve 
Kosofsky Sedgwick’s gloss on the Nietzschean term, not only as a rela-
tively abstract “resentment,” but also as “re-sniffing . . . or re-tonguing, 
re-palpating,” the French verb sentir meaning “to taste,” “to feel,” and “to 
smell.”50 Here is the transgressive satisfaction verging on the sexual of 
which Philip Roth’s narrator speaks: not a Jewish or a homosexual satis-
faction, but an all-American one; a compulsory satisfaction, dressed up 
not just as moral “purity” but as moral purification. Resenting the comic, 
the sycophant gets to re-sent it: to re-taste it, to re-feel it, to re-smell it; 
to sniff after it under the pretext of sniffing it out; to repeat it in an act 
of “poisoned imitation” that is no less an imitation for being poisoned. 
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If the sycophant flatters those above, his flattery, somewhat surprisingly, 
achieves its sincerest form in extending to those below.
So there is something attractive, something worth imitating, in comi-
cosmopolitanism, even if the attraction is fatal and the imitation poi-
soned. Understandably, the poison in resentment is enough to make 
one wary of its embrace—so wary that one might well be inclined to 
follow today’s academic criticism in keeping the comic at a distance, in 
circumscribing it as an acceptable topic of analysis but refusing it en-
try into analytic discourse itself. To be sure, many contemporary critics 
have made a point of renewing and espousing cosmopolitanism without 
the comic, whether in the name of dialectical materialism or in that of 
“cozy liberalism” (philosophies less incompatible with each other in the 
eyes of, say, huac or the Hollywood studios than they themselves would 
allow).51 And if the new, Hebraic cosmopolitanisms dispense with the 
comic, they also typically do without the Jews—who, before the Second 
World War, before the establishment of the state of Israel, and before 
the blacklist, its diasporic complement—figured as the cosmopolitan, as 
well as the comic, “race” par excellence. “Jews no longer represent the 
cosmopolitan citizen of the world,” Sharon Marcus has noted, “particu-
larly not in the United States, the country that now serves as the primary 
reference point for theorists of cosmopolitanism.”52 This trend requires 
little explanation. Why, after all, should an academic culture of high 
seriousness have trouble assimilating these earnest, forward-looking 
neo-cosmopolitanisms, when they already work so hard to affirm their 
ethical and political good intentions? As long as cosmopolitanism re-
frains from becoming comic—as long as smartness doesn’t act smart-
aleck—its bona fides goes unquestioned. And yet, keeping the comic 
out of the cosmopolitan may not be so easy, particularly when the comic 
inhabits the cosmopolitan from the outset. As Rebecca L. Walkowitz has 
recently proposed, an element of “unseriousness” inheres, at any rate, 
in what she calls “critical cosmopolitanism,” with its “ethos of uncer-
tainty, hesitation, and even wit that is sometimes at odds with political 
action and with the interventionist paradigms of critical theory.”53 Unlike 
“planetary humanism,” with its heroics of judgment and commitment, 
critical cosmopolitanism permits, indeed promotes, an “apparent abne-
gation of agency,” a “willingness to relinquish physical or psychological 
control.”54 At least as witty and as unserious as critical cosmopolitanism, 
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comicosmopolitanism resembles it in realizing the possibilities afforded 
by cosmopolitanism’s constitutive irresponsibility, in the literal sense of 
the term: its failure to snap into action at the command of the officials 
in place, a failure caused by its preference for being in many different 
places without being arrested by any one of them in particular.
The most uncooperative witnesses, I would argue, embody such a comi-
cosmopolitanism, the neologistic conflation underscoring the mutual 
inherence of the comic and the cosmopolitan, and signaling the self-
abnegating, self-relinquishing tendencies that they share. As I have also 
suggested, however, the uncooperative witnesses stand in for a larger, 
more diffuse race of jokers and smart alecks, whose range extends from 
the sphere of mass culture (where one would of course expect to find 
them) to the high end of the cultural elite: namely, the sphere of aca-
demic intellectuals. For all the zeal with which Hollywood and Jewish 
intellectualism rushed to disown each other at the start of the Cold War, 
the threat of their persistent, covert complicity hardly failed to cross the 
suspicious minds of those in charge. Indeed, huac by no means re-
stricted its investigations to Hollywood or even to the performing arts in 
general, although the worlds of show business of course offered it the 
advantage of maximum publicity: the committee’s reach comprised the 
academy, as well as (even) less exalted levels of education, bureaucracy, 
and civil service—as though a shameless resistance to the obligatory na-
tional seriousness could spread even into the best-disciplined sectors 
of cultural production and administration. Without ever having been 
a member of the Communist Party or having worked in show busi-
ness, one could—and still can—find oneself charged with an intolerable 
comicosmopolitanism.
The sycophant tries to please those above by abusing those below, but 
if his superiors are the true wielders of power, his inferiors do not ex-
actly correspond to “the powerless”—at least, not before they are black-
listed. For the comicosmopolitanism that makes them resistant to the 
intimidation of ridicule is not a mere loss or lack of power. Rather, it is 
a peculiar kind of power in its own right: the power to become power-
less. When, as often happens these days, cosmopolitanism thinks itself 
uncomic, when it takes itself seriously, the resulting accommodation to 
the world and its power can of course appear to define cosmopolitan-
ism rather than to deform it. A citizen of the world, as her name makes 
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clear, the cosmopolite, or a certain type of cosmopolite, might in fact 
be said to have worldly accommodation as her very raison d’être—even, 
or especially, when she respects the world enough to want to make it a 
better place. In view of the current academic prestige of this reasonable, 
dignified cosmopolite, this “realistic” cosmopolite, the present study at-
tempts to recover a “radical” cosmopolite: one whose radicalism involves 
less an overt political program—although such programs sometimes ac-
company comicosmopolitanism—than a return to cosmopolitanism’s 
comic roots. Comicosmopolitanism—the cosmopolitanism that doesn’t 
repress or (more moderately) control its comic implications—is a way of 
moving in and through the world, but without internalizing the world’s 
terrible rigor.
The ongoing war on comicosmopolitanism seeks to dissolve the links, 
both etymological and conceptual, between the citizen and the city. Comi-
cosmopolitanism dissolves citizenship—even worldly citizenship—
while expanding our sense of “the city,” while multiplying “cities.” Ac-
commodating cosmopolitanism can accommodate the hardness of all 
the various national dispensations that provincially take themselves to 
be the world, or that, like Cold War Americanism, no less provincially, 
but with the provinciality of empire, identify themselves with the world’s 
very survival. Cosmopolitanism can also be accommodating, however, 
when it accommodates hardness in the mode of resistance: as an ethico-
political imperative to oppose nationalism and imperialism, where the 
combat has the odd, specular effect of turning resistance into collabora-
tion. Next to the hardness engendered by compliance or resistance, the 
unembarrassed softness of comicosmopolitanism, its “homosexual” and 
“Jewish” effeminacy, its unabashed disintegration of the self, footloose 
and fancy-free, into the multiple worlds it encounters, could look almost 
obscenely delectable—in other words, like happiness itself, like the life 
everyone would want if he or she were permitted to imagine it. And this 
is precisely why it must instead be made to look repulsive, to seem far 
worse than “a kind of embarrassment”: as bad, in fact, as humiliation, 
the devastating fate from which all citizenship, including and especially 
citizenship of the world, is supposed to save us.
Explicitly citing Arendt on refugees, Giorgio Agamben has called atten-
tion to the way in which even enlightened, democratic political thinking 
(e.g., the 1789 Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen) reduces the 
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human to citizenship: “Rights . . . are attributed to the human being only 
to the degree to which he or she is the immediately vanishing presup-
position (and, in fact, the presupposition that must never come to light 
as such) of the citizen.”55 Against this fetish of citizenship, Agamben 
would center a new political philosophy on the figure of the refugee: 
“Only in a world in which the spaces of states have been . . . perforated 
and topologically deformed and in which the citizen has been able to rec-
ognize the refugee that he or she is—only in such a world is the political 
survival of humankind today thinkable.”56 But what if, instead of privi-
leging the tragic figure of the refugee, we were to discover in ourselves 
that other Arendtian figure, the refugee’s comic cousin, the pariah? 
Members of the unpatriotic, un-Christian cultural elite, academic critics 
and other intellectuals are ideally situated to recognize themselves (or 
at least to invent themselves) as this particular kind of “Jew.” The tragic 
role may be more appealing, for all the obvious psychic and ideological 
reasons; but the comic one suits us better, since intellectuality is already 
widely and, I would claim, accurately construed as a joke anyway: as a 
perverse and perverted deviation from the rules of thinking and feeling 
on which all serious, normal, responsible people automatically agree. To 
opt for tragedy over comedy, in fact, would not be so different from the 
maneuver by which an enviable image of happiness gets transformed 
into the sorriest abjection. Better, I think, to accept and to cultivate that 
“ridiculous” happiness, one that is otherwise all but unimaginable—bet-
ter to elicit the longing latent in the ridicule—than to participate in the 
vast political and cultural project of making happiness look like humilia-
tion, and humiliation look like strength.
For this latter project, which is still taking place all around us, the sy-
cophant is indispensable. Where his complicity and perfidy would make 
him an object of almost universal revulsion, he does his most effective 
cultural work, for, however despicable his actions may be, they model 
“dignity” itself by reclassifying another order of beings as truly despi-
cable.57 The sycophant serves as the fulcrum of the chiasmic operation 
whereby someone else’s ecstatic release from citizenship gets rewritten 
as wretchedness, while his own subordination to power seems to confer 
on him the admirably virile attributes of solidity, durability, and authority. 
Whether male or female, the sycophant always wants to be a man. Most 
of this book’s references to the sycophant will use the male pronoun, 
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which, given the often desperate wishfulness of the sycophant’s mascu-
linity, should probably be enclosed in quotation marks—a punctilio that 
I will be forgoing, so as to avoid both the bristling defensiveness and the 
sheer clutter that it can produce, but that the reader can take for granted. 
That masculinity, in any case, derives from a certain passivity is by now 
familiar to students of “subjection,” whose essential ambiguity is built 
into the term itself, with its simultaneous connotations of agency and in-
feriority. Judith Butler, for example, has written extensively on how the 
subject is formed in the act of turning against itself, on how “the subject 
is the effect of power in recoil.”58 In Butler’s account, the subject takes 
shape through and as an imitation of power’s mastery. Much less famil-
iar, however, than the subject’s, or, rather—since every subject is poten-
tially and implicitly a friendly witness—the sycophant’s self-constituting 
imitation of power is his equally self-constituting imitation of those with 
the power to give up power: to enjoy, or to en-Jew, the stateless state 
of desubjectification.59 The sycophant imitates the comicosmopolitan, of 
course, to the extent that eagerness to please always produces a sort of 
pseudocomedy. But the sycophant’s imitation (or flattery) of the comi-
cosmopolitan goes further: to keep the authorities informed of what the 
comicosmopolitan may be up to, one must follow her, staying on her 
scent by copying her actions. And what are those actions? A generalized 
comicosmopolitanism might well have as one of its consequences that 
“the spaces of states” are “perforated and topologically deformed”; as 
though to prefigure that political disorganization, the comicosmopolitan 
herself practices the art of falling apart. Abrogating the virile privileges 
to which the sycophant aspires, the comicosmopolitan, of whatever gen-
der, is as indicatively female as the sycophant is indicatively male. And 
if she becomes the envied object of a necessarily imitative re-sentment, 
this is because she gives herself over to the enviable experience of a 
primitive sentment or scentment, an ur-smelling, that is itself a kind of 
primary imitation:
Of all the senses the act of smelling, which is attracted without objecti-
fying, reveals most sensuously the urge to lose oneself in identification 
with the Other. This is why smell, as both the perception and the per-
ceived—which are one in the act of olfaction—is more expressive than 
other senses. When we see we remain who we are, when we smell we 
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are absorbed entirely. In civilization, therefore, smell is regarded as a dis-
grace, a sign of the lower social orders, lesser races, and baser animals.60
Thus do Horkheimer and Adorno interpret anti-Semitism as hatred 
of what they call “mimesis”: the “disgrace” of losing oneself in a cha-
meleonic imitation of the environment. Unlike colonial mimicry, mi-
mesis—a central concept in the chapters ahead—promotes not subver-
sion, but “deliquescence.” “It makes little difference,” Horkheimer and 
Adorno point out, “whether the Jews as individuals really display the 
mimetic traits which cause the malign infection or whether those traits 
are merely imputed.”61 Once the Jews as a group, like blacks as a group, 
are numbered among the “lesser races,” the races of olfaction—and 
Horkheimer and Adorno are writing both in and about the moment 
of “enlightened” culture when the Jews are being exterminated as that 
race par excellence—anti-Semitism is a form of anti-mimeticism: a vio-
lent aversion to the “malign infection” of mimetic behavior. But if, as 
Horkheimer and Adorno argue, “the ego has been forged by harden-
ing itself against such behavior,”62 the forging entails a double act of 
forgery: the ego counterfeits the iron force of the state, yet that act of 
upward imitation must continually be stimulated and sustained by one 
of downward imitation as well. That is, the ego hardens itself by remind-
ing itself obsessively and fearfully of the suicidal temptation of softness 
against which it has materialized: by recalling the ever-present danger of 
dissolution from which it has barely escaped, and with which it must in 
fact keep making petrifying contact. A sycophant through and through, 
the ego cannot identify itself with the master, therefore, without also 
mimicking the mimics.
In Horkheimer and Adorno’s account, this mimicry can sometimes 
seem like a rare, if carefully dissimulated, treat:
The civilized person is allowed to give way to such [mimetic] desires only 
if the prohibition is suspended by rationalization in the service of practical 
purposes, real or apparent. One is allowed to indulge the outlawed drive if 
acting with the unquestionable aim of expunging it.63
Yet the “civilizing” process does not simply “allow” one “to indulge the 
outlawed drive”: it compels one to do so. What makes the sycophant the 
model citizen is that he keeps scaring himself straight by returning over 
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and over to his criminal origins. Strictly speaking, as I have suggested, 
the informer, at least during the reign of huac, does not inform: the 
state already knows the names he pretends to be giving it. But in show 
business, and in the branch of show business known as politics, appear-
ance is of course everything. Even when the informer really does offer 
the authorities information they do not already possess, what matters 
more than the information itself is the show of gathering and transmit-
ting it. The cooperative witness stars in what Victor S. Navasky calls a 
“degradation ceremony,”64 whose captivating power consists of its am-
biguity, in which the degradation, ostensibly and ostentatiously aimed 
at those named as criminals, already attends the informer himself—not 
only because of the baseness of informing, but also because he con-
stantly risks re-immersion in the underworld that he can never stop in-
vestigating and that, in the best film-noir fashion, he can never leave 
behind as the scene of his own confessed crimes. If the informer tells 
the state what it already knows, the ceremony centered on him owes no 
small degree of its spectacularity to his dangerous reconstruction and 
re-enactment of the “outrages” practiced by the underworld’s denizens 
(as when, to cite a relatively mild example, they ask him how dialecti-
cal materialism helped him to do Fancy Free). Imitating outlawed en- 
Jewment, but in order to police it, the sycophant mobilizes against it the 
counterseduction of the law itself, that hard master whose hardening 
effects on him must thus appear identical not just with citizenship but 
with “civilization” as such, lest he, or anyone else, continue to prefer the 
far greater “sensuous” delights of mimetic self-loss.
Imagine, for instance, Lionel Stander’s pleasure in losing himself in 
his comic mimesis of congressional high seriousness, even outrage (“I 
am deeply shocked, Mr. Chairman”). Perhaps imagining that mimetic 
pleasure all too well, one of the congressmen interrogating Stander warns 
him: “Unless you [answer the questions], your performance is not going 
to be regarded as funny.”65 Indeed, the point of the whole chiasmic opera-
tion of sycophancy is to make sure that comic mimesis is not regarded 
as funny: to relocate it under the horrifying sign of the uncivilized, the 
inhuman, the abject; to replace en-Jewment with the mere Jew, as anti-
Semitism construes that figure. What is anti-Semitism at its genocidal 
extreme if not an attempt to punish the insult of en-Jewment by turning 
desubjectification-as-comedy into desubjectification-as-horror? Arendt 
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famously characterized the Dreyfus affair as a dress rehearsal for the 
Holocaust; the blacklist was its sanitized, Disneyfied revival—no less 
effective an instrument of terror for being sanitized and Disneyfied.66 
In this revival, the sycophant-star enacts for the nation as a whole an ob-
ject lesson in how to rise above what might have seemed paradise itself 
until he cooperated with the lawmakers in transforming it into a foul-
smelling swamp inhabited by “the lower social orders, lesser races, and 
baser animals.” And if this swamp turns out to be the ground on which 
the sycophant stands, we should not be surprised by the precariousness 
of his footing. By informing, the informer separates himself from the 
underworld in which he would otherwise find himself mired—by in-
forming, the informer continues working in Hollywood—but that sepa-
ration can never be complete: even after he has named names, he must 
be prepared to keep sniffing after the swamp-dwellers among whom he 
once lived, and back into whose fetid ranks he thus always risks fall-
ing. For the work that he continues to do—the films and the television 
shows that he continues to make—reveals what is inherent in all mass 
entertainment: that to entertain is not just to please those in power, to 
bow before their law, but to please them by denouncing and betraying 
the outlaw—the outlaw one once was and always risks becoming again. 
Every citizen, as I have suggested, must be ready to turn state’s witness, 
to perform by informing—which is to say that, unless she melts into 
comicosmopolitanism, every citizen must be ready to perform a patriot 
act in a show, or a show trial, for the instruction of other citizens. When 
the citizen in fact works in the world designated as show business, and 
when he does so because he has in fact named names for huac, the syco-
phantic imperative, the compulsion to inform under which every citizen 
labors, simply becomes more visible. The entertaining ego—that is, the 
ego—hardens itself for the law and against the outlaw. Yet the process of 
hardening never quite ends, and never quite succeeds: every sycophantic 
performance takes place on the edge of softness, requiring as it does 
yet another journey into the underworld of en-Jewment, where the per-
former who forgets what (and whom) he’s there for can easily lose him-
self in comicosmopolitan mimesis, the outlawed drive that he indulges, 
at least ostensibly, “with the unquestionable aim of expunging it.”
Should that aim become questionable, should the “civilized” treachery 
of the ego succumb to the treacherous instability of the ground beneath 
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its feet, the performer-informer, during the blacklist period, opens him-
self to the charge of being “soft on Communism,” where “on” evokes 
the shakiness of a dependency masquerading as a superiority: a depen-
dency, like that of an addict, in which to be “on” something is to be 
“under” it, or under its influence. Keeping in with the power-wielding 
politicians, American mass culture of the Cold War indeed sycophanti-
cally portrayed Communism as just such a softening, narcotizing influ-
ence.67 But the more seductive and more dangerous softness, against 
which the sycophant hardens himself and, by his example, his fellow 
citizens, comes from something prior to Communism, and for which 
Communism, alleged to operate behind various legitimating “fronts,” 
itself provides an oddly reassuring front: it comes from mimetic behav-
ior, which, ontologically and historically preceding any ideological for-
mation whatsoever, has the capacity to break ideologies down as well. 
The mimetic “urge to lose oneself in identification with the Other,” es-
pecially when generalized as the cosmopolitan urge to lose oneself in 
identification with many Others, poses a greater threat to the hardened 
ego, and the hardened nation, than any ideology, however pernicious, 
since ideology, to become ideology, has already paid civilization the com-
pliment of hardening itself.
Against and before all the ideologies, mimesis might be described as 
an archaic cosmopolitanism, as a kind of cosmopolitanism sauvage. In its 
fluidity, in its fluency, in the way it “makes itself resemble its surround-
ings” instead of “mak[ing] its surroundings resemble itself,”68 mimesis 
implies a relaxed attitude toward ideology, even an indifference to it—in 
short, a comic inability to freeze up around it. (Quite un-Bergsonian, 
this version of the comic is soft, not hard.) And, despite the Jewish as-
sociations that it shares with other cosmopolitanisms, mimesis no more 
offers refuge in ethnic identity politics than it promotes the comfort of 
ideological warfare. To be sure, “the act of smelling,” which best ex-
emplifies the pre-ideological atavism of the mimetic urge, appears to 
make mimesis a Jewish thing, at least in that Enlightened, Western 
world where, among the “lesser races” assigned to bear the disgrace of 
olfaction, the Jews seem chosen people indeed. In that world, the most 
“symptomatically” Jewish feature is of course the nose. Moreover, in an 
instance of the very olfactory identification between “the perception and 
the perceived” to which Horkheimer and Adorno refer, the nosy Jews 
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have stereotypically been represented as smelling in both subjective and 
objective senses of the term.69 Yet the Jew’s mimetic aptitude—a bless-
ing that must be disguised—remains at odds with any attempt to claim 
mimesis as an essentially or uniquely Jewish practice, as one that “de-
fines” the Jew, or the Jewish “community.” Like “comicosmopolitanism” 
and “en-Jewment,” its conceptual partners, “mimesis” is a kind of em-
barrassment indeed, because, while it undoes the individual ego, on 
which the very possibility of embarrassment rests, it similarly corrodes 
the group ego, the site of an always vulnerable ethnic pride, and thus 
one of the most important foundations of social control in a “multi-
cultural” society.
“Jewishness,” then, functions in this book as a signifier for the plea-
sure of the pariah amid the deadly seriousness of nations and races: 
the comic pleasure of relinquishing or refusing the dubious privilege 
of national and racial dignity and belonging, by “losing oneself in iden-
tification with the Other.” For Arendt, this comic pleasure is embodied 
by figures like Heine, Kafka, and “even [the Judaized or ambiguously 
non-Jewish] Charlie Chaplin”; for Horkheimer and Adorno, it can be 
seen again in Chaplin, as well as in the Marx brothers, in Karl Kraus, 
and in the Austrian and German dialect comedians.70 What comes into 
being as “Jewish” mass entertainment in twentieth-century America is 
thus the precipitate of a more diffuse set of energies circulating through 
and from nineteenth-century Europe. When, at least twenty years be-
fore the advent of the Hollywood blacklist, those energies coalesce as the 
American film industry, the time of the sycophant has already begun, 
for the industrialization of comic pleasure—its “rationalization in the 
service of ” ego-formation and social discipline—fundamentally betrays 
it along with its practitioners. But even in the nineteenth century, the 
precursor of the Hollywood movie, namely the Victorian novel, proves 
capable of featuring a Jewish informer drawn from the ranks of the co-
medians in whom that early form of mass entertainment encounters its 
own uncanny underworld. Consider the following passage from Oliver 
Twist (187–9):
Mr. Fagin laid great stress on the fact of his having taken Oliver in, and 
cherished him, when, without his timely aid, he might have perished 
with hunger; and he related the dismal and affecting history of a young 
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lad whom, in his philanthropy, he had succoured under parallel circum-
stances, but who, proving unworthy of his confidence and evincing a de-
sire to communicate with the police, had unfortunately come to be hanged 
in the Old Bailey one morning. Mr. Fagin did not seek to conceal his share 
in the catastrophe, but lamented with tears in his eyes that the wrong-
headed and treacherous behaviour of the young person in question, had 
rendered it necessary that he should become the victim of certain evidence 
for the crown: which, if it were not precisely true, was indispensably nec-
essary for the safety of him (Mr. Fagin) and a few select friends. Mr. Fagin 
concluded by drawing a rather disagreeable picture of the discomforts of 
hanging; and, with great friendliness and politeness of manner, expressed 
his anxious hopes that he might never be obliged to submit Oliver Twist 
to that unpleasant operation.71
“Mr. Fagin,” whom Dickens elsewhere simply calls “the Jew,” is of 
course the head of a gang of thieves, into which he is now endeavor-
ing to reinsert Oliver. To be a criminal, however, is not necessarily to 
be an outlaw of the kind with which The Un-Americans is concerned. 
Fagin’s flamboyant criminality, at any rate, by no means prevents him 
from enjoying friendly relations with the law, starting with the law of 
capitalist exchange, by which his activities as a fence and a pimp per-
versely abide. Then, of course, there is his routine production—or, if 
need be, fabrication—of “certain evidence for the crown.” To forestall 
the “treacherous behaviour” of his protégés, he beats them at their 
own game, “communicat[ing] with the police” before they do, even if 
the information he provides is “not precisely true.” But we have not yet 
reached the limit of Fagin’s cooperativeness. The treacherous specular-
ity obtaining between him and the ungrateful “young lad,” for example, 
derives from the more systematic treachery that informs his inform-
ing: the treachery that consists in poisoning imitation itself. Not just a 
shrewd businessman but also an adroit clown and mimic (Fagin knows 
how to put on a show that leaves Oliver “laugh[ing] till the tears ran 
down his face”72), Dickens’s “Jew” places his mimetic virtuosity in the 
service of what Horkheimer and Adorno call a “mimesis of mimesis.”73 
D. A. Miller’s The Novel and the Police has demonstrated how thoroughly 
the novel as a genre is implicated in police work; a character like Fagin 
has the virtue of specifying what that work necessarily betrays, in the 
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flattering mode of imitation.74 Implicit in the “organized laughter” of 
the anti-Semitic mass “celebration,” the mimesis of mimesis permits 
the crowd at once “to indulge” and to attack “the outlawed drive” of the 
Jewish pariah: to indulge it in the mode of attack; to mock it, with all 
the contemptuous simulation signaled by that word. Imagine how ef-
fective this spectacle can be with a mock-comic Jew, a Jew who mocks 
the comic, as its pivot. Like Jerome Robbins in front of huac, Fagin 
obligingly communicates with the police in his deadly tour de force, his 
pseudocomic turn, his turning against the comic. Even when he is not 
actually naming names—even when he is just “relating” and acting out 
a story of naming names—Dickens’s “Jew” is putting the comic to work 
for the criminal justice system. In telling his frightening story, Fagin 
wants to keep Oliver away from the police, of course. To do so, however, 
he must threaten to hand him over to them, thereby cooperating with 
them himself, as he has done in the past—and as, more fundamentally, 
he is doing even now, by using his formidable narrative and histrionic 
powers to scare his spectator halfway to that death which he so impres-
sively foreshadows for him: “Little Oliver’s blood ran cold, as he listened 
to the Jew’s words, and imperfectly comprehended the dark threats con-
veyed in them.”75
How different is “the Jew” ’s undertaking here from that of the kindly 
Mr. Brownlow (who ultimately adopts Oliver) when, at the end of the 
novel, he takes him to visit Fagin in his prison cell just before that old 
villain undergoes “the discomforts of hanging” himself ?
“Is the young gentleman to come too, sir?,” said the man whose duty it 
was to conduct them. “It’s not a sight for children, sir.”
“It is not indeed, my friend,” rejoined Mr. Brownlow; “but my business 
with this man is intimately connected with him; and as the child has seen 
him in the full career of his success and villainy, I think it as well—even at 
the cost of some pain and fear—that he should see him now.”76
How different, for that matter, is Fagin’s blood-chilling tale from the 
pedagogical project of the novelist himself, who interpellates his reader 
on the model of the abused child, for whom still more “pain and fear” 
are the “cost” of that civilized subjectivity that this novel, like all Victo-
rian novels, works to forge in its audience? Both Oliver’s protectors and 
his exploiters—both law-abiding citizens and criminals, both the good 
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and the evil—agree in wanting to make a “man” of him. That the villain-
ous “Jew” conspicuously shares his author’s gift for performance and 
storytelling points to Dickens’s own implication in entertainment as a 
civilizing, that is, terrifying, betrayal of the comic. “I shall tear myself 
to pieces,” he announced just before taking the stage, for what would 
indeed be the last time—the performance contributing to his death—to 
give one of his famous public readings as Fagin: in effect, to imperson-
ate his impersonator.77 If this authorial self-dismemberment suggests 
the mimetic “urge to lose oneself in identification with the Other,” the 
suggestion is a grisly one: like the novel’s series of hanged bodies, of 
which Fagin draws such a “disagreeable picture,” and in which his own 
body is the last, the author’s deadly serious pursuit of death-by-imitation 
testifies to the element of ghastly travesty in the mimesis of mimesis, 
whereby a certain violence, mocking mimetic desubjectification, gets 
misrecognized as the dignity of the “living” ego, while the comic plea-
sure—the “Jewissance,” to borrow Daniel Boyarin’s happy neologism—
against which it mockingly hardens itself assumes an aspect of corpse-
like stiffness.78 Thanks to the sycophant’s mockery of it, in other words, 
that comic pleasure is made to seem a fate far worse than the petrifaction 
that passes for viability in the civil society synonymous with civilization. 
As the sycophant turns, so does the whole chiasmus whereby mortifica-
tion comes to resemble life itself, and the voluptuous escape from mor-
tification comes to look like death. Who, after this star turn, would want 
the ecstasy of desubjectification, when it involves, precisely, a mortifying 
loss of that social intelligibility known as the self—when, instead, she 
can be toughened into social membership, with all its privileges?
“The cost of some pain and fear” appears negligible when it buys one 
the priceless rewards of psychic and political identity: rewards for which 
one is never more grateful than when they are conveyed by and as enter-
tainment itself. When Fagin, that consummate entertainer, scares Oliver 
stiff, he takes care to do so “with great friendliness and politeness of 
manner.” In addition to befriending the police and the power for which 
they stand, the friendly witness directs his friendliness at his fellow citi-
zens, those spectators and readers whom he instructs, and constructs, by 
the example of his own cooperation. Dickens of course ironizes Fagin’s 
“friendliness,” implicitly proposing himself, in contrast with “the Jew,” 
as a true friend, both of Oliver and of the Oliver-identified reader. Yet, 
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as if in defiance of the ironic frame, Fagin keeps figuring as an appall-
ing portrait of the artist. Like “the dismal and affecting history” that he 
relates to Oliver, the dismal and affecting history that is the novel itself 
is perhaps most dismal in presenting the terror with which it affects us 
as a testimony of friendship: of friendship that binds us in “that phe-
nomenon of participation outside of which we are generally reluctant,” 
in the words of Roland Barthes, “to consider any entertainment pos-
sible.”79 To be entertained is to be bound in a veritable community of sy-
cophants, where the constant possibility that the friend will turn friendly 
witness—as in Fagin’s little band of thieves, in which Fagin is not alone 
in his “desire to communicate with the police”—must be mitigated by 
the comfort that community, and indeed communication, themselves 
afford. Identity, after all, presupposes identification—not just identifica-
tion with others, but also identification by others: by those “friends” with 
whom we commune in the power that unites us, not least in our mutual 
suspicion. In the age of sycophancy, entertainment communicates with 
the police in its very essence. And if one effect of this communication is 
to produce petrified (hardened and frightened) subjects—subjects who 
have every reason to suspect and fear one another—another effect is to 
put all of those subjects in communication with the police: if they can-
not help being entertained to death, they are each thereby animated, 
rendered life-like, assuming, along with some of the authority of the law 
that takes charge of them, a semblance of its “vitality.” Epitomized by 
the performer-informer, mass communication turns its whole audience, 
potentially stretching from coast to coast, into a band of insiders.
The cold comfort of belonging to this immense and awesome net-
work of “friends,” this monstrous collective body of the entertained, is 
another sycophantic travesty of mimetic identification with the Other, 
where, far from being preserved in a state of frozen panic and paranoia, 
one melts into the delicious statelessness of being, as Horkheimer and 
Adorno put it, “absorbed entirely.” Mass entertainment is itself a mi-
mesis of mimesis: mocking mimetic pleasure, it produces at the same 
time an anticomic parody of mimetic intimacy. That intimacy needs to 
be parodied because, otherwise, it would be intolerably seductive: more 
than just a sympathetic relation between stable and coherent subjects, it 
marks their blissful disintegration. The tears in Fagin’s eyes as he sutures 
Oliver back into his gang betoken not only a treacherously crocodile-like 
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imitation of sympathy, but also a cynical sham of the dissolving subject. 
I have glossed mimesis as a form of chameleonism, but the sycophant is 
also a chameleon, a prodigy of upward and downward imitation—except 
that, where the mimetic chameleon delightedly ceases to be himself, 
the adaptations of the sycophant-chameleon serve the anxious cause of 
self-protection. As a sycophant, Dickens’s entertaining Jew is not above 
doing a creepy imitation of the happier lizard he might have been:
The mud lay thick upon the stones, and a black mist hung over the streets; 
the rain fell sluggishly down, and everything felt cold and clammy to the 
touch. It seemed just the night when it befitted such a being as the Jew 
to be abroad. As he glided stealthily along, creeping beneath the shelter 
of the walls and doorways, the hideous old man seemed like some loath-
some reptile, engendered in the slime and darkness through which he 
moved: crawling forth, by night, in search of some rich offal for a meal.80
Everything in this passage promotes an aversion therapy designed to 
make a mouthwatering en-Jewment seem disgusting: to turn a luxu-
rious meal (o liver!) into shit. Always ready to communicate with the 
police, Fagin helps Dickens help us appreciate the miserable mock- 
intimacy of the regime of entertainment under which the novel is bring-
ing us together: we are all the more grateful for the mock-intimacy after 
we have had a whiff of the real thing. “When we smell we are absorbed 
entirely. In civilization, therefore, smell is regarded as a disgrace, a sign 
of the lower social orders, lesser races, and baser animals.” A lonely 
crowd, we, the entertained, can at least be glad that we do not smell like 
the Jew, even if reading about him means constantly sniffing after him.
Its members linked to one another in fearful isolation, the mass audi-
ence of what Horkheimer and Adorno dub the culture industry emerges 
as another version of that “community of kindred spirits” that they see 
in the mass audience of anti-Semitism. With its “organized laughter,” 
with its “rage” against what it desires, with its love of assassination pass-
ing for good clean fun, the anti-Semitic audience indeed explicates the 
audience for entertainment of a more general kind. And there is nothing 
particularly forced or far-fetched about the explication when, as in the 
case of the Dickens novel, a slimy Jew serves as both agent and object 
of poisoned imitation. The crowd’s organized laughter, as well as its 
organized tears, are themselves instances of poisoned imitation. In an 
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act of collective sycophancy, the mass audience, with or without a Jew-
ish informer to set an example, turns on its own “Jewishness”: on the 
primitive mimetic impulses that both individuals and the human spe-
cies must overcome if they are to survive in the modern environment, 
and whose return or persistence, instead of occasioning joy, must be felt 
as an unforgivable, unbearable regression. “In the bourgeois mode of 
production,” Horkheimer and Adorno write, “the ineradicable mimetic 
heritage present in all praxis is consigned to oblivion. The pitiless ban on 
regression appears like an edict of fate; the denial is so total that it is no 
longer registered consciously.”81 Once the Jews, who are closely linked 
with the cosmopolitanism of enlightenment, modernity, and progress, 
are also symbolically tied to the protocosmopolitanism of the mimetic 
heritage that must not be inherited, “the bourgeois mode of production” 
becomes almost inevitably “anti-Semitic.”
Mimesis is indeed “consigned to oblivion,” but this forgetting is not 
the same thing as an absolute loss or repudiation: it not only permits but 
demands contact with what is “denied” and yet remains “ineradicable.” 
To the extent that the mass audience engages in poisoned imitation of 
mimesis, its act of turning on “Jewishness” is not simply a turning away 
from it; this “self-hating” turn is also a return, a turning back, but with 
the difference that this second encounter with “Jewishness” can take 
place only as an exercise in its destruction. All the better if a Jew can be 
recruited to enact, on a novelistic stage or in the House of Representa-
tives, the “self-hating” turn that every good citizen must perform: that 
turn without which there is no citizenship at all. Whether fictional or 
real, this exemplary Jew, of course, covers the guilt that the “commu-
nity” might otherwise have to acknowledge. Like the gay homophobe, 
the Jewish informer—even better, the Jewish and gay informer82—clears 
everyone else of a hatred that, however colorfully it manifests itself as in-
dividual psychopathology, is endemic and pervasive. Where sycophancy 
is the normal condition of citizenship, where subjectivity, subjection, 
and resentment are one and the same—that is, everywhere in the West 
since the rise of the culture industry in the nineteenth century—Jewish 
cooperative witnesses are never more cooperative than in distracting at-
tention from cooperativeness as a requirement that no one who wishes 
to be taken seriously can escape. From the perspective of sycoanalysis, 
however, the Jewish sycophant reveals instead of covering up: he or she 
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literalizes a condition of subjectivity to which everyone is subject, but 
that usually passes unnoticed, so natural does it seem. When “the piti-
less ban on regression . . . is so total that it is no longer registered con-
sciously,” when the repression of mimesis has itself been repressed, the 
Jewish sycophant, and the Jewish comic pariah on whom he or she re-
sentfully informs, allow the sycoanalyst to bring back from oblivion both 
the “Jewishness” and the “anti-Semitism” on which civilization rests.
Sycoanalysis, therefore, will find itself especially drawn to a novel 
like Oliver Twist, with its comic Jew eagerly lending his talents to the 
deadly serious business of entertainment. As instructive as it is, though, 
to reflect on the central role of the Jew in this product of the nascent 
culture industry—and we might have considered other Victorian novels 
as well83—The Un-Americans focuses on a more recent moment in the 
history of mass communication as communication with the police: a 
moment that has lately come to feel all too close to many inhabitants, 
and to many observers, of the American scene. This book emphasizes 
the particular sycophancy of blacklisting not with a view toward produc-
ing another history of the blacklist—however historically informed, this 
is not a work of historiography—but with a more theoretical aim: it takes 
the period of the blacklist less as an object of historical reconstruction—
although I hope that the student of the period will find these readings 
useful—than as a highly favorable matrix of sycoanalytic theory, as a 
densely symptomatic expression of broader cultural forces, at work even 
in less obviously and less obligingly hysterical times and places, should 
there be any.84
“Oh the moral horror of this parade of stoolpigeons,” wrote one of 
the Hollywood Ten, the screenwriter Albert Maltz, to another, the di-
rector Herbert Biberman, as the second round of huac hearings was 
producing a new legion of show-business informers; “what a sickness 
it spreads over the land.”85 Maltz’s eloquent dismay is eminently under-
standable. Unlike the second, larger group of unfriendly witnesses, who 
invoked their Fifth Amendment rights and thus were “merely” black-
listed, the Hollywood Ten, who mistakenly counted on the protection of 
the First Amendment, were blacklisted and imprisoned for their refusal 
to cooperate with huac. To see their suffering turning out to have been 
act one in the collapse of the Hollywood left, and indeed of the American 
left in general, can only have been deeply embittering. In no way mini-
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mizing the “moral horror,” this book hypothesizes that the “sickness” 
of which Maltz writes had spread throughout the body politic well be-
fore the blacklist began, even before there was a Hollywood; that it is as 
old as the culture industry and the bourgeois mode of production; that, 
characteristically taking itself not as a sickness at all but, to the contrary, 
as the cure for whatever “malign infection” is threatening the nation, it 
continues to rage to this day; and that its ultimate horror lies in its fright-
eningly convincing imitation of health itself.
As a manifestation of that sickness, the postwar American “parade of 
stoolpigeons” is indeed horrifying, not least in the stoolpigeons’ desire 
to communicate with the police by projecting the horror of their conspi-
ratorial complicity onto the comic comrades they are assassinating. For 
sycoanalysis, however, the parade has the value of, precisely, the spec-
tacular. Showing what ordinarily stays hidden, it discovers horror not in 
the aberrant and the alien—in what descends on the land like some un-
thinkable disaster—but, rather, in the normal and the familiar—in what 
grows out of the land like its inner truth. “Yes. Government by stool-
pigeon. Everybody investigating everybody else”: with these words, the 
Hollywood Ten, on their way to jail, raised the specter of a whole nation 
gone sycophantic. Only the strange interlude of the Second World War, 
necessitating a tactical, partial, and highly reluctant suspension of hos-
tilities against the left and its cosmopolitan sympathizers (including the 
“Jewish” President Roosevelt himself ), prevented this specter from being 
recognized as the boy next door.86 Ominously evoked by the Hollywood 
Ten as an unprecedented national crisis, “government by stoolpigeon” 
was in fact a return to business as usual. What was unprecedented, or at 
least unusual, was the way in which the war against fascism temporarily 
relaxed or even scrambled the rules of good citizenship—not quite to 
the point of en-Jewing or comicosmopolitanizing America, but enough 
to make a certain progressive internationalism seem almost patriotic.87 
Reacting against this turn of events, the blacklist was aberrant only in 
making a parade out of the normal conditions of civic responsibility.
A parade of stoolpigeons, indeed: if Maltz, like the other Ten, was 
taken unawares by the spectacle of sycophancy, he nevertheless subtly 
identified the particular subgenre to which it belongs. A parade, after 
all, is a patriotic spectacle, one that, with quasi-military ostentation, and 
with the brutal insistence of all state-sponsored festivity, puts on display 
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the machinery of national “pride.” To be sure, there are other episodes 
of collective sycophancy that are even more horrifying than the blacklist 
period in America. Vichy France, for instance, suggests itself as an alter-
native model, offering a pertinent lesson in the paradoxes, discerned by 
the period’s most trenchant historians, of nationalist hegemony deriving 
from national humiliation, and of patriotism from treason.88 Though 
perhaps the classic paradigm of modern collaboration, Vichy, of course, 
is not an example of Jewish informing. Nor, for that matter, is the black-
list: if a significantly large number of the friendly witnesses, and of their 
victims, were Jews, and if the blacklist period, as I have speculated, con-
stitutes a case of civilization turning on its own “Jewishness,” it is impor-
tant to point out again that there is nothing inherently or uniquely Jew-
ish about either friendly or unfriendly witnessing. Chapter  considers a 
film by two of the four non-Jews among the first group of unfriendly wit-
nesses, although it argues that these non-Jews were persecuted for not 
seeming non-Jewish enough; chapter 4 features the most renowned and 
the most powerful of all the friendly witnesses, who was also a non-Jew, 
albeit a non-Jew who, to his dismay, was mistaken for a Jew. As for spe-
cifically Jewish informing and collaboration, should one wish to adduce 
it, there are the usual notorious and controversial suspects: the recently 
“rehabilitated” figure of Judas, or the Judenräte, the Jewish Councils 
that cooperated with the Nazis. Yet in none of these cases, and nowhere 
in the canon of nineteenth-century fiction, is the element of organized 
spectacle as clear or as strong as it is in huac’s parade of stoolpigeons, 
where the political show translates with diabolical fidelity what is already 
going on behind the scenes of that very business of show from which the 
witnesses were enlisted. For the purposes of the discipline elaborated in 
the pages ahead, the parade of stoolpigeons, in short, is a kind of embar-
rassment: an embarrassment of riches.
To call sycoanalysis a discipline, of course, is to admit its own commu-
nication with the police. The reader may already have remarked its debt 
to psychoanalysis, in the use, for example, of terms like “ego,” “identifi-
cation,” “symptomatic” “repression,” and so forth. Like psychoanalysis, 
sycoanalysis could even be characterized, in the manner of Karl Kraus’s 
bon mot, as the very disease that it purports to cure. (It is no doubt symp-
tomatic that the word “sycoanalysis,” looking like “psychoanalysis,” 
sounds like “sickoanalysis.”) The language of disease and cure, like the 
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language of concealment and revelation, indeed bespeaks the partici-
pation of both analyses, psycho- and syco-, in the civilizing project of 
forming the suspicious ego. Tracking, exposing, denouncing: these are 
the work of the sycophant, proud to serve his masters by sniffing out 
subversives, for whom, because like whom, he has a preternaturally, 
prehistorically acute nose. On the trail of the sycophant, the sycoana-
lyst does to him what he does to the comedian. But if sycoanalysis thus 
takes its place in a transferential chain—if it is necessarily derivative, 
belated, vicarious, and tied to the sadistic power of the law (even though 
that law may not always coincide with the law of the state)—sycoanalysis 
differs from sycophancy in one important point: where sycophancy is a 
rationalized imitation of mimetic pleasure—an imitation that sycoanaly-
sis must imitate in turn, in order to “catch” sycophancy—sycoanalysis 
also permits itself an unrationalized indulgence of the mimetic drive. 
Sycophancy is condemned to remain a pseudocomic practice, and an anti-
comic one; no stranger itself to the pleasure of detecting and expunging, 
the sycoanalytic bloodhound, however, pursues the almost opposite ol-
factory pleasure as well: the pleasure of sniffing to the point of its own 
disintegration.89 As an analysis, it can hardly escape either the imperative 
to break its objects down, or the thrill of “empowerment” that accompa-
nies the execution of this task. But the task does not constitute the limit 
of sycoanalysis (as it constitutes the limit of Victor S. Navasky’s in many 
ways admirable book, Naming Names, the canonical study of informers 
during the Cold War, which the author frankly presents as “less a history 
than a moral detective story”90). Not content to stop at breaking its object 
down, sycoanalysis aspires to break itself down as well. A comic practice, 
a performing comicosmopolitanism, sycoanalysis indulges a fantasy of 
working through and beyond sycophancy, through and beyond the mi-
mesis of mimesis, to become the mimetic en-Jewment that both it and 
sycophancy are studying—sycophancy in the name of patriotic surveil-
lance, sycoanalysis with open and even “ridiculous” admiration.
Obviously informed by psychoanalysis, sycoanalysis at the same time 
takes a certain inspiration, as some readers may have guessed, from the 
antipsychoanalytic activity that Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari called 
“schizoanalysis.”91 In its deterritorializing aims, particularly as demon-
strated by the “minor literature” of Kafka, or by the “black humor” of 
another exemplary comic pariah, Proust, schizoanalysis is an important 
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precursor of sycoanalysis. The influence is not merely thematic: syco-
analysis resembles schizoanalysis in wanting to go beyond “interpreta-
tive examination” or analytic decoding to become a comic event in its 
own right, one that releases and mobilizes flows and energies that are 
systematically blocked in the ego- and nation- and civilization-building 
operations of making serious.92 The unblocking agent in schizoanalysis 
is of course the schizo, with its lines of escape “well below conditions of 
identity.”93 The syco cannot play an analogous role in the less euphoric 
science of sycoanalysis, for the syco is in some sense blockage itself. Nor 
is there any way around this blockage: sycoanalysis cannot go directly 
to the mimesis it wishes to become. Instead, it must work through the 
sycophant to get to mimesis, because the latter is mediated by the for-
mer—by the informer. What we know about mimesis—especially once 
its representatives are blacklisted into oblivion—is in large part what the 
sycophant has told us. He betrays in the full ambiguity of the word: in 
delivering his friends to the police, he makes them known. That is, the 
blockages formed by the sycophant are not insurmountable. Not only 
does he yield as much he congeals: he yields by congealing. His solidity, 
one might say, has a curiously gelatinous character. Insofar as the pro-
cess of sycophantic hardening is never complete, insofar as the risk of 
softness is one of sycophancy’s occupational hazards, sycoanalysis will 
in fact favor those moments of intense envy and resentment in which 
the sycophant almost loses his self-discipline: when the organized, or-
ganizing comedicidal rage that makes him hard almost results in an ec-
static meltdown.
The cruel pleasure of the sycoanalyst’s examination of these moments 
is not easy to distinguish from the pleasure that the sycophant himself 
takes in his assassinations. But if we are familiar by now with this struc-
ture of interpretative implication, sycoanalysis has another, less predict-
able “embarrassment” in store. For the sycoanalyst does what the syco-
phant cannot. He allows his “own” discipline to go soft, to become an 
undiscipline: an “undisciplined mimicry” of the sycophant, and thus, 
on the far side of sycophancy, the mimesis mimicked so warily by the 
sycophant.94 The sycoanalyst is never more like the sycophant than in 
subjecting him to the same hermeneutic of re-sentment to which the 
sycophant subjects the comedian. Yet perhaps the sycoanalyst is also 
never more unlike the sycophant in this moment: what the sycoanalyst 
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wants, anyway, is for her re-sentment, by virtue of its very lack of disci-
plinary restraint, or by its failure to provide a sufficient cognitive alibi for 
its disciplinary excesses, to stop resembling its rationalized, intermedi-
ate object and to approximate instead its unrationalized, ultimate one: a 
mimeticism without reserve.
So while the sycoanalyst is implicated in the dynamic of denuncia-
tion, I hope that the anger directed at the parade of stoolpigeons in this 
book will not seem entirely reducible to the stoolpigeon’s anger at the 
comedian. The sycoanalyst’s rage at the sycophant may well be, as one 
reader of these pages has suggested, the rage of Caliban looking at him-
self in the mirror. But rage is not, I think, the only affect impelling this 
book, or providing its dominant tone. Comedy is of course no stranger to 
aggression, as the funniest of the blacklisted—Lionel Stander, Abraham 
Polonsky, Judy Holliday, Zero Mostel, Ring Lardner Jr.—abundantly 
demonstrate. Imitating them with a view toward modeling a comic criti-
cism, this book necessarily takes on the violence inherent in their joy. 
But if violence inheres in joy, the latter may nonetheless exceed the for-
mer. The anger informing my analyses here is anger at the (continuing) 
war on comicosmopolitanism; but the extravagance with which I some-
times express it is not (or not just) an overflow of moral indignation. 
Rather, this extravagance is itself an attempt to bring back some of the 
comicosmopolitanism that the blacklist would have destroyed.
In the same comic (or at any rate would-be comic) vein, the sycoana-
lyst, like the schizoanalyst, will “claim the right to a radical laxity, a radi-
cal incompetence.”95 In an academy ruled by Hebraic strictness of con-
science, where cosmopolitanism is permitted only if the citizen of the 
world makes a solemn commitment to both citizenship and the world, 
sycoanalysis exploits the un-Hebraic “Jewishness” in cosmopolitanism: 
what makes it unassimilable to the ethico-political norms of academic 
respectability today. Indeed, “laxity” and “incompetence,” which so many 
critics and theorists are trying to take out of cosmopolitanism, are pre-
cisely what sycoanalysis wants to keeps in. Cosmopolitanism’s “laxity” 
is the floating calm that prevents it from being terrorized into obedient 
identification, affording it a polyglot fluency—a promiscuous urge to lose 
itself in multiple identifications, rather than to find itself in just one— 
that puts it “well below conditions of identity.” Cosmopolitanism’s “in-
competence,” apparently the antithesis of fluency, consists, rather, in a 
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way of being so un-self-consciously absorbed in the language of the 
Other that one speaks it well but not too well—not, that is, with the pro-
prietary arrogance of the “native speaker” or the overbearing presump-
tion of the arriviste. “Competence,” in the vocabulary of sycoanalysis, 
designates the provinciality of overidentification, the chauvinism that 
delights in its rigorous command of the orthodoxy in which all credible 
subjects find themselves mirrored. That this provinciality and chauvin-
ism sometimes assume the guise of cosmopolitanism itself—call it the 
cosmopolitanism of knowingness, the cosmopolitanism of the insider, 
the cosmopolitanism of the consummate professional—makes incom-
petence all the more precious. Amid the many bien-pensant professional-
isms—which it is by no means above imitating—sycoanalysis wishes to 
become an amateur science.
As an amateur science, it would arise out of a flirtation with a number 
of other sciences: psychoanalysis and schizoanalysis, of course, but also 
the sort of literary criticism exemplified earlier in this chapter by the dis-
cussion of Oliver Twist, and the kinds of philosophy variously represented 
by Arendt, Horkheimer and Adorno, Agamben, and Badiou. This book 
also engages crucially with scholarship in film studies, both academic 
and nonacademic—most obviously, with Michael Rogin’s Blackface, 
White Noise: Jewish Immigrants in the Hollywood Melting Pot and Neal 
Gabler’s An Empire of Their Own: How the Jews Invented Hollywood. Less 
obviously, but still decisively, the book draws on the work of such schol-
ars of film and television as Jon Lewis, who provocatively and incisively 
reads the blacklist as the unacknowledged charter of postwar Hollywood 
down to the present, the basis of its shift from entrepreneurial to con-
glomerate capitalism; James Naremore, who argues against a stereo-
typically “pessimistic” construction of film noir and demonstrates the 
genre’s vital progressive affiliations; Robert Sklar, whose writing on left- 
leaning stars like Humphrey Bogart, James Cagney, and, both least re-
membered and most important for this book, John Garfield, opens up 
intriguing perspectives on the vertiginous politics of career and perfor-
mance in the Hollywood of the studio system; and Thomas Doherty, 
whose history of television and the Cold War offers exemplary resistance 
to received ideas about the medium in its ascendancy.96
One science to which sycoanalysis remains alien, however, is political 
science. For all that this book concerns itself with American politics of 
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the postwar period, and with certain questions of political theory, syco-
analysis offers no suggestions for a new political order: for a new, post-
modern citizenship, for a politics of the refugee, or for a radical democ-
racy of pariahs. Far from encouraging the self-congratulatory illusion 
that the aesthetic and the erotic turn magically into the ethical and the 
political, this book refuses to flatter progressive literary and cultural crit-
ics by pretending that comic mimesis is itself a significant resistance to 
power. That resistance requires funds of seriousness, and a willingness 
to invest them in the world, that sycoanalysis lacks. Let others pursue the 
work of political resistance, as they are doing now, and as they will no 
doubt continue to do.97 But if sycoanalysis has no prescriptions for what 
Agamben calls “the political survival of humankind,” its psychoanalytic 
affinities include, among other things, a broadly therapeutic orientation. 
Again, though, a difference must be marked. Less euphoric than schizo-
analysis, sycoanalysis is less wary than psychoanalysis: where the psy-
choanalytic cure would promote a certain accommodation to the world, 
a certain acceptance of civilization and its discontents, the sycoanalytic 
cure would consist in uncivilizing the ego by showing it how to disinte-
grate into mimesis.
Toward this end, moreover, sycoanalysis has another therapeutic am-
bition: to heal the wound, exacerbated if not inflicted by huac, between 
the two branches of the Judaized cultural elite in America. Sycoanalysis, 
that is, wants to be both the method and the scene of a reconciliation 
between the jokers and smart alecks of the academy and the jokers and 
smart alecks of mass entertainment. The war against the American left 
that began or, more accurately, resumed in the late 1940s found its sy-
cophantic echo, I have noted, in the film studios and the television net-
works themselves, as they began attempting, by means of the blacklist— 
and with more frenzy than success—to disown or at least to disguise 
their affiliations with cozy liberalism and Jewish intellectualism. Pin-
ning their survival on their talent for reading the minds of both their 
masters and their masses—categories less easily separated from each 
other than one might think—the mostly Jewish studio heads and net-
work executives picked up on, and then subscribed to or even devel-
oped, the postwar American policy of hiding anti-Semitism behind the 
more respectable anti-liberalism and anti-intellectualism that are already 
bound up in it. And while the “culture monopolies” would thus have 
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projected these linked stigmas onto the more loathsome elites of the 
university, of the higher journalism, and of high culture, the intellectu-
als, as I have also noted, retaliated by looking down their noses at the 
products of mass entertainment. Though the contempt may have abated 
somewhat, at least on the academic side, its consequences are still in 
force, in (for example) the persistent Hebraism of an academy that is 
popularly construed, whatever its actual composition, as a bastion of 
liberal Jewish intellectuals, and that keeps projecting its attendant “ri-
diculousness” back onto low art, even if the academy now agrees to find 
that ridiculousness charming, once it has been exorcised. Intervening 
in this long-running (if rather flimsy) melodrama of mutual disavowal, 
sycoanalysis not only acknowledges but also deploys its own low art of 
“Jewish” ridiculousness, which is built into critical thought, whether or 
not critical thought can stand to admit it. As far as sycoanalysis is con-
cerned, what Adorno says about the ridiculous in art would also apply to 
the ridiculous in criticism:
The ridiculous in art, which philistines recognize better than do those 
who are naïvely at home in art, and the folly of a rationality made abso-
lute indict one another reciprocally; incidentally, when viewed from the 
perspective of the praxis of self-preservation, happiness—sex—is equally 
ridiculous, as can be spitefully pointed out by anyone who is not driven 
by it. . . . Human beings have not succeeded in so thoroughly repressing 
their likeness to animals that they are unable in an instant to recapture 
it and be flooded with joy; the language of little children and animals 
seems to be the same. In the similarity of clowns to animals the likeness 
of humans to apes flashes up; the constellation animal/fool/clown is a 
fundamental layer of art.98
Simian, incompetent, and unserious—animal, fool, and clown at once— 
the sycoanalyst enacts comic irresponsibility as fundamental to any think-
ing that would differ from the dreary praxis of self-preservation. The spite-
ful philistine cannot help ridiculing such thinking: it produces a hap-
piness that embarrasses and insults him by reminding him how much 
self-preservation has cost him. No fool, despite the folly of his rational-
ity, the philistine does not need an informer to help him spot a joker and 
a smart aleck a mile away, because he is himself an informer. He knows 
what he has lost in refusing to lose himself. Every time his own likeness 
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to an ape flashes up—every time he finds himself looking “Jewish”—he 
must make sure that the joy of this image turns to hatred instead.99 
With informers everywhere, including inside himself, the sycoanalyst 
responds by reversing the process.
Accordingly, the next chapter of this book discusses the transforma-
tions of “Jew Envy,” whereby the image of the Jew’s privileged access to 
happiness—“sex,” as Adorno baldly puts it, but also happiness as the 
comic and as the related unseriousness sometimes called “style”—is sys-
tematically trashed, made repellent rather than desirable. Continuing the 
elaboration on Horkheimer and Adorno’s account of anti-Semitism— 
an elaboration that is the book’s leitmotif—the chapter develops their 
insight into the need to refigure Jewish happiness as aversive, lest the 
mass public recognize it as happiness and demand the same for itself. To 
speak of the sexy, comic, stylish Jew in early-twenty-first-century America 
is obviously anachronistic: the outrageous image of the Jew invoked 
here recalls nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century Europe. The anach-
ronism, however, is the point: outlining a genealogy of the blacklist, the 
chapter shows, in a series of readings of Jewish images in America from 
the 1920s to the 1950s, how, despite the attempt to produce an unenvi-
able American Jew—a Jew who would at last be spared the vengeful trib-
ute of anti-Semitic re-sentment—something all-too-desirably “European” 
continues to stick to American Jews during and even after the blacklist.
Chapter , “Petrified Laughter: Jews in Pictures, 1947,” focuses on 
three Hollywood films from the first year of the blacklist period—Cross-
fire, Body and Soul, and Gentleman’s Agreement—all of which promi-
nently feature Jewish characters, performers, and themes. These films 
testify to the American Jew’s ambivalent location between “America” 
and “Europe.” Figuring a certain Old World or prehistoric Jewishness, a 
comic-mimetic Jewishness, the films freeze that Jewishness, as if already 
internalizing the Cold War chill in the air, which would have profound 
consequences for virtually everyone associated with the films (the pro-
ducer and director of Crossfire, for example, were among the Hollywood 
Ten). But freezing has an ambivalence of its own: while it immobilizes, 
it also preserves. The surprisingly cold shoulder to which these three 
anti-Semitic films submit their comic Jews becomes less surprising once 
we see that it may in fact help surreptitiously to protect them throughout 
the dangerous years (and decades) ahead.
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The fourth chapter, “Collaborators: Schulberg, Kazan, and A Face in 
the Crowd,” interprets that 1957 film, directed and written by two friendly 
witnesses, not just as a sophisticated apologia for sycophancy but as a 
portrait of America itself as a nation of sycophants. Unlike the film’s 
screenwriter, Budd Schulberg, its director, Elia Kazan, was not Jewish. 
But he was famous for “looking Jewish,” and for being misidentified as 
a Jew—or rather, in his own language, as a “Jew boy.” Hardly pleased by 
this misidentification, Kazan responded to it by becoming a patriotic in-
former before huac; without denying his own Jewish identity, Schulberg 
nonetheless joined Kazan in producing a film that, more hysterically 
than their previous collaboration, On the Waterfront, attempted to show 
all American citizens how to rise above the en-Jewment out of which, 
as out of a marsh, they are all engendered, beginning as comic Jewish 
women, but ending as serious American men.
Chapter 5, “Comicosmopolitanism: Behind Television,” looks at the 
new and emblematic Cold War medium, television, considering the risks 
involved in broadcasting from the cosmopolis of New York City a comic 
Jewishness, whose reception, or at least whose anticipated reception, by 
the rest of America—by what the broadcasters themselves regarded as 
the real America—resulted in the timidity, indeed the servility, that con-
tinues to define network television in the United Sates. While historians 
of television have identified a gradual Jewish self-closeting at work in 
television programming in the fifties, I emphasize here a concomitant 
but less well-noticed pattern: a strategy of turning comic Jews into tragic 
Jews, of turning Goldbergs into Rosenbergs. Against the now-dominant 
image of the tragic Cold War Jew (or of the benign and earnest Cold War 
Jew in the case of the recent film, Good Night, and Good Luck), I adduce 
the 1976 film The Front, an underrated revisiting of the blacklist and of 
fifties television, written, directed, and acted by blacklist survivors. This 
film, I show, re-comicizes both fifties Jewish television and its blacklisted 
personnel, rescuing them from the oblivion of tragic nobility.
The final chapter, “Bringing Down the House: The Blacklist Musical,” 
continues the book’s move away from the American film industry, to-
ward the two other dominant commercial entertainment media of the 
Cold War. This move is also a move eastward: away from Hollywood to 
the even less American cultural capital, New York City. Although Broad-
way did not have a blacklist, it felt the effects of Hollywood’s, not least 
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through such central figures of the postwar musical theater as Jerome 
Robbins; his fellow informer, the writer Abe Burrows; the blacklisted ac-
tor Zero Mostel; and the actor Judy Holliday, whose performances both 
in the musical, Bells Are Ringing, and before a huac-like Senate subcom-
mittee complicate the opposition between cooperative and uncoopera-
tive witnessing. Beyond these particular “cases,” however, the chapter 
articulates the role of postwar musical comedy in constituting, like the 
island of Manhattan itself, a space at once inside and outside America: 
a space where the comic promesse de bonheur talks and sings with a dis-
tinctly un-American accent.
The book’s coda explicitly engages the present, linking the contempo-
rary sycophantic regime consolidated by the blacklist in America with 
the current state of Israel—“the country in the world,” as Alain Badiou 
has recently styled it, “where there are the fewest Jews.”100 Almost exactly 
simultaneous with the institution of the blacklist, the founding of Israel 
as a “Jewish state” represents, for Badiou, the antithesis of the sort of 
cosmopolitan state that a Jewish politics of universalism and contingency 
might have made possible. The cosmopolitan state, posited alongside 
what Badiou calls “the basic anti-Semitism of all states,” may be a theo-
retical fiction, not to say an oxymoron.101 What gives it both a certain use-
fulness and a certain plausibility, however, for radical and liberal theo-
rists alike, is that there is something conservative in cosmopolitanism 
itself, something that likes a state. Against this relatively assimilable ele-
ment of cosmopolitanism, and against the new cosmopolitanisms—the 
most approved forms of labor in the academy today—I offer one last 
evocation of the soft, ridiculous, mimetic cosmopolitanism that perhaps 
even radical political theory cannot tolerate. Banished not just from the 
United States and from Israel, but even from the “cosmopolitical” acad-
emy, this primitive Jewish cosmopolitanism, this comicosmopolitanism, 
may find a hospitable greeting only in the secret, erotically charged re-
cesses where literary studies originate as a kind of comparative literature 
avant la lettre: in that preconceptual xenophilia of which, oddly enough, 
we have grown reluctant to speak, as if it were as dangerous as making 




In Dialectic of Enlightenment, Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno 
posit envy as one of the “elements” of anti-Semitism:
No matter what the makeup of the Jews may be in reality, their image, 
that of the defeated, has characteristics which must make totalitarian rule 
their mortal enemy: happiness without power, reward without work, a 
homeland without frontiers, religion without myth. These features are 
outlawed by the ruling powers because they are secretly coveted by the 
ruled. The former can survive only as long as the latter turn what they 
yearn for into an object of hate.1
Exiled to America, as totalitarian rule is destroying European Jewry, Hork-
heimer and Adorno are writing before the establishment of Israel; hence 
“a homeland without frontiers.” No less “dated” from a contemporary 
U.S. perspective, however, is the first of the characteristics they associate 
with the image of the Jews: “happiness without power” evokes a decid-
edly prewar and markedly European stereotype of the Jew, a stereotype 
almost quaint in its inapplicability to postwar America, in which Jews, 
far from lacking power, are often alleged to have too much of it, and 
in which, far more than happiness, the “feature” of the Jew most reli-
ably disseminated by mass culture would seem to be neurosis. Happiness 
without power? The image of Jews in today’s America might better be 
characterized as one of power without happiness.
Not that Horkheimer and Adorno’s portrait of the enviable Jew is all 
sweetness and light. That portrait is “dialectical” enough, at any rate, to 
accommodate its apparent opposite. Earlier in the same discussion of 
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anti-Semitism, the authors conjure up a Jewish face on which one sees 
not the signs of happiness but, rather, a grimace. The trace of “undisci-
plined mimicry . . . inherited through an unconscious process of imita-
tion in early childhood from generation to generation, from the Jewish 
rags-and-bones man to the banker,” the grimace, curiously enough, proves 
no less enviable than the smile over which one might think it casts a 
chilling shadow: “The grimace seems like play-acting because, instead 
of performing serious work, it prefers to portray displeasure. It appears 
to evade the seriousness of life by admitting it without restraint.”2 In the 
very excess of its portrayal, the grimace pushes grimness to the point at 
which it bizarrely resembles a grin. Emblematizing unhappiness with 
hyperbolic abandon, it rejoins the happiness to which it seems antitheti-
cal; registering seriousness “without restraint,” it becomes a cipher of 
nonseriousness. The Jew’s genetically transmitted gift of “undisciplined 
mimicry” is perhaps never more infuriatingly enviable than when, in a 
triumph of style over content, “it appears to evade the seriousness of life” 
precisely by embracing it—when it makes even “displeasure” look like 
“play-acting.” Admittedly, apparent play-acting is not the same thing as 
apparent happiness (everything here, in this anatomy of anti-Semitism 
as spectacle, taking place on the level of image and semblance). But in 
its insolent simulation of freedom from the discipline of seriousness, 
play can be an exemplary signifier of happiness. For Horkheimer and 
Adorno, in any case, both nonseriousness and powerless happiness, if 
only apparent, bespeak the Jew’s exemption from the rules with which 
“the ruling powers” keep “the ruled” in their place. What could be more 
desirable, and what therefore more urgently needs to be refigured as de-
spicable, than this Jewish talent for overacting—for a mimicry so undis-
ciplined that it renders even subordination as escape?
Envy in general tries to refigure the desirable as the despicable. As 
Melanie Klein theorizes, envy insists on spoiling the desired object.3 
Horkheimer and Adorno formulate the “secretly coveted” Jewish “char-
acteristics” in terms of withoutness (happiness without power, reward 
without work, a homeland without frontiers, religion without myth); to 
spoil these characteristics is to rewrite the desirable “without” of free-
dom as the despicable “without” of lack. Thus taught to “turn what they 
yearn for into an object of hate,” the anti-Semiticized masses perform 
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the “serious work” of envy as group psychopathology. And what their 
envy works on and over, making it the object of a violent aversion ther-
apy, is a Jewish desirability bordering on the sexual.
To be sure, when Jewish happiness manifests itself, as it sometimes 
does even in the “neurotic” postwar American mode, it is most likely 
to show up as a propensity for the comic.4 But the enviably comic has 
a tendency to shade into the enviably erotic, happiness assuming more 
than one set of “features.” In 1946, just two years after Horkheimer and 
Adorno published Dialectic of Enlightenment, and echoing their diagno-
sis of desire turned into hatred, Jean-Paul Sartre proposes a model for 
anti-Semitism as a kind of “sexual attraction”:
In Berlin I knew a Protestant in whom sexual desire took the form of in-
dignation. The sight of women in bathing suits aroused him to fury; he 
willingly encouraged that fury and passed his time at swimming-pools. 
The anti-Semite is like that, and one of the elements of his hatred is a 
profound sexual attraction toward Jews.5
To put the Jew into a bathing suit has in effect been the aim both of cer-
tain anti-Semitisms and of much feminist- and queer-theory-inflected 
scholarship in the past decade or so.6 In their attention to the politics of 
embodiment, queer and feminist examples have helped Jewish cultural 
studies to reconstruct what one of the founding texts in that field has 
called the Jew’s body.7 It is not so much a question, to be exact, of put-
ting the Jew into a bathing suit as of putting the Jew back into a bathing 
suit: of retrieving a distinctly un-American image of the Jew not just as 
sexual but as the object of “sexual desire [taking] the form of indigna-
tion.” If, as in Sartre’s analogy, this Jewish image resembles that of the 
woman, it also resembles that of the male homosexual, insofar as the 
latter image, too, is elaborated by a phobia mythically containing an “ele-
ment” of “profound sexual attraction.” The present book participates in 
the scholarly project of bringing back the Jew of enjoyment, the Jew of 
en-Jewment. Strategically anachronistic, this project reactivates a politi-
cally risky old-school and even old-world construction of Jewishness, a 
“degenerate” Jewishness of the type that a European philosopher might 
have taken for granted as late as the 1940s, but that seems embarrass-
ingly out of place in the racial imaginary of post–Second World War 
U.S. culture, in which the Americanization of the Jew has consisted 
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precisely in unlinking Jews from women, homosexuals, and queers—in 
which the Americanization of the Jew, the Jew’s (rather equivocal) suc-
cess story, has consisted largely in “her” desexualization.
The desexualization is “hers” because the desexualized person is not 
exactly a man, but not exactly a woman either—more thing, in fact, than 
gendered human subject.8 Consider, for example, an image circulating 
in newspapers and magazines in the United States at the time of this 
writing: an advertisement for tcm’s “Thirty-One Days of Oscar” series, 
showing Barbra Streisand holding her Oscar for Funny Girl, with the 
caption: “When you’re with the most desired man in Hollywood, that’s 
enviable. When he’s only 13½ inches tall, that’s classic.”9 Awarding Strei-
sand, still one of the iconic Jewish-American celebrities, an enviability 
that it then replaces with classicism, the ad offers an image of the Jew-
as-woman quite different from that intimated by Sartre. If it is enviable 
to be with the most desired man in Hollywood, it might in fact be even 
more enviable for him to be “only 13½ inches tall,” not just because his 
diminutiveness makes a giant of the woman with him, but also because 
that diminutiveness is oddly compatible with her enjoyment of him as 
a rather large (“only 13½ inches”?) sex toy. And yet, the ad typifies the 
ironizing hygiene with which Barbra Streisand is almost always repre-
sented in today’s mass culture, with the result that, even outside the jour-
nalistic circles of the professionally blasé, it is becoming increasingly 
difficult to utter her name without a smirk of derision. The ad turns, 
that is, on a preemptive spoiling of the fun—preemptive because, where 
envy wants to spoil the envied object, the whole idea here seems to be 
to prevent the object from becoming enviable in the first place. No one 
must envy Barbra Streisand’s good fortune, because, in the disparaging 
doxa to which the ad subscribes, it is no good fortune at all. Streisand’s 
gigantic stature in relation to her little “man,” for instance, gets re-
signified as that of a dinosaur, like the Godzilla-esque “Mecha-Streisand” 
(a puerile or Yiddishizing corruption of “Mega-Streisand”?), the colos-
sal, hideous creature that terrorizes the children on television’s South 
Park. Not only has it become almost mandatory to represent her as a gro-
tesque relic of mass entertainment’s unhip prehistorical era, the 1960s 
and 1970s: the ad plays on other ambient elements of the Streisand my-
thology—the overbearing diva, the devourer of men—and so insinuates 
into her gigantic shape the sketch of a monstrous Jewish mother, who, 
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not content merely to castrate men, collapses them into their severed 
members, which she then uses to gratify her monstrous sexual desire. 
And precisely because that desire, not to mention the ability to gratify it, 
might seem all too desirable itself, it must be patheticized as an out-of-
control case of penis envy—a condition about as enviable as Streisand’s 
famous nose, plainly (in the meanest sense of “plain”) a symptom of 
that very condition, in its sad prosthetic attempt to substitute for what 
she can never have.10
In its own conspicuous antiquity, moreover, as in its caricatural irony, 
the black-and-white photograph of the star at the center of the ad effec-
tively turns her into a statuette, albeit a colossal one. Or, rather, it cites 
and repeats her by-now well-established reification as a kind of kitsch 
object herself, a “funny girl” whose funniness not only, predictably 
enough, guarantees her exclusion from the sphere of female beauty— 
as if, notwithstanding the ugly duckling’s best efforts, “funny” could 
only ever mean “funny-looking”—but also, more cruelly, reduces her 
even in her comic “homeland” to the butt of a stale joke, in which she 
is routinely enlisted as an unwitting self-parody of Hollywood vanity, 
megalomania, middle-brow banality, etc.11 At once monumentalized and 
shrunken, even her legendary comic iconicity signifies less a saving free-
dom from seriousness than imprisonment in a cultural repertoire of 
sardonic knowingness. Neither funny nor a girl, the funny girl is denied 
both comic and erotic happiness. It is as though the point of the entire 
exercise were to erase any residual image of the Jew as enviable—indeed, 
to install a counterimage of the Jew as unenviable, despite all the evi-
dence (wealth, fame, talent, awards) to the contrary. The envied image 
is a desired object turned into an object of hate. But here, it seems, ev-
erything conspires to ensure that Streisand’s image never arouses more 
than a semi-amused indifference.
No doubt I am placing a fair amount of weight on a single magazine 
ad, but I am doing so in the belief that it represents more than just 
the late-career repackaging of one Jewish-American celebrity. The mock- 
innocence that the ad shares with almost all other mass-cultural artifacts 
requires that Streisand’s Jewishness remain at the level of mere conno-
tation, so that, while the “sophisticated” mass public is expected to pick 
up on her Jewishness, any explicit attempt to read it is doomed to appear 
paranoid, as every suspicion of mass culture’s mock-innocence is apt to 
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be called. And yet, the blurring and dimming of the star’s Jewishness are 
of a piece with the putting-under-erasure of the enviability that her Jew-
ishness, at least according to Sartre and Horkheimer and Adorno, might 
have conferred upon her. That putting-under-erasure, I would argue, 
stands in miniature for the story of Jews in America since the 1920s, 
but especially over the past fifty or sixty years. As my quotations from 
the mid-twentieth-century European theorists suggest, Jews, especially 
during and just after the Second World War, had reason to suspect that 
being envied isn’t so enviable. As the secret logic of anti-Semitism, Jew 
envy has turned out to be at best a backhanded compliment, one that its 
recipients may well have come to think they could live without.
The villain of the 1947 film Crossfire—as we shall see in the next 
chapter, one of that year’s two prominent Hollywood films about anti- 
Semitism—hates Jews, to the point of killing one, because they “live off 
the fat of the land.” “You know the kind,” he sneers, adopting the pseudo-
discretion of innuendo. “Guys that played it safe during the war. . . . 
Got swell apartments, swell dames. . . . Some of them are named Samuels, 
some of them got funnier names.”12 Entirely resonant with the contem-
porary accounts of anti-Semitism advanced by the European writers I 
have cited, the killer’s justification of his crime may have sounded a 
warning to American Jews that they had better take steps to shrink or 
even eliminate the parasitic swellness that the envious might otherwise 
attribute to them.13 The avowed aim of the filmmakers, of course, was 
to educate Gentiles, not to frighten Jews, but when the producer and 
the director were sent to prison three years later for refusing to “cooper-
ate” with the Communist-hunting House Committee on Un-American 
Activities, their fate, even though they were both non-Jews, may have 
served to reinforce the unintended message that, for Jews in America, a 
certain amount of image-revision was in order. For while the film made 
a point of discrediting the anti-Semite’s Jew envy—revealing Joseph 
Samuels, the murdered Jew, to have been nothing more than an average 
Joe—its mistake had perhaps been to remind the American audience 
of what needed discrediting in the first place, to flaunt the Jew’s “se-
cretly coveted” features if only by way of dismissing them as so many 
stereotypes.
How is this effort to preempt Jew envy different from what happens 
in the ad featuring Barbra Streisand? Both the film of 1947 and the ad of 
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2006, after all, raise the specter of a certain Jewish happiness, or “fun-
niness,” in order to send it packing. The difference has something to 
do, doubtless, with that between old left earnestness and postmodern 
irony. Yet it is also, more broadly, the outcome of a large-scale and long- 
running, if to some extent unconscious and uncoordinated, campaign of 
public relations dating back to the Jewish invention of Hollywood, but 
assuming a special urgency and intensity since and because of the inad-
vertent provocation constituted by a film like Crossfire. This campaign 
is epitomized by, though by no means restricted to, Hollywood’s “vol-
untary” self-censorship in the form of a blacklist. Instituted in 1947 and 
continuing into the 1960s, containing the names of alleged Communists 
and “Communist-sympathizers,” and thus ending or at best suspending 
their Hollywood careers, the blacklist worked precisely to weaken the 
American Jew’s enviability, thereby appeasing the enraged myrmidons 
of national identity, whose prosecution of Reds, I suggested in chapter 
1, functioned mainly as a red herring, the search for political subversives 
legitimating a quasi-sexual obsession—not unlike that of Sartre’s indig-
nant Protestant at the swimming pool—with the “outlawed” features of 
a happiness so dangerously desirable that it must be wiped off the face 
of the land. Explicitly dedicated to the pursuit of happiness, the country, 
by the middle of the last century, began pursuing it with a vengeance.14
It is a commonplace of Cold War history, at any rate, that anti- 
Communism provided a cover for anti-Semitism.15 In an apparent 
paradox, historians of anti-Semitism also agree that the period of the 
Red Scare—roughly, the years from 1946 to 1956—coincides with the 
marked diminishing of anti-Jewish sentiment in America, and with 
the triumphant entrance of Jews into the American mainstream.16 The 
rise of American Jews in an age of political anti-Semitism may be less 
paradoxical, however, than it seems: Barbra Streisand’s “failure” typifies 
the conditions for American-Jewish “success” since the forties. “Is a nose 
with deviation such a crime against the nation?” To the question posed 
in the mid-sixties by funny girl Fanny Brice’s mother in the Broadway 
and Hollywood musical that made Streisand a star, the answer, at last, is 
a relieved “no”—provided that the deviant nose belongs to someone who 
denounces crimes against the nation. Once upon a time, the nation may 
have been excited and outraged by Jewish deviation; but the dominant, 
anti-invidious Jewish image-making of the past half-century—the long 
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1950s, whose end is not yet in sight—has managed, without recourse to 
plastic surgery, to carve out a Jewish face whose deviation hardly makes 
a difference.
“Hardly,” because, like all such operations, the operation of putting 
Jewish enviability sous rature never quite covers up what it crosses out. 
Even in the tcm ad, the largest typeface is accorded to the words “envi-
able” and “classic,” the former in fact enjoying pride of place at the top 
of the ad. If the ad takes away with one hand what it gives with the other, 
the gift—a dubious one, to be sure—nonetheless leaves a trace of itself. 
The process of turning Jews into Americans required the elimination of 
everything that made Jews look provocatively (i.e., at once irritatingly and 
excitingly) un-American. Calling that alien substance “Communism” 
had the advantage of masking the witch-hunters’ envious pursuit—both 
persecutory and erotic—of a more subversive, if less recognizably politi-
cal, crime against the nation: the crime of appearing to refuse the seri-
ousness of being American, to shirk the interminable labor of patriotic 
performance ranged under the banner of what never quite announces 
itself as American activities. But the alibi (in Cold War jargon, the “front”) 
of anti-Communism had a corresponding disadvantage: that of failing 
to expunge the less “ideological” signs of Jewish un-Americanness. Be-
neath the counterimage of the desexualized Jew, that is, there may still 
be something to yearn for; there may yet be something criminal about 
Barbra Streisand’s nose.
The Jewish-American story that I would tell here has two different tem-
poralities: a temporality of change, corresponding to a movement from 
the image of Jews as “the defeated,” as Horkheimer and Adorno write, to 
that of the victorious, where “defeat” is European-style happiness with-
out power and “victory” is American-style power without happiness; and 
a temporality of persistence, working beneath the whole ambitious pro-
cess of Americanization to preserve an archaic residue of unassimilated, 
prewar Jewishness in its intolerably sexy alterity. Occasionally, as we 
shall see, the interplay of these two temporalities will produce uncanny 
effects, as when the topoi of 1920s anti-Semitism, supposedly so remote 
from the way we live now, reappear in the discourse of today’s self- 
appointed protectors of the American family and the American child.
What gives the story yet another layer of opacity, moreover, is that the 
envious subject is no less veiled than the envied object. Even before the 
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palimpsestic counterimage has been imposed, that is, Jew envy itself will 
have taken care to put on a disguise—like, for instance, the mask of anti-
Communism. For Jew envy, like all envy, is a shameful emotion: what 
E. L. Doctorow, in his fictional account of the Rosenberg executions, calls 
“the emotion of a loser.”17 Envy begins in the wound of inferiority, real 
or perceived, which is why it cannot stop at the sour-grapes technique of 
turning what it yearns for into an object of contempt: it must go further 
and hide even from itself, masquerading as moral indignation, political 
rigor, pious “concern,” bemused condescension—in short, as an expres-
sion of social authority, the very thing that it so poignantly lacks. When 
one confesses to being envious, one almost never is. Or rather, the envy 
one confesses to must be so light that the confession involves little or 
no loss of face. And envy (the word comes from the Latin verb invideo, 
meaning “to look askance at”)18 has a great deal to do, as we have seen, 
with the management of looks and faces, with “features” and “images” 
and “figures” and “masks”: envy wants nothing so much as to wipe that 
grin off the face of the envied one, although, while it is in the make-over 
business, it must also dissimulate its own sneer and clenched teeth and 
narrowed, sidelong gaze. Avowed envy is usually offered and received 
as a kind of compliment, as admiration with the added tribute of mock-
rancor, and the charade flatteringly testifies to a certain intimacy, a cer-
tain understanding, between sender and receiver—between, in effect, 
benefactor and beneficiary. But while avowed envy implies generosity, 
which in turn betokens the relative comfort and success of the one who 
envies, unavowed, unavowable envy—what well deserves to be called 
serious envy—clutches at seriousness itself to avoid recognizing the frus-
tration out of which it festers.
“A breakdown of Gentile seriousness is the opportunity of the Jew.” So 
warned Henry Ford’s weekly, the Dearborn Independent, in 1922, in a se-
ries of articles later published under the rubric of The International Jew, 
with the aim of introducing an American audience to the anti-Semitic 
forgeries known as The Protocols of the Elders of Zion.19 Even restored or 
fantasmatically unviolated, however, “Gentile seriousness” may be mere 
compensation for the insult of Jewish nonseriousness—the insult, that 
is, of Gentiles’ inability to participate in it. Among the multiple threats 
posed by Ford’s International Jew, well before the post–Second World 
War accomplishment of the Jew’s Americanization, is one that even 
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contemporary U.S. readers will recognize: that of a leftist, secularizing 
cultural elite, dividing its subversive operations between Hollywood and 
the academy:
Colleges are being constantly invaded by the Jewish Idea. The sons of 
the Anglo-Saxon are being attacked in their very heredity. The sons of 
the Builders, the Makers, are being subverted to the philosophy of the 
destroyers. . . . The youth is captured by influences which deliberately 
lie in wait for him in the colleges. True, in after years a large proportion 
come to their senses . . . and they come back to sanity. They find that “free 
love” doctrines make exhilarating club topics, but that the Family—the 
old-fashioned loyalty of one man and one woman to each other and their 
children—is the basis, not only of society, but of all personal character 
and progress. They find that Revolution, while a delightful subject for fi-
ery debates and an excellent stimulant to the feeling of supermanlikeness, 
is nevertheless not the process of progress.
And, too, they come at length to see that the Stars and Stripes and the 
Free Republic are better far than the Red Star and Soviet sordidness.20
Famed for its destructiveness, Jewish intellectuality—here, “the Jew-
ish Idea”—is especially pernicious because it gives pleasure: it seduces 
“the sons of the Anglo-Saxon” with “exhilarating,” “delightful,” “excel-
lent stimulant[s].” This pedagogical seduction might seem an all-male 
affair, except that the invader precisely undermines the maleness of the 
“invaded,” not least when appearing to exalt it: the role of superman 
(another Jewish Luftmensch) is too flighty for any real American man to 
play. Yet the unmanning of America, its undermanning, may prove all 
too attractive—as enviable as the Jewish image of “the defeated.” Jew-
ish lack becomes Jewish luck: the international Jew’s airy rootlessness 
translates itself happily into the promiscuity of “free love.” And like the 
“free love” that it promotes, the Jewish invasion—an invasion by the 
defeated—affords a release from the prison of heterosexual monogamy 
known as “the Family.” In place of the club with which the latter beats 
its members into docility, “the Jewish Idea” entices with the offer of 
membership in a “club” of a less violent kind. The figure lurking not 
too far behind this “Idea,” of course, is the sinister (malevolently leftish) 
Jewish college professor: a stereotype that, as a Jewish college professor 
myself, I would much sooner embrace than repudiate, especially when 
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so many others of my kind are busy pledging allegiance to the dominant 
seriousness in its most available forms (historicist diligence, political 
gravitas, ethical responsibility). In the face of all this virtue, the present 
book is in fact dedicated to the redeployment of the destructive Jewish 
professor—whom Henry Ford’s ideological heirs have not hesitated to 
mobilize for their own purposes anyway. A perennially popular stock 
villain in the nightmares broadcast by the mass media’s guardians of the 
Family, and of the Christian Family in particular—even if, nowadays, the 
cagier among those cops usually tone down the Jew-baiting—this Jew-
ish professor reveals the oppressiveness of American morality by pro-
posing, as an alternative to it, the pleasure of thought, as the similarly 
seditious Jewish Hollywood producer proposes the pleasure of “mere” 
entertainment.21 In 1922, the professorial villain resembles a pederastic 
drug dealer pushing a lethally foreign and cosmopolitan combination 
of Nietzsche and Bolshevik “Revolution.” But he will not look too differ-
ent in 1953, or in 2009. Minus the Nietzsche, he will return (or remain) 
to haunt the fever dreams of McCarthyite America; minus the obvious 
Jewishness—except, of course, when he is waging war on Christmas, 
like a bicoastal, Streisandish superwoman looking down her nose at the 
rest of America—he will figure, in our own time, as the bête rose of Fox 
News and the less “respectable” right-wing media.22
Whether in the twenties, the fifties, or even the first decade of the 
twenty-first century, whether international, un-American, or unpatriotic, 
a certain Jew, then, is interposed between “the ruling powers” and “the 
ruled” (Henry Ford, of course, being no more an average American than 
Rupert Murdoch). This interposed Jew serves not only to absorb the an-
ger the latter might otherwise direct at the former, but also to embody an 
“outlawed” deviation from the discipline of national identity in a “Free 
Republic.” For the freedom of that republic risks seeming almost totali-
tarian unless the alluringly international is wrapped in “sordidness,” or 
unless the banalizing magic of ideology causes the Jew’s insidious, ex-
otic “influences” simply to lose their charm, so that “a large proportion” 
of American “youth,” “subverted to the philosophy of the destroyers,” 
somehow nonetheless routinely “come to their senses,” “back to sanity” 
and “the Stars and Stripes.” To be sure, the political and economic elites 
need the “cultural elite,” in both its academic and its show-business 
divisions, as a screen for their own power and privilege. Yet the “cul-
	 J e w	env y	 61
tural elite” is not just a screen for other elites. What is being attacked 
in the cultural elite (by which “the sons of the Anglo-Saxon are being 
attacked in their very heredity”) is indeed something imagined as spe-
cifically “cultural”: in this case, happiness not exactly without power, but 
not exactly with it either. As I noted at the beginning of this chapter, 
American Jews today may be resented for having “too much” power; but 
this resentment is not the same as the animus against a covertly or im-
plicitly Jewish cultural elite, since the “power” of such an elite is always 
vitiated by the impotence that attends the cultural tout court in a world 
where real power belongs to the politician or the businessman, like 
Henry Ford. Next to this real power, and next to the capitalist ideal of 
“serious work,” what simultaneously offends and attracts in the cultural 
elite is “reward without work,” to recur to Horkheimer and Adorno’s 
list of enviable Jewish characteristics: the cushy life of that pays de co-
cagne that the wits of the right call Hollyweird; or, in the less glamorous 
but perhaps even more degenerate groves of academe—not far, by the 
way, from the Communist workers’ paradise—work turning into play, 
sobriety into exhilaration, discipline into delight. Although the Jew’s en-
viability includes “religion without myth” (rounding out Horkheimer 
and Adorno’s list), and although there may be other reasons for non-
Jews to envy Judaism (as distinguished from Jewishness), the Jew who 
gets envied in America is thus more typically the “cultural” Jew than 
the religious Jew. The Jew’s “culture,” however, is not the simple op-
posite of American seriousness: more invitingly, more threateningly, it 
introduces and activates a subversive frivolity principle within serious-
ness. The Jewish intellectual “destroyers” must be destroyed for putting 
a heady pleasure inside the head.
In keeping with the American industrial know-how for which the 
name “Ford” once stood, the passage I have been discussing illustrates 
a certain technology of envy. Here, the ruling powers protect themselves 
against the ruled by showing the latter how to turn their desire into ha-
tred and their hatred into “sanity”: the fundamental racial strength that 
binds the target audience—in this case, the old populist and nativist 
constituency of the rural South and Midwest—to “the Builders,” “the 
Makers,” the “Anglo-Saxon” masters.23 So ingenious is this technology, 
moreover, that, while rebuilding “Gentile seriousness,” it provides its 
used users with a simulacrum of the Jewish nonseriousness that they 
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originally coveted but to which they must never accede. No reward with-
out work here, but rather a reward for work—a secret bonus granted for 
performing the inherently rewarding work of making oneself a national 
subject—this subliminal Jewishness-effect is produced by the anti-Semitic 
discourse’s imitation, conscious or not, of the Jewish “philosophy” that 
it condemns.
That envy should be mimetic comes as no surprise.24 One can per-
haps at least be like what one cannot be, although the likeness must 
never be confused with actual liking: there may be imitation, but it must 
take the sadistic form of mockery. Not, of course, that sadism itself pre-
cludes the fondest attachment. Mocking the meat it feeds on, or would 
feed on if it could, the green-eyed monster, after all, merely instantiates 
mockery’s ambivalence, its constitutive wavering between ridicule and 
homage.25 As a mode of envy, anti-Semitism is a mode of parody as well. 
Bristling with theoretical affectations and bogus learning, aspiring to 
become a “philosophy” in its own right, anti-Semitism might also be 
called pseudo-Semitism. A Jew manqué, the anti-Semite mimics the 
Jew’s perverse intellectuality (is there any other kind?), at once reviling it 
and vicariously enjoying it.26 Consider, for instance, the aping involved 
in the assertion that the “sons of the Anglo-Saxon” eventually “find that 
Revolution, while a delightful subject for fiery debates and an excellent 
stimulant to the feeling of supermanlikeness, is nevertheless not the 
process of progress.” While the readers of this passage are themselves 
being hailed as the endangered but reliably stout-hearted sons of the 
Anglo-Saxon, they are also being treated to an ersatz version of the Jew-
ish intellectual’s playful irony (“an excellent stimulant to the feeling of 
supermanlikeness”) and impressively incantatory, vaguely “European” 
jargon (“the process of progress”). Anti-Semitism here offers a double 
gratification: it flatters its audience into feeling not only “strong” but 
also “smart.” And if the smartness isn’t quite as “exhilarating” as Jewish 
doctrines of free love and so forth, if it must remain a pale imitation of 
what Daniel Boyarin calls “Jewissance,” that pallor, which is to say that 
whiteness, is of course its own consolation.27
As recent scholarship has shown, at the beginning of the 1920s Amer-
ican Jews had not yet secured their identity, so precious in America, as 
white. It was not until later in the decade, Michael Rogin has argued, 
with the apotheosis of Jewish blackface in the 1927 film The Jazz Singer, 
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that Jews would establish their whiteness by appearing to “lose” it.28 But 
while the Jew circa 1922 was trying to get rid of her deviation from the 
American racial norm, that very deviation may have been what others 
were secretly coveting.29 In the articles published as The International 
Jew, the coveting is indeed a well-kept secret; the hysteria of Ford’s “ex-
tremism” works overtime to conceal the erotic cathexis that motivates it. 
Only three years later, however, a far more urbane text is still figuring 
the Jew as “repellently” international: as the avatar of a frankly “Oriental” 
extravagance. Willa Cather’s 1925 novel, The Professor’s House, features a 
Jewish character named Louie Marsellus, about whom the eponymous 
professor and his wife have the following exchange (in which the profes-
sor speaks first):
“It all comes down to this, my dear: one likes the florid style, or one 
doesn’t. You yourself used not to like it.” . . .
“I dislike floridity when it is beaten up to cover the lack of something, to 
take the place of something. I never disliked it when it came from exuber-
ance. Then it isn’t floridness, it’s merely strong colour.”
“Very well; some people don’t care for strong colour. It fatigues them.”30
With the Proustian echo some have heard in his name, Marsellus in-
deed represents a striking foreignness of style in the Midwestern milieu 
of Cather’s novel. Whether one “likes” this style or “dislikes” it, whether 
one calls it “floridness” or “merely strong colour,” it suggests a Jewish 
difference that has as much to do with language as with race. Whatever 
Marsellus’s color tells us about his complexion, that is, it equally evokes 
the colors of rhetoric: what he overflows with, in an “exuberance” that 
“fatigues” the professor and charms his wife, is tropes; his “floridity” is 
a surfeit of the flowers of language. Marsellus’s “exuberance” recalls an 
aspect of Jewish happiness that we encountered earlier, in the “undisci-
plined mimicry” that lifts the grimace into a mask of levity. In addition 
to its comic and erotic features, this happiness assumes the guise of 
style itself—not just of a particular, or particularly excessive, style, but of 
style as excess, as portrayal “without restraint,” as what an Anglo-Saxon 
college student might find temporarily exhilarating but what must al-
ways “fatigue” his professor, provided, of course, that the professor is 
an American and not himself an international Jew. For, even when he 
is a Europhilic intellectual and aesthete like the novel’s titular character 
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(who, for his part, professes to admire the “austere” style), the American 
man’s American manhood must remain rooted in the seriousness that 
disavows style. “All style . . . is, ultimately, epicene,” Susan Sontag ob-
served in “Notes on ‘Camp’ ”; style makes happy, not to say gay, because, 
like Jewishness itself around 1925, it deviates from the straight path of 
serious work.31 In the same essay, Sontag also claimed, however, that 
“the two pioneering forces of modern sensibility are Jewish moral seri-
ousness and homosexual aestheticism and irony.”32 Much closer to the 
latter than to the former, in fact radically nonserious in its refusal to stay 
within bounds, Marsellus’s exuberance epitomizes Jewishness as style 
transgressing norms of gender and nationality at once, since whatever 
goes further than the strict requirements of getting the job done, what-
ever introduces an element of luxury into the performance of the task at 
hand, is at odds with the rugged masculinity—so easily fatigued—of the 
American character in general. Unmanly and therefore un-American as 
well, Marsellus’s Jewish style, while not explicitly “outlawed,” falls out-
side the law regulating the assimilation of outsiders into insiders. Not just 
diegetically replacing but symbolically outdoing the resonantly named 
Tom Outland, a non-Jewish-identified character who nevertheless (as the 
Professor’s wife remarks) “was highly coloured too,” Marsellus exercises, 
in the domestic scene adumbrated by the novel’s title, the outlandish fas-
cination of the perversely ausländisch or alien.33
Soon, as I have noted, The Jazz Singer will arrive to mark a decisive 
“success” in the long—indeed, perhaps interminable—erasure of this 
outlandish Jew. The whitening process has been going on for some time, 
of course, before Al Jolson puts on blackface. But once he does so, it 
becomes all the more evident that the strong color of Louie Marsellus 
and his kind has faded into the repressed prehistory of Jews in America: 
a repressed prehistory that nonetheless remains faintly legible beneath 
the normative counterimage. If Jolson’s Jewish jazz singer, or, rather, 
his Jewish-American jazz singer, is a definitive inscription of that coun-
terimage, a somewhat later, but maybe equally decisive move in the 
“demystifying” project of assimilation will consist in rewriting the too-
colorful Louie Marsellus not just as an American but as the worst kind 
of American. What I am describing is the achievement of What Makes 
Sammy Run?, the 1941 novel by Budd Schulberg, about the rapacious rise 
of a “smart little yid” from Lower East Side urchin to Hollywood studio 
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head.34 In the fifties, Schulberg would become a “cooperative” witness 
before the Committee on Un-American Activities, naming names of for-
mer Communist associates, and claiming that he did so in part because 
of the Communist Party’s attack on his novel. Not that one can blame 
the Party for smelling a rat, since, even in the novel itself, published six 
years before the blacklist resumed the work, so effectively performed by 
blackface, of whitewashing the Jew, Schulberg is already “cooperating”: 
he produces (and produces himself as) the Good American Jew—a fig-
ure whom, after Sontag, we might call the “modern” Jew of “moral seri-
ousness”—by testifying against the Bad American Jew, whose badness, 
unenviably enough, seems un-American only to the extent of giving 
America a bad name.
Of course, even the “Communism” pursued by huac served as a mere 
front, as I suggested earlier, for un-American activities of a less politi-
cally circumscribed, more diffusely seductive kind. No Communist—in 
fact, an anti-Communist stoolpigeon in his own right—Sammy Glick, 
the antihero of Schulberg’s novel, still strangely anticipates huac’s of-
ficial villains, his political opposites, in representing a sublated residue 
of the “premodern” Jew: the “epicene” Jew of happiness. In the case of 
the Communists, the strong foreign color of a downright red floridity is 
obscured, or, better, dulled, by a stratagem that might be dubbed a ruse 
russe: a vast Soviet drabness thrown, like a wet blanket, over the postwar 
left in general. In the case of Sammy Glick, the policy of envy-reduction 
centers on the trick of keeping the florid style but grafting the Jewish 
fleurs du mal into a context where they lose their exoticism and instead 
appear depressingly homegrown. The procedure begins with Sammy’s 
last name: a variant of the German Glück or the Yiddish glik, meaning 
“luck” or “happiness,” “Glick” announces the character’s travesty of the 
promesse de bonheur implicit no longer in the exhilarating international 
Jewish Idea or in exuberant Jewish cosmopolitanism à la Marsellus but, 
rather, in the American dream itself—an ideal so earnestly maintained, 
by Schulberg among others (“from the very beginning it was Jefferson 
versus Hamilton” [327]), that it effectively crushes happiness beneath 
the weight of seriousness, if not of power.35 What makes Sammy run, in 
any event, is a pursuit of happiness so compulsive and so ruthless that 
it resembles a machine for the production of misery. Himself a kind 
of machine (hence the narrator’s obsession with what makes him run), 
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Sammy, or, as he styles himself, “Uncle Sammy” (81), is less a character 
than an embodied principle at work throughout American culture “in 
the first half of the twentieth century” (276): an “epidemic” (102, 275) or 
a “cancer” (275) of selfish, all-destroying individualism. Universalized as 
the “sammyglickness” (193) and the “Sammy-drive” (xiv) that have over-
run America, Schulberg’s backstabbing Jewish parvenu, in short, is “the 
id of our whole society” (193).
In this presentation of the “yid” as American “id,” neither the yid nor 
the id fares particularly well: while the former is divested of any for-
eign glamour, the latter finds its pleasure systematically spoiled by the 
obtrusion of ego and money. Even that money, moreover—one of the 
anti-Semite’s most beloved Jewish signifiers—lacks its usual capacity to 
induce Jew envy, since it serves only to fuel Sammy’s frenzy of upward 
mobility. And yet, despite the novel’s conscientious attempt to ward off 
envy by projecting, in and as Glick, an iconic disfiguration of Jewish hap-
piness, Schulberg’s “all-American heel” nonetheless preserves some of 
the features of his undisfigured forerunners: features whose great virtue 
is that they can’t be taken seriously.36 As befits a heel, however, those fea-
tures have been displaced from the face to the feet. For if Sammy runs 
like a car, the literalizing insistence with which the novel keeps posing 
the question of its title necessarily focuses our attention on his footwear. 
Portraying show business as shoe business, the novel maps Sammy’s 
rise in Hollywood in terms of his brilliant career as a shoe fetishist. “I’m 
a sucker for shoes” (44), Sammy says, and the narrative doesn’t hesitate 
to prove him right, pausing regularly—with all the butch unexcitability 
one would expect from a good Jewish narrator named Al Manheim—to 
observe the latest hysterical symptom of his fashion-victimhood: “The 
chair in front of him was empty and he turned it around and stuck his 
feet up on it. I couldn’t help noticing the shoes. They were new again. 
A style I had never seen before, without any laces at all” (132); “Even the 
customary patent-leather evening shoes weren’t good enough for him 
tonight. He had discovered dancing pumps, those dainty, ultra-evening 
slippers with the pointed toes and little black bows” (143); “The crepe 
soles on his white kid shoes seemed to be half a foot high” (160).
As hysterical symptoms, these fashion faux pas obviously partake of the 
pathology of overassimilation, of nouveau-riche vulgarity, Jewish-style. 
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But the Jewish style on display here evokes the hysterical in its comic 
sense as well as in its pathological one. Like the exhilaration and the 
exuberance before it, Sammy Glick’s Jewish extravagance—as “female” 
and as “homosexual” as its hysteria suggests—bespeaks an impulse of 
style almost antithetical to the deadly serious, all-American “Sammy-
drive”: a comic impulse, and also an erotic one, to trample upon the 
dreary decorum of American masculinity. Behind Sammy’s lifetime of 
shoe-shopping stands this primal childhood scene: “Sammy played in 
the streets without shoes. For his fifth birthday he was given a pair that 
Israel [his older brother] had outgrown. But they were still several sizes 
too large for him, and the way they flapped like a clown’s made the other 
kids laugh” (212). Clearly traumatic—the other kids laugh at Sammy, not 
with him—this scene at the same time contains the seed of the clown-
ish frivolity principle that will keep Sammy running as much as his 
grim American quest for riches and fame. Obviously, his entire career 
can be read as an endless attempt to master or to avenge the trauma 
of childhood humiliation. And, like many fashion-crazed overachievers, 
he plays a “sucker” ’s game indeed: the more he tries to overcome that 
trauma, the more he repeats it. “He swung his feet up on his desk and I 
noticed his camel’s hair socks and tricky shoes, leather strips woven like 
a Mexican basket, with a space left for the toes to stick out. ‘These are 
swell shoes for working,’ he said” (44). But if “swell” cruelly reinscribes 
“several sizes too large”—as though “swell” really meant “swollen”—if, 
that is, the very swellness of each new pair of shoes condemns them to 
replicate those original flapping, clown-like hand-me-downs, the swell, 
as we saw earlier, is one of the stylistic signatures of a Jewishness far 
more enviable than pathetic. Grown-up Sammy is just as laughable as 
little Sammy. But to call the dandy’s “tricky” and “dainty” shoes ridicu-
lous is not necessarily to put them down: in the “ridiculous,” we some-
times hear the laughter of style itself as it dandily dances its way, in 
its increasingly light loafers, out of the confines of manly dignity. The 
voice of quasirabbinical morality, Manheim predictably insists on read-
ing this dance as the desperate race of that Schulbergian specter (and 
semblable), the American rat, who can never do anything more than run 
in ironic circles. Yet the piety and banality of his reading cannot account 
for the enthralled obsessiveness with which he imposes it. Even more 
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than what makes Sammy run, what makes Manheim keep asking what 
makes Sammy run is the comic, erotic, stylistic pirouettes whereby the 
latter decorates the crude and conventional “blueprint” (276) in which 
Jewish moral seriousness keeps him trapped.
The Jew’s tribute not only to “modern sensibility” but to America as 
well, moral seriousness yearns for its prisoner as the anti-Semite yearns 
for the forbidden features of the Jew. More fundamentally, there is no 
Manheim without Sammy, no modern American Jew without an ata-
vistic clown to keep an eye on—with the result that it is not entirely 
clear who is imprisoning whom.37 At any rate, it is as if the good Jew, 
in his wary attempt to reduce the causes of Jew envy, had ended up in-
ternalizing it. Hence the often-repeated charge that Schulberg’s novel 
is anti-Semitic. And, after all, how could it not be, with Schulberg’s sur-
rogate, Manheim, so relentlessly “horrified” by his captivating captive? 
When, ten years after publishing the novel, Schulberg goes before huac 
to name names, it is no longer the Republican parvenu but the left-wing 
pariah whom he is patriotically betraying. Yet the parvenu and the pa-
riah are both Glicks: both traces of a Jewish happiness still worth envy-
ing, despite the considerable pains taken to trash it.
So dangerous was this residual enviability still thought to be, more-
over, that “friendly” witnesses like Schulberg were by no means the only 
Jews to make friends with American seriousness. One of the pariahs 
themselves, in fact, would become an enduring heroine of the left while 
doing some serious envy-avoidance—almost by doing some serious envy- 
avoidance. Here, again, is Lillian Hellman, explaining to huac why she 
would talk to the committee about her own political beliefs but not—as 
all witnesses were required to do if they wished to escape the blacklist—
inform on other people: “To hurt innocent people whom I knew many 
years ago in order to save myself is, to me, inhuman and indecent and 
dishonorable. I cannot and will not cut my conscience to fit this year’s 
fashions.”38 Wrapping herself in the prestigiously dowdy mantle of anti-
style, and her persecutors in the less flatteringly oxymoronic frippery 
of reactionary chic, Hellman would appear the staunchest of American 
patriots. Her letter to the committee continues:
 I was raised in an old-fashioned American tradition and there were cer-
tain homely things that were taught to me: to try to tell the truth, not to 
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bear false witness, not to harm my neighbor, to be loyal to my country, 
and so on. In general, I respected these ideals of Christian honor and did 
as well with them as I knew how. It is my belief that you will agree with 
these simple rules of human decency and will not expect me to violate the 
good American tradition from which they spring. (93–94)
If the line about “this year’s fashions” insinuates a feminizing, ho-
mosexualizing dig at the guardians of Americanism—as late as 1976, 
when she publishes Scoundrel Time, her blacklist memoir, Hellman is 
not above making homophobic wisecracks about Roy Cohn, the Sammy 
Glick of the Cold War—the flag-waving that ensues is as much finger- 
wagging as appeasement.39 Elsewhere in Scoundrel Time, as we have seen, 
she describes the craven Jewish studio heads of Hollywood, huac’s 
accomplices in blacklisting, as trying “to offer the Cossacks a bowl of 
chicken soup” (68). Hellman has devised a recipe for shaming the 
Cossacks by offering them chicken soup that tastes downright unko-
sher. For, with the exception of patriotic loyalty, the “ideals of Christian 
honor” that constitute her “good American tradition” come right out of 
the Ten Commandments; those “old-fashioned American” values, even 
more old-fashioned than she claims, are as old as the Old Testament.
Combining modern sensibility with divine authority, Hellman’s Jew-
ish moral seriousness masquerades, then, as the old-time American 
religion that the committee members themselves, all Gentiles, ought 
to be practicing. Yet her performance before huac is not simply an anti- 
and old-fashion show: not simply—to use the terms of the ad featuring 
Barbra Streisand—a performance of the “classic” rather than of the en-
viable. To be sure, her challenge to the committee—which could have 
sent her “straight to jail” (101) for trying to negotiate as to the limits of 
her testimony, but which “merely” blacklisted her instead—is remem-
bered for its straighter-than-thou gutsiness. Who remembers, though, 
that, when she stood up to huac as a better Christian and thus a bet-
ter American, one whose “homely” morality compelled her to repudiate 
“this year’s fashions,” she was wearing the latest Paris original? Under-
standably, Hellman makes much of her bold anti-fashion statement. 
But she also points out that she took great care to choose the outfit in 
which she would appear before the committee: on the day before she 
testified, she bought herself a “beautiful, expensive Balmain” (96) dress, 
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along with “a very expensive hat and a fine pair of white kid gloves” (98). 
Like Sammy Glick’s “white kid shoes,” and indeed like the rest of his 
wardrobe, Hellman’s gloves and her hat and her dress all hail from the 
realm of luxury in which secretly coveted Jewish happiness now itself 
lives in semi-secrecy, in the Cold War’s cold storage, such that its rare 
public appearances are attended by an acute sense of just how “expen-
sive” expensive things are.
In her diary notes on the day of her testimony, Hellman wrote: “My 
dress, my hat, my gloves . . . will be the last extravagances for many years. 
They felt good” (98). They will be the last extravagances because, like ev-
eryone else who refuses to name names, Hellman will soon find herself 
unemployed. But once the project of reducing Jew envy has begun, all 
extravagances are the “last” extravagances: anything that feels good must 
be experienced as if it were about to be renounced. Even a cooperative 
witness like Budd Schulberg, whose cooperation wins him the privilege 
to continue working in Hollywood, does so on the condition that he con-
tinue giving up Glick, where giving him up entails both turning him 
over to the authorities and going without him. But if one must keep on 
kicking the habit, then of course one must keep on indulging in it—with 
all the abuse that both the kicking and the indulgence suggest. In other 
words, the abuse may be a kind of cultivation. At a certain point in the 
career of Jews in America, trashing what is enviably Jewish may become 
a furtive way of preserving it—perhaps the only way of preserving it, 
other than by letting it look female or homosexual rather than Jewish, 
as when Lillian Hellman’s extravagances become forgivable, and forget-
table, because readable as a woman’s but not as a Jew’s prerogative, or 
when Hollywood’s gay cabal covers for Hollywood’s Jewish cabal.
The enviable is obviously worth preserving. But because it just as obvi-
ously attracts the murderous hostility of envy itself, it must be preserved 
in disguise. Like the “homeliness” that descends on certain faces lest 
anyone begrudge them their joy, the unenviable Americanized coun-
terface shields what it is written over and thereby mars. Without this 
protective disfiguration, the face of Jewish happiness risks exciting the 
kind of envious rage whose genocidal consequences impelled Sartre and 
Horkheimer and Adorno to write their analyses of anti-Semitism in the 
first place. To read a series of American texts with the help of these mid- 
century European theorists, as I have done here, is to de-Americanize 
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not only the texts but also the Jewishness variously featured within them. 
In uncovering an archaic, “European” image beneath the blandly re-
spectable Jewish-American countenance, I have no doubt been courting 
Jew envy as well as studying it. But the alternative is not necessarily 
preferable. While it may be safer to keep the enviable Jew, along with 
Jew envy, covered up, the safety entails a certain risk of its own. As the 
recent war on the “war on Christmas” shows, envy-avoidance is not a 
foolproof strategy. And when it fails, it offers no critical leverage over 
the aggression it has been trying to prevent. However far American Jews 
may have come since the days when Horkheimer and Adorno could 
write about organized anti-Semitism under totalitarian rule, enough of 
pre–Second World War “Europe” has stayed with them, I have been sug-
gesting, to attract the notice of those who can’t stand the sight of other 
people’s happiness without power. Even in America today, some people 




Jews in Pictures, 1947
Nominations
In his book on the Jews of Hollywood, Neal Gabler recounts the follow-
ing story of how the actor John Garfield got his name:
“What kind of a name is Garfield, anyway?” Jack Warner asked a young 
actor from New York’s Group Theater. “It doesn’t sound American.” Jules 
Garfield, formerly Julius Garfinkle, protested that it was the name of an 
American president, so Warner countered that it was the Jules that had 
to go. How about James—James Garfield? “But that’s the president’s 
name,” Garfield objected. “You wouldn’t name a goddamn actor Abraham 
Lincoln, would you?” “No, kid, we wouldn’t,” answered a Warner execu-
tive, “because Abe is a name that most people would say is Jewish and we 
wouldn’t want people to get the wrong idea.” So Julius Garfinkle became 
John Garfield.1
“We wouldn’t want people to get the wrong idea” of course means “we 
wouldn’t want people to get the right idea”: an idea they could get—since 
you can never be too careful—even from a name like “Abraham Lincoln.” 
True to type, however, the moguls proved as shrewd as they were 
self-hating. After all, you wouldn’t name a movie actor “Abraham,” even 
today. And though Jack Warner may not have known much American 
history, his immigrant ear was acute enough to pick up some bad vibes 
around the name “Garfield.” For, like Lincoln, the American president 
who bore it was one of the three assassinated presidents at the time of 
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John Garfield’s christening. That this “goddamn actor” would share a 
Christian name with the fourth president to be assassinated is no doubt 
what they call an accident of history. Another accident of history—but 
an utterly predictable accident, an accident waiting to happen—was the 
assassination of John Garfield himself: by which I mean the targeting 
and tormenting of the actor by the House Un-American Activities Com-
mittee, which, intent on humiliating him into the violent redundancy of 
naming names, played a large role in causing the heart attack that would 
kill him in 1952 at the age of thirty-nine. For refusing to become a fink, 
the former Garfinkle paid with his life.
“What kind of a name is Garfield, anyway?”: as though to naturalize 
his own name, Jack Warner doesn’t so much ask a question as issue a 
warning. No one more alert to what “doesn’t sound American” than a 
Jewish studio head in Hollywood’s golden age—especially as that golden 
age gave way to a more overt reign of terror conducted in the name of 
patriotism, and supported with abject enthusiasm by every Jewish mo-
gul, including Jack Warner. If Warner, assisting in the naming of John 
Garfield, darkly intuited the fatality of that name, his endorsement of 
the blacklist would help turn his intuition into a self-fulfilling prophecy, 
and his caution into a death wish. “How about James—James Garfield?” 
With warners like these, who needs stalkers? With bodyguards like 
these, who needs assassins?2
In 1947, the same year in which the Un-American Activities Commit-
tee began its inquisition in Hollywood, and in which, eager to please 
their Christian masters in Washington and on Wall Street, even at the 
cost of self-destruction, Warner and his fellow studio heads instituted 
the blacklist, Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, living in Los 
Angeles, the very capital of what, through their indictment of it, would 
come to be known as the culture industry, published that indictment in 
the first printed edition of Dialectic of Enlightenment. We have already 
encountered this passage, but it is worth considering again what the au-
thors had to say about “culture monopolies” like the Hollywood studios: 
“They have to keep in with the true wielders of power, to ensure that 
their sphere of mass society, the specific product of which still has too 
much of cozy liberalism and Jewish intellectualism about it, is not sub-
jected to a series of purges.”3 At once the purge and the deflection of the 
purge, the blacklist, far from proving Horkheimer and Adorno wrong, 
74	 chaP ter	three	
conveniently illustrates their whole oxymoronic ontology of the culture 
monopolies, or the culture industry, as domination by the dominated, 
as liberal totalitarianism, as the Nazism of the Jews—as the very grand-
daddy of all those baby-faced tyrannies that cultural studies loves to hate. 
If the Warner brothers hadn’t existed, Horkheimer and Adorno would 
have had to invent them.
And while we’re at it, here’s one more Accident That Isn’t One: also 
in 1947, Hollywood released two high-profile films about anti-Semitism, 
as well as a third picture, which, though less explicit in its representa-
tion of Jewishness, may be the most “Jewish” of them all. This last film, 
in which John Garfield played the starring role, was Robert Rossen and 
Abraham Polonsky’s Body and Soul. One of the two films about anti-
Semitism—whose producer in fact invited Horkheimer to comment on 
it—was Crossfire, which I discussed briefly in the previous chapter, and 
to which I will return in a moment. The other was the Academy Award–
winning Gentleman’s Agreement, in which Garfield had a supporting 
role, and which Elia Kazan directed. Garfield was huac’s most stellar 
target, and Kazan, to whom we will turn in the next chapter, its most 
eminent collaborator, but a remarkably large number of those involved 
in all three films would in fact end up, whether “uncooperatively” or not, 
in the committee’s cross hairs, lending plausibility to the view that Cold-
War anti-Communism was inseparable from Cold-War anti-Semitism. 
No doubt the inquisitors in Washington owed much of their zeal to 
the assumption that all Hollywood movies were Jewish pictures—even 
when, like Darryl Zanuck, the studio chief responsible for Gentleman’s 
Agreement, their makers were Gentiles. Adding insult to injury, the three 
films of 1947 that I discuss in this chapter had the effrontery to be not 
just Jewish pictures but pictures of Jews. This alone may seem to ac-
count for their evident nonappeasement of “the true wielders of power.” 
But what exactly is the trouble with Jews in pictures? Is it as plain as the 
noses on their faces? Is the answer as simple as Jewishness and left-
wing politics in the first year of the Cold War? Are these things really so 
simple, especially when they come together in pictures? What is it about 
these films, and about Body and Soul and Crossfire in particular, that so 
inflamed huac, and that threw the Jews behind pictures—the mostly 
Jewish heads of studios—into a veritable frenzy of appeasement, whose 
effects, some have argued, are still in the air, even though the Cold War 
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is over?4 To answer this question will be to suggest the extent to which 
recent cultural-studies accounts of the distinctively (though not exclu-
sively) Jewish culture industry, whether or not they are explicitly derived 
from Horkheimer and Adorno, continue the work of the blacklist by 
suppressing not just the “cozy liberalism” but indeed the radicalism of 
these Jewish pictures, and not just the radicalism of the Jewish minority 
but the radicalism of the Jew as minor performer: a radicalism of the 
character actor, a radicalism of the comedian, and therefore, to be sure, 
a radicalism not recognizable by the most approved political signs.5
Comic Materialism
Less celebrated than Gentleman’s Agreement, Crossfire in fact opened a 
few months before it, and has the added distinction not only of showing 
how a Hollywood of Jewish liberals is always already a Hollywood of 
assassins, but also of revealing exactly what gets caught in the crossfire 
of “always already,” crossed out in the chiastic intersection of “culture” 
and “industry.” Directed by Edward Dmytryk and produced by Adrian 
Scott, both of whom, in part because of the film, would soon end up 
in prison as members of the Hollywood Ten—the first casualties of 
huac and the studios—and based on Richard Brooks’s novel The Brick 
Foxhole, Crossfire takes place in a claustrophobically noirish milieu of 
soldiers and civilians in the immediate aftermath of the Second World 
War. But where Brooks’s novel is about the murder of a homosexual and 
the pursuit of his killer, the film, playing by the rules of a Production 
Code that, as film scholars such as James Naremore and Peter Lev have 
noted, insisted on keeping homosexuality unnameable—substitutes an 
anti-Jewish hate crime for a homophobic one.6 While this substitution 
dutifully works to appease the true wielders of power, the censors seem 
not to have caught the pederastic implications of the narrative’s liberal 
pedagogy, implications that survive the degaying of the murder victim. 
First entrusting that pedagogy, in a flashback, to the middle-aged Jew-
ish man with whose killing the film begins, Crossfire wears its bleeding 
heart on the sleeve of a figure, part rabbi, part therapist, who all too 
vulnerably embodies the very “sensitivity” that, in 1947—that is to say, 
in that brief interval after the Holocaust and before the establishment 
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of the state of Israel—a lot of Jewish men were trying to shed, or at 
least, in the semi-tough manner of, say, John Garfield, trying to hide.7 
In the first of the film’s two scenes of instruction, both featuring, as stu-
dents, young, handsome, confused, male soldiers, the part of teacher is 
played by a character named Joseph Samuels, played by Sam Levene. As 
a certain name game itself thus gets played, the teacher, at last giving a 
diegetic face to Hollywood’s cozy liberalism and Jewish intellectualism, 
makes that liberalism and intellectualism look so cozy that the scene of 
instruction, enacted with remarkable intimacy between two men in a 
bar, closely resembles a scene of seduction:
samuels: My girl is worried about you. We were talking about you when 
that kid spilled that drink on her. She says you’re not drinking but 
you’re getting drunk anyway. Anybody that can do that has got a prob-
lem. It’s a funny thing, isn’t it?
mitchell: Very funny.
samuels: It’s worse at night, isn’t it? I think maybe it’s suddenly not 
having a lot of enemies to hate anymore. (Picks up peanut from bowl.) 
Maybe it’s because for four years now we’ve been focusing our mind on 
one little peanut. The win-the-war peanut. That was all. Get it over with. 
Eat that peanut. (Pops it in his mouth.) All at once, no peanut. Now we 
start looking at each other again. We don’t know what we’re supposed 
to do, we don’t know what’s supposed to happen. We’re too used to 
fightin’. But we just don’t know what to fight. You can feel the tension 
in the air. A whole lotta fight and hate that doesn’t know where to go. 
A guy like you maybe starts hatin’ himself. Well, one of these days, 
maybe we’ll all learn to shift gears. Maybe we’ll stop hatin’ and start 
likin’ things again, huh?
Samuels will be killed shortly after inviting the soldier, Mitchell, up 
to his apartment. But though Mitchell is suspected of committing the 
murder, he is being framed by the real killer, a fellow soldier named 
Montgomery, or Monty, and played with frighteningly believable thug-
gishness by Robert Ryan, who, looking like the sleek, movie-star version 
of Patrick Buchanan, needs no fiery cross to evoke the special horror 
of anti-Semitism, American-style. Monty kills Samuels not because he 
fears that Samuels is coming on to him or to Mitchell (“eat that peanut”), 
but because he is enraged by what he regards as Samuels’s typically Jew-
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ish parasitism—by the way the Jews “live off the fat of the land.” “You 
know the kind,” Monty, we have seen, observes to the detective inves-
tigating the murder; “guys that played it safe during the war. . . . Got 
swell apartments, swell dames. . . . Some of them are named Samuels, 
some of them got funnier names.” The swell dames, of course, keep the 
censors themselves out of the swell apartments, which, alone, might 
have signaled too close an affinity between Jewish luxuriousness and 
homosexual decadence. Yet if the film takes as much trouble to clear 
Samuels of the invidious charge of Jewish parasitism as to provide him 
with a “girl” and an interest in baseball—it turns out that he has no 
money, and that he served in Okinawa during the war—his softness, 
as though resisting total abstraction into liberal humanitarianism, pre-
serves traces not only of gay hedonism but also of the Jewish “materi-
alism” from which, in any case, a guy like Monty might not bother to 
distinguish it. For although Samuels, judge and prophet like his biblical 
namesake, concludes his fable of the peanut with what we might be 
tempted to banalize as a plea for tolerance—“One of these days, maybe 
we can stop hating and start liking one another”—what he actually says 
is “One of these days, maybe we’ll all learn to shift gears. Maybe we’ll 
stop hatin’ and start likin’ things again.” “Likin’ things”: consistent with 
the terse, manly “poetry” of the screenplay as a whole, the phrase is suf-
ficiently general that “things” can no doubt be taken to include “people.” 
But if “things” includes “people,” people are nonetheless things: like the 
“funny thing” that Samuels mentions at the beginning of the scene—
when he refers to Mitchell’s getting drunk without drinking—or like the 
funny thing at the center of his lesson, the “win-the-war peanut” that he 
ends up popping into his mouth.
Insofar as the point is to stop hating and start liking things again—to 
stop hating things and to start liking them again—then the funny thing 
would seem to be a good place to start. For the funny thing would seem 
to be an eminently likeable thing—unless, of course, you’re Monty, in 
which case the funniness of the funny thing, like the funniness of the 
funny name (“Some of them got funnier names”), causes not fun or 
liking, but envy, resentment, and an urge to wipe out the happily funny 
difference that can only signify pathologically funny deviation. Monty’s 
anti-Semitism, in fact, consists not in his treating Jews as things, but 
in his failing to treat them as likeable things. To be sure, his hatred and 
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violence dehumanize his victim; but that victim proposes, against the 
postwar paranoia of which Monty is the most egregious symptom, and 
which threatens to continue the war by bringing it home, a more than 
easygoing, indeed a fundamentally comic, relation to the world, whereby 
people, named things—transformed into things through the medium of 
the name—become available once more as objects of affection.
Murderously anticomic, Monty cannot tolerate Samuels’s comic ma-
terialism. And as the hard-hitting story of a murder investigation, this 
well-intentioned film, necessarily following the murderer, itself repeats 
his deadly seriousness, casting its murder victim out into the world 
where the actor who plays him seems to belong: the alternative universe 
of Broadway comedy and musical comedy, where no self-respecting film-
noir citizen would be caught dead.8 Horkheimer worried that, for all its 
overt anti-anti-Semitism, Crossfire unconsciously invited the audience’s 
identification with the hunky anti-Semitic killer: an identification, we 
might add, that, by virtue of its genre, the film cannot but share.9 Yet, 
while the narrative pursues the taut, lean svelteness of Monty’s killer 
body, the swellness that Monty not-so-mistakenly attributes to Samuels 
produces a certain quiet counternarrative of its own. Within the rippling, 
tense angularity of the suspenseful narrative, that is, something swells: 
Sam Levene in Crossfire
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and what swells is precisely the word “thing.” Almost by virtue of its very 
imprecision, its colloquial elasticity, that word—manly in its plainness 
but somehow, to quote Michael Rogin’s description of Samuels himself, 
“vaguely effeminate,”10 or perhaps effeminately vague—proliferates in 
the second of the film’s scenes of instruction, where the role of student 
is now played by a soldier named Leroy, and where the teacher, Samuels 
in the previous scene, is now a police detective named Finlay:
finlay: Leroy, has Monty ever made fun of your accent?
leroy: Sure, lots o’ times. He . . .
finlay: Why? He calls you a hillbilly, doesn’t he? Says you’re dumb. He 
laughs at you because you’re from Tennessee. He’s never been to Ten-
nessee. Ignorant men always laugh at things that are different, things 
they don’t understand. They’re afraid of things they don’t understand. 
They end up hating them.
leroy: You get me all mixed up. You know about all these things I don’t 
know anything about. How do I know what you’re trying to do? How do 
I know you aren’t a Jewish person yourself, or something?
finlay: You don’t. But would it make any difference? Well, alright, Leroy. 
But I’d like to tell you one more thing.
“Ignorant men always laugh at things that are different, things they 
don’t understand.” “You know about all these things I don’t know any-
thing about. . . . How do I know you aren’t a Jewish person yourself, or 
something?” “But I’d like to tell you one more thing.” “Thing”s are be-
ginning to get out of hand here, especially as “thing”s swell into “some-
thing” and “anything.” What prevents anything funny from happening 
(“How do I know what you’re trying to do?”) is that this teacher keeps 
both the proper distance from the student and the proper straight face 
to go with it. The star system having dispensed with the comic func-
tions of minority character (Samuels) and minor actor (Levene) alike, 
the Law finds its appropriately major embodiment in Robert Young’s 
pedagogically earnest detective: a figure as humorless, albeit in the 
name of “understanding,” as is the churlish heavy, Monty, who at any 
rate never even laughs at things, but merely marks them as funny the 
better to hate them. As if it weren’t enough for the two actors (Robert 
Ryan and Robert Young) to share a first name, their characters must 
also attempt to match each other in their general grimness. Not that 
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there is anything unusual in the kinship between criminals and police, 
especially in a genre like film noir, where almost everyone, even the egg-
head, comes hard-boiled. That Monty was a cop before the war merely 
reinforces the specular relation between the anti-Semitic villain and the 
anti-anti-Semitic hero. At the end of the film, after Finlay talks Leroy 
into helping him catch Monty, the detective guns down the killer from 
a high window, eerily anticipating the fourth presidential assassination. 
Thus liberal Hollywood indeed seems to stand unmasked as the double, 
and as the accomplice, of its ostensible opposite: the right-wing terror 
that, in 1947, was taking over the country but that, even in the happiest 
days of the New Deal, demanded to be served. Teaching Monty a lesson, 
benign pedagogical narrativity seems to reveal itself as the brutally ar-
resting force of interpellation that it always was.
In this gloomy light, it is difficult not to take a dim view of Finlay’s 
answer to Leroy’s question: “How do I know what you’re trying to do? 
How do I know you aren’t a Jewish person yourself, or something?” 
When Finlay replies, “You don’t. But would it make any difference?,” a 
cynical voice might be heard to whisper the dirty secret of the culture in-
dustry: that the rabbi-therapist doesn’t turn into a cop who turns into an 
assassin, because rabbinical-therapeutic Hollywood is already by defini-
tion policial-terroristic Hollywood. “No,” the rhetorical question bitterly 
answers itself, “it wouldn’t make any difference.” Needless to say, Finlay 
will go on to establish for Leroy that he isn’t a Jewish person, or some-
thing—or rather, that the something he is isn’t a Jewish something: the 
“one more thing” Finlay tells Leroy is a story about how his Irish-Catholic 
grandfather was murdered by a racist mob in Philadelphia in 1848. 
And while the overt moral of the story is that hatred can strike anywhere 
and anyone, even a white Gentile soldier from Tennessee, its barely hid-
den assurance, for all the Leroys out there in the dark, is that the film 
itself isn’t just “Jewish propaganda.”11
But Leroy may not be as dumb as Monty says he is, or as the film 
itself seems to think he is: if only because of all the “thing”s he and 
Finlay have to say—that is, if only because of the swelling thingness of 
the dialogue—he knows very well not only that there’s a Jewish person 
behind the non-Jewish cop, and behind the film’s non-Jewish director, 
producer, and writer, but also that it makes a difference. One name for 
that Jew—indeed, one of those funnier names “some of them got”—is 
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Dore Schary, the liberal head of production at rko, the studio that made 
Crossfire, and the co-author, in 1947, both of the film, in whose shap-
ing he was involved, and of the founding text of the blacklist, the clas-
sically sycophantic “Waldorf Statement,” which, via huac, would send 
Dmytryk and Scott, the film’s director and producer, to jail.12 As we know, 
however, another name for the Jew behind Finlay is Joseph Samuels, 
and still another, behind Samuels, is Sam Levene. Names like these— 
“Samuel,” for instance, means “name of God”—aren’t quite as funny as 
Dore Schary. But in this film “starring three Roberts,” as Robert Osborne 
calls it13—for along with Robert Ryan and Robert Young, the film also 
features Robert Mitchum—names of non-stars, minor names, names 
like Joseph Samuels and Sam Levene, are funny enough.14 “Perhaps 
names are nothing but petrified laughter,” Horkheimer and Adorno 
write elsewhere in Dialectic of Enlightenment, accidentally suggesting 
what gets left out of their ontology of the culture industry, lost between 
Hollywood liberalism and the more frankly petrifying fascism that Hol-
lywood liberalism, by always appeasing, always already is.15 If names 
are no more (and no less) than petrified laughter, funny Jewish names, 
on the one hand, may be names that, in becoming unpetrified, threaten 
to liberate the dream of happiness implicit in all names, a dream that 
cooler names, icily glittering star names like Robert, merely keep locked 
up and in suspense. On the other hand—though there’s no reason why 
these two hands can’t meet—Jewish names, especially at the beginning 
of the Cold War, may be the most tongue-twistingly thing-like of them 
all: the un-American-sounding names that fail to flow naturally, and so 
intensify their funniness as they turn petrifaction into something other 
than the extremity of fear: into the sign of the “magic” whereby the Jew-
ish dream factory preserves, as through a process of deep-freezing, the 
whole swell mise en scène of a comically likeable material world.16
Without being Jewish persons themselves, Dmytryk and Scott perform 
this magic well enough to find themselves implicated in en-Jewment—
which, together with their refusal to talk about their politics, a politics of 
left materialism, after all, is why they went to jail. For all their success 
in liberalizing Leroy, if not in putting one over on him, Crossfire’s pro-
ducer and director had no such luck with a committee of Montys, who, 
like Leroy, couldn’t be fooled into believing they weren’t Jews or some-
thing—what kind of a name is Dmytryk, anyway?—but for whom their 
82	 chaP ter	three	
difference made the worst kind of difference. To clear his name—that is, 
to resume working in a Hollywood from which he would otherwise have 
been frozen out—Dmytryk, on leaving jail, would himself name names. 
“He ought to look at a casualty list sometime. There are a lot of funny 
names there too,” Robert Mitchum says to Robert Young after Robert 
Ryan makes his unfunny crack, in the film that would help put the names 
of its producer and director on another, but not unrelated, casualty list. 
Dmytryk got his name off that list by putting other people’s names on 
it; he survived the assassination attempt by assassinating his friends. 
The blacklist turned a series of funny names into a list of the dead. It 
parodied, by inverting, the “sentimental” lesson of Joseph Samuels 
and Sam Levene: that it is only by following Hollywood’s example and 
seeing people as things that we can imagine a world that could make us 
happy—a world we could ask about without interrogating. What kind of 
a name is Garfield, anyway? If only we did “know the kind.”
Comic Formalism
Swollen with “thing”s—that is, with the word “thing” and thus with a 
certain thingness of words in general—the dialogue of Crossfire at times 
borders on what Horkheimer and Adorno, in the chapter on anti- 
Semitism in Dialectic of Enlightenment, call “uncontrolled mimesis.” Un-
controlled mimesis, “proscribed” by civilization, is precisely what makes 
the Jew so fascinating to the anti-Semite:
There is no anti-Semite who does not feel an instinctive urge to ape what 
he takes to be Jewishness. The same mimetic codes are constantly used: 
the argumentative jerking of the hands, the singing tone of voice, which 
vividly animates a situation or a feeling [ein bewegtes Bild von Sache und 
Gefühl] independently of judgment [unabhängig vom Urteilssinn], and the 
nose, that physiognomic principium individuationis, which writes the indi-
vidual’s peculiarity on his face.17
Funny how the Jew’s comic materialism (“vividly animates a situation 
or a feeling”) coincides with a comic formalism (“independently of judg-
ment”)—with a mimetic flair for bringing out what genteel language 
shuts up: its gestural or even animal unconscious. Later, Adorno will 
	 Petr i f i ed	L aughter	 83
locate an example of this comic formalism in the Austrian-Jewish critic 
Karl Kraus:
The sympathy that Kraus showed many dialect writers and comedians, in 
preference to so-called high literature and in protest against it, is inspired 
by complicity with the undomesticated mimetic moment. It is also the 
root of Kraus’s jokes: in them language imitates the gestures of language 
the way the grimaces of the comedian imitate the face of the person he 
parodies. For all its rationality and force, the thoroughgoing constructiv-
ism of Kraus’ language is its translation back into gesture, into a medium 
that is older than that of judgment.18
Translating language back into gesture, Kraus’s jokes, like those of the 
dialect writer or the comedian, make so-called high literature speak 
against itself: in their radical complicity with undomesticated mimesis, 
they turn that literature back into the gestural prehistory that, like 
an anxious immigrant parvenu, it struggles to overcome. How many 
Jewish jokes, from Freud and Proust to the Borscht Belt and Wendy 
Wasserstein, play on just this reversal of gentility into its repressed an-
tecedents? How many of these jokes, that is, show the reversal as, pre-
cisely, an effect of gesture, where gesture is the part of language that, 
like a funny accent or an unassimilated parent, embarrasses language? 
That the embarrassment should strike at the very moment when lan-
guage is most concerned to make a good impression accounts, of course, 
for the particular sting with which the jokes themselves strike. Just 
when language thinks it has everything, especially itself, under control, 
it starts gesturing, or even gesticulating, thereby hysterically display-
ing one of the classic signs of an always excessive Jewish identity. The 
Jewish comedian in Kraus does his most mischievous work when—to 
trope on Sander Gilman’s term—he voices “the hidden language of the 
Jews” in authors whom the revelation would mortify, when—to invoke 
one of Freud’s Jewish jokes—he changes “anti-Semitism” to “ante- 
Semitism.”19
The radical comedy of undomesticated mimesis may once have played 
a role in what has become the culture industry: Horkheimer and Adorno 
evoke “the pure nonsense which, as buffoonery and clowning, was a le-
gitimate part of popular art up to Chaplin and the Marx Brothers.”20 For 
the authors of Dialectic of Enlightenment, the culture industry, of course, 
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is neither popular nor art, but rather a travesty and a betrayal of whatever 
buffoonery and clowning it may piously invoke in its occasional nostalgie 
de la boue. Yet the petrified laughter of a film like Crossfire alerts us to 
what is not so much excluded from as suspended in Horkheimer and 
Adorno’s totalizing chiasmus of entertaining totalitarianism. Anticipat-
ing a time of “liking things again,” Crossfire simultaneously gestures back 
toward a happiness as ancient as the gestural medium itself. The “funni-
ness” of this otherwise straight-faced film suggests, that is, that not every 
Hollywood movie of 1947 is merely fraudulent and self-congratulatory 
in its relation to its comic antecedents. Indeed, audiences of 1947 
were offered, along with Crossfire, an even more ambitious (if also more 
ambivalent) example of a Hollywood product that, in the name of left-
ist art, translated language “back into gesture,” back into authentically 
popular culture and “proscribed” Jewish mimetic origins. I am referring 
not to Gentleman’s Agreement, but to the other film with John Garfield, 
Rossen and Polonsky’s Body and Soul. Unlike Crossfire’s producer and 
director, none of the personnel involved in Body and Soul wound up 
in jail, but almost all of its authors and major players would soon find 
themselves treated like criminals. And while the film’s complicity with 
an illegal and “undomesticated” mimesis was by no means its most ob-
vious offense, that complicity could only have had an aggravating effect, 
like that of a thumbed nose (“that physiognomic principium individuatio-
nis”), in the eyes of a vengeful Americanism. At any rate, in addition to 
Garfield, whom huac hounded to death, the committee’s victims from 
this film alone included the actors Canada Lee, whom it also drove into 
an early grave; Anne Revere, Art Smith, and Lloyd Goff (also known as 
Lloyd Gough), all of whom were blacklisted; the director, Robert Rossen, 
who was first subpoenaed as one of the Hollywood Nineteen before the 
Nineteen became Ten, and who later, like Dmytryk, saved his career 
by recanting and informing; and the screenwriter, Abraham Polonsky, 
whose fateful middle name, Lincoln, wasn’t all that likely in the first 
place to keep his un-American-sounding first and last ones off huac’s 
hit list, where they too ended up, and where they would stay for a decade 
and a half after his appearance as an “unfriendly” witness in 1951.
Notoriously paranoid, the committee needed no incisive hermeneutics 
of suspicion to detect the un-Americanism of Body and Soul’s makers, 
whose left-wing politics the film quite frankly propounds.21 As Michael 
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Rogin observes, “If any film gives [credibility] to the hallucinatory charge 
that a Communist conspiracy was seizing control of Hollywood . . . this 
is the one.”22 Though less programmatically anti-anti-Semitic than ei-
ther Crossfire or Gentleman’s Agreement, Body and Soul is emphatically 
anticapitalist and unabashedly systematic in its critique of American so-
ciety, far bolder than the other two films in linking racial oppressions—
of blacks as well as Jews—with economic ones. Elaborating its critique 
in the form of a rags-to-riches story about a Lower East Side street kid 
named Charley Davis, played by Garfield, who becomes a boxing cham-
pion by submitting to the control of a crooked promoter, impudently 
named Roberts, after the film’s producer (one Robert Roberts, to be 
exact—as though there weren’t already enough Roberts in 1947), Body 
and Soul pulls no punches in presenting the promoter’s manipulation 
of both boxers and their public as a metaphor for the ruthlessness, cor-
ruption, and mendacity of American capitalism as a whole. But the same 
left hand that strikes out at the capitalist system also gestures toward the 
possibility of resisting it. For, at the end of the film, after Charley has 
watched his friend and coach, the black former champion named Ben 
Chaplin and played by Canada Lee, stand up to Roberts (Lloyd Goff ), 
even though he dies as a result, Charley wins a fight that he had agreed 
to throw, and walks away from an angry, threatening Roberts, saying, 
“What are you going to do, kill me? Everybody dies. . . . I never felt better 
in my life.”
Commenting on the disagreement between the director, Rossen, and 
the screenwriter, Polonsky, as to how the film should end, Robert Sklar 
writes:
Rossen, as Polonsky recalls it, wanted Charlie [sic] to be shot down for 
his defiance as he leaves the arena after the fight. Polonsky says that he 
prevailed on the ambiguous, but surely upbeat, ending. “Bob Rossen was 
fundamentally an anarchist by disposition,” Polonsky later said. . . . “He 
also thought that death was truer than life, as an ending. But we who are 
radicals know the opposite is true.”23
Sklar goes on to argue that, much as we might applaud the victory of the 
soon-to-be-blacklisted Polonsky over the soon-to-be-informing Rossen, 
Polonsky’s account of the film and its ending should be viewed with a 
certain skepticism. And Sklar has a point. Despite Polonsky’s intelligence 
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and moral force and political commitment, and despite his status as one 
of blacklist’s great heroes and martyrs—as “the anti-Kazan,” the left-
ist intellectual in Hollywood who gave up twenty years of a filmmak-
ing career rather than betray himself and assassinate his friends—one 
has to admit that the text of Body and Soul doesn’t quite support Po-
lonsky’s oppositions between himself and Rossen, between radicalism 
and anarchism, between life and death.24 The film indeed ends happily, 
as Polonsky wanted it to, with Charley defiantly walking away from the 
capitalist villain. Luckier than the actor who played him, Body and Soul’s 
hero escapes assassination, at least for the time being. Within Polon-
sky’s screenplay itself, however, the dominant voice is less life-affirming 
than preciously surly: the noirish voice of “urban poetry,” a fancier ver-
sion of Crossfire’s already self-consciously “literary” guy-talk; a voice one 
might even call the Rossen voice, were it not such a distinctive feature of 
Polonsky’s own style.25
To an interviewer who remarked of Rossen, “His pictures frequently 
seem a mishmash of blue-collar melodrama and art film, as though 
he had always wanted to do both types of films and constantly mixed 
them up,” Polonsky replied, “You have him down cold.”26 Of his own 
style, however, Polonsky once observed, “I live dangled between the for-
mal and argot without solution.”27 Exemplifying the very condition it 
describes, this statement also suggests how one man’s mishmash may 
be another man’s dangling without solution. Especially as embodied by 
John Garfield, who portrays his character with what one critic has called 
“a combination of tough cynicism and urban dreaminess,”28 the film’s 
style seems less a mixture of Rossen and Polonsky than the product 
of their surprisingly consonant, because similarly mixed, voices. And 
yet, the conflict over the ending does begin to open up what is more-
than-Rossen in Polonsky, revealing Polonsky to be more “radical” than 
his tendentious formulation allows. Prevailing in that conflict, so that 
Charley Davis can finally affirm “I never felt better in my life” over “every-
body dies” (the film’s chilling refrain), Polonsky in effect recovers a pos-
sibility of the formal-argotic, and indeed of popular culture itself, that 
gets put on ice by its reification, in 1947 and after, as urban poetry or 
arty toughness. Just before he spoke about being dangled between the 
formal and argot, Polonsky, asked whether he had been influenced by 
Clifford Odets (whose Golden Boy, written for Garfield, Body and Soul 
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deliberately revises), answered, “We both derive from Jewish jokes and 
street quarrels.”29 The word “argot” itself derives from the French ar-
goter, meaning “to quarrel,” and argoter in turn derives from the Latin 
ergo. But just as Karl Kraus’s dialect writers and comedians show how 
language-as-gesture precedes and underlies language-as-rationality, so 
Jewish jokes, rehearsing the translation of ergo into argot, translate dia-
lectic back into the dialect it always implicitly was. They reveal the comic 
or mimetic roots—not just the happy endings but also the happy begin-
nings—of political argument in general, in which, to recall Horkheimer 
and Adorno, argument becomes “the argumentative jerking of the 
hands,” like a “singing tone of voice, which vividly animates a situa-
tion or a feeling independently of judgment.” The “radicalism” of Jewish 
jokes consists in translating street quarrels back into plays of form, in 
shifting the action from the street to a kind of theater behind the street.
The happy ending of Body and Soul is best understood in relation to 
a short scene much earlier in the film, where Charley is standing out 
on the street in front of the boarded-up remains of his family’s candy 
store, which we have just seen bombed in an attack on a neighboring 
speakeasy that has killed Charley’s gentle, humorous father (played by 
Art Smith). A figure appears out of the grocery next to the candy store: it 
is the grocer, a metonymic shadow of the murdered father, who says, in 
the Yiddishly inflected accent of the Lower East Side, “Charley, it’s cold 
out. Why don’t you come in and get a little warm?” To which Charley 
responds, with a little coldness of his own, “Thanks, I’m waiting for 
somebody.” Obviously feeling the chill, the grocer says, “okay,” and dis-
appears back into his store—located on but also, like the stage set that it 
is, literally behind the street where Charley continues to stand shivering. 
The grocer disappears, anyway, until a scene near the end of the film, 
where Charley, now a rich and famous boxing champion, has to con-
front the implications of his throwing an upcoming fight, on Roberts’s 
orders. Charley and his girlfriend, Peg, are visiting his mother in her 
apartment above the old candy store, when the grocer, now identified as 
“Shimen,” comes in carrying a box filled with bags:
shimen: Charley, Charley. You’re a sight for sore eyes.
charley: Hello, Shimen!
shimen: Good to see you, you look wonderfu . . . ( begins to drop the box)
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charley (catching the box): Oh!
shimen (to mrs. davis): He looks fine.
mrs. davis: You know Miss Born, Charley’s fiancée?
shimen: This I suspected. Here y’are, Mrs. Davis. Charley, something 
special for you (handing him grapes from one of the bags)—straight 
from the Garden of Eden.
charley: Thanks.
mrs. davis: Have some wine, Shimen.
shimen: What’s the occasion?
mrs. davis: Charley’s last fight.
shimen: You don’t say?
charley: Well, don’t spread it around, Shimen.
shimen: I’m like a grave. Does that mean you won’t fight anymore?
charley: That’s right.
shimen: Well? So you’ll retire champeen. That’s bad? It’s good. (Charley 
laughs.) To the future retired champeen of the world, good luck. And 
to my five dollars that I bet on the fight, good luck too. (Drinks.) Mmm, 
good. Excuse me. Charley, everybody is betting on you, the whole neigh-
borhood, like you was the Irish sweepstakes.
mrs. davis: People shouldn’t bet.
shimen: No, no, Mrs. Davis, it isn’t the money, it’s a way of showing: 
over in Europe the Nazis are killing people like us, just because of their 
religion. But here, Charley Davis is champeen. (To Charley): So you 
win and retire champeen, and we are proud. Period. (To Peg): I’m glad 
I met you. And Charley, when you leave, stop in and say toodle-do. 
(Exits.)30 . . .
charley: Suckers like Shimen shouldn’t bet.
mrs. davis: Suckers like Shimen? You didn’t hear what he said, Charley. 
It isn’t the five dollars, it’s the . . .
charley: (getting angry) I know, I know. I can still lose.
After admitting to Peg and to his mother that he in fact must lose, or 
lose his boxing career, the sixty thousand dollars he’s betting on the 
fight, and probably his life, Charley returns to the training camp where 
Ben tries to talk him out of fixing the fight. Interrupted by the arrival of 
Roberts, Ben defies Roberts’s order to leave, frenetically acts out a fan-
tasmatic comeback, collapses, and dies from the blood clot on the brain 
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that Charley, having won the championship from Ben, has unknowingly 
exacerbated.
Although Ben’s defiance of Roberts (“You don’t tell me how to live”), 
a defiance he shows even in his death, gives Charley the courage not 
to throw the fight in the climactic scene that follows, a certain analytic 
focus on the guilt-laden symbolic negotiations between the black boxer 
and the Jewish boxer has occluded the narrative logic that situates the 
box-carrying Jewish grocer, a box-er in his own right, alongside the black 
mentor, effectively making them Charley’s co-teachers. Even the few crit-
ics who notice Shimen have a way of not noticing him. Michael Rogin, 
for instance, writes: “ ‘Everybody’s betting on you,’ a local named Sh-
imin [sic] tells Charley. The only character marked by name and accent 
as distinctively Jewish, Shimin appears in this scene (and no other) to 
remind Charley, ‘Over in Europe the Nazis are killing people like us. 
Just because of their religion. But here Charley Davis is champeen.’ ”31 
Of course, Shimen does appear in another scene. And if his appearance 
there is fleeting enough to be forgettable, this is itself significant, since 
Charley himself rebuffs Shimen, choosing the cold street over the warm 
grocery—choosing tough, bitter urban poetry over a different concoc-
tion of the formal and the argotic, one that the later scene will imbue 
with the tenderness and sweetness of grapes straight from the Garden 
of Eden.
But though Rogin, editing Shimen out of the street scene, gives him 
an even colder shoulder than Charley does, he is right about how Shi-
men is the only character in the film with a distinctively Jewish name 
and accent. And he aptly points out the “documentary effect” whereby 
“Shimin Rishkin”—immigrant names often undergoing revision—“was 
played by a Jewish comedian of the same name.”32 According to his 1976 
obituary in Variety, Shimen Ruskin, as he semi-anglicizingly called him-
self in Hollywood, “began his career as a child actor in Vilna, Poland, 
giving recitals of Yiddish poetry and performing with the Vilna Troupe, 
where he played the child bridegroom in the premiere of ‘The Dybbuk.’ ” 
After emigrating to the United States at the age of fourteen, Ruskin “for 
many years was associated with the major Yiddish acting companies,” 
performed with John Garfield on Broadway, and went to Hollywood in 
1940, appearing in such films as Dark Passage, Letter to an Unknown 
Woman, and Murder, My Sweet as well as Body and Soul, until he “was 
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called before the House Unamerican Activities Committee, where he 
denounced the Committee’s campaign of political intimidation and re-
fused to recant his convictions or to inform on friends and associates. As 
a result he was blacklisted for 10 years and expelled from the American 
Federation of Television and Radio Artists.”33 Over in Europe the Nazis 
were killing people like us, but here. . . .
Being blacklisted wasn’t the same thing as being killed by the Nazis, 
although I am not sure that the survivors of John Garfield and Canada 
Lee would take much comfort from this observation. A colleague of both 
Garfield and Lee, and a survivor of their victimization and his own, Po-
lonsky, for his part, said of the blacklist years: “It was like collaboration 
under the Nazis. And it was like the resistance. The spectrum took in 
everything human including the inhuman.”34 The “like” in “like collabo-
ration under the Nazis” and “like the resistance” somehow seems safer, 
more hygienically metaphorical, than the all too pointedly indeterminate 
“like” in “killing people like us” (even if “people like us” are killed “be-
cause of their religion”). Yet Shimen Ruskin, comedian and martyr, born 
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in Poland and banned in America, appearing like if not as himself in 
Polonsky’s film of 1947, has the accidental, retroactive effect of making 
the safer “like” look a little like the scarier “like”: he calls into question 
the reassuring distance he seems to affirm between over there and over 
here, between the violence that he and people like him had escaped and 
the violence that he and people like him would not escape, between the 
state-sponsored terror that had just ended and the state-sponsored terror 
that was just beginning.
Appearing like if not as himself, that is, Shimen Ruskin both enhances 
Body and Soul’s documentary style and does something that only seems 
to undermine it: as though anticipating the sitcom practice of giving 
characters the same first names as the actors who play them, Shimen- 
playing-Shimen causes a bit of show business—but in this case, a bit of 
“undomesticated,” indeed un-American, show business—to seep into 
the everyday life of ordinary people.35 This theatricalization of the ev-
eryday by no means renders it frivolous, or mitigates the film’s affront 
to the patriotic. Heir to Karl Kraus’s dialect writers and comedians, Shi-
men, with his background in the Yiddish theater, delivers not just the 
groceries but also, straight from the Garden of Eden, a whole tradition of 
outlawed comic mimesis, where language reverts to gesture and where 
argument gets translated back into the expressive forms that make it 
possible.
Or, to put it in more Polonskyan terms: where the formal and ar-
got, far from standing in dialectical opposition, as high to low, operate 
in dialect-ical partnership, as process to product—specifically, as joke-
work to joke. The ambassador to the film from an all-but-annihilated 
culture—a culture as un-German as it is un-American—Shimen repre-
sents what remains of a radical Jewish comic formalism, a formalism 
(“independently of judgment”) that, bringing out as it does the gestur-
ing, gesticulating body hidden in genteel language, is also inevitably 
a materialism. For though Charley Davis indeed ends up repudiating 
one materialism—typified by the corrupting world of swell dames and 
swell apartments to which capitalist success condemns him—Shimen 
purveys another: a materialism of sensual pleasure—he’s a grocer, after 
all—without the usual sycophantic costs of betrayal and assassination. 
As Joseph Samuels/Sam Levene articulates Crossfire’s comic-materialist 
dream of a likeable world, so fellow character actor Shimen/Shimen 
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Ruskin, whose own funny name is never funnier than when it, too, tra-
verses the line between life and show, stands for an intolerable happi-
ness, the final destruction of which huac and its many collaborators will 
soon undertake, seeking to complete the work begun by their counter-
parts over in Europe.
Here again are Horkheimer and Adorno on the psychology of anti-
Semitism, from their text of 1947:
Those blinded by civilization have contacts with their own tabooed mi-
metic features only through certain gestures and forms of behavior they 
encounter in others, as isolated, shameful residues [als isolierte Reste, als 
beschämende Rudimente] in their rationalized environment. What repels 
them as alien is all too familiar: it lurks in the contagious gestures of 
an immediacy suppressed by civilization: gestures of touching, nestling, 
soothing, coaxing. What makes such impulses repellent today is their 
outmodedness.36
The antimimeticism—the mimetic shame—that can turn into genocidal 
anti-Semitism is by no means limited to the most obvious forms of Jew-
hatred: it manifests itself in, say, the Charley Davis who rejects Shimen’s 
offer of warmth and calls him a sucker, or in the Michael Rogin who 
represses one of his two scenes, or in the latter-day Jack Warner who 
decided, bizarrely but perhaps not so astonishingly, to delete Shimen’s 
line about Nazis killing Jews both from the latest reissue of the Body and 
Soul videotape and from the recently released dvd. Those “repelled” by 
Shimen and his kind might even include the Abraham Polonsky who, 
“when asked about the continuing Yiddishist themes in his work, . . . 
made jokes.”37 If the jokes themselves put off the Yiddishist themes, 
they also, of course, continue those themes. With his “tabooed mimetic 
features,” with his gestures and accent and name—“isolated, shameful 
residues in [the] rationalized environment”—Shimen, comedian and 
grocer, constitutes for Polonsky himself a guilty pleasure: the guilty plea-
sure of the primeval, old-world self, of the Pol(e) in Polonsky. For Rogin, 
whose account of “Jewish immigrants in the Hollywood melting pot” has 
achieved a certain paradigmatic status in cultural studies, a figure like 
Shimen is off-putting because he resists the masterplot of the Jewish- 
American success story, where “success” depends upon the master-
ful Jewish appropriation and exploitation of African American symbolic 
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labor: if not the Nazism of the Jews, Rogin’s culture industry is at least 
the racism of the Jews.38 For Polonsky, the trouble with Shimen—what 
makes the pleasure guilty—is also his failure to play the Man, albeit the 
Man of the left. In contrast with the muscular leftist popular culture to 
which the screenwriter of Body and Soul aspires, and which he embodies 
not just in Garfield but in a character like the angular, sharp-tongued, 
rigorously antistereotypical Jewish mother played by Anne Revere, 
Shimen, for all his radicalism, conjures up the “wrong” popular culture: 
metonym of the murdered maternal father, antonym of the feisty pa-
ternal mother, he recalls an “outmoded” popular culture of schmaltz 
and shtick and kitsch, a popular culture of the yiddishe Mama, of the 
Mamaloshen. Where the leftist egghead cracks wise to show he knows 
the ways of the street, Shimen’s comedy is of the more disconcertingly 
“touching” kind. A tender comrade indeed, Shimen, like Joseph Samuels, 
tenderizes comradeship to the point at which it might make another 
comrade nervous.39
Not that one has to be a leftist male intellectual like Polonsky, or like 
Rogin, to have this embarrassed relation to the film’s ambassador from 
mimetic prehistory. Repellently alien yet “all too familiar,” off-puttingly 
“outmoded” in the intimacy of his impulses, Shimen, inviting Charley 
to come in from the cold, would lure every shivering Cold War subject 
back into someplace like a winter garden: a pleasure dome like the Yid-
dish theaters that were themselves anachronistic survivors on the mean 
streets of Charley Davis’s Lower East Side. His initial invitation refused, 
the repressed Shimen returns to figure not just the gravity (“I’m like a 
grave”) that the film is otherwise reluctant to name as distinctively Jew-
ish, but also the performance matrix from which it even more ambiva-
lently derives: that of the distinctively Jewish levity (“say toodle-do”) to 
which his name itself pays documentary tribute.
Acknowledging its origins in an alternative and older Jewish popular 
culture—a comic culture less of the street than of the (undomesticated) 
playhouse, less of quarrels than of the “infectious gestures” behind the 
quarrels—the film nonetheless takes care to circumscribe the acknowl-
edgment. If it names its comic Jewish character after the comic Jewish 
actor who plays him, it makes sure that, even when Shimen returns for 
his “big” scene, this avatar of tabooed mimesis stays within the confines 
of a role so minor as to border on a cameo, and ends up—even before 
94	 chaP ter	three	
the 1993 censoring of his speech all but reduces him to a face on the 
cutting-room floor—looking less like an honored ancestor than like an 
“isolated, shameful residue” indeed. Nor can this circumscription of the 
acknowledgment, this freezing of the film’s assets, simply be dismissed 
as the work of the treacherously cynical director. About Polonsky’s own 
reticence concerning his work’s persistent Yiddishkayt, Paul Buhle and 
Dave Wagner write:
He was preoccupied with universal issues that go to the heart of Western 
culture and history, of capitalism and revolution, of loyalties and betray-
als that have less to do with ethnic identities than with the rise and fall of 
cultures and states. No doubt he long regarded the Jewish elements in his 
work as incidental, the necessary accretions to any story line that grows 
out of personal experience.40
Had Horkheimer and Adorno been asked to comment on Body and 
Soul, they might have pointed out what the film already knows: that the 
Jewish elements in Polonsky’s work are its universal issues. The “iso-
lated, shameful residues that survive in their rationalized environment,” 
or—in a phrase of Polonsky’s that makes him sound remarkably like 
Horkheimer and Adorno, “the undestroyed element left in human na-
ture”41—Polonsky’s continuing Yiddishist themes, emblematized and 
minoritized in Shimen’s “outmoded” name and accent and person, ata-
vistically rehearse a tabooed mimetic stage whose contagious gestures no 
one, not even the toughest modern customer, ever entirely escapes. As 
the unhappy fates of Body and Soul’s personnel attest—thanks to huac, 
no film has a longer casualty list, extending from star to screenwriter to 
supporting cast—something about the film seemed so repellently alien 
as to provoke the xenophobic rage of a congressional committee. The 
provocation, however, may have come less from the film’s overt political 
ideology than from its form, like “the singing tone of voice, which vividly 
animates a situation or a feeling independently of judgment”: from its 
traces of undomesticated mimesis, whose gravest offense, sufficient to 
raise the specter of the enemy within, consists, uncannily, in not being 
alien enough.
The film, that is, may construct a cordon sanitaire around the embar-
rassing icon of its “proud” ethnic identity, an ethnic identity that is at the 
same time an aesthetic lineage; and yet, one wonders about the efficacy 
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of this protective device, even as a means for producing an illusion of 
containment. For all that Shimen’s old-world performance style makes 
him seem as distant and archaic as the Garden of Eden, he personifies 
the capacity of the film itself—a critical and commercial hit—to deliver, 
into the homes not only of the self-avowedly Jewish Mrs. Davis and her 
neighbors, but also of the ethnically unmarked Mrs. America and hers, 
something juicier than a rather schematic anticapitalism: the promise, 
like that of grapes straight from Eden, of “an immediacy suppressed 
by civilization.” More subversive than the film’s explicit political theme, 
the tempting, staining fruit of mimesis is as sweet, as sticky, and as in-
toxicating as the wine with which Shimen and the others toast Charley’s 
upcoming victory and retirement. Charley himself, or the charismatic 
Garfield, is of course the official body and soul of the film’s leftist popu-
lar art. But like huac’s most monstrously representative member, John 
Rankin of Mississippi, who, as we have seen, entertained his colleagues 
by revealing the “real” Jewish names of various left-leaning movie stars, 
the committee as a whole would have had little trouble sniffing out the 
film’s “real” Jew, the racial precursor behind John Garfield and even 
Julius Garfinkle, the true performing body hidden within the virile, 
“American” encrustations of Hollywood star and New York actor alike. 
Behind Garfield, behind Garfinkle, the committee could easily have de-
tected the funny-sentimental bit player who would end up denouncing 
it—and who, without ever threatening to steal the show, never ceases to 
be disturbing, since a sucker like Shimen, at once victim and vampire, 
could suck even good Americans “back into a medium that is older than 
that of judgment.”
Figures like Shimen and Samuels/Levene are disturbing, that is, be-
cause, instead of merely satisfying the demand for prescribed ethnic 
performance within the great American variety show, they implicitly, 
and radically, reach out to “ethnicize” those who must seem untouched 
by them, who must appear to regard them from a safe distance. (Angli-
cizing “Rishkin,” “Ruskin” in turn gets yiddishized by “Shimen.” What 
kind of a name is Ruskin, anyway? Russian?) It is precisely such disturb-
ing figures who embody the mimetic Jewishness that every anti-Semite 
“has an instinctive urge to ape” but that, ashamed of this urge (itself mi-
metic), he sets out to destroy instead. For the blacklister as for the Nazi, 
“people like us,” that is, like Shimen, present the risk of a contagion too 
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desirable to be endured. With the pushiness ascribed by anti-Semites to 
Jews in general, a figure like Shimen mimes the regression of language 
to those “gestures of an immediacy suppressed by civilization: gestures 
of touching, nestling, soothing, coaxing.” Thus, when he says, for in-
stance, “This I suspected,” he sounds a little suspect himself, issuing 
his invitation to inversion, performing, in his “awkward” Yinglish, the 
pleasure of the syntactical somersault. But then, no less awkwardly, no 
less suspiciously, he flip-flops again, this time semantically: “That’s bad? 
It’s good.” As written by Abraham Lincoln Polonsky, these lines rewrite 
American English so that it “doesn’t sound American.” Or rather, they 
coax out the un-American accents already latent in American speech.42 
In the best Krausian way, Shimen’s—and Polonsky’s—“language imi-
tates the gestures of language,” as the syntactical reversals continue: 
“To the future retired champeen of the world, good luck. And to my 
five dollars that I bet on the fight, good luck too.” No, no, Mrs. Davis, 
it isn’t the money: more than the Jewish greed that routinely accom-
panies Jewish pushiness in one of anti-Semitism’s drearier vaudeville 
acts, what arouses suspicion here, along with the mimetic agitation of 
language’s body, is a similarly regressive “vivid animation,” in which 
things have feelings, a primitive, even Edenic, state of affairs, not to be 
confused with commodity fetishism, whereby luck, or happiness—the 
Yiddish glik means both—redounds to things and people alike. Thanks 
to Shimen’s happy idiomatic “mistake,” in other words, we glimpse a 
world like Crossfire’s world of likeable things, where “things” includes 
“people,” and where this objectification needn’t inspire terror. Indeed, 
the argotic acrobatics of the immigrant tongue bring us even closer 
to that world, by fracturing civilized rules of objecthood, affect, and 
affection.
What Horkheimer and Adorno call uncontrolled mimesis in fact 
evokes just such a precivilized world, for this mimesis bespeaks nothing 
so much as “the urge to lose oneself in identification with the Other,” 
especially the inanimate other.43 In mimesis, formalism and material-
ism become one. When, as in Karl Kraus’s or Shimen Ruskin’s jokes, 
language imitates the gestures of language, the gestures it imitates are 
those in which the personality animating language becomes saliently 
thing-like. Just as Crossfire’s things included people, so Body and Soul in-
vites us to imagine how, to borrow Polonsky’s words, the human might 
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include the inhuman, but an inhuman that has yet to assume the aspect 
of barbarism and cruelty. Hence, of course, the film’s intolerable seduc-
tion. Whether merging with “earth and slime”44 or, if he lives in the 
modern city, just with money, the mimetic comedian exemplifies the 
dirtiness anti-Semites love to hate, and hate to love, in all Jews—all of 
whom, conversely, they see as mimetic comedians, as “playing them-
selves,” albeit less obviously than Shimen or Jack Benny or Jerry Seinfeld 
or Roseanne. Far from compromising the moral gravity of his reference 
to European genocide, Shimen’s comic performance embodies the very 
thing that the Nazis had just tried to wipe out, and for which their nicer 
American cousins were busy preparing less drastic solutions. Over in 
Europe the Nazis are killing people like us because we make them laugh. 
Against that would-be final solution, Body and Soul tenders one last 
image. As Charley, who “never felt better in [his] life,” walks with his 
lover Peg away from the menacing Roberts, we see, just above the words 
“The End,” a sign saying “candies”: a sign, of course, of the old candy 
store, damaged but undestroyed, like “the undestroyed element in hu-
man nature,” back to which Shimen Ruskin would lead us.
That the destruction is neither over nor simply “over in Europe,” and 
that “people like us” doesn’t just mean “Jews,” are signaled in the film’s 
other decisive scene of instruction—like Crossfire, it has two—which im-
mediately follows the scene with Shimen in Mrs. Davis’s apartment. Af-
ter Shimen leaves and Charley explains to his mother and Peg that he’s 
throwing the fight, the champ returns to the training camp where he 
witnesses the death of Ben. The force of this scene undeniably has a lot 
to do with Ben’s lesson in courage: seeing him defy Roberts, Charley ul-
timately chooses to do the same in the film’s climactic fight scene. As in 
Crossfire, however, the shift from a Jewish to a non-Jewish teacher doesn’t 
mean that Jewish teaching has dropped out of the picture. Though that 
shift, in Crossfire, supposedly removes the taint of “Jewish propaganda,” 
it replaces “a Jewish person . . . or something” with something Jewish. 
And though the shift from Shimen to Ben, in Body and Soul, presumably 
helps the film transcend its “incidental” “Jewish elements” in favor of 
“universal issues,” the resulting universality must remain colored by the 
specificity of the Jewish and black performers who exemplify it. More-
over, if the final scenes of the film imply a continuity of Jewish and Af-
rican American pedagogies, this continuity extends beyond the message 
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of racial pride. To be sure, Ben, as Rogin points out, “echoes [Shimen’s] 
message: ‘It always felt so good after the fight. Walk down Lenox Ave-
nue. Kids all crazy for you. And proud.’ ”45 But like Jewish pride, black 
pride occasions embarrassment because it expresses itself in the shame-
ful rudimentary gestures of mimetic intimacy. The broadly histrionic, 
even pantomimic, manner in which Canada Lee performs Ben’s defiant 
death scene—as Rogin describes it, “the distraught black man collapses 
backward, gets up, starts swinging wildly, . . . and falls face down”—sug-
gests the mimetic excess attending the translation of language back into 
gesture.46 And the fact that Ben’s last name is Chaplin, just as the hero’s 
first name is Charley, locates both the black teacher and the Jewish pupil 
in a tradition of “popular art up to Chaplin and the Marx Brothers”: a pa-
riah tradition that, as Charles Chaplin’s emblematic place in it reminds 
us, neither limits its membership to Jews nor ever quite casts off the 
aura of Jewishness that surrounds it—and that would account for the 
anti-Communist harassment of both Chaplin and the actor who plays 
his fictional namesake.47
What makes Lee’s performance of Ben’s death scene almost painfully 
embarrassing is not just the “wildness” of his gestures but the way in 
which they inflect tragedy toward comedy. While powerfully evoking pity 
and terror, Ben’s delirium and death are staged in a way not inconsistent 
with Chaplinesque and Marxian modes of “buffoonery and clowning.” 
Even in his enactment of black pain and rage, Lee reveals a certain face 
of comic mimesis: his performance of anguish brings to mind “the gri-
maces of the comedian imitat[ing] the face of the person he parodies.” 
Not that Ben, or Shimen, or even Charley Davis, lacks something to gri-
mace about. But when is comic formalism ever a purely formal exercise, 
empty of affective content? With his voice, his face, his body, Canada 
Lee vividly animates a feeling like the pleasure Ben and Charley both 
experience after winning more than a fight (Ben: “It always felt so good”; 
Charley: “I never felt better in my life”)—or like the anger blacks and 
Jews both feel as a result of the genocidal violence directed against them 
because of their “tabooed mimetic features.”
Of course, to the extent that the film itself continues to find these mi-
metic features embarrassing, Charley’s big fight at the end will have to 
play up the virilizing anger at the expense of the feminizing pleasure—
so much so, in fact, as to go beyond, or rather, below, mimesis. For in 
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place of such gestures as “touching, nestling, soothing, and coaxing,” 
the climactic boxing match offers punching, bruising, maiming, and 
stupefying. And to the extent that the film’s embarrassment compels 
it to embrace a tough-guy popular culture instead of a tender-comrade 
popular culture—even Shimen, of course, wants Charley to win, though, 
importantly, to win the title of “retired champeen”—the big fight will 
seem to mark the knockout victory of an aesthetic derived from “street 
quarrels” over one derived from “Jewish jokes.” As a result, critics will 
forget about Charley’s relationship with Shimen and focus instead on 
his relationship with Ben, reducing the film to yet another instance of 
Jewish blackface, in which Jewish men appropriate the “authentic” mas-
culinity of black men, all the while submerging the jazz standard with 
which the film shares its title and making Peg a painter with a European 
accent, so as to effect what Rogin calls the film’s “European high-culture 
choice” and its “African American sacrifice.”48 But “European” doesn’t 
always have to mean “high-culture,” as demonstrated by Karl Kraus’s 
“sympathy for dialect writers and comedians, in preference to so-called 
high literature and in protest against it.” Just as Polonsky acknowledged 
his debt to “Jewish jokes and street quarrels” (emphasis added), making 
them one aesthetic rather than two, so are the black boxer from Harlem 
and the Jewish grocer from Europe performers in the same mimetic 
mode. Behind many a black prizefighter and many an Irish cop, today 
as in 1947, one can no doubt discover a soft or sweet Jewish man who 
mustn’t be seen too much. Sometimes, though, when there’s a Jewish 
person behind one of these butcher-looking figures, this may be be-
cause, as performers, the cop and the prizefighter are themselves radi-
cally “Jewish” comedians.
Best Picture
What happens when Jewish performance, far from being a matter of 
too much, becomes one of not enough—when the anxiety that you will 
turn into a Jew gives way to the anxiety that a Jew will turn into you? 
What happens, in other words, when the Jew is played by a wasp? This 
is the question posed by the third “Jewish” picture of 1947. The year’s 
big Oscar winner, Gentleman’s Agreement is now the least watchable 
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of the three films—for many of the same reasons that made it the big 
Oscar-winner. While Crossfire and Body and Soul both cannily assume 
the protective shading of noirish intrigue, mitigating the earnest didac-
ticism of the “social problem” picture or the improbable optimism of 
Popular Front melodrama, Gentleman’s Agreement makes no such ge-
neric amends for the middlebrow piety with which it treats its theme of 
anti-Semitism in America. Not that the film can be called artless. On the 
contrary, while Body and Soul and Crossfire revel in a look of low-budget 
grittiness, Gentleman’s Agreement, in the tradition of Important Pictures 
from The Life of Emile Zola to Crash, takes care to wrap its high-mindedness 
in an equally imposing glossiness. It even goes so far as to theorize the 
latter, in a speech one of its characters makes in defense of “things” and 
the human cathexis of them. But while Crossfire associates the fantasy of 
a world of likeable things with the film’s one Jewish character, Gentle-
man’s Agreement plays it safer and chooses as its spokesperson for mate-
rialism a young Christian divorcée, the hero’s girlfriend, who, showing 
him the quietly tasteful house she has built and decorated deep in the 
Connecticut suburbs whose “restricted” housing policies give the film 
its title, explains: “When you’re troubled and hurt, you pour yourself 
into things that can’t hurt back.” This observation almost amounts to the 
housing policy, or at least the design scheme, of the film itself which, 
recognizing that some things can hurt back, preemptively swathes itself 
and its characters in folds of discreet plushness, its silken empire flung 
from the hills of Darien to the offices and restaurants and apartments 
of Manhattan.
Pouring itself into an aesthetic of things-that-can’t-hurt-back, of gentle 
things, Gentleman’s Agreement becomes a textbook illustration of the gen-
tility it takes to task.49 Elia Kazan, who would win an Oscar for directing 
it, would remark, many years later: “Whenever I see it, it reminds me of 
the illustrations in ‘Redbook’ and ‘Cosmopolitan’ in those days. I mean, 
those people don’t shit.”50 (Or, as Kazan put it in 1952, in a supplement 
to his aggressively sycophantic testimony before huac: “I think it is in a 
healthy American tradition, for it shows Americans exploring a problem 
and tackling a solution.”51) The film’s thing-love, its materialism, that is, 
represents a choice of wasp good taste over Crossfire’s Jewish luxurious-
ness: a choice of safe things over funny things, of a defensive material-
ism over a comic materialism. To pour oneself into things that can’t hurt 
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back is not to “lose oneself in identification with Other,” as Horkheimer 
and Adorno articulate the aim of mimesis, but rather to guard against 
such mimetic self-dissolution. Unlike the Rabelaisian unfreezing of the 
laughter preserved in funny Jewish names, this liquefaction brings, in 
place of happiness, mere insurance against pain. And if liberatory thaw-
ing in no way precludes the luxurious comic congealment that makes 
things and people swell, the an-aesthetic of Gentleman’s Agreement re-
veals, as double of the liquid self, the brittle self. So fundamental is the 
film’s defensive protocol that it undergirds, and thus itself restricts, 
whatever comic “relief ” the film provides.
“Fundamental,” to be sure, need not mean “total”: the film cushions 
itself against being “hurt back” in part because it risks giving offense. If 
not quite as daring as it pretends to be—the film, for instance, fails to 
make the obvious connection between anti-Semitism “over in Europe” 
and anti-Semitism over here—Gentleman’s Agreement has enough au-
dacity to identify John Rankin as a professional anti-Semite. “Give me 
the lowdown on your gut when you hear about Rankin calling people 
kikes,” Phil Green, the Gentile hero, played by Gregory Peck, imagines 
saying to his Jewish friend. Though usually dismissed nowadays as 
timid and naive, Gentleman’s Agreement has the distinction of being the 
only pre-seventies Hollywood film, as far as I can tell, to denounce, if not 
huac itself, its then-presiding genius. Here playing the Jewish friend, 
Dave Goldman—a man of gold, what Robert Sklar calls “the Canada Lee 
role,”52 this film’s Jewish counterpart to Body and Soul’s dignified Afri-
can American—John Garfield observes, “There’s a funny kind of elation 
about socking back.” Which is to say that John Garfield is also playing 
the John Garfield role. And if this film’s idea of a happy ending is to have 
his character buy a house in previously “restricted” Connecticut, this as-
similationist triumph nonetheless puts the slugger from the street in the 
heart of Anglo-Saxon suburbia.53 Yet this happy ending is only structur-
ally comic. As in Body and Soul, John Garfield throws the punches while 
somebody else throws the punch lines. There may be a funny kind of 
elation about socking back at gentleman’s agreements and genteel anti-
Semitism, but that elation has nothing funny about it.
Rather, funniness here devolves into a merely parrying function, as 
comedy shrinks back into its anxious culture-industry stereotype. Lack-
ing Crossfire’s Jewish comic materialism, the film also lacks Body and 
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Soul’s Jewish comic formalism. Instead of imitating the gestures of lan-
guage, the comedy of this “solemn and self-important” film consists in 
deflecting them.54 Relegated to “supporting” status, but deprived, unlike 
their confreres in the other two films, of the contagiousness minority 
can confer, its two comedians epitomize two different ways of fending 
off an intimacy, whether with things or with people, that, in 1947, it is by 
no means paranoid to imagine as potentially hurtful. One of these two 
characters is an Einstein-like Jewish scientist, implausibly named Joe 
Lieberman, whose irreverently “brainy” jokes about Jewishness and anti-
Semitism exemplify, for Kathy Lacey, the film’s Christian heroine, the 
salutarily nonparanoid relation to those subjects, a refreshing exception 
to the rule of Jewish “oversensitivity.” As her journalist boyfriend, mas-
querading as a Jew, begins to merge alarmingly with the mask, Kathy, 
wanting him to lighten up a little, offers him the counterexample of 
Professor Lieberman, who “feels the problem [of anti-Semitism] deeply, 
but . . . has a sense of humor about it.” That Lieberman is played by Sam 
Jaffe, who would become another victim of the blacklist, testifies ironi-
cally to the ever greater need for a sense of humor against the crushing 
evidence of its defensive inefficacy.
As Jaffe shares Sam Levene’s first name and Shimen Ruskin’s fate, so 
his old-fashioned, almost vaudevillian, character resembles Levene’s in 
Crossfire and Ruskin’s in Body and Soul—or would resemble them, were 
Gentleman’s Agreement the kind of film to indulge in such comic ata-
vism.55 Preferring a sleeker, more “modern” comic personation, it more 
prominently features its other comic character—a chic but good-hearted 
fashion editor played by Celeste Holm, who, polishing her trademark 
role as the wisecracking gal who gets the laughs but not the guy, picked 
up as her consolation prize an Oscar for her supporting performance. 
Of that performance, Kazan rather ungraciously remarks: “Celeste 
Holm did well, but she got an Oscar because she had [screenwriter] 
Moss Hart’s wittiest lines.”56 In 1947, the same year in which he was 
writing those lines, Hart—as if he had read Horkheimer and Adorno, 
or at least met them—said of Hollywood: “It is a very totalitarian town. 
Its people are the most frightened of those in any industry.”57 Without 
endorsing Kazan’s backhanded compliment, I would still suggest that 
Hart explicates the political terror behind both his own (Jewish) wit and 
Holm’s hysterical (but non-Jewish) embodiment of it. With huac and 
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the studio heads cracking down, and with assassination in the air, the 
witty woman’s wisecracks signify not a potentially subversive sharpness 
and looseness of tongue, but rather a self-consciousness so compulsive 
as to become self-policing, beating the cops themselves to the punch. 
And though Holm’s character, Anne Dettrey, does finally stop biting her 
tongue long enough to accuse Kathy of “hypocrisy” with respect to the 
Jewish question, this “catty” outburst, as Anne characterizes it, marks 
both wit’s end and the end of her viability in the narrative. Proposing 
to replace Kathy in Phil’s affections, in effect proposing to him period, 
she commits sexual suicide, driving him back into Kathy’s arms, so that, 
after the happy ending that puts a Jew in Connecticut, comes the even 
happier one that puts the Christian male and Christian female leads 
together again.
Thanks to Holm’s fashion editor, the repellent “pushiness” of the Jew 
gets displaced onto the secondary, not to say minoritized, woman—a 
self-styled “sophisticated New Yorker,” rather like Moss Hart himself. 
Comic and cosmopolitan (or at least as cosmopolitan as Cosmopolitan 
magazine), but not comicosmopolitan—she must not be permitted to 
relax long enough for wit to soften into pleasure—Holm’s Anne is fre-
quently paired with Garfield’s Dave, as if to imply an affinity less roman-
tic than sibling. Ring Lardner Jr., is said to have quipped that the moral 
of the film is “that you should never be mean to a Jew, because he might 
turn out to be a gentile.”58 But the film—which could have been called 
Jewish Like Me—also shows how a Gentile might turn out to be a Jew. In 
keeping with the assimilationist project of Gentleman’s Agreement, racial 
cross-dressing here presupposes—and demonstrates—the minimalism 
of Jewish difference, as opposed to its mimetic hypervisibility in Crossfire 
and Body and Soul. Peering into the mirror as he conceives his plan to 
play Jewish, Phil sizes himself up thus: “Dark hair, dark eyes. Sure. So 
has Dave. So have a lot of guys who aren’t Jewish. No accent, no man-
nerisms. Neither has Dave.” In this decor of upholstered things and sub-
tilized people, “Jewish” and “Gentile” traits are exchanged so equitably 
that the film even ends up producing a paranoia for Christians.
Yet comedy’s role here is to allay anxiety, not to provoke it. Like Lieb-
erman’s healthy sense of humor, Anne’s pathological wit seeks to ap-
pease the true wielders of power. The film’s comedy, that is, can only 
compensate for its Garfield-like pugnacity, instead of reinventing more 
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shamefully rudimentary gestures, like the reaching and touching that 
get rebuffed as pushiness. The film’s strategy worked insofar as it got 
its three Oscars—more than Body and Soul’s one or Crossfire’s none. Al-
most at the same moment, however—in October and November of 1947, 
to be exact—the comedians were beginning to face the assassins, and 
we know what would happen in the next few years to John Garfield, 
and to Sam Jaffe, and to Anne Revere, who here plays mother not to 
Garfield but to Peck. Of course, everybody dies, to quote Garfield, or, 
rather, Garfield’s character, in Body and Soul. Moody, tough, or solemn, 
all three Jewish pictures of 1947 record an increasingly petrifying cli-
mate for Jews, for African Americans, for Communists, for liberals, for 
witty women, and for comedy itself. All three of them accordingly sub-
ject comedy to a certain isolating procedure, as a result of which not too 
many laughs seem to be in store. Two of them, however, take advan-
tage of the chilly climate as a means precisely to store the laughter that 
might appear merely dead but that, like a deadpan expression, keeps the 
promise of happiness alive. By turning their apparent seriousness into a 
medium for comedy’s survival, these Jewish pictures, pictures of forgot-
ten ancestors coming back to life, show us radically old ways to come in 
and get a little warm.
❨ 4 ❩
Collaborators
Schulberg, Kazan, and A Face in the Crowd
About Kazan, I put it three ways: One, I wouldn’t want to be 
buried in the same cemetery with the guy. Two, if I was on a desert 
island with him I’d be afraid to fall asleep because he’d probably eat 
me for breakfast. Three, we’ve already given him the Benedict Arnold 
award, which is usually reserved for presidential assassins. 
Except he didn’t kill a president, just his friends.
—abraham polonsky 
The writer Budd Schulberg and the director Elia Kazan made two films 
together: On the Waterfront in 1954 and A Face in the Crowd in 1957. 
The first, a widely celebrated and hugely influential Hollywood classic, 
perhaps the definitive fifties American film, was the Oscar champion of 
its year, winning awards for best picture, best actor, best director, and 
best screenplay, among others. The second fared considerably less well. 
As François Truffaut observed in Cahiers du cinéma, A Face in the Crowd 
“was a vivid disappointment to the American public and to the French 
public as well—almost surely because it is the exact opposite of On the 
Waterfront and because one must attack today whomever one flattered 
yesterday.”1 No mere extrinsic circumstance of the films’ reception, the 
imperious protocol of flattery and attack, as we shall see, inheres defini-
tively in both Schulberg-Kazan collaborations, not only as subject matter 
but also as organizing principle. But why does Truffaut think that A Face 
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in the Crowd is “the exact opposite of On the Waterfront”? The opposition, 
it seems, consists in the fact that while the earlier film is “basically 
demagogic,” the later one can be described as “anti-fascist,” even as a 
brilliantly satirical analysis—“as inexorable as a ‘Mythology’ of Roland 
Barthes”—of “the capricious career of Senator Joseph McCarthy (whom 
the authors had in mind).”2
Kazan, for one, denied that A Face in the Crowd is about McCarthy, 
but, in his autobiography, he quotes extensively from a review of the film 
in the Communist Party’s People’s World that makes Truffaut’s broader 
point rather more polemically:
When two stool pigeon witnesses before the Un-American Committee 
[sic] conspire to produce one of the finest progressive films we have seen 
in years, something more than oversimplification of motives is needed to 
explain it. Both Budd Schulberg . . . and Elia Kazan . . . did not hesitate to 
betray what both believed in before the witch-hunting House Committee. 
But they must have learned something during their days in the progres-
sive movement and motion picture audiences will be the beneficiaries. A 
Face in the Crowd is a hard-hitting exposé of the television industry and the 
way a hillbilly guitar plucker can be built up to be a national menace.3
With its sexy, Christ-like stoolpigeon of a hero, On the Waterfront has 
been viewed, even by its star, Marlon Brando, as a defense, indeed as a 
glamorization, of Kazan’s and Schulberg’s own “friendly” testimony be-
fore the House Un-American Activities Committee, for which they both 
obligingly recited the names of their former associates in the Communist 
Party.4 A diabolical inversion of Polonsky and Rossen’s Body and Soul, 
On the Waterfront turns gangster capitalism into gangster communism, 
and locates its boxer hero’s triumph not in his choice of radical solidar-
ity over the glittering corruptions of “success,” but rather in his decision 
to cooperate with a remarkably avuncular “Crime Commission,” by in-
forming on the crooks who run the labor union to which he belongs. If 
not as inexorable as one of Barthes’s “Mythologies,” On the Waterfront 
provoked Barthes to write one, distinguishing itself, in his words, as “a 
good example of mystification,” whose aim is a “passive acknowledg-
ment of the eternal boss,” and in which “what is orchestrated for us . . . is 
the restoration of order.”5 Coming three years after the demagogic Water­
front, and in the year of Joseph McCarthy’s death, A Face in the Crowd 
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might well seem to stand as an antifascist palinode, as a demystification 
of the very media-powered, pseudopopulist demagogy—figured here 
less as McCarthyite, to be sure, than as generically southern-fried—with 
which the more successful film and its authors had collaborated. I want 
to argue, however, that A Face in the Crowd is in no way the opposite 
of On the Waterfront, and that both Schulberg-Kazan collaborations are 
acts of collaboration in the political as well as the professional sense. Far 
from atoning for On the Waterfront, and far from attesting to the victory 
of an irrepressible “progressive” spirit over collaborationist treachery, 
A Face in the Crowd extends and refines On the Waterfront’s project of 
glorifying that model citizen of the long 1950s whose end we have yet to 
see: the American sycophant. However eagerly (forgivingly, vindictively) 
one might expect the sycophant’s apology, what one gets instead is the 
sycophant’s apologia—or rather, more of the sycophant’s apologia, since 
A Face in the Crowd picks up where On the Waterfront left off.6 A Face in 
the Crowd failed where On the Waterfront succeeded, I will also argue, 
not because of a nonexistent thematic opposition, but because of the dif-
ferent way in which it misrepresents the sycophant’s essentially adoles-
cent experience of humiliation as the sycophant’s essentially adolescent 
fantasy of revenge.7
This difference can be evoked, perhaps, in terms of temperature: where 
the perverse genius of On the Waterfront centers on its trick of taking the 
stoolpigeon—hitherto, in Hollywood anyway, a despicable, even repul-
sive figure, as exemplified by the simian title character in John Ford’s 
The Informer (1935)—and making him cool, which is to say making him 
Marlon Brando, Face, as I will sometimes call it, typically gets character-
ized as “hysterical,” “frenetic,” and “overheated.”8 Notoriously anything 
but a cinematic prude, Pauline Kael, for instance, remarks of the film’s 
cast, “They could all use a good cold shower.”9 “It never hurt none to play 
hard-to-get,” says the film’s mock-folksy protagonist, but the film itself 
seems not to be listening. Though by no means free from stridency, On 
the Waterfront, like its permanent teen rebel of a star, seduces with its 
general aura of rough, brooding naturalism.10 Less winningly, A Face 
in the Crowd, playing up Actors Studio “intensity” rather than Actors 
Studio “grittiness,” invests this intensity in a bullying tendentiousness 
as grotesque as its supposedly charismatic hillbilly guitar-plucker’s to-
talitarian megalomania.11
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That the film itself, like its media-spawned monster, registers as “hys-
terical” points to a difference of genre as well as to one of temperature 
between the two Schulberg-Kazan collaborations: unlike the impecca-
bly “dramatic” On the Waterfront, A Face in the Crowd hysterically as-
pires to be hysterical—in the sense of the term that movie reviewers (no 
strangers to sycophancy themselves) increasingly prefer to “hilarious.” 
“There’s a lot of humor in it,” Kazan told an interviewer. “I’ve never 
done anything as funny as this.”12 Which may not seem to be saying 
much: Kazan’s status as the preeminent American director of the 1950s, 
in Hollywood as on Broadway, never rested on his comic touch. And yet, 
in its very shrillness, Kazan and Schulberg’s will-to-comedy in A Face in 
the Crowd is not without value for the fledgling discipline of sycoanalysis. 
For, whatever its defects from the viewpoint of seduction, the authors’ 
hysterical pursuit of funniness reveals, more clearly than their solemnity 
in Waterfront, how much the sycophant—whose canary-like informing 
typically pigeonholes him as a singer—owes to a certain type of come-
dian: the type of comedian, in fact, whom Kazan and Schulberg had to 
inform on to continue making movies in the Hollywood of the blacklist, 
and whose mutilated body, I would go so far as to claim, constitutes 
the unacknowledged, unacknowledgeable ground of any collaborationist 
film whatsoever, not just the two by these particular collaborators.
As I have suggested, huac’s preoccupation with alleged Communist 
influence in Hollywood was itself a “front”—to speak the committee’s 
own language—for a more diffuse, more powerful, and far less present­
able obsession.13 Under the pretext of hunting for Communists, huac, 
and later McCarthy and company, conducted a campaign against a related 
but rather different form of international or subversively un-American 
activity: the cosmopolitan mimesis whose universality modern civi-
lization refuses to tolerate, or even to recognize, and circumscribes in-
stead in the figure of the comic Jew. Sam Levene’s Samuels in Crossfire, 
Shimen Ruskin’s Shimen in Body and Soul: these are the redundantly 
named atavistic avatars of the infectious comic materialism and comic 
formalism that must be exterminated lest, in their incorrigibly touching 
way, they reach out and en-Jew the entire American population, com-
pleting the work of cultural contamination already begun by “Franklin 
D. Rosenfeld” ’s New Deal and by the recently ended Second World 
War.14 More unnervingly intimate, more insidiously inviting, than any 
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“Communist ideology”—in which, for all their own manifest hysteria, 
the members of huac had little interest, and of which they had even 
less knowledge—the Jewish mimetic comedian, or chameleon, none-
theless raised the specter of a radical foreign conspiracy to undermine the 
American way of life, which is why a wildly disproportionate number of 
both blacklistees and informers were Jews. When, by a happy coincidence, 
one of the comedians turned out—like Shimen Ruskin, or Abraham 
Polonsky, or, as we shall see in chapter six, like Judy Holliday or Zero 
Mostel—to have been a member or an ally of the Communist Party as 
well, the war on Jewish cosmopolitan comic chameleonism found its 
alibi, along with a “c” word it could use, in a war on Communism, the 
alibi deriving more credibility still from the official left’s partly deserved 
reputation for humorlessness. Who would take seriously a Committee 
against Comedy? But a committee to rid the nation of “screwballs” and 
“crackpots” and “kooks” with recognizably leftist politics: that is no laugh-
ing matter.15 huac’s investigations extended beyond the world of enter-
tainment, but the committee members would not have been the first or 
the last tourists to have trouble tearing themselves away from Babylon 
for more wholesome destinations. To fulminate against “Hollyweird” is 
to advertise the psychosexual animus for which fifties anti-Communism 
provided a more sober and more respectable cover.16 Denunciations of 
“Hollyweird,” of course, perpetuate the homophobia that has played 
such an indispensable role in U.S. culture at least since the Cold War. 
But the same oafish bon mot also betrays the resentment that has always 
suspected, among the “cultural elite”—as opposed to, say, the real elite—
about whom there is by definition something funny, and who would 
shove or push themselves down the nation’s throat, the homosexual’s 
Jewish cousin, the Svengali behind the “liberal media” for which the 
fifties “Communist,” least enviable of all these weirdos, proved a highly 
convenient surrogate.
Both self-styled liberal anti-Communists, Kazan and Schulberg liked 
to imagine themselves as manfully resisting all tyranny, “whether fas-
cist or Communist.”17 Here is a typically symmetrizing comment from 
Schulberg on his leftist critics: “They question our talking [about them]. 
I question their silence [about Stalin]. There were premature anti-fascists 
but there were also premature anti-Stalinists.”18 Or, as he says of his 
blacklisted former friends: “These are Nazis posing as libertarians.”19 
110	 chap ter	four	
In sycophantic theory—a morality of revenge, like most moralities—I 
betray you because you betrayed me, or rather, the democracy of which 
I am the champion. In sycophantic practice, however, the liberal anti-
Communist’s fetish of symmetry breaks down, ostensibly because the 
tyranny of the left is in fact even worse than the tyranny of the right. I 
quote Schulberg again: “You’re called by huac, and you don’t want to 
act to endorse its thought control, but you know the greatest thought 
control you’ve experienced was from the Party.”20 Because Communist 
thought control is so egregious, you act to endorse anti-Communist 
thought control even though you don’t want to. The asymmetry 
works the other way, however, once the abstractions are dropped and 
“Communism” or “the Party” becomes, say, the group of left-wing 
screenwriters whom you name, while “anti-Communism” becomes the 
bloodthirsty congressional committee before whom you name them. At 
this point, in other words, the act of naming names presents itself in 
its dual aspect, as at once a surrender and an assassination: a surrender 
to those with the power to get you fired, and an assassination of those 
without power, whose blacklisting indeed reduces them to the silence 
for which you reproach them.21
As we have seen, the “friendly” performance before huac, which 
Victor S. Navasky calls a “degradation ceremony,” required both the sur-
render and the assassination: it was not enough merely to degrade one-
self, to confess one’s own political sins; in order to escape blacklisting, 
one had to give the committee the names of one’s associates in the Com-
munist Party—or rather, in most cases, to repeat back to the commit-
tee the names that it already had from its collaborators in the fbi.22 To 
become the “friend” of the state, in other words, one had to be seen 
helping the state to kill one’s friends, as Polonsky puts it. And when two 
such friendly killers, two such friend-killers, get together and befriend 
each other—“there was an immediate warm sympathy between us. We 
became brothers,”23 Kazan remarks of his first meeting with Schulberg, 
soon after they both testified—the treachery built into the American so-
cial contract, and increasingly routinized in the postwar war on comi-
cosmopolitanism, betrays itself with chilling clarity. Not that huac in-
vented the figure of the good citizen as assassin. In a book on Vichy 
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whose actual title is Psychanalyse de la collaboration, the co-author Jean-
Paul Abribat formulates the imperative of the collaborators as follows: 
“asservir les autres, en se faisant les servants de cet Autre obscur qui 
n’existe pas.”24 How quickly, though, America translated this principle 
into its own reign of terror, as if desperate to import the very thing it had 
just spent four years helping to defeat overseas. And how easily, not to 
say how predictably, American state terror, in its rush to flex its muscles 
by making spectacular examples of bad citizens, recruited accomplices 
among the semicriminal classes themselves: among, that is, the artists, 
intellectuals, and “foreigners” most likely to cause trouble for the regime, 
and whose treasonous tendencies needed to be counteracted by a care-
fully staged, widely publicized, government-sponsored trahison des clercs. 
When collaboration came to the States in the late forties and early fifties, 
Schulberg and Kazan, at any rate, distinguished themselves as unusu-
ally diligent servants of the big American Other: few could match them 
in the zeal with which they served that Other by producing and then 
standing on the piled-up remains of the un-Americans among whom 
they otherwise risked losing themselves.25 (Kazan, an Anatolian Greek, 
on being treated as a social nonperson during his undergraduate days 
at Williams College: “Those Anglos making the choices, what did they 
think? That I was a Jew boy? Yes, I looked like one.”26) Helping the au-
thorities by pointing out the sinister jokers in our midst, doing their best 
to please their illusory yet no less intimidating masters, performing, in 
short, the abject pseudocomedy of appeasement, Schulberg and Kazan, 
not just in A Face in the Crowd but already in their huac testimonies, 
both commit comedicide and, as murderers sometimes do, assume their 
victims’ identity. With an exemplarity more than bordering on overkill, 
each of these friendly witnesses pays the sycophant’s sincerest tribute to 
the comedian he has just slain: virtuosos of imitative betrayal, mimics of 
the mimesis they destroy, they pay, that is, the backhanded compliment 
of the flattery that attacks and the attack that flatters.27
Schulberg testified before huac in 1951, still indignant about how, ten 
years earlier, the Communist Party had compelled one of its book re-
viewers to supplant a flattering review of his novel, What Makes Sammy 
Run?, with an attack on it. Driven by that instance of thought control not 
only to renounce his own Communist Party membership but also, now, 
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to give the committee the names of fifteen other Communists, Schul-
berg, like most “cooperative” witnesses, finds his cooperation rewarded 
with a demand for more of the same. “I am sure that I, as a member of 
the committee,” says Congressman Clyde Doyle of California, “would not 
want to lose the opportunity to give you every opportunity to give us any 
suggestion you might have, if you have any, any processes or any action, 
any attitude that we should take with reference to any possible remedial 
legislation to meet the present subversive misconduct of people.”28 Every 
inch the Hollywood prince—as he dubs himself in the subtitle of his au-
tobiography, which stops well before his huac testimony29—Schulberg, 
evincing throughout this testimony the peculiar combination of entitle-
ment and panic that is the birthright of every studio executive’s son, 
knows his audience well enough to give it what it wants: a slightly im-
proved imitation of its ineloquent, fatuous, terrifying self. Here is his 
response to the congressman’s invitation:
On the subject of outlawing the Communist Party, my mind itself is not 
made up. I think there are some reasons for that. As long as some line 
can be drawn between simply political action and all this other business 
that goes on. I feel if the thing is outlawed it will probably spring up un-
der some other name. That part is the problem . . . which is how do you 
get people not to join these other groups, whichever they are, that come 
out under this name. I feel that that is a question of finding an American 
organization, American activities which will give the American people the 
ability they have always had to protest, to talk up for the underdog, to 
have humanitarian impulses and so forth without falling into the hands 
of these people who use these causes, and the Civil Rights Congress I am 
convinced is an example of that.30
To be a sycophant, in other words to be a pseudocomedian, is necessar-
ily to imitate the powerless as well as the powerful, the imitators as well 
as the imitated. As “pseudo” suggests, however, Schulberg’s imitation 
of the comedian he attacks is no less approximate than his imitation of 
the congressman he flatters. Roger Caillois characterizes the animal be-
havior of mimétisme, ordinarily taken to be a means of self-defense—for 
a human analogy, think of the practice, in the American melting pot, 
called assimilation—as in fact “un luxe dangereux,” because the mimetic 
animal, as if carried away by the sheer thrill of mimesis, mimics its sur-
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roundings even at the risk of its own destruction.31 Where a cosmopoli-
tan comedian-chameleon, pushing imitation beyond the boundaries of 
identity governing flattery and attack, would have thrown himself with 
almost suicidal extravagance into the jargon of American patriotism, 
Schulberg’s sycophantic chameleonism, a mockery of the mimesis that 
might have been, distinguishes itself by the cringing, calculating self-
protectiveness of its crowd-pleasing antics, by the piety of its parody.32 
“An American organization,” “American activities,” “the American peo-
ple”: this is no doubt parody of the dominant discourse, parody filled 
with ambivalence “and so forth,” but it is parody Hollywood­style, which 
is to say, the Jewish parvenu’s attempt to keep the Cossacks from killing 
him by singing them their favorite songs—and also, in Schulberg’s case, 
where the parvenu becomes a pigeon, by singing, period.33 Far from 
“talk[ing] up for the underdog,” and even further from letting the un-
derdog talk up for itself, this chauvinistic blather, so earnestly rehearsed 
here for official consumption, not only talks up for the top-dog, but does 
so by offering it new underdogs to chew on (“the Civil Rights Congress I 
am convinced is an example of that”). To be sure, Schulberg stops short 
of endorsing the “outlawing of the Communist Party”—a move that, in 
1951, would have been somewhat superfluous34—but he no more hesi-
tates to entice huac with the prospect of fresh victims (“these people 
who use these causes”) than he has balked at throwing the committee 
the red meat of the fifteen people he has already named, and whose ca-
reers in the dog-eat-dog world of Hollywood he has thus helped to end, 
while of course saving his own. (Before his huac appearance, Schulberg 
had himself been named by another informer.)35
As much pseudomimesis as pseudocomedy, sycophancy is grimly pa-
rodic for another reason besides its devotion to telling the big Other 
what it wants to hear. In its contempt not just for those it imitates but 
for the mimetic and comic principle of pleasure itself, it resembles 
“the practical joke,” which, according to Horkheimer and Adorno, “is a 
wretched parody of fulfillment.” In this respect, or rather, in this disre-
spect, sycophantic pseudomimesis is a paradigm as well as a parody. As 
Horkheimer and Adorno go on to suggest,
Anyone who sniffs out “bad” smells in order to extirpate them may imi-
tate to his heart’s content the snuffling which takes its unrationalized 
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pleasure in the smell itself. Disinfected by the civilized sniffer’s absolute 
identification with the prohibiting agency, the forbidden impulse eludes 
the prohibition. If it crosses the threshold, the response is laughter. That 
is the schema of the anti-Semitic reaction.36
The sycophant’s literal resentment is the very model of anti-Semitism: a 
mimesis of mimesis, anti-Semitism is essentially (to borrow once again 
from Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s declension) a re-sniffing, a permissible 
indulgence of the lowly sense of smell, an “imitation”—for the purpose 
of detection, and for the good of social hygiene—of somebody else’s “un-
rationalized pleasure,” somebody else’s dangerous luxury, somebody 
else’s perverted eroticism of the nose.37 The mimetic organ par excel-
lence, as Horkheimer and Adorno point out, the Jew’s nose affords him 
or her so intimate and so intense a “pleasure in the smell itself ” as to 
dissolve the boundaries between him or her and it, between smeller and 
smell. (Indeed, the nose may be the only part of the Jew that survives 
all chameleonic metamorphoses.) When comic mimicry goes this far, 
not just individual subjects but the social order itself is threatened with 
disintegration, since everyone might want to mimic the mimic, to enjoy 
en-Jewment. And when this crisis arises, it is time for that special inves-
tigator, that professional re-smeller, that re-sentment artist known as the 
sycophant to go to work, tracking down the “bad” smell that the mimetic 
Jew has become. And if the sycophant “happen[s] to be Jewish,”38 as 
Budd Schulberg says of himself, all the better: with the primitive and 
yet highly evolved sensory apparatus that is at once his racial blessing 
and his racial curse, he will know just whom to smell, and just how to 
smell them.
A civilized bloodhound on the scent of dirty underdogs, Schulberg the 
collaborator may not betray any more Jewish self-hatred than Schulberg 
the author of the allegedly anti-Semitic What Makes Sammy Run?39 
But, in his “absolute identification with the prohibiting agency,” with 
the comedicidal state, where laughter is allowed only if it destroys the 
comic, Schulberg the collaborator inflicts that state’s violence as he puts 
on its power. Of course, for the sycophant, neither an underdog nor a 
top-dog but always a middle-dog—like the snob, with whom he has so 
much in common—that power can only be put on. Like his brother sa-
dist, the practical joker, the sycophant takes pleasure in giving pain, his 
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cruelty not just sanctioned and rewarded by the state but in fact required 
by it. Sycophancy, we recall, is a normal perversion: an obligatory perver­
sion.40 Yet the sycophant knows very well, whether or not he admits it 
to himself, not only that his license to kill can be revoked if he fails to 
maintain the proper patriotic straight face while using it, but also that, in 
the no-nonsense “organization” that he serves, the extirpators can easily 
become objects of extirpation themselves. In its middleness, sycophancy 
might seem like a strategy for having it both ways, for being at once 
Jew and Nazi: for enjoying the “forbidden impulse” of comic mimesis 
and, at the same time, for assuming the deadly force of the eternal boss 
in whose service you keep busy extirpating it. Yet sycophancy lets you 
have it neither way. For though “the forbidden impulse eludes the pro-
hibition” as long as it does not “cross[ . . . ] the threshold” into mortify-
ing laughter, the possibility of that social death reduces your sniffing 
to the furtive, vicarious exercise of a rationalized pleasure, to the mere 
eagerness-to-please that is a “wretched parody” of comic pleasure. And 
though your identification with the prohibiting agency makes you feel 
like a man, that very identification, as any Hollywood prince should 
know, is what keeps you a boy, since identifying with power means sub-
mitting to it. (Even in his nineties, Schulberg remains “Budd.”) “Yes, 
sir.” “No, sir.” “I will cooperate with you in any way I can”:41 Schulberg’s 
testimony demonstrates that he learned his lines well, even if he persists 
in not quite understanding their implications, retrospectively according 
himself, for example, a fantasmatic critical distance from huac’s power, 
as though he had negotiated with it in the manner of a free agent. His 
misgivings about “act[ing] to endorse” huac’s “thought control” evade 
the recognition that, instead of endorsing it, he enforced it, in the subor-
dinate way in which a prince, or any other court favorite, carries out the 
orders of the king.
As we turn from Schulberg to the even feistier Kazan, misgivings 
about huac and company give way to outright disdain: “I never said I 
liked McCarthy, I despised him, I really and truly did, I said that pub-
licly all the time. I said, ‘I’m embarrassed at being connected at all with 
these people.’”42 But what is more authentically adolescent than “really 
and truly” despising your parents? And who is more “embarrassed at 
being connected” with such losers than the cool suburban teenager?43 
To an interviewer who asks him how the hostility toward his friendly 
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testimony has affected him, Kazan responds: “I think it made a man of 
me. Up to then, I was the blue-eyed boy, everybody’s darling. . . . I was 
essentially an other-directed man, I was really working for the praise of 
others, for the notices in the papers. This thing made me say: well, not 
everybody likes me, I’ve lost many of my best friends. . . . I said, okay, 
I’m going to satisfy myself now, not the critics, not even my friends.”44 
In his autobiography and elsewhere, Kazan made a point of portraying 
his youthful self as an angry immigrant outsider in America, hiding his 
resentment of “Anglos” and other insiders beneath the serviceability 
that earned him the nickname “Gadg,” short for “Gadget.”45 (The syco-
phant does not resent just the Jew, although resenting the Jew, or anyone 
else thought to enjoy the perversion of unrationalized pleasure, is one 
of the requirements for becoming a sycophant.) Having spent the first 
half of his life as a non-Jewish “Jew boy” (who even looked Jewish), as an 
“other-directed” pariah longing in vain for the love of his hated wasp op-
pressors, Kazan regarded his huac testimony as the crisis that liberated 
him into the tragic grandeur of manly maturity:
I don’t say that what I did was entirely a good thing. What’s called a “dif-
ficult decision” is a difficult decision because either way you go, there 
are penalties, right? What makes some things difficult in life is: if you’re 
marrying one woman you’re not marrying another woman, if you go one 
course you’re not going another course. But I would rather do what I did 
than crawl in front of a ritualistic Left and lie the way those other com-
rades did, and betray my own soul. I didn’t betray it, I made a difficult 
decision.46
What Kazan did, of course, was to crawl in front of a ritualistic Right. 
But, like Schulberg flattering himself with the fantasy that he “endorsed” 
huac, Kazan mistakes his abjection for existential heroism. So grossly 
misreading his servile complicity with the committee, he can also, like 
many informers, ignore (or pretend to ignore) the larger resemblance 
between American anticommunism and the Soviet totalitarianism that 
it showily opposes. The American sycophant needs America to be the 
land of the free so that he can construe his sycophancy as the act of a 
free man: a difficult but brave act, like dumping one woman to marry an-
other, or like betraying your friends so as not to betray your own soul.
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One is never a sycophant now: one can only have been a sycophant 
then. (“I was ratting on myself all them years,” On the Waterfront’s 
Terry Malloy says of his subservience to mob—i.e., Party—discipline.) 
Kazan’s conversion narrative turns obsessively on the image of crawling: 
he would rather do what he did than “crawl in front of a ritualistic Left”; 
he quit the Communist Party because, as he wrote in his prepared state-
ment to huac, “the last straw came when I was invited to go through 
a typical Communist scene of crawling and apologizing and admitting 
the error of my ways.”47 The equivalent, for Kazan, of Schulberg’s hu-
miliation by the Party over What Makes Sammy Run?, the “typical Com-
munist scene of crawling,” or Kazan’s recollection of it, is also the straw 
that finally overcomes his reluctance to name names—he met with 
huac in January of 1952 but refused to inform—and sends him back to 
the committee three months later, to offer the names of eleven former 
“comrades,” along with an account of how each of the films and plays 
he has directed thus far is “thoroughly and wonderfully American,” “op-
posite to the picture which Communists present of Americans.”48 (“A 
Tree Grows in Brooklyn. . . . It is a typically American story and could 
only happen here, and a glorification of America not in material terms, 
but in spiritual ones.” “Gentleman’s Agreement. Picture version of the 
best-selling novel about anti-Semitism. It won an academy award and 
I think it is in a healthy American tradition, for it shows Americans 
exploring a problem and tackling a solution.”49) Nor was Kazan content 
to stop there: two days after his cooperative testimony, in an apparent 
access of hit-man’s euphoria, he published an advertisement in the New 
York Times in which he congratulated himself for shattering the “se-
crecy [that] serves the Communists” and thus for showing “the people 
of this country . . . how to protect ourselves from a dangerous and alien 
conspiracy and still keep the free, open, healthy way of life that gives us 
self-respect.”50 These are noble words, even nobler for Kazan’s omission 
of any reference to how his Hollywood studio had been pressuring him 
to give in to huac.51 They are nobler, too—though perhaps less can-
did—than the words with which Kazan describes his soul-searching in 
his autobiography: “Cornered and angry, I wanted to name everybody, 
break open the secrecy, not only of those in our cell but of everyone else 
I knew to be ‘in,’ at any time. . . . I was against them all. I wanted to hit 
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the Party’s elite especially hard; pull them down into the muck with me. 
I knew damned well they weren’t good for the country.”52 Here, Kazan’s 
patriotism looks like a mere afterthought, a flimsy cover not just for his 
lifelong vindictiveness—which, he admits, propelled him into the Com-
munist Party in the first place53—but for something even “darker”: the 
re-sentful compulsion to imitate, even to wallow in, another’s smelly 
nasal eroticism, a compulsion that constitutes the subtext of his syco-
phantic crawling tout court, whether in front of the left or in front of the 
right.
For, in Kazan’s case, the “forbidden impulse” indulged by “anyone 
who sniffs out ‘bad’ smells in order to extirpate them” directs itself both 
at the former comrades he wants to “pull . . . down into the muck with” 
himself and at the committee that he “really and truly” “despise[s].” 
(“The mimetic function,” Horkheimer and Adorno write, “is sneeringly 
enjoyed as something despised and self-despising.”)54 That this impulse 
is forbidden explains the distaste with which Kazan speaks not just of 
his youthful Communism but even, at certain moments, when he is not 
altogether denying his surrender to the right, of his middle-aged collabo-
ration with huac: “Obviously,” he told Michel Ciment in 1974, “there’s 
something disgusting about giving other people’s names. . . . One feel-
ing is that what I did was repulsive.”55 The other, stronger feeling, of 
course, is that the Soviet Union is even more repulsive, so Kazan—the 
one ex-Communist who, given his bicoastal preeminence, might have 
been able to discredit huac, some have speculated56—was right, he in-
evitably concludes, to do the difficult thing that he did. Even franker, 
though—and Kazan prides himself on his frankness, a virile virtue, as 
Barthes points out57—might have been an acknowledgment of the plea­
sure (however derivative) attending the difficulty. To become a “man,” to 
achieve “self-respect,” is to sniff after not only the little others whom you 
police but also the big Other for whom you police. A sycophant is literally 
one who shows the fig, and we will return at the end of this chapter to 
the obscenity of fig-showing. But let us not forget the “dirtiness” of the 
more available and more colloquial synonyms for “sycophant”: “boot-
licker,” “asskisser,” “arselicker,” “buttsniffer,” “suck-up,” “brownnose,” 
and, in other languages, “Arschkriecher,” “leccaculo,” “lèche-cul.” The 
sycophant, in other words, is a man in love.58 If the middle-dog is con-
demned merely to imitate both the pleasure of the Jew and the power 
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of the Nazi, this double vicariousness is its own consolation: the vicari-
ousness, I mean, finds its consolation in the doubling of its libidinal 
field, which includes the high as well as the low. “Fuck you all, big and 
small!”: this, Gadg tells us, was his mantra, the cry of his “truer” self.59 
One must attack today whomever one flattered yesterday? The law of 
sycophancy might be written thus: one must attack today whomever one 
flatters today. Or, more crudely: there can be no ass-kissing without as-
sassinating. As long as the sycophant remembers to despise both his 
erotic aim (sniffing) and his erotic objects (those whom and for whom 
he sniffs), as long as he remembers to rationalize his perversion, he 
can take comfort, and pleasure, even in the submission to the Man that 
makes a man of him.
Even? Isn’t it obvious that the sycophant positively rejoices in his own 
submission? Not always, the case of Kazan seems to suggest. “Disin-
fected by the civilized sniffer’s absolute identification with the prohibit-
ing agency, the forbidden impulse eludes the prohibition.” Sometimes, 
the absolute identification not only disinfects, but is itself disinfected, 
to the point where its mucky absoluteness vanishes behind a sneering 
mask of revulsion, as though dependency did not thrive on such “oedi-
pal” theatrics. The inventor of Marlon Brando and James Dean, Kazan 
was the master of these theatrics, in Hollywood and on Broadway, and 
perhaps never more so than in the staging of his own life. An actor him-
self in the Group Theatre before he became a director, he continued, 
even into old age, to epitomize the “Method,” not least as a method for 
obeying the “other-directed” imperative to entertain by appearing to re-
fuse it in favor of something far superior: the manly-yet-sensitive pur-
suit of Honesty. In collaborating with huac, Kazan was not saving his 
ass by kissing the state’s: unlike “those other comrades,” busy betraying 
their souls like the whores that they were, he was finally being true to his 
own soul.60 In naming names, he was not sacrificing his friends to ingra-
tiate himself with the neighborhood bullies: he was at last ceasing to be 
a gadget and starting to say, “I’m going to satisfy myself now.”61 The hu-
morlessness that is one of the clichés of Method acting—as of that other 
Cold War phenomenon whose “Russian” accent is more pronounced, 
namely, Communism—reflects the skill with which Kazan himself, on-
screen and off, practiced the seductive theatricality of antitheatricality, 
the sprezzatura of the twentieth-century courtier. America’s teenagers 
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may once have wanted to be Brando and Dean, but it was the big-nosed 
Kazan—with help, on Waterfront, from the big-nosed Schulberg—who 
taught these two heartthrobs the adolescent art of a surly servility.
And yet, sometimes even the coolest teenager becomes a little hysteri-
cal. Sometimes, that is, he loses his cool by clutching it desperately, and 
allows “Fuck you all, big and small!” to sound too much like what it really 
means: “You’re gonna love me!,” in the words of “Lonesome” Rhodes, 
the pathetically well-nicknamed hillbilly superstar of A Face in the Crowd, 
as he crashes and burns at the end of the film. Entertainment’s almost 
ontological sycophancy—its inherent obligation to oblige, an obligation 
overtly politicized in huac’s theater of collaboration—is generally toler-
ated as long as the entertainer’s kisser, as Lonesome calls a face, doesn’t 
seem too much to be kissing anything. In Kazan’s disappointing stab at 
comedy, however, it is as though entertainment had ineptly given away 
its horrible pseudocomic “neediness,” not by rationalizing comic plea-
sure too little but by rationalizing it too much, like a hip-hop performer 
whose gangsterish contempt for his audience suggests nothing so much 
as a temper tantrum. No less manically than the demagogic monster 
whose rise and fall the film chronicles, Face wears on its face a hyena’s 
sneer that is all too reminiscent of a logo, out of which issues Madi-
son Avenue’s latest scream for attention. (The film’s last words: “Don’t 
leave me! Come back! Come back! Come back!”) What crowd, Ameri-
can or French, would not have recoiled, as if seeing its face in a mirror, 
from this, the “funniest” of Kazan’s films, its signature rictus (ce rire qui 
n’en est pas un) emblematizing a “wretched parody of fulfillment”? “In 
America,” Truffaut noted in his review of Face, “politics always overlaps 
show business, as show business overlaps advertising.”62 The ultimate 
target of the film’s satire, the world of advertising, has nothing on Kazan, 
whose belated attempt to save Face perpetuates its aggressively conform-
ist hipness:
What I like in the film is the energy and invention and bounce which 
are very American. It’s really got something marvelous about it, this con-
stantly flashing, changing rhythm. In many ways, it’s more American 
than any picture I ever did. . . . It has a theme that even today is completely 
relevant. Finally what I think is that it was ahead of its time.63
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“Even today”—that is, in the early seventies, twenty years after he sang 
for huac, diligently supplementing his performance with an enumera-
tion of the American qualities of his plays and films—Kazan is still at 
pains to update his patriotic c.v. “Marvelously American” plus “a little bit 
avant-garde” would seem to be a winning formula in the upper-middle-
brow cultural sphere of which Kazan was one of the most luminous 
postwar commissars. In this formula, in fact, lies much of the success of 
earlier Kazan films, like the teen-idol vehicles On the Waterfront and East 
of Eden. In contrast, what “doesn’t work” in A Face in the Crowd is that it 
works too hard: its determination to be cool reeks of flop-sweat. (Need-
less to say, I mean that as a compliment. As the sycophant delights in 
sniffing out “bad” smells, sycoanalysis delights in the stench of the syco-
phant himself.) The film’s problem is not that it was “ahead of its time,” 
but rather that its desire to be ahead of its time is so hysterically, so 
symptomatically, of its time (and therefore “completely relevant,” “even 
today”): the film’s “energy and invention and bounce,” its “constantly 
flashing, changing rhythm,” are “very American” indeed—as American 
as the hyperkinetic belligerence of a nation of servants so afraid of losing 
the Boss’s love that they would kill to keep him happy.
America America: this is the title of Kazan’s favorite—though not the 
most American—of all his films, from 1963.64 It is also the refrain that 
both Kazan and Schulberg sing before huac and after it. Even once the 
immigrant has made it, he can never stop singing, never stop repeating 
his lines in the musical pseudocomedy of American life, in which not 
just entertainers but all citizens, naturalized or native-born, peddler or 
prince, are conscripted into the endless postwar “parade of stoolpigeons,” 
in the phrase of Albert Maltz’s discussed in chapter 1.65 Of course, bounc-
ing, flashing, swaggering hyper-Americanism, which stands out in the 
already frenetic crowd as a symptom stands out in a neurosis, is not the 
only thing that embarrassingly calls attention to itself. Here is Kazan’s 
description of his father amid the alien corn of wasp New England, on the 
day that he and Kazan’s mother took Kazan to college: “My father wore 
his business suit, cut full at the waist to contain his pot, and a high, hard 
collar, clutching a bow tie of blue polka dots. He looked what he was, a 
small cosmopolitan importer, uncomfortable out of his environment.”66 
You don’t have to be the bitterly self-conscious, resentment-ridden 
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seventeen-year-old son of immigrant parents to know that there is noth-
ing necessarily paradoxical about a cosmopolitanism that doesn’t fit in. 
Cosmopolitanism is a dangerous luxury because of the recklessness 
with which the chameleon makes use of its mimetic versatility, tend-
ing to adapt itself out of existence. But it can also be a dangerous luxury 
insofar as this mimetic versatility, whether used or not, is perceived to 
differ from the provincial fixity all around it. Cosmopolitanism’s fluency 
can then stick out like a “high, hard collar,” and its conspicuous talent 
for imitating its environment can seem as insolently dandyish as a “bow 
tie of blue polka dots,” in which case it provokes the murderous resent-
ment of sons, and daughters, whose demand for a real father, imaginary 
ruler of a land that one might be stuck-up enough to call a patrie, fre-
quently goes by the name of patriotism.
Against the hapless father’s dangerously luxurious chameleonism, 
Kazan, like Schulberg, practices the son’s cautious, conservative, syco-
phantic chameleonism. The mimesis of profligacy—both the cosmopol-
itan importer and the studio executive lost their fortunes—is replaced 
by the mimesis of panic, and the panic is nowhere more evident than 
when the two collaborator sons get together to collaborate on the over-
heated Face in the Crowd. One can almost smell the fear, for instance, in 
the caginess with which these two buddies manage their shared family 
romance, narrowing it to the classic lineaments of an assault on the bad 
totalitarian father and an affirmation of the good American father, so 
that all other histories, especially less schematic ones, are either sub-
sumed by this narrative or, better yet, erased by it. This “progressive” 
film, which agrees with the Communist People’s World in considering 
itself “a hard-hitting exposé” of the antidemocratic conflation of politics 
and mass entertainment in postwar America, does not hit so hard as to 
expose, or even to acknowledge, what might seem the most “relevant” 
instance of that baleful phenomenon: the motion-picture blacklist, the 
result of that unholy alliance between Hollywood and Washington that 
both Kazan and Schulberg, only a few years earlier, had gone out of their 
way to promote, and that, in 1957, was still very much in force, working 
to preserve a rigid distinction between those who got to produce hard-
hitting exposés and those who got to produce nothing at all. Just as the 
appeal of Andy Griffith’s Lonesome Rhodes derives, Kazan claims, from 
his “down-to-earth truthful[ness],”67 so the film itself projects an aura of 
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bold satirical iconoclasm, of trenchancy so refreshingly irreverent as to 
command the admiration of all but the most cowardly or hypocritical of 
spectators. And yet, like those husbands who abuse their wives because 
they “don’t got gumption enough to take it out on the boss,” as Lone-
some puts it in one of his early radio broadcasts, Kazan and Schulberg, 
with their keen sycophantic noses for rank and status, direct their satire 
not at the movie business, but at the commercially ascendant and there-
fore culturally inferior medium of television. This is not simply a matter 
of snobbery, although the snobbery is undeniable, and indeed puts A 
Face in the Crowd in the vanguard of “sophisticated,” television-bashing 
Hollywood films, like Network, The King of Comedy, Quiz Show, and To 
Die For.68 In attacking television rather than movies, this movie’s authors 
protect more than just “the industry” as a whole. More specifically, they 
make sure to exempt from their satire the studio heads who maintained 
the blacklist, the politicians who imposed it, and the ideal of American 
manhood behind the whole inquisition, aiming their punches instead 
at the gray flannel suits presiding over the more remote television- 
advertising complex, safely located in New York City, rather than in Hol-
lywood or Washington, and, despite the authenticating presence of real 
media celebrities like Walter Winchell and Mike Wallace, blown up to 
such caricatural proportions as to seem barely plausible. The two blood-
hounds who made this film know better than to bite the hand that feeds 
them. To be sure, the film’s truth-telling doesn’t exactly spare American 
politics. But, for such a cutting-edge satire, its political villains are a curi-
ously anachronistic (not to mention somewhat ideologically ill-matched) 
couple: an aristocratic, neofascist tycoon with an English accent, and 
an elderly, pedantic senator described by “some of those left-wing New 
York papers” as “the last of the isolationists.” So intent on being ahead 
of the curve—Kazan thought that the film “foretells Nixon”69—this ruth-
less critique of contemporary culture spends a curious amount of its 
time recycling the leftovers on the cutting-room floor of Frank Capra 
and Preston Sturges.70
Obviously, Kazan and Schulberg could not have made a film explic-
itly criticizing the blacklist, even if they had wanted to, since one of the 
blacklist’s principal effects was to police not just film personnel but film 
content as well, and since the first rule of this censorship was to censor 
the fact of its own existence. Some might therefore see in Face’s strategy 
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of displacement the cunning of allegorical indirection. But the “allegory” 
of A Face in the Crowd functions like the allegory of On the Waterfront, 
not like the allegory of, say, The Crucible. In changing the subject, that 
is, the film doesn’t transform it; it evades and misrepresents it. Giving a 
fancy English accent to General Haynesworth, the evil genius pulling the 
hillbilly’s strings, is like that other Hollywood ruse of portraying Nazis as 
homosexual aesthetes rather than as the hard-working family men that 
they were. And in case we fail to notice the pinkish hue of the general’s 
fascism, Schulberg names his company “International Drug.”71 Kazan 
and Schulberg would have us believe that American totalitarianism, for 
all its ostentatious just-plain-folksiness, could never have its roots in 
the American Volk itself, which, though boorish and dim-witted, always 
wises up in the end. Lonesome’s father may have been a con man—
no surprise there—but only an un-American “adopted father” like the 
General, only a “dangerous and alien” mastermind, could turn a con 
man into a dictator. In place of the coarse faux-populist xenophobia that 
Kazan and Schulberg lampoon, then, they offer a refined faux-populist 
xenophobia. A composite—in his own witticism, a “compost heap”—of 
Huey Long, Will Rogers, and Arthur Godfrey, Lonesome himself repre-
sents that virulent (and, one might add, by no means diminished) strain 
in American politics and culture that Kazan calls “hayseed fascism.”72 
As some viewers have noticed, however, although the television tyrant’s 
swan song (to invoke Godfrey again) features snatches of a hymn, Lone-
some has been pretty well divested of the militant Christianity that ac-
counts for much of the power enjoyed by hayseed fascists, then and now, 
including the power to intimidate their would-be critics into silence, for 
fear of seeming antireligious, or even Jewish.73 And when, to complete 
the obfuscatory incoherence, Kazan and Schulberg put the hillbilly and 
his puppeteer into bed with a feeble, high-wasp dinosaur of an isola-
tionist presidential candidate—an old-school reactionary, as opposed to 
the new-school reactionaries with whom the authors so recently made 
nice—they execute perhaps the cleverest dodge of all: by turning 1957 
into 1940, they neatly conjure away the whole Communist-loathing 
Cold-War national security state for which they both performed such ex-
emplary service, and to which they thus owe their continuing careers.74
No doubt a more “balanced” assessment of the film would give it credit 
for its antiauthoritarianism, however selective, in an age of conformity. 
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Yet even this putative antiauthoritarianism bespeaks the filial piety of 
the American sycophant. As the deliciously recognizable face and voice 
of Mike Wallace might remind us, the hard-hitting exposé, singularly 
fastidious as to whom it hits and what it exposes, finds its cozy home in 
a media machine whose marshmallow softness serves as an immense 
cushion not so much enveloping as constituting the official version of 
The Way We Live Now. That this machine needs hard-hitting exposés as 
a cat needs canaries is clear from the alacrity with which publishers vie 
for the manuscript of Demagogue in Denim, the book Mel Miller (played 
by Walter Matthau) has written to “pull the mask off ” Lonesome Rhodes 
and “let the public see what a fraud he really is.” To no one does it come 
as news, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, that the unmasking 
and ritual dismemberment of celebrities is as essential to the infotain-
ment empire as is their production and worship. But the news is just 
as old in 1957: when the first Mrs. Rhodes shows up to blackmail her 
famous husband by threatening to sell her story to Confidential maga-
zine, the film is assuming in its audience a familiarity with an already 
firmly established regime of scandal-mongering, Schadenfreude, and res­
sentiment, as American as apple pie. And well it might: the huac hear-
ings in which its writer and director both participated so cooperatively 
opened up the giddy postmodern phase of the venerable, all-American 
spectator sport that Philip Roth has called “moral disgrace as public 
entertainment.”75
Indeed, Mel Miller’s hard-hitting exposé, like the film of which it is 
the ego ideal, continues the project of informing begun by Kazan and 
Schulberg in 1952 and 1951 respectively (“I wanted to hit the Party’s elite 
especially hard”) and embodied most glamorously in On the Waterfront. 
But while it wouldn’t be easy to miss the collaborationist politics of that 
earlier film, its air thick with pigeons both literal and figurative, little 
attention has been paid to the ways in which, in A Face in the Crowd, 
Kazan and Schulberg are still testifying, which is to say, still justifying 
testifying, with all the guilty conscience, bad faith, self-delusion, and 
redoubled aggression that that anxious undertaking involves. Insofar as 
the collaborators’ friendly testimony comes up at all, it tends to be cited 
as the source of the film’s admirable aesthetic richness and ambiguity, 
qualities that Kazan himself, for one, preferred to the “simplistic” taste 
for “either-or” answers that he lamented in the work of “liberals” such as 
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Arthur Miller and Lillian Hellman.76 An aesthetics of ambiguity: there is 
much to be said for this excellent thing, especially when it dresses up an 
ethics of “difficulty” à la Kazan (What I did was disgusting but heroic, 
and all the more heroic for being disgusting), or a rage for symmetry 
à la Schulberg (The left is really the right, only worse). Even after the 
aestheticizing, however, what is “difficult” is still a betrayal, and what 
the symmetry would neutralize is still an assassination.77 Unlike Terry 
Malloy, Mel and Patricia Neal’s Marcia Jeffries—the two murderous col-
laborators of A Face in the Crowd, or, as it was subtitled in an earlier 
version, The Assassins—do not testify in front of a crime commission, or 
any other quasi-governmental body: the film itself is their testimony.78 
Nor do they follow the lead of Waterfront’s dreamy working-class hero of 
an informer in bringing down an unmistakably Stalinoid thug like the 
loathsome union boss, Johnny Friendly (with friends like these . . . ). 
But then, these two friends and witnesses, these two friendly witnesses, 
don’t need to follow in Terry Malloy’s humble, punch-drunk footsteps, be-
cause, like Budd Schulberg and Elia Kazan, they are both well-educated, 
well-placed, well-paid show-business intellectuals. In Malloy’s betrayal 
and assassination of Johnny Friendly, the working class avenges its 
persecution by its own self-styled leaders; the evil Communist boss is 
slain so that the eternal boss of American democracy may be embraced 
the more passionately. That a Hollywood prince and a bicoastal Wun­
derkind should choose as their fictional representative an inarticulate, 
sullenly handsome boxer-longshoreman with a heart of gold merely re-
flects the insatiable appetite of upper-middle-class American men, espe-
cially those in the “soft” professions, for fantasies of their own virilizing 
déclassement.79
Casting the Wunderkind and the prince as a female producer with a 
degree from Sarah Lawrence and a pipe-smoking, bespectacled Jewish 
male writer would seem to constitute one example, at least, of how A 
Face in the Crowd is the “opposite,” as Truffaut claims, of On the Water­
front. As we shall see, though, this “protofeminism” and ethnic realism 
in fact play no more than supporting roles in a process—not so differ-
ent, after all, from the butching-down at work in On the Waterfront—of 
making a man out of the sycophant. In any case, having situated the 
fight against Communism on the waterfront—that is, in a working-class 
milieu—Schulberg and Kazan move the battleground, three years later, 
	 coll abor ators	 127
a bit closer to home: not, as I have said, to Hollywood, but to the kind of 
mass-cultural sphere around which two such apparatchiks could still be 
counted on to know their way (Schulberg had actually written scripts for 
television). In this sphere, moreover, what they are pleased to see as the 
fascism of the left might well take hold in the manner of regular fascism, 
typically showing its face as the grinning media spectacle of a Lonesome 
Rhodes rather than as scowling labor gangsterism of a Johnny Friendly. 
By locating the anti-Communist agon in a showbiz arena like, but not 
the same as, the film colony to whose own collaboration with huac they 
had lent their talents, and to whose resulting sponsorship their muck-
raking film owes its existence, Schulberg and Kazan afford themselves 
the apparently contradictory advantages of semiautobiography: while es-
caping from the scene of their earlier violence, and so avoiding its impli-
cations, they get to inflict it again.
But why this need to re-inflict the violence one is avoiding, to avoid the 
violence one is re-inflicting? Why not either stop testifying altogether 
or just keep testifying without trying to justify it? Because sycophancy 
is love—that is, a sick fancy or an incurable disease—the sycophant 
can never stop kissing ass, or kicking it. But sycophantic love is really 
two loves: a love of “bad” smells, and a love of the agency that prohibits 
them. And the sycophant’s second love, his identification with the Man, 
not only mustn’t know itself (how can you be the Man if you love the 
Man?) but prevents him from ever knowing the first either: instead of 
knowing it, all he can do is to keep rationalizing it, misreading both his 
sniffing and his sniffing-out as acts of rectitude of which a free man 
can be proud. Hence the double gesture of avoidance-as-repetition, and 
hence a film such as A Face in the Crowd, hysterically mystifying and hys-
terically mystified in its hard-hitting honesty.80 Happily for sycoanalysis, 
the sycophant, like any hysteric, performs what he cannot know, betray-
ing himself along with his victims. Sycoanalysis is nothing other than 
the psychoanalysis of a social order (Vichy France, the United States 
since 1947) in which the sycophantic character of all citizenship is not so 
much flaunted—a certain “democratic” decency discourages such explic-
itness—as imbued with a kind of epidemic salience.81 Precisely because 
Schulberg and Kazan think they’re producing something else—say, “a 
punch in the nose” (as Mel Miller nasally describes his exposé) to those 
who would threaten American democracy, or a tough-loving homage to 
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American “energy and invention and bounce”—A Face in the Crowd is a 
veritable textbook for “Sycoanalysis 101,” an anatomy of postwar America 
as Assassin Nation.82
Lonesome Rhodes is meant to be initially charming, as is the audi-
ence that finds him so. “The real source of his power,” Kazan explains, 
“was not his trickiness but his knack of seeing something that everybody 
feels but doesn’t dare say, and he dares say it.”83 When Marcia Jeffries 
discovers him sleeping like a dog on the floor of an Arkansas jail cell, 
she immediately senses the appeal, and the show-business potential, of 
his earthy authenticity. Having persuaded him to sing for the listeners 
of A Face in the Crowd, as she abysmally calls her radio show, she in-
troduces him as follows: “When I went east to Sarah Lawrence—that’s 
a college—I majored in music. And I learned that the real American 
music comes from the bottom up. When George Gershwin played it 
in New York, it was black-tie music. But the real beginning of it was in 
folks who never owned a tie.” From the outset, however, the charm of 
the bottom is exceeded by its petty, envious opportunism: before Lone-
some will agree to sing for Marcia, he wants to know, “What do I get out 
of this? I mean Mr. Me, Myself, and I.” “Better watch him. He’s mean,” 
somebody warns the deputy as he goes to wake the prisoner who’s been 
arrested for being drunk and disorderly, and who’s about to be made 
a star. The warning seems to go unheard—otherwise, how could we, 
like Marcia, be charmed?—but it registers nonetheless. While barring 
it from her consciousness, Marcia is shrewd enough an impresario to 
admit it into her formulation of Lonesome’s alleged charm: a charm in 
which she smells the animal magnetism of that chien méchant, the angry 
white male who hates mimetic New York Jews like George Gershwin for 
stealing “his” music—this film is too progressive to make the one Afri-
can American prisoner sing and dance—and putting a black tie on it.84 
Back east at Sarah Lawrence, Marcia may have majored in music, but, 
the condescending faux pas of “that’s a college” notwithstanding, she 
seems to have learned almost as much about public relations, so skilled 
is she in the sycophantic art of simultaneously flattering her audience’s 
wounded narcissism and attacking the cosmopolitan parasites who have 
deprived these “real American[s]” of their rightful status as cultural top- 
dogs. Better watch him indeed: in the hands of his media-savvy female 
Pygmalion—Marcia even names him Lonesome—this American idol’s 
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meanness will be fashioned into a captivating image of his mass audi-
ence’s resentment of those un-Americans above who ought to be be-
low, into a hypnotic personification of the indignant glee with which 
the toppled tops sniff at the upturned bottoms of those perverts who 
get to put on the dog. “My public love dogs,” Lonesome, now a televi-
sion megastar, tells the prissy senator whose presidential campaign he 
is making over (and planning to ride into the White House). “One pitch 
with a hound is worth ten thousand words.” Of course it is, for a pitch 
with a hound is a pitch to hounds, as a Dartmouth-educated middle-dog 
like Budd Schulberg demonstrated in his huac testimony, or as clever 
Marcia may have intuited even before she walks into the jail cell, from 
the minute she conceives her search for the all-American hyena.
“I could make ’em eat dog food and think it was steak!,” Lonesome 
boasts of his hold over his audience. Sycophantically catering to the 
doggy resentment of a nation of sycophants, where everyone, it seems, 
is some kind of adman or press agent or drum majorette or—to use 
Lonesome’s own word for his underlings—bootlicker, Marcia, who ma-
jored in music but minored in “communications,” constructs in Lone-
some Rhodes the fascist demagogue as supersycophant, the secret of 
whose success is not, as Kazan thinks, his knack for saying “what every-
one else feels but doesn’t dare say,” in the bracing style of the politically 
“Better watch him. He’s mean”: Andy Griffith in A Face in the Crowd
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incorrect satirist, but rather his ability to enact his public’s fantasies of 
revenge against their illegitimate pseudomasters, the stand-ins for all 
the Gershwins of the world, all the Jews of the liberal media, from the 
more conveniently local substitutes (at the beginning, the radio-station 
owner, the mattress manufacturer, any “softies who ’sist on sleeping on 
a bed,” and the sheriff, to whose house—in a particularly virtuoso piece 
of hound-pitching—he gets his listeners to send their dogs) to the more 
conveniently distant ones (“our limey cousins,” as his fame grows bigger 
and his reach more global). Of course, Marcia doesn’t see herself as a 
sycophant, nor, even though she is Lonesome’s “producer,” in both the 
parental and the artistic senses of the term, does she see herself as being 
in the business of sycophant-making and sycophant-entertaining. When 
she christens the singing drunk in the jail cell, giving him the name 
Lonesome, she in effect gives birth to him as well, in an act of maternal 
authorship that, if it doesn’t suggest the enchantment of “Pygmalion in 
reverse,” evokes scarier references to Frankenstein.85 And yet, the mon-
strosity of her creature—the collaborator’s golem, a “living doll” (in the 
words of one ad agency secretary) who protects patriotic show people 
by siccing the “folks” on the cosmopolitan ones—is not supposed to be 
part of his original nature. (“Why, he’s a monster!,” one of Lonesome’s 
fans clucks in surprise after the doll-gone-bad has been exposed at the 
movie’s end.) Or rather, his monstrosity is supposed to consist in how 
his good instincts—the “humanitarian impulses,” as Schulberg would 
say, that allow him to feature a “colored” woman on his Memphis tele-
vision show, and to get his viewers to send her money to rebuild her 
house—are perverted, to such an extent that he ends up screaming at 
the waiters at his aborted dinner party: “Get out, you dressed-up black 
monkeys. You turn my stomach.”86 Look, Schulberg and Kazan seem to 
be saying: this is how the idealism that made us join the Communist 
Party was betrayed, how two impressionable American boys were taken 
advantage of by something that seemed so appealing and yet turned out 
to be so appalling. Even though Kazan insists that the “realest story of A 
Face in the Crowd” is the story, encoded in Lonesome’s relation to Marcia, 
of his and Schulberg’s relations to their wives at the time, and even 
though Lonesome initially seems to share the co-authors’ penchant for 
satirical truth-telling, Lonesome is not Schulberg and Kazan.87 Instead, 
Lonesome is at once Schulberg and Kazan’s idea of the tragic corrupt-
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ibility of the American left and a warning that, given our in many ways 
salutary childlike vulnerability, it could still happen again.
“You’re getting to be all the things you used to harpoon,” Marcia 
tells Lonesome after an especially wounding manifestation of how he 
has begun to go bad—under the influence, of course, of some effete, 
vaguely foreign villains from Capraland. Yet what sustains this fiction 
of innocence corrupted is not just a fond mother’s sentimentality about 
her rotten son: with equal poignancy, Schulberg and Kazan deny that 
the rot was there from the start, lest it corrode their amour-propre, their 
sense not just of their past selves as innocents abused, but also of their 
present selves as satirists rather than, say, publicists.88 Unlike Lonesome, 
they have never become, nor ever will become, the things they harpoon; 
their harpoon is indeed sharper and harder than ever, not despite but 
because of their youthful flirtation with Communism. But what if that 
hard-hitting harpoon is always already a softball, a Madison Avenue 
pitch for—to quote Kazan’s ad in the New York Times again—“the free, 
open, healthy way of life that gives us self-respect”? “You were taken in 
[by Lonesome], just like we were all taken in,” Mel tells Marcia at the 
film’s end. “But we get wise to ’em. That’s our strength. We get wise to 
’em.” Like Gentleman’s Agreement, A Face in the Crowd “is in a healthy 
American tradition, for it shows Americans exploring a problem and 
tackling a solution.”
Satire’s attack may well advance a normative agenda of social repara-
tion. Whether or not A Face in the Crowd does anything for the nation’s 
health, this brutally truthful film certainly tackles a solution to the prob-
lem of how to leave the American audience feeling good after all. For 
the attack launched by the film comes thickly wrapped in flattery: flat-
tery of “our strength,” not least the strength of the wised-up attackers, 
whose object, moreover, is never really a good (ol’) boy like Lonesome 
Rhodes, for all that the film makes a point of having Marcia assassi-
nate the monster she’s created, and for all that it invites us to get off on 
seeing Mel shoot bullets into the corpse. (I am speaking figuratively, 
of course. Lonesome does not really die, any more than does Johnny 
Friendly. As Kazan himself points out, however, there are many kinds 
of assassination besides what he calls “actual assassination.”89 “I don’t 
figure him for a suicide,” Mel reassures Marcia at the film’s end, as she 
looks up anxiously at the penthouse from which Lonesome’s screams are 
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issuing. Mel is right: a victim of homicide can’t very well commit 
suicide.90) Rather, what the attackers are after is a figure lurking behind 
the front provided by Lonesome: a much more dangerous figure, so cor-
rupt and so corrupting that he can never even appear on the screen—as 
if he had never existed at all, or as if, after having been annihilatingly 
named, he had to be annihilatingly unnamed.91 That figure, of course, 
is the one whom the satirist—one of those “mild men [who] hate them-
selves for being mild,” as Mel Miller defines himself—can only resent, 
and whom he resents a lot more than the star-spangled red herring after 
whom he sniffs with such well-rehearsed repugnance. I am referring 
not to the mimetic Jewish composer, but to that even bigger softy, the 
mimetic Jewish comedian, whose luxuriously unrationalized pleasure 
stands in infuriating contrast to the rigorously rationalized pleasure of 
satire and sycophancy alike. One of the film’s daring theses is that, in 
today’s superficial society, the selling of a presidential candidate is no 
different from the selling of a product like Vitajex, an update of “the old 
patent medicines” and an ahead-of-its-time Viagra. But much as Kazan 
and Schulberg send up the hard- and soft-sell fakery with which Madi-
son Avenue pushes the fantasy of phallic potency in politics as in the 
bedroom—the film’s acme of funniness is a sequence of Vitajex com-
mercials, in which, for instance, the pills lengthen and stiffen the tail 
of a cartoon pig—A Face in the Crowd itself is one long, stiff commer-
cial for the phallic potency of American guys who get strong by getting 
wise: guys, it turns out, like Elia Kazan and Budd Schulberg. “Precisely 
because he does care about people,” Kazan wrote in a puff piece for the 
film published, like his earlier, more notorious self-advertisment, in the 
Times, “Budd has a hard core of morality.”92 And precisely because Kazan 
and Schulberg are both still scared stiff, petrified by the thought of the 
en-Jewment always threatening to engulf them if they fail to stand at 
attention, their joint Bildungsroman demands that they make a man out 
of the sycophant, rewriting Marcia—“short for ‘marshmallow,’ ” Lone-
some, with typical nastiness, observes—as Mel, or rather, rewriting both 
the woman and the Jew as, in effect, the Marshal, the officer of Our U.S. 
Law.93
The rewriting has already begun, in fact, as soon as Marcia is named 
“Marcia,” with its etymological relation to “martial.” And it is also at 
work in the highly determinate indeterminacy surrounding Mel’s Jew-
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ishness, a triumph of connotation over denotation.94 Unlike Abe Steiner, 
Lonesome’s first agent and, with his “Semitic face,”95 the only character 
the film, or rather, the screenplay, explicitly identifies as Jewish, Mel 
is the locus of a Jewishness that isn’t as plain as the nose on his face. 
Instead, starting with his “ambiguous” name (“Miller”?—not neces-
sarily; “Mel”?—probably), Mel Miller is Jewish in the wary style of the 
assimilationist fifties.96 In this as in so many other ways taking after 
Schulberg, who wrote in 1952, “I despise [ . . . ] anti-Semitism not be-
cause I happen to be Jewish myself but because I have always opposed 
Neanderthalism in any form,”97 Mel finds himself the bearer of an ac­
cidental Jewishness: a Jewishness that his loathing of Neanderthalism 
wouldn’t let him deny, should anyone be so vulgar as to ask, but, at the 
same time, a Jewishness that he wouldn’t want to push in anyone’s face, 
should there be any Neanderthals in the room with whom you just can’t 
reason. “What are you, Eastern college?” Lonesome sneers at the writer, 
after Marcia introduces Mel to the star of the Memphis television show 
on which she and Mel are now collaborating. (“Writer! You’re going to 
have the softest job in the world, boy.”)98 “No,” answers Mel, with the 
nervous, would-be-propitiatory grin that one hailed as “boy” might use 
on, say, one of the czar’s constables, or a storm trooper, or a congressio-
nal investigator. “As a matter of fact, I went to school over in Nashville. 
Vanderbilt ’44.”99 But Lonesome is not about to be put off the scent by 
this jittery attempt at Lokalpatriotismus: for though he “never learned 
to do much reading”—that’s why Mel’s job will be so soft—he’s smart 
enough to sense something vaguely foreign in this dark interloper, per-
haps even smart enough to hear the New York accent that Walter Matthau 
fails to conceal beneath his shaky Southern drawl. Not that Mel, or Mat-
thau, or Schulberg, has anything to hide, exactly: for the Hollywood 
prince, the maven’s maven, anyway, his racial patrimony, if contingent, 
is nonetheless a point of some pride, a fountainhead, as he sees it, of 
his showbiz moxie, intelligence, and, not least, class privilege. But the 
media insider must take care, lest he outsmart himself, and his Jewish-
ness degenerate, in an almost fin de siècle way, into the “mere” softness 
that Lonesome resentfully ascribes to Mel and his bookish tribe. “All 
those months he was calling me ‘Vanderbilt ’44’ and ‘Frontal Lobe,’ ” 
Mel himself resentfully recalls as he tells Marcia about Demagogue in 
Denim. “Well, now I’ve got the book to punch him in the nose.” The 
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boxing-loving Schulberg would choose this metaphor, whose masculine 
pugnacity would be subverted by the telltale Semitism of its nasal fixa-
tion, if it weren’t already subverted by itself, pugilophilia being perhaps 
the definitive mania of Jewish boys of Schulberg’s generation, especially 
the intellectuals among them. All of which is why, finally, it is not quite 
enough for Marcia to become Mel. Mel himself must rise above his al-
ready toned-down Jewishness to become a not-too-ethnic wise guy: a hit 
man for America. “You’re not throwing me off the train like poor Abe 
Steiner,” an angry Marcia tells Lonesome after he has jilted her to marry 
a seventeen-year-old drum majorette instead.100 Marcia doesn’t exactly 
get thrown off the train, like the insufficiently ruthless old Jewish agent, 
but, amid the general streamlining conducted by the film’s energetic 
narrative, she does get sent to the second-class car, along with anything 
too softly “Semitic” in her young Jewish male collaborator himself. As 
we have seen, the sycophant is nothing without the nose he uses to track 
down former comic comrades; for this reason, A Face in the Crowd is not 
about to cut off Mel’s nose to spite his, or its, face. Yet a nose alone is not 
enough: Mel must continue to sniff, but, in America, a man must also 
stand up straight; the Jew must be virilized. Softness’s mimicry of hard-
ness, the comic simulacrum of an erection, the travesty of a top gun, the 
Jewish man’s nose, in short, needs to be fixed. And if Dr. Frankenstein 
herself—the easternized but apparently non-Jewish Marcia—has to get a 
little roughed up in the process, who ever said that freedom was free?101
Lonesome lucidly interprets his own repeated cruelty to Marcia (whom 
he plays, to recall the title of one of his signature tunes, like a “Mama 
Guitar”) as a response to his dependency upon her—“You made me, 
Marcia. . . . I owe it all to you”—and to her superiority, both moral and 
intellectual. So when he calls her “my marshmallow,” this belittling 
term of endearment easily betrays his resentful awareness that “Marcia” 
has warlike associations—that the marshmallow is herself one tough 
cookie. Nonetheless, Kazan’s and Schulberg’s progressivism doesn’t 
quite extend to letting the woman stick up for herself.102 To be sure, it 
is Marcia who finally has the honor of bringing down the monster she 
has helped to build up (“as if she were throwing an execution switch on 
him,” Schulberg’s screenplay specifies,103 she turns on the sound dial 
in the control room to make sure that Lonesome’s television audience 
hears him expressing his contempt for them). But her merely honorary 
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role here reflects more than just an effort to attenuate the responsibility 
of the American media intellectual—I mean, of course, the repentant 
and patriotic American media intellectual—for the totalitarianism that 
she has authored, a totalitarianism that must instead be blamed on 
the obscurely alien interference of the bad company of “International 
Drug”-dealers her boy has fallen in with. As Marcia pulls the switch that 
destroys Lonesome, the closing title on the television screen reads, ironi-
cally, “Produced by Marcia Jeffries.” But the real irony here is that the 
producer-executioner has herself been infantilized. Marcia’s diminished 
responsibility—her demotion from author to co-author, and from co-
author to “little ol’ gal Friday”—fulfils the film’s need to remake the 
mother as a girl. One collaborator is not enough: a collaborator has to 
have a collaborator—less to work with, however, than to work under, and 
less to turn to than to turn into. “I hear you just wrote the ending to my 
book,” Mel says to Marcia after she’s exposed Lonesome to his public, in 
effect informing on him. Yet it is still Mel’s book, just as it is he who now 
takes charge of the whole exhilaratingly sadistic process of sending the 
hillbilly Stalin crashing back to the dirt from which he came. Even more 
jubilantly than Terry Malloy punching out Johnny Friendly after he has 
already gunned him down by informing on him for the Crime Commis-
sion (“I’m glad what I done to ya!”), Mel, Schulberg’s latest edition of the 
Jewish prince turned boxing champion, ecstatically transforms himself, 
with the zeal of a Christian soldier, into a righteous American killing 
machine: a machine built on the assumption that one must keep on kill-
ing what is already dead, since, like Johnny Friendly, Lonesome Rhodes, 
Stalin, Communism, terrorism, etc.—all threatening, in authentic horror- 
movie style, to come back—it can never be dead enough.
Not only does mild but hard-hitting Mel (with what Schulberg’s screen-
play pantingly calls “quiet authority”104) get to make the big hit, delivering 
the climactic second death blow to the monster by throwing the book at 
Lonesome in the form of the film’s final baroque harangue: in the best 
husbandly way, or like a Reform rabbi who knows when to crack jokes 
and when to crack down, he also assumes control over the moral educa-
tion of Marcia herself, goading her into throwing the switch on Lone-
some by rubbing her nose in his exploitation of her (“You’re the locker 
room where he eases up after the fight,” and so on), and then bullying 
her into telling Lonesome that it was she who did him in.105 (Marcia’s 
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life with this caring intellectual promises to be even more “Gothic” than 
all the abuse and betrayal dished out by her churl of a son and demon 
lover.) As I have said, Mel is obviously Schulberg’s idealized incarnation 
of himself; but there is also plenty of Dartmouth-educated Schulberg in 
Sarah Lawrence–educated Marcia. It is not as if Marcia simply repre-
sented Kazan and Mel simply represented Schulberg. The two collabora-
tors in the film do not correspond in any neat way to the two collabora-
tors behind the film. Kazan and Schulberg both start out as Marcia, but 
they must both turn into Mel, and Mel must end up as the fully Ameri-
canized avenger of Us. Female collaboration, that is, must give way to 
male collaboration, so that the “femininity” of collaboration itself may be 
put in its place and risen above, leaving no doubt about the collaborator 
left standing in the end: like any self-respecting sycophant, “he does care 
about people,” but the point of this care is to implant within his requisite 
malleable mildness “a hard core of morality,” without which the four-
eyed superhero—introduced in Schulberg’s screenplay as “an intelligent, 
hulking but not­too­forceful­looking young man”106—cannot smash the false 
idols always ready to pop back up and make us go all girlish. Out of the 
marsh, out of the en-Jewing muck, Kazan and Schulberg must erect a 
real killer of a strong and wise American Man.
In an essay entitled, “The Psychology of Quislingism,” Ernest Jones, 
after having asserted that the quisling typically handles his “fear of the 
dangerous Father” either by “submit[ting] to” him or by “ally[ing]” him-
self with him, concludes: “Both are exquisitely homosexual solutions.”107 
Yet these solutions, adopted by Kazan and Schulberg, are not exquisitely 
homosexual enough. Collaboration with the enemy—call it vertical col-
laboration—may suggest the sort of cryptofascist muscle-worship sup-
posedly limited to gay male culture; but nothing could be straighter than 
identifying with the power of the invader. As for collaboration with an-
other man—call it horizontal collaboration—this too has been thought, 
not necessarily homophobically, to entail a certain homoeroticism; but, 
at least in the case of the two collaborators in question, collaboration 
works hard to spirit away any gay content, establishing, in its place, the 
joy of an essentially abstract participation in a vast corporate entity, a 
thoroughly masculine and yet disembodied body, membership in which 
gives one the hardening thrill of being able to say “our strength.” Far 
from being deviant, sycophancy is all too normal—even among those 
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who cultivate an image of “almost outrageous” unconventionality, to 
quote from the jacket copy praising Kazan’s autobiography. “Many of 
the men I’ve liked best,” Kazan writes in that book, “have had strong 
‘feminine’ characteristics,” and Schulberg is among the male friends 
he then praises for their “sympathetic yielding qualities.”108 “Strong” is 
the operative word here: whatever sympathetic yielding qualities it takes 
to be a sycophant, they must finally yield, indeed, to the “masculine” 
identification with power that is an even more important requirement 
for the job. What this masculine-feminine schema represses, of course, 
is that the “masculine” identification is no less a surrender than the 
“feminine” compliance: sycophantic assassination is as much a bid for 
the father’s love as is sycophantic groveling, and sycophantic revenge 
betokens the same adolescent manipulability as does the sycophantic 
humiliation that it undertakes to punish. “Once I was a girl,” says the sy-
cophant, “but now I’m a big boy, because I kill for Daddy.” As a girl, the 
sycophant can be “taken in”; as a big boy, he can “get wise.” As a girl, the 
sycophant can experience Communist “thought control”; as a big boy, 
he can control the controllers. The more sycophants change, though, 
the more they stay the same. The sycophant can never be anything other 
than the eternal boss’s eternal servant. And never is he more the eter-
nal servant than when he thinks he’s “his own man,” as a pre-wised-up 
Marcia calls Lonesome.
But try telling this to a nation of sycophants. Needless to say, Schulberg 
and Kazan don’t, even if their film does. As sharply focused on the 
main chance as the self-described “shlockmeister” Joey De Palma—the 
slick, venal, bad sycophant to Mar-Mel’s anguished, earnest, good syco-
phant—they know all too well, and therefore show all too well (as Face’s 
disappointing box office suggests), that the one thing that must never 
be advertised is the sycophant’s permanent subjection: hence the syco-
phant’s Bildungsroman—which necessarily doubles as a national Fami­
lienroman. Not only does Lonesome Rhodes “seem like a redneck rela-
tive of Schulberg’s Sammy Glick,” in Nora Sayre’s phrase109: A Face in 
the Crowd repeats the heterosexual triangulation of What Makes Sammy 
Run?, presenting itself as a contest in which, for the good of the nation, 
the Schulbergian hero takes the girl away from the symbol of the Amer-
ican Dream Turned Nightmare. Like “Uncle Sammy,” his city-slicker 
kinsman, corny old Lonesome makes a mockery of the promise that, 
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in America, even the most oppressed underdog can be a “Free Man in 
the Mornin.’ ”110 Not to worry, though: in both cases, the Schulberg sur-
rogate is there, as dependable as a “Jewish American” politician out to 
prove that he’s as much an American as a Jew, to redeem that promise 
after all, inscribing love of the Fatherland in the equally reassuring idiom 
of heteroerotic rivalry.111 Mel spells it out for Marcia: after pleading guilty 
to the self-hatred of “all mild men,” he adds: “And they hate the windy 
extroverts whose violence seems to have a strange attraction for nice 
girls—who should know better.” But the Schulbergian mild man will 
not be denied the sweet smell of success (to cite 1957’s other big film by 
and about sycophants112): Mel’s ultimate triumph over Lonesome affords 
the classic wish-fulfilling comfort of the Jewish nerd’s revenge against 
the studly swine whom all the girls go for—a revenge all the sweeter 
not only for the Jew- and gay-baiting (“Vanderbilt ’44,” “Frontal Lobe”) 
brainy Mel has had to endure from the steaming pile of ressentiment that 
is the American Everyman, but also for Mel’s own “strange attraction” 
to this big brute of a goyishe golem.
The murky, mucky affective glue without which book-long demys-
tifications do not get written, Mel’s fascination with his rival must of 
course be disinfected by his identification with the prohibiting agency 
in whose name the fatal exposé takes place: the redeemed strong man 
of “our” American democracy. To prepare for this film, Schulberg and 
Kazan conducted extensive research in advertising agencies; as their 
previous work testifies, however, they hardly needed Madison Avenue 
to teach them that nothing fights germs and eliminates odors like patri-
otic heterosexuality. Among those odors may be not just “strange attrac-
tion” but, indeed, the hatred that often feeds on it: in this case, hatred 
of a quite specific genre of “windy extroverts,” whose all-American “vio-
lence” Lonesome Rhodes uncannily replicates. Like Mel’s book, A Face 
in the Crowd thinks it’s unmasking an affable monster, but, also like 
Mel’s book, it ends up showing a little more of its own face than flattery 
might countenance. What Schulberg and Kazan’s cover story doesn’t 
quite cover, for example, and what some critics have reprehended as 
their “elitism,” may be their abiding resentment of the Jew-hating wind-
bag politicians whose Neanderthalism they haven’t exactly opposed and 
to whom, if they want to stay in the American movie business, they can’t 
stop selling themselves: the whole gang of publicity-crazed demagogues, 
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whose right Stalinism—to coin a phrase in Schulberg’s symmetrizing 
manner—finds its unflattering mirror image in Lonesome’s left fas-
cism.113 Especially by the end of the film, that fascism, to be sure, emits 
a perfume more evocative of cracker-barrel American nativism than of 
anything stereotypically left: in Rhodes and his poisonously honeyed 
mystique of “just plain folks,” Kazan and Schulberg do seem to have 
captured what has become the compulsory style of American politics, 
a style even more compulsory for liberal Democrats, of course, than for 
conservative Republicans. And yet, in the authors’ disdain for “hayseed 
fascism,” it is the hayseed that repels them far more than the fascism: 
Marcia’s need to mention Sarah Lawrence and then explain that it is a 
college bespeaks a distaste for the simple folk exceeded only by Mel’s 
reverence for the strength of our national boss man, cet Autre obscur 
qui n’existe pas. Besides, even Kazan and Schulberg’s hatred, doubt-
less sincere, of rural American culture partakes of their interminable 
sycophantic effort to rationalize their perversion—to reduce their re-
sentment, a sniffy nasal eroticism, to mere rancor. Wearing the masks 
of parody and satire, the authors can estrange themselves from their 
own strange attractions: the strange attraction to country music, for in-
stance, that drove Schulberg to write the film’s songs, this time with 
another co-author, Tom Glazer. And while they are working so hard to 
turn their strange attractions into repulsions, Schulberg and Kazan do 
not forget to hate their attraction to strangeness itself, by which I mean 
the strangeness that keeps threatening to be their own: that un-American 
activity, or rather, that blissful un-American inactivity, from which they 
must struggle ceaselessly and manfully to dissociate themselves. As 
show-business royalty, as eggheads, and as “Jew boys”—biologically or 
otherwise—Kazan and Schulberg constantly teeter on the verge of being 
“pull[ed] . . . down into the muck” of a “dangerous and alien conspiracy,” 
for which, as I have argued, the Communist Party is merely a politically 
expedient pretext. “I’ve never done anything as funny as this”: A Face in 
the Crowd’s satire, and for that matter its parody, are a “wretched parody” 
of comic pleasure, yet they stand as signs of Kazan and Schulberg’s 
longing to sink, without vindictiveness, disgust, contempt, or any of the 
other usual precautions, into the marsh of en-Jewment, the impossible, 
unrepresentable ground not only of collaborationist Hollywood but of 
Vichy America in general.
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“All mild men are vicious,” Mel tells Marcia, with snappy Schulbergian 
semi-self-awareness. “They hate themselves for being mild.” The syco-
phantic writer is certainly vicious, and his viciousness is no doubt an 
expression of his self-hatred. But the self-hatred derives from a resent-
ment much greater than any animus Mel can acknowledge, because this 
resentment in turn derives from an envy so acute that even admitting 
to it could melt the mild man, the already “sympathetic” sycophant, 
entirely out of shape. Mel has no trouble confessing that he hates him-
self, and windy extroverts like Lonesome Rhodes. What he cannot say 
is that the man he hates most of all is the mild man who doesn’t hate 
himself for being mild, and whose mildness, instead of serving the 
self-protective purpose of mollifying the Cossacks du jour, indicates a 
fundamentally and unforgivably relaxed attitude toward the self and the 
Cossacks alike. This other mild man, not self-hating but not particularly 
invested, either, in having a self to love, not exactly vicious but not so 
sympathetic that he’d want to be eaten for breakfast by a guy like Elia 
Kazan, is of course the mimetic comedian, whose intolerable pleasure 
consists in not disinfecting his forbidden olfactory impulse—in snuf-
fling his way out of manly American strength and wisdom, into and 
even beyond a luscious marshmallow suavity, finally “cross[ing] the 
threshold” (in Horkheimer and Adorno’s phrase) into marshy, stinky, 
disintegrating laughter. Merely to show such a dangerously luxurious 
animal would imply the possibility of men who neither hate nor love 
their mildness, but simply enjoy letting it make them cease to be men. 
For men like Kazan and Schulberg, showing this creature—no Marlon 
Brando, but a much sexier beast than Lonesome Rhodes—would carry 
an especially grave risk: it would signify that, worse than being soft on 
comedy, they might become, or even want to become, soft from comedy. 
Needless to say, for all their bouncing, flashing “funniness”—which is 
not just pseudocomic but even, finally, in its hysterically pliant rigidity, 
anticomic—these two almost outrageous organization men would not 
be caught dead looking like so much as the comedian’s fellow travelers. 
And so, unrepresentable exactly insofar as he is resentable, the mimetic 
comedian must be punished. For his suicidal deliquescence, he gets as-
sassinated (smell this!), not once but twice: first, when he is named by a 
collaborator’s collaborator in front of huac; second, when he is system-
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atically excluded from the semiautobiographical film the collaborator 
and his collaborator get to make because of their collaboration.
Recalling the multiple hits to which Lonesome Rhodes is subjected, 
the repeated assassination of the comedian suggests, however, that, al-
though he is unrepresentable, his exclusion may not be absolute. Just 
as Lonesome and his monstrous kind are never quite dead, so through 
Marcia’s misbegotten golem does something of the murdered come-
dian seep onto the screen. “I owe it all to you, Marshy,” Schulberg’s 
screenplay has Lonesome say, putting the resonant regionally inflected 
diminutive—which Andy Griffith often uses in the film—in place of 
the more standard “Marcia.”114 Earlier, I wrote that Marcia is apparently 
non-Jewish. Unlike Mel, she really has gone to an Eastern college—but 
without arousing in Lonesome the racial suspicion or the racial antipa-
thy for which his “Eastern” is a front (a bit like “Frontal Lobe”), the code 
word with which the discreet anti-Semite lets the discreet Jew know that 
he’s “wise to” him. Of course, given the dog-like indiscriminateness 
with which Lonesome conducts his adventures in heterosexuality, it is 
quite possible that he simply manages to “overlook” any Jewishness he 
may detect in the fetching Marcia, confining his aversion to Jewish men. 
Despite certain effects of surrogacy, neither Mel nor Marcia, neither the 
male author nor the female author, let me repeat, simply “stands for” 
Schulberg. As I have argued, the collaborators in the film do not line 
up allegorically with the collaborators behind the film. This is not to 
say, however, that Schulberg, in Flaubertian fashion, has not put a little 
something of himself into all of his characters, or that his co-author, the 
virtual Jew, has not done the same. Or, to frame it as a rhetorical ques-
tion: why not presume Jewishness, rather than the usual generic wasp-
ness, as the default ethnicity of the dramatis personae in a mainstream 
American film? Particularly when the American mainstream flows out 
of the marsh of en-Jewment—when, that is, normal citizenship is predi-
cated on a soft and softening mass body of dangerous strangers, whom all 
normal citizens have the patriotic duty to sniff out—such a presumption 
seems no more than the tritest common sense. Nous sommes tous des juifs 
allemands—which is why we must report them to the authorities. A Jew-
ish Marsh-a, at any rate, might engender just such a creature as Lone-
some Rhodes, and might give him just such a name, fashioning him not 
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only out of the Arkansas dirt but out of the richer soil, the mother lode, 
of comic mimesis. Having done so, she would immediately, of course, 
have to clean up his act by converting it into satire’s wretched parody of 
comic pleasure: into the hayseed pap that he indeed purveys, and that 
passes for invigoratingly “down-to-earth” home truths on the timid (if 
ravenous) American palate. But the resentment that is Mel’s repelled at-
traction to Lonesome may attach itself to more than just the latter’s pale 
imitation of mimesis: Mel may be attracted to the mimesis that Lone-
some imitates. For this mimesis is nothing other than the matrix out of 
which, like all good Americans in this nation of immigrants, he himself 
has crawled, and in which even his own name seems to be inscribed: the 
marshy, mellow, unhealthy muck of strangeness that lies just beyond 
Lonesome’s crusted-over façade, and into which ruggedly Americanized 
intellectual assassins, even more heavily armored themselves, might 
well yearn to collapse, or to return, along with all the other Jew-boys and 
Jew-girls without whom this country could not have been built.
Mel in fact seems to give voice to such a yearning in the very scene 
where he tells Marcia why all mild men are vicious. She has come to pay 
a visit to the writers’ room: “Hey, welcome to the Black Hole of Calcutta,” 
he cries as she walks into the smoky office, whose walls are decorated 
with signs that say things like “Do Not Feed or Annoy the Writers” and 
with posters of Lonesome, at which the swarthy prisoners throw darts, 
in a prolepsis of the big assassination(s) at the end of the film. “Here 
you see the lepers of the great television industry,” Mel continues. “Men 
without faces,” he says, displaying a fellow writer who lacks not a face 
but hair, which is a good start. “Why, they even slide our paychecks un-
der the door so they can pretend we’re not here.” Soon comes the mild 
man’s ostensibly incisive self-analysis. Yet the banter leading up to it is 
far more revealing. In some sense, to be sure, this is just a rehash of a 
rancid tune, call it the hack’s lament, that occurs in virtually every Holly-
wood novel, including What Makes Sammy Run?: the hacks have been re-
located from Hollywood to New York, from movies to television, but the 
jokes and the whining are the same.115 Like his movie-business counter-
part, the television writer is stereotypically an unhappy sycophant, one 
who knows just how wretched his wretched parody of fulfillment is: he 
hates himself for the mildness that causes him to betray Art, and that 
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prevents him from becoming a Real Artist, which is to say, from becom-
ing “his own man.”116 But within this song of the stoolpigeon, a less 
familiar, and less grating, tune can be heard. On the way to getting hard, 
Mel articulates, in the mode of denegation, a desire to get soft: or rather, 
to get even softer than he already is, becoming not his own man (that 
is, somebody else’s) but no man at all. “I wouldn’t want to be buried in 
the same cemetery with the guy,” Abraham Polonsky said of Elia Kazan: 
even the mimetic comedian won’t sleep with just anyone. But when 
Marcia drops into the Black Hole of Calcutta, she enters something like 
a happy cemetery, a graveyard marked by nothing so much as the lev­
ity of its occupants. For a moment, the film itself takes a detour into a 
fantasy space of male decomposition: a smelly, mellow marsh filled with 
lepers, men without faces, and animals. The film’s comedy central, a 
repository of self-pitying wisecracks as stale as the cigarette smoke that 
hangs in the air, the writers’ room is at the same time almost a scene 
of the obscene, the closest Face can get to representing its unrepresent-
able desire for the facelessness of comic mimesis. Because Kazan and 
Schulberg cannot face the mortification that would ensue if they stopped 
rationalizing their forbidden impulse to sniff out “bad” smells, their hys-
terically “funny” film does not in fact dare to cross the threshold into 
the peculiarly side-splitting kind of soft­core pornography that, in its very 
softness, remains much more dangerous, in American culture, than the 
violence of any hard-core morality, and that must therefore be infused 
with a foul aroma, compounded of male-homosexual anal eroticism and 
the fetor of “undeveloped nations” (the marsh of en-Jewment already 
spreading, in the 1950s, to take in gay male culture and the Third World, 
the cesspools of un-Americanness in which new conspiracies would be 
hatched). And yet, if the film must not cross the threshold into soft-
core comic pornography, some soft-core comic pornography crosses the 
threshold into the film, via the very crack under the door through which 
they slide the writers’ paychecks, or via the very wisecracks with which 
the future wise guy keeps his nose clean. In its wary, titillated excursion 
into the black hole of the writers’ room, the film permits itself a whiff 
of unrationalized comic pleasure. Before it closes the door on this other-
wise forbidden colony, it remembers not only how strangely attractive 
the leper’s misery can seem next to the sycophant’s wretchedness, but 
144	 chap ter	four	
also how strangely attractive a cemetery filled with guys you would want 
to be buried with can seem next to the life of the assassin the sycophant 
is supposed to “turn into” when he “grows up.”
In other words, the film quickly opens, and then almost as quickly 
closes, a door onto its own swampy ground: the burial ground of mi-
metic comedians, whose dissolute, even self-decomposing, tendencies 
demand that they be finished off repeatedly, with a vengeance. Paying 
a visit to writers without faces, Face pays tribute, in the only way that it 
can, to the writers whose defacing, whose obliteration by the blacklist, 
is its condition of possibility: to those Hollywood lepers without whom 
it could not have been made. But if the writers’ room is a repository of 
guilt, it is also an object of desire. As if overcome by a smell that offends 
all the more because, oddly, it isn’t quite as repellent as it should be, A 
Face in the Crowd rushes back to the business of building an American 
killer: of getting mild-mannered Mel Miller out of the writers’ room and 
into his superhero costume. Once transformed, of course, Mel still looks 
like Clark Kent; but don’t let the glasses fool you. “Intelligent, hulking 
but not­too­forceful­looking,” Mel owes his real strength to the wisdom 
that he gets from being not just an intellectual but an American intel-
lectual. Precisely because of their elitism, Schulberg and Kazan know 
better than to make the “we” in Mel’s triumphal “We get wise to ’em” 
so narrowly royal as to designate only a class of princes and princesses 
with degrees from schools like Dartmouth, Williams, Sarah Lawrence, 
and even Vanderbilt: this “we” packs a punch because behind it stand 
the American people, who prove that pseudopopulist menace Lonesome 
Rhodes wrong by knowing the difference, at the end of the day, between 
dog food and steak. “It is your most misanthropic film,” Michel Ciment, 
speaking about A Face in the Crowd, says to Kazan, who seems to take the 
remark as a compliment, supporting it with this example: “The journal-
ist played by Walter Matthau was not dealt with mercifully. I’ve never 
been very favourably inclined toward ‘intellectuals.’ . . . Budd thinks 
that character is sympathetic. I don’t think he has much gumption, or 
strength.”117 “Budd Schulberg and I were very close in our views of every-
thing,” Kazan tells another interviewer.118 The two statements do not con-
tradict each other, and neither do the two collaborators. That Schulberg 
likes the “intellectual” while Kazan dislikes him merely conforms to the 
rules of the game of good cop–bad cop, that masterpiece of aesthetic 
The Writers’ Room: Patricia Neal, Walter Matthau, and  
others in A Face in the Crowd
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ambiguity, in which these two informers excel.119 Mel hates himself for 
being mild, but his buddy Schulberg hates him even more, at least as 
much as his enemy Kazan does, since no one is as hard on the intel-
lectual would-be tough guy as another intellectual would-be tough guy. 
The egghead must be turned into a patriotic hit man, but no egghead, 
not even a non-Jewish one, will ever really have gumption or strength 
enough for the job—not just because, as an egghead, he can never fully 
rid himself of the softness that he shares with writers and comedians, 
but also because, as a patriotic hit man, he can never be anything other 
than a good little soldier. Pour faire une hommelette—to amend one of 
Lacan’s better cracks—il faut casser des oeufs.120 Always already a broken 
man, the intellectual who wants to be a supercop can never quite forgive 
himself for never quite pulling himself together.
Clearly, being a sycophant is no joke: even when the sycophant makes 
his funniest movie, he can’t help feeling like the saddest of clowns. In-
deed, the funnier he tries to be, the less he escapes his own hysterical 
wretchedness. Then again, the sycophant can always console himself 
with the thought of how normal it is to be a sycophant, especially a mis-
anthropic one. Who is quicker to tell the world to go fuck itself than one 
who makes a living sniffing after it? In America, of course, such a one 
has plenty of company, or at least stiff competition: there are many faces 
in the lonely (or is it lonesome?) crowd of flag-wavers, baton-twirlers, 
baby-kissers, and other publicity-seekers. To stand out in this crowd, 
as in a sea of billboards, one must in fact adopt Kazan’s policy of be-
ing almost outrageous: outrageous enough to attract the public’s easily 
distracted attention, but not so outrageous as to affront its merciless 
morality. Consider, with this end in view, the end of A Face in the Crowd, 
where what the film puts in the crowd’s face looks a lot like a fesse in the 
crowd: instead of kissing the American public’s ass, as Mel’s pious vale-
dictory peroration has just been doing, this assassinating film—here, it 
seems, firmly under the control of its “misanthropic” director—sticks 
its own ass in the air, cheekily sabotaging, one might imagine, the final 
flourish of patriotic congratulation and self-congratulation toward which 
it appears to be heading. I am referring to the huge neon “Coca-Cola” 
sign that fills the screen as Mel and Marcia drive off into the night, and 
beneath which the even bigger words “The End” are flashed.121 “Look 
how Kazan has managed to ridicule the capitalists.”122 So writes Barthes, 
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at his most ventriloquially sarcastic, in his analysis of the end of On 
the Waterfront. And just as that film is never more reactionary, Barthes 
shows, than “at the moment when many supposed that Kazan had skill-
fully insinuated his leftism,” so its successor is never more a cheerleader 
for the American way of life than when it mockingly brandishes the 
brand name that virtually spells “America” throughout the world.123 
With the adman’s flair for the provocation that provokes no one, the end 
of Face covers its ass while appearing to show it. Like the hard-hitting 
exposé that maintains the cushiness of the doxa, the “ironic” ad, which 
sells its product by making fun of it, is of course a mainstay of the post-
war publicity machine—as illustrated, say, by Lonesome Rhodes’s bad-
mouthing of Luffler and his mattresses, which has the predictable effect 
of increasing sales. Operating on the same principle, the final image of 
A Face in the Crowd is wicked only in its cleverness as a piece of product 
placement. In this case, the product being placed is not exactly Coca-Cola 
itself, since there is no such thing as Coca-Cola itself. There is only what 
“Coca-Cola” is a sign for: namely, “our strength,” which comes from 
our “healthy American tradition” of “getting wise,” this wisdom consist-
ing both in our particular ability eventually to see through demagogic 
frauds like Lonesome Rhodes and, more important, in our generalized 
knowingness, like that of a pack of hardened mall rats, who are always 
more inclined to buy something if the commercials for it flatter us for 
being hip enough to look down our noses at it. Is capitalism the end of 
America? Of course it is: but only if we invoke the hipster lingo of 1957 
and interpret “the end” as beatnik slang meaning “the best,” “the great-
est,” “the most wonderful.” Not only is capitalism the end of America: 
America is Endsville itself.
“What I like in the film is the energy and invention and bounce which 
are very American. It’s really got something marvelous about it, this con-
stantly flashing, changing rhythm. In many ways, it’s more American 
than any picture I ever did.” But a hit isn’t always a hit. If the American 
public didn’t share Kazan’s affection for his “funny” Face, this is neither 
because the film fails to be flashy enough to capture the limited atten-
tion span of its already Coked-out audience nor because, “ahead of its 
time,” it goes too far in its assessment of how much outrageousness that 
audience can tolerate.124 The film has as much energy as an overstimu-
lated teenager, and as much obsequious cunning as an overstimulated 
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teenager with tyrannical parents. The trouble with the film is not that 
it lacks bounce, or that it fails to keep that bounce within national 
bounds, making sure that everyone perceives it as “very American.” 
Rather, the trouble with Face is that, in the ghastly jauntiness of Kazan 
and Schulberg’s hip hype for the Daddy-o who, precisely a zero, doesn’t 
exist, the crowd saw a much uglier monster than Lonesome Rhodes. 
The mid-twentieth-century-American dislike of A Face in the Crowd is 
the rage of Caliban seeing his own face in a glass. That the 1950s French 
disliked it too, as Truffaut notes, suggests that France and the United 
States, frequently estranged from each other—the one so “feminine,” 
the other so “masculine”—have more in common than either country 
might care to think. As the long 1950s continue, the prospect of a re-
newed Franco-American friendship is nothing to sneer at, of course.125 
French and American audiences once agreed in their dislike of a film by 
two friends and friendly witnesses. If only they could learn once again 
to dislike it together—this time, however, not on the basis of their com-
mon revulsion from its familiar and yet disturbingly strange face, but on 
the basis of their common repelled attraction to its strange and yet dis-
turbingly familiar smell: the “bad” smell both of sycophancy itself and, 
even “worse,” of the pleasure that sycophancy is after. If the sycophant 
is after the comedian, the sycoanalyst, after all, is after the sycophant. 
But though “after” indicates both belatedness and pursuit, the pursuit 
by the belated need not take the apparently inevitable form of a pursuit 
of suspects, or even the cheerier but still excessively American form of a 
pursuit of happiness. What we sycoanalysts are after is a comic pleasure 
more exotic, more fragrant, and dirtier than any mere happiness could 
ever be.
Like Elia Kazan, the word “sycophant” has Greek roots. The Greek word 
sykhophantes means “informer,” as we have seen, and is constructed by 
combining sykhos, “fig,” with phanein, “to show.” According to some 
accounts, informers were called sycophants because they informed on 
those who broke the law against exporting figs from Athens; according 
to others, informers collected taxes in the form of figs, which they then 
dutifully presented to the authorities; according to still others, “show-
ing the fig,” still an obscene gesture in Italy, for instance, and a sign 
of the female genitalia, suggests the informer’s contempt for those on 
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whom he informs (what better way, after all, of giving someone the fin-
ger than by fingering him?).126 In his “memories of a Hollywood prince,” 
Budd Schulberg recounts what we might consider his own primal tale 
of sycophancy. In this tale, Schulberg and his then–partner in crime, 
Maurice Rapf, another Hollywood prince—who would also become a 
screenwriter and a member of the Communist Party, but who refused to 
cooperate with huac and was therefore blacklisted—are both fourteen 
years old, and they have the run of the lot at mgm, where Maurice’s fa-
ther is an executive. Here is how they amuse themselves:
Just inside the mgm auto gate . . . was an enormous fig tree, a relic of 
the days when the whole western basin of Los Angeles was fragrant with 
fruit orchards. The old tree was a studio ornament now, for no one ever 
seemed to pick the fruit. The figs would ripen to squashy black missiles, 
ideal weapons for us to hurl against moving targets. . . .
Maurice and I would crouch behind the thickened trunk of the giant 
tree, under the dark-green protection of its heavy branches, rear back with 
juicy figs in our hands, and throw them with all our small but consider-
able might. Black fig skins and pinkish-white pulp would splatter against 
expensive sports jackets and famous profiles.127
Schulberg makes a point of explaining that “there was an inverse caste 
system to our target priorities”: these two princes weren’t primarily out 
to get the little people, the more or less proletarian studio workers; it was 
the stars they most wanted to hit:
What we were really after was a John Gilbert in a dapper ascot, a chic 
Billy Haines, a strutting Erich von Stroheim, a swashbuckling (or swish 
buckling) Ramon Novarro. Nor were the glamorous ladies neglected. . . . 
The fact that the ladylike Norma Shearer was known to be under the pro-
tection of Irving Thalberg provided no shield against the rotting figs that 
come flying mysteriously from the depths of our leafy barricade.128
It is not long before a snake appears in the garden, in the form of Maurie 
the Mailroom Boy, yet another version of that familiar Schulbergian anti-
hero, the flunky on the make, the perfidious all-American hustler:
He seemed to enjoy our assault on studio dignity. But we soon learned 
never to trust the mailroom boy. He would turn his own mother in to the 
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studio cops if it meant a step up the ladder. So our mailroom Judas ratted 
on us, revealing us as the perpetrators of the soft-fig massacre. . . .
I do not say that Maurie the Mailroom Boy earned his promotion as a 
direct result of his betrayal of our youthful figging. It was simply a symbol 
of his readiness to please the stronger by turning on the weaker.129
As the perceptive reader will have guessed, the soft figs—not to mention 
the somewhat shaky ground on which Schulberg, himself a fig-shower, 
is standing—are about to yield to his famous hard core of morality:
You had to impress somebody at least one rung above you, scramble to get 
an in, and then use that in to climb up over the back of your benefactor if 
you could. Horatio Alger would do no less. You might call it the American 
way of life, to gnaw and claw your way to the top, like the Rockefellers 
and the Morgans and all the robber barons who aced themselves into the 
American aristocracy. Hollywood, after all, was only a picture of America 
run through the projector at triple speed.130
Here, Rabbi Schulberg flatly tells what A Face in the Crowd hysterically 
shows: that America is a nation of rats. And yet, Schulberg once again 
proves himself a master, like Kazan, of an honesty that is only almost 
outrageous. Schulberg’s bluffly universalizing move provides a leafy 
barricade behind which his own particular treachery can recede, either 
as though self-serving betrayal were so pervasively and so definitively 
American as to make his collaboration disappear into what must hence-
forth be understood as just the great national rat race, or, better yet, as 
though he simply exempted himself from the general condition he is 
diagnosing, by virtue of diagnosing it, sycophantic nosology unmasking 
sycophancy everywhere except in the nosologist. (Schulberg’s autobiog-
raphy, or this volume of it, at any rate—a sequel has been promised—
ends with his leaving home for college, keeping his huac testimony 
in the distant future and past.) Of course, even before he thus covers 
himself, Schulberg, with his publicist’s genius for self-protection, has al-
ready sought a shield in the claim of inverse snobbery. Not only is he the 
victim of “Maurie the finger-boy,”131 the object rather than the subject of 
informing: with his Robin Hood–like “target priorities,” he is the very 
antithesis of the hateful “mailroom Judas,” the model of the thoroughly 
loveable outlaw. But there is no more safety in Schulberg’s picaresque 
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pose as the antisycophant than Norma Shearer could find in Irving 
Thalberg, once the figging began. For even the wistful antisycophantic 
masquerade has something sycophantic about it. (As a hysteric, the 
sycophant can always be trusted to rat on himself, as Terry Malloy 
would say.) Long before Schulberg names a single name, even as he 
plays the anti-Maurie, the kindhearted princely scamp, who just wants to 
throw figs, not to show them, he displays his own “readiness to please the 
stronger by turning on the weaker.” At the unripe age of fourteen, little 
Budd already has the impressively developed political nose, the subtle 
rodent intelligence with respect to hierarchies of all kinds, that will serve 
him so well in his permanent adolescence as an American citizen. His 
gift for sniffing out weakness and strength in others certainly mani-
fests itself with regard to the class structure, or what he calls the “caste 
system”—who other than a Hollywood prince could have such refined 
contempt for the ambitious mailroom boy, or such a longing to punish 
his impudence?—but he is equally astute in his perception of sexual vul-
nerability, by which I mean not only his eagerness, in keeping with the 
traditional genital symbolism of the fig, to make fig-pulp splatter against 
“glamorous ladies,” but also his killer instinct for softness in men, or 
for the signs of any effeminate cosmopolitanism, as evinced by, say, “a 
John Gilbert in a dapper ascot, a chic Billy Haines, a strutting Erich von 
Stroheim, a swashbuckling (or swish buckling) Ramon Novarro.” Obvi-
ously, Schulberg’s “inverse caste system” does not preclude a desire to 
target male “inversion” itself. Schulberg has always opposed Neander-
thalism in any form, but boys will be boys—especially when a certain 
supplementary fruitiness might threaten to attach itself to them, by dint 
of their status as the “spoiled” offspring of vaguely foreign royalty from 
vaguely degenerate racial stock running a suspiciously soft business in a 
notoriously decadent town.
Nothing could be more banal than the homophobia of a pampered male 
adolescent, except perhaps his emergence as a full-blown finger-boy in 
the sycophantic America of his middle age, or his attempt, at both stages 
of his life and in his late-life memoirs, to present himself as a tough, 
independent humanitarian. In literalizing what we might consider the 
basics of sycoanalytic theory, Schulberg’s fig-tale, however, reveals the 
outlines of a less normative figure than either of those budding good 
citizens, the figger and the fingerer, the fig-thrower and the fig-shower 
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badly hidden inside of him. I have in mind not the antisycophant, who 
is nothing more than the sycophant’s vain shadow, but, rather, the sy­
cophile, whose rotting love-bombs or “squashy black missiles” convey a 
wish for collective mimetic self-decomposition, and for a much juicier 
comic pleasure than can be squeezed out of a brittle, projective piece 
of wit like “swashbuckling (or swish buckling).” The sycophant, who 
after all hates himself for being mild, hurls figs at his soft targets to 
rid himself of his hated softness. And when he gets a little older, he 
discovers bigger and more profitable ways of giving softies the finger. 
The sycophile throws figs at the swells not to differentiate himself from 
their dangerous luxury, but further to enmarsh himself in it, the splat-
tered pulp making not a humiliating stain but a palpable, sticky, stinky 
connection. Young Budd Schulberg, I want to insist, is both sycophant 
and sycophile, and so is young Maurice Rapf (who advised Schulberg 
on this autobiography, and who, despite their continuing disagreement 
about the blacklist, did not deny the story of the figs).132 Just as, thirty 
years later, Schulberg and his co-assassin Kazan would both be Mel and 
Marcia, so Schulberg and his present collaborator are both “perpetrators 
of the soft-fig massacre.” Every sycophant, as I hope this chapter has 
suggested, was once a sycophile, and always risks falling back into syco-
philia unless he polices it vigilantly, going to work, like everyone else in 
town, for “the studio cops.” And yet, as Rapf ’s presence in Schulberg’s 
fig-tale reminds us, not every collaborator becomes, or perhaps I should 
say remains, a sycophant: there may be ways of staying in touch with 
one’s fig-love without fingering it. There is only one difference between 
“Maurie” and “Maurice”: the letter “c,” the letter of “Communism” and 
“comedy” alike, the latter, of course, making for much juicier forbidden 
fruit than the former. Let it stand, then, as what Schulberg would call 
“simply a symbol,” a symbol of “what we [are] really after”: laughter as 




As a critique of the complicity between politics and show business, A 
Face in the Crowd, we have seen, takes care to direct its aim away from 
Hollywood and the motion-picture industry of which it is a product, 
sending its satire to New York instead, where the interlocked worlds of 
television and advertising furnish a much safer target. But if this deflec-
tion spares the film’s satirists the embarrassment of having to acknowl-
edge the ongoing Hollywood blacklist in which they have both collabo-
rated, we should note that (unlike the theater, as we shall see in the next 
chapter) television had a blacklist of its own. In his history of Jews in 
and on American television, David Zurawik, having observed that the 
television networks, like the Hollywood studios, were run by anxiously 
assimilationist Jewish executives, explains why the networks were so co-
operative: “The fledgling networks were even more vulnerable than the 
film studios in the early 1950s, because television was so dependent on 
Madison Avenue. . . . In terms of programming, the advertising industry 
controlled prime-time television up until about the quiz show scandals 
of 1958, and Madison Avenue was decidedly wasp.”1 Where the cruelty 
of the Hollywood blacklist is often evoked by citing the death of John 
Garfield, the greater vulnerability of the fledgling networks hardly made 
their policies of blacklisting any less murderous, or any less apt to pro-
duce martyrs. Registering vulnerability’s penchant for inflicting wounds 
of its own, Zurawik adduces the most manifestly tragic episode in the 
history of the television blacklist: the firing, in 1951, of the actor Philip 
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Loeb, co-star of the situation comedy The Goldbergs; followed by the can-
cellation of the show; followed in turn by Loeb’s suicide in 1955.
Much of the value of Zurawik’s account, however, consists in his dem-
onstration of how the brutality of blacklisting extends both structurally, 
beyond specific practices of firing and nonhiring into a more or less con-
scious and systemic de-Judaizing of television content, and temporally, 
beyond the quiz show scandals of the late fifties into the seventies—in 
fact, into the nineties, where even the supposed mainstream triumph of 
uncloseted Jewishness in the blockbuster sitcom Seinfeld offers evidence 
of persistent Jewish self-censorship in the shadow of a normatively 
Christian and presumptively anti-Jewish mass audience of “American 
viewers.” Some writers, directors, and actors who had been blacklisted 
could work openly in television once again after, say, 1962; but the me-
dium to which they were returning, Zurawik suggests, remained, and 
remains, sufficiently traumatized by the blacklist to keep acting as if it 
were still in force: to keep imposing it on itself, at the level of content if 
not at the level of personnel. And so it is in force, its genius consisting 
in having implanted itself so firmly in the mass media it had terrorized 
that, appearing finally to have been “broken” in the early sixties, it could 
pretend to put itself out of business. This chapter later looks at the work 
of blacklist survivors; but let us note now that, long past reports of its 
demise, the blacklist itself survives, all the more robustly for being pre-
sumed dead.
Like American movies, American television proves the truth of the 
claim—not always a malevolent one—that Jews play a dominant role in 
running the mass media. But perhaps even more than American mov-
ies, American television constitutes the paradox of a Jewishly dominated 
mass medium without Jews—or, to put it more cautiously, in which Jew-
ishness, if not kept entirely out of sight, must show its face as little, or 
as guardedly, as possible, for fear of alienating the non-Jewish majority, 
whose image, in the collective unconscious of network executives, prob-
ably still resembles that of the adoring audience of Lonesome Rhodes 
in A Face in the Crowd. Blacklisting in American television, Zurawik 
suggests, is never just about anti-Communism, or even primarily about 
anti-Communism, though of course anti-Communism provides it with 
its alibi, as it does in the film industry as well. In what might pass for a 
slip, Zurawik writes, “When the House Un-American Activities Com-
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mittee (huac) first started formally looking for Jews in the motion pic-
ture industry . . .”2 “Formally,” or at any rate officially, huac was looking 
for Communists, not for Jews. In previous chapters, I have argued, how-
ever, that the hunt for “Communists” legitimated a much broader and 
murkier pursuit: indeed, a pursuit of “Jews,” insofar as that term stands 
for those entertainers and intellectuals, those Jewish, or (like Charlie 
Chaplin) Jewishly associated, jokers and smart alecks, whose mimetic 
tendencies put them dangerously at odds with the dominant national se-
riousness. Despite having been named in the television blacklist’s bible, 
Red Channels: The Report of Communist Influence in Radio and Television, 
Philip Loeb denied that he had ever been a Communist; it was enough, 
however, that, as a liberal member of Popular Front organizations, he 
could be characterized as politically “controversial,” thus giving the net-
work and the sponsor an excuse for firing him. Meanwhile, those “con-
troversial” politics just happened to coincide with an overt Jewishness—
a holdover from radio, The Goldbergs featured recognizably Jewish actors 
playing explicitly Jewish characters—whose distinctive tone was comic, 
and whose distinctive accent belonged to that least American of Ameri-
can cities: its eccentric and exotic cultural capital, namely, New York.3
Loeb was fired, in short, for what I have called comicosmopolitanism, 
not for the Commiecosmopolitanism—the participation in a putative 
international Communist conspiracy—of which Red Channels accused 
him, and for which a nervous nbc dismissed him, after picking up The 
Goldbergs from an even more sycophantic cbs. Zurawik speculates as to 
the latter network’s motives for dropping the show:
Though not reported until May [1951], the decisions by General Foods 
and [cbs head William] Paley to cancel [The Goldbergs] had actually been 
made in early April, shortly after the conviction on March 29, 1951, of Ethel 
and Julius Rosenberg as spies for the Soviet Union. Their three-week trial 
in New York and subsequent death sentences made daily headlines across 
the country. To the best of my knowledge, the connection between the 
conviction of the Rosenbergs and the cancellation of The Goldbergs has 
never been made, but the timing is such that one cannot help but wonder 
if the official branding of the Rosenbergs as spies at the height of the Cold 
War didn’t have a direct impact on what happened to The Goldbergs. Both 
were, after all, young Jewish families with two children. Would gentile 
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viewers think of the Rosenbergs when they saw The Goldbergs on their 
television screens?4
Zurawik is right to notice a “connection between the conviction of the 
Rosenbergs and the cancellation of The Goldbergs.” But where he con-
strues the former as the cause of the latter, I want to propose instead 
that The Goldbergs gave rise to The Rosenbergs, as a thesis provokes its 
antithesis: that the sitcom produced its own negation in the form of the 
sensational, long-running show constituted not just by the Rosenbergs’ 
three-week trial, but by the whole process culminating in their execu-
tions two years later. For the point of that show was to replace Jewish 
situation comedy with Jewish situation tragedy: to substitute tragic Jews 
for comic Jews, or, rather, to turn comic Jews into tragic Jews. After 
The Goldbergs, Jews could still be seen on television, but they had to be 
seen as chastened—as symbols of laughter reduced to tears. “Phil is not 
a symbol for us,” write Loeb’s friends Kate Mostel and (fellow actor and 
blacklistee) Madeline Gilford. “We remember him as one of the funni-
est, dearest men we ever knew, our true and funny friend. To this day we 
find ourselves constantly telling Phil Loeb stories.”5 Fired and, in effect, 
executed too, Philip Loeb had to be tragicized, like the Rosenbergs—he 
had to be, as the French might say, suicidé—less because gentile view-
ers might have seen him and his fellow cast members as Soviet spies 
than because he represented something even more threatening to na-
tional discipline than Communist subversion: the exemption from that 
discipline enjoyed by the comic actor descended from a tribe of shape-
shifting wanderers, and practicing his art in the geographically extreme, 
polyglot show-business cosmopolis.
Loeb’s tragic fate, then, is not the consequence of the Rosenbergs’ con-
viction; rather, their conviction, or the spectacle of their conviction and 
its protracted denouement, stands as the logical fulfillment, the telos, of 
the larger cultural process that his tragicization exemplifies: a process, 
begun as early as the first huac hearings in 1947, of transforming the 
intolerably undisciplined, enviably un-American, in a word, comicosmo-
politan, Jew into an object of pity and terror, not to say contempt. The 
Red Scare, as I have suggested more than once, was something of a red 
herring; by the same token, the blackmailing insinuation that the televi-
sion networks functioned as “red channels” mainly afforded a plausible 
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pretext for a campaign of ressentiment designed to punish those pub-
lic figures perceived as having it too easy. Here, as quoted in Thomas 
Doherty’s study of television and the Cold War, is Jack O’Brian, televi-
sion critic at the New York Journal-American, gleefully revealing Loeb’s 
listing in Red Channels as “the real reason The Goldbergs disappeared 
from the Columbia Broadcasting System after a long and luxurious hia-
tus in that network’s pink-tinged boudoir”: “The Columbia Broadcasting 
System may deny it,” O’Brian continued, “but won’t most of the fla-
grant Red Channels nominees find it necessary to earn their crackers and 
caviar on other networks next fall?”6 The authors of Red Channels them-
selves—three enterprising former fbi agents, now operating a patriotic 
“protection” racket—refer to “the great prestige and crowd-gathering 
power that derives from having glamorous personalities of radio and tv 
as sponsors of Communist fronts and as performers or speakers at front 
meetings and rallies (which incidentally adds to the performers’ pres-
tige).” For all their animus against “Communism,” these bloodhounds 
almost risk losing its scent, so distracted are they by the more intoxicat-
ing stench of “prestige,” “glamour,” and “power” that fills the air like 
the flagrant fragrance of caviar in some luxurious, pink-tinged boudoir.7 
From the perspective of the Red-hunters, “Communism,” ominously 
and relentlessly advertised as a clear and present danger to American 
democracy, was nothing so much as a happy accident: the lesser charge 
on which they could nonetheless convict the perpetrators of far more 
serious—which is to say, far more comic—crimes.
Even after The Goldbergs was purged of Philip Loeb, the show’s for-
tunes declined rapidly: having fallen from cbs to nbc, it would pass 
from the low-rent DuMont network to the bas-fonds of syndication, where 
it would die in 1956. Its demise is often related to a larger demographic 
shift that students of American television observe in the early years of 
the medium. Thomas Doherty writes:
Like Milton Berle, whose vaudeville antics on Texaco Star Theater made 
him television’s first superstar when a New York City minority owned 
a majority of television sets, The Goldbergs was destined to be ethnically 
anomalous as television spread across America. “There is some hinter-
land TV trade and audience opinion that there’s too much borscht tint-
ing TV comedians,” cautioned Variety’s veteran reporter Abel Green in 
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1951. “The Catskill Mt. resort-trained comics are coming into their own in 
vaudeo, and while the New York metropolitan area has almost 50% of the 
10,000,000 tv sets in U.S. homes today, there is still a sizable audience 
away from a melting pot metropolis like Gotham.” The future of televi-
sion lay out in the heartland, away from the Judeo-centric regions of the 
greater New York area. Warning against what he called “Lindy’s patois,” 
“dialectic boobytraps,” and “nitery asides,” Green argued that the wise-
cracks exchanged at Jewish delicatessens like Lindy’s in New York “don’t 
belong on tv.”8
If less luxurious than caviar, borscht of course resembles it in signify-
ing “Russia.” But while “Russia” in turn signifies “Communism,” what 
makes early television comedy’s borscht tint a taint, for Green, is that 
this pink tinge betrays more than just an infusion of Red ideology. That 
ideology may provide the most convenient reason for “warning against” 
the stain of borscht, but Variety’s veteran reporter reads hinterland tastes, 
or distastes, as spreading well beyond mere ideological aversion, to con-
stitute a whole system of aesthetic and erotic phobias, rooted in a racial 
hatred that can never be identified (much less condemned) as such, only 
connoted through its supposed bêtes noires, including, but by no means 
limited to, such elements self-evidently in need of ethnic cleansing as 
“Lindy’s patois,” “dialectic boobytraps,” and “nitery asides.” It is not just 
the red herring, in short, but the whole delicatessen that gives the heart-
land heartburn. Small wonder if the finicky Volk spits such unwhole-
some fare back into the “melting pot metropolis” from which, at the 
beginning of the 1950s, before television production more or less moves 
to California, most TV dinners are being served. The patois, the booby 
traps, and the asides, after all, are ingredients of the piquant, Jewish- 
tasting linguistic soup that is comicosmopolitanism.
William Paley and his counterparts at the other networks probably 
did not require Abel Green’s transparently encoded warnings to make 
the change toward blander fare, effecting a profound and constitutive 
split between the site and the agents of television production, on the 
one hand, and the content and the imagined audience of television pro-
duction, on the other. A Jewish-controlled medium that put Jews in the 
closet, early television thereby became a technology for putting New 
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York City in the closet as well. The Jews who ran television were not 
slow to join the Jews who ran movies in enforcing the first rule of mass 
entertainment: never offend the palates of the dreaded (and yet revered) 
American Cossacks “out in the heartland.” Indeed, given “Gotham” ’s 
image as an even more Jewish (and even less American) city than Holly-
wood—as what the less genteel among the anti-Semites still call “Jew 
York City”—the Jews of television had an even greater incentive for en-
forcing that rule. (George Clooney’s film, Good Night, and Good Luck, 
about Edward R. Murrow’s confrontation with Joseph McCarthy, gets 
everything about the period right, from the haircuts to the coffee tables 
to the cigarettes—everything, that is, except the thick haze of New York-
Jewish anxiety about “the American people” suffusing the world of net-
work news, and determining its every calculation, now as well as then.)9 
With that rule firmly in mind, the big-city caterers in charge of network 
programming frantically revised their menus to minimize not just the 
local flavors of “Russia,” which is to say, of that part of Jewish “Russia” 
transplanted to the New York metropolitan area, but everything disgust-
ingly heterogeneous and unlocalizable that this Jewish particularity seems 
to carry with itself.
For if Jews, prestigious pariahs, have often been associated with cos-
mopolitanism tout court—the institution of the blacklist and the found-
ing of the state of Israel, roughly contemporaneous events, having gone 
a long way toward weakening that association—comicosmopolitanism 
represents Jewishness as diffusion. Even more stereotypically Jewish by 
virtue of the comic embedded within it, comicosmopolitanism at the 
same time works against stereotypicality’s hardness and boundedness. 
While the comicosmopolitanism of early television has a pronounced 
regional and ethnic marking—its authors and performers are mostly 
New York Jews not far removed from Eastern Europe—what makes it 
comicosmopolitanism, after all, is that it exceeds this marking. Lindy’s 
patois, dialectic booby traps, and nitery asides all figure in the distinctive 
showbiz vernacular of the Judeo-centric metropolis. Yet, taken together, 
they are not merely metropolitan but cosmopolitan as well, since, as a 
repertoire of codes, they represent the multiple fluencies—the conver-
sancy with a variety of jargons and idioms and argots—that make up so 
much of the texture, and indeed so much of the pleasure, of everyday 
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life in the modern urban landscape: a space characterized, to be sure, by 
fiercely “protected” turfs and by all sorts of invidious stratification, but 
also by displacement and circulation, and by a promiscuous crossing 
and recrossing of boundaries. Even among themselves, the patois, the 
booby traps, and the asides display a notable heterogeneity: the wise-
cracking lingo of the delicatessen is not the same as the comic mother 
lode of immigrant malapropisms, which in turn is not the same as the 
racy bavardage of nightclubland. Nor, for all their appearance of peril-
ously inbred tribalism, do the “native speakers” of these three discourses 
constitute a monolithic category. The reporter for Variety obviously 
knows what he is doing when he refers to Lindy’s, dialect, the Catskills, 
and borscht: himself deploying a patois or two—in this case, the ba-
roque, know-it-all patter of Variety-speak, plus the telegraphy with which 
showbiz Jews signal danger to other showbiz Jews—he says “Jewish,” 
of course, without saying “Jewish.” But the Jews of Lindy’s, the Jews 
of dialectic booby traps—epitomized by The Goldbergs’ matriarch, Ger-
trude Berg’s Molly—and the Jews of The Stork Club do not form one 
economically or culturally homogeneous clientele: to move among these 
three speech communities would already be to perform in miniature a 
comicosmopolitan trajectory, consisting of many minute negotiations, 
transfers, and translations, the deft maneuvers of that now nearly extinct 
human type, the inventive city-dweller who, without actually having to 
work in show business, is necessarily, and luxuriously, a mimetic vir-
tuoso, and who, in the course of a day, travels in much wider and more 
numerous overlapping circles than those described by this very limited 
sample.10
No wonder the firing of Philip Loeb was not enough to save The Gold-
bergs: the politically “controversial” co-star was gone, but the comicos-
mopolitan irritant remained, in the unlikely person of the show’s star 
herself, playing that apparently anticosmopolitan Jewish stereotype, the 
Jewish mother—whose dialectic booby traps (“I don’t like your latitude 
one bit, young lady”; “It’s late, Jake, and time to expire”; “Patience is a 
vulture”11), although easy to laugh off as “charming” signs of the unlet-
tered ethnic’s verbal ineptitude, at the same time register a less self- 
congratulatory laughter within language itself, whereby fractured En-
glish reveals standard English as already fractured, as already inhabited 
by its erring, Yiddishizing self-parody. It is as though, thanks to Gertrude 
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Berg’s “Mollypropisms,” the English language cracked up on discovering 
its own internal cracks. Inside these dialectic booby traps, a dialectic—a 
comicosmopolitan process of linguistic deterritorialization—may indeed 
be at play. Continuing the tradition of the dialect comedians favored by 
Karl Kraus and evoked by Adorno as avatars of mimesis, Berg practices 
a cosmopolitanism whose primitiveness—whose lack of cosmopolitan-
ism’s usual signs—in fact consists in the deconstructive tour de force 
of returning language to its gestural prehistory. Precisely because this 
comicosmopolitanism seems disarmingly naïve, rather than imposingly 
urbane, and precisely because it operates at the “innocent” level of the 
signifier, rather than at the “controversial” level of what passes for poli-
tics, it is difficult to locate and thus to uproot. In a case like that of The 
Goldbergs, therefore, drastic measures were called for: the excision of 
the “controversial” Loeb having failed to make the show palatable to the 
heartland, nothing short of cancellation would do.
And yet, as television programming underwent a general de-Judaizing 
and de-citifying—a conspicuous suburbanization and rustication both 
of its locales and of its general ethos, in accordance with the shifting 
demographics of the audience—neither Jews nor New York City simply 
disappeared from the picture. I am not referring merely to the survival 
of a certain New York–Jewish “sensibility” despite and within the appar-
ently de-urbanized landscape, or to the fact that that landscape is itself 
the product of a certain New York–Jewish fantasy of “America.” In the 
age of Lonesome Rhodes—and of all of his clones, ready to replace him 
just as quickly as he falls—certain televisual images of the comicosmopo-
lis are still disseminated. The most iconic television show of the 1950s, I 
Love Lucy, has no central Jewish characters or performers, but its leading 
man is a Cuban American bandleader who owns and performs in a New 
York “nitery.” A greater challenge to the thesis of an early-fifties war on 
comicosmopolitanism would seem to be constituted, moreover, by the 
most celebrated comedy-variety show of the period, Your Show of Shows 
(which mutated into Caesar’s Hour), performed and taped not in the 
pseudo–New York of I Love Lucy and of almost all subsequent sitcoms 
set in New York (including Seinfeld) but in New York itself. Featuring a 
largely Jewish cast (Sid Caesar, Carl Reiner, Howard Morris), written by 
a mostly Jewish staff (Reiner, Mel Tolkin, Mel Brooks, Lucille Kallen, 
and, for Caesar’s Hour, Neil Simon, Larry Gelbart, and Woody Allen), 
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and expressing, however inexplicitly, a brashly literate New York–Jewish 
sensibility, Your Show of Shows would seem to bespeak comicosmopoli-
tanism’s triumph in Cold War television, not its collapse.12
Two points must be made regarding this apparent triumph, however. 
The first is that, even during the show’s heyday, its comicosmopolitan-
ism kept it under suspicion, if not under attack. The show’s star, Sid 
Caesar, claims that he himself attracted the attention of McCarthy and 
other witch-hunters: “They had actually come after Lucille Ball and me, 
but they couldn’t find anything on either of us.”13 huac did actually find 
something on Ball, if not on Caesar. But the committee’s failure to “find 
anything” in any given case should not be surprising, since the aim of 
the blacklisters was not necessarily to convict: indeed, harassment and 
intimidation, more sadistically open-ended and suspensive than mere 
conviction, in many ways better served the needs of state-sponsored 
terror. The failure to find incriminating evidence is equally unsurpris-
ing, moreover, because the blacklist, as we have seen, was less about 
punishing political subversives than about pursuing—that is, persecut-
ing—cultural enemies, whose “guilt” could never be proven, only re-
peatedly alleged, or, more menacingly yet, obscurely intimated. In any 
case, although Your Show of Shows and Caesar’s Hour lasted longer than 
other borscht-tinted television entertainments of the 1950s, Caesar and 
company ultimately fell afoul of the same hinterland taste that rejected 
The Goldbergs and Milton Berle. Of the cancellation of his second show, 
Caesar, echoing such media historians as Doherty, observes: “as the tele-
vision audience was expanding outside of the big cities, audience tastes 
were changing and attention spans were shrinking. They didn’t under-
stand the foreign movies we were parodying. We were writing high-class 
comedy and were not willing to dumb it down.”14
But the second, more important point about this apparent triumph of 
comicosmopolitanism amid rumors of its death is that a certain comi-
cosmopolitanism was in fact permitted to survive, even to flourish for a 
while, so that it could be made an example of. Like many wars, the war 
on comicosmopolitanism does not always seek merely to eliminate its 
object: just as terror is sometimes happier dangling its victim indefi-
nitely than nailing it with a conviction, so might the taste police prefer a 
prolonged and exquisitely public disciplining of the offender to a simple 
extermination. Instead of being destroyed, that is, the comicosmopolis 
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can be colonized, as Paul Buhle and Dave Wagner suggest when they 
remark that the “attempt to suppress the social possibilities in the new 
medium of television was also meant in part to show that even New 
York, if only under extreme duress, could be as ‘normal’ and as ‘Ameri-
can’ as Indiana—or at least New Jersey. And if New York could be forced 
into line, so could the rest of the country.”15 As we have seen, one way 
to treat a comic Jew was to turn him into a tragic Jew; but a subtler 
variation on this technique was to make comicosmopolitanism peri-
odically banalize itself, in the name of nationalist conformism. Along 
with Gertrude Berg’s Mollypropisms, Caesar’s famous double-talk—his 
macaronic, Yiddish-sprinkled simulations of French, German, Italian, 
Japanese—represents the comicosmopolitanism of early television at 
its most prodigious: more recognizably “high-class” than Berg’s signa-
ture practice of televisual littérature mineure, especially when, as was fre-
quently the case, it accompanied the parodies of foreign films and operas 
in which Your Show of Shows and Caesar’s Hour specialized, double-talk 
here defied the xenophobic monolingualism and monoculturalism of 
the new Cold War dispensation. All the better, then, for America to see 
this comicosmopolitanism “forced into line,” as when, for instance, Carl 
Reiner, introducing a sketch about a Russian talent show, with Caesar 
as double-talking, balalaika-strumming host named Arthur Gorki (the 
Russian Arthur Godfrey), is made to sneer: “The Russians claim to have 
invented everything.”16 A comicosmopolitanism compelled to interrupt 
its cheeky Joycean boundary-crossings to mouth the ideological pieties 
of the day demonstrates for the entire nation the inescapability of the 
American consensus: if even the jokers and smart alecks in New York 
can condemn the imperialist arrogance of “the Russians,” there are no 
limits to the normalizing power of “America.” New York, for all its xeno-
philia, and indeed for all its own apparent status as a “foreign movie” in 
relation to the vast hinterland that passes for the real America, turns out 
to be merely an extension of that blandscape, whose anticosmopolitan 
language—call it single-talk, the talk of the single-tongued “American 
people”—forms the remote but ever-present horizon keeping the court 
jesters in line.
In other words, as television comedy comes to be dominated, at the end 
of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s, by wise small-town sheriffs 
to whom no one “gets wise”—far from dying, Andy Griffith’s Lonesome 
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Rhodes simply hides his fangs and becomes a sitcom star—and by wasp 
families where father knows best, comicosmopolitanism does not alto-
gether fade away: rather, it assumes its place in the new national order—
the place of the residual formation, of the vanquished enemy—the bet-
ter to display the docility it has learned. Thus, for example, Carl Reiner 
makes a sitcom out of his experiences as a writer for Your Show of Shows 
and Caesar’s Hour—but has to recast it as The Dick Van Dyke Show, with 
the Jewish hero converted into a Midwestern Protestant, and with the 
private, familial, naturalistic world of suburban New Rochelle provid-
ing necessary “balance” against the public, professional, presentational 
world of showbiz Manhattan, where, in keeping with the quota system 
that is no less an open secret than the blacklist from which it derives, 
the writing staff of the comedy-variety show for which Van Dyke’s char-
acter works includes exactly one Jew.17 In this context, Seinfeld, often 
invoked as the apotheosis of Jewish television comedy finally liberated 
from the closet of gentility, or recognized and embraced for what it is 
after its long exile in heartland drag, emerges less as a great coming-
out or coming-back than as one more instance of comicosmopolitan-
ism disciplined.18 I would not be the first to note the systematic timidity 
governing Seinfeld’s representation of Jewishness, which continues to 
be subjected to the standard methods of occultation, euphemism, and 
containment that television has almost always applied more stringently 
to this one ethnicity—which we might be tempted to call “its own,” were 
it not that television still refuses to own it—than to any other. Nor would 
I be the first to comment that, for all the show’s ostensible diffusion of 
a “New York” sensibility into the American mainstream, its image of 
the cosmopolis betrays nothing so much as a suburban and adolescent 
fear of and disdain for the cosmopolis; one critic has traced Seinfeld’s 
“ideology of Manhattan” to “the smugly defensive posture of teenagers 
from some affluent Long Island town . . . in Manhattan for the first time, 
putting down as abnormal or stupid everything that went beyond what 
they knew at home.”19 Seinfeld’s pseudo–New York—its pale and at the 
same time improbably “colorful” imitation of the city, the simulacrum 
that it shares with almost all the situation comedies purporting to take 
place in the Judeo-centric metropolis—keeps the city at a prophylactic 
distance, revealing not only the defensive posture of the Long Island 
teenager but the whole hygienic machinery of American normativity, of 
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which that teenager is only one of millions of agents. The phenomenal 
success of Seinfeld testifies to the success of an operation dating back to 
the early years of television: an operation not content to stop at the mere 
homogenization of the cosmopolis at the level of televisual representa-
tion, but striving, even more imperially, to reduce the real New York City 
to a simulacrum of its televised simulacra.
Still a work in progress, the reduction has thus far proven startlingly 
effective and extensive, as many have observed. But while the “malling 
of Manhattan” is usually explained as one effect of an increasingly global 
economy, globalization is not the whole story here: globalization has ad-
vanced in partnership with the equally powerful, only apparently anti-
thetical process of provincialization, the bad or false cosmopolitanism 
of the one reinforced by the franker anticosmopolitanism of the other, 
the two combining not to annihilate the city, in the manner of mere 
barbarians, but, rather, to occupy it—and, once having done so, to make 
it pay its occupiers the tribute of imitation. So now that, concomitantly, 
urban life has been bullied into imitating sitcom art—now that the term 
“Jew York City” has an almost nostalgic ring to it, the city of shows, or 
at least Manhattan, too well resembling such shows of the city as Sein-
feld, Friends, and Will and Grace—it may be useful, and not merely for 
reasons of nostalgia, to revisit what was itself a revisiting of an already 
lost urban paradise: the blacklisted and whitewashed city par excellence, 
the city that show business abandoned the better to conquer it. I would 
like to turn, that is, to the 1976 film, The Front, one of the few films that 
a supposedly repentant Hollywood has made about the blacklist since it 
supposedly ended in the early 1960s. Like A Face in the Crowd and the 
more recent Good Night, and Good Luck, The Front addresses the politics 
of Cold War mass culture in the preferred way of Hollywood films: by 
focusing on the New York–centered television industry rather than on 
the Hollywood-centered film industry. As a film about television, The 
Front can shed a light on television that television cannot shed on itself. 
But it has an even greater advantage: if the film performs the obliga-
tory deflection away from its sponsor—it was financed and distributed 
by Columbia Pictures—its New York setting allows it to activate the re-
pressed comicosmopolitan energies of the city that remains its source, 
the more “foreign” of the two American show-business capitals. Unlike 
the pseudo- and anticomic Face in the Crowd and the earnestly uncomic 
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Good Night, and Good Luck, The Front deliberately brings out the comic 
in the comicosmopolis that the blacklisters and their heirs have never 
stopped forcing into line.20 To recall our discussion of early Cold War 
cinema: The Front undertakes the project of thawing out the laughter 
that various Cold Wars have sought to keep frozen. In an interview, the 
film’s screenwriter, Walter Bernstein—himself a blacklist survivor, like 
the film’s director, Martin Ritt, and a number of its actors—explains 
how the solemn subject of blacklisting came to be treated comically:
For a long time, Marty and I had been talking about doing something 
about the blacklist. We wanted to do a straight dramatic story about some-
one who was blacklisted. We could never get anybody interested at all. 
It wasn’t until we came up with the idea of a front and making it as a 
comedy that we were able to get the film done. The Front became my first 
true comedy.21
Like the casting of a then-hot Woody Allen as the film’s protagonist, 
the decision to make it as a comedy at first appears to be a commer-
cially expedient adulteration of its authentic nature—a regrettable but 
necessary retrofitting and Hollywoodizing of a properly dramatic story, 
one perhaps too dramatic (too intense, too political, too depressing) to 
be told, or at any rate sold, “straight.” Bernstein’s interviewer remarks, 
“When I spoke to Marty, he seemed to feel the film should have been 
done dramatically, and that the comedy aspect was a compromise.” But 
Bernstein challenges this view of the comic as compromise, replying, “I 
don’t agree with him [Ritt], really. The idea that you can’t be serious in a 
comedy, I don’t agree with.”22 Although the decision to make The Front 
as a comedy came belatedly, its belatedness, I would argue, developing 
Bernstein’s point, reflects a delayed recognition that the blacklist was 
precisely about the comic—that the seriousness of blacklisting turned, 
in fact, on the politics of the comic. No mere sugarcoating mandated 
by insipid studio taste, or—what amounts to the same thing—by the 
studio’s typically craven catering to the insipid taste of the American 
hinterland, the belated comicizing of the story rediscovers the comedy at 
its core: the un-American, comicosmopolitan impertinence, the disgust-
ingly borscht-like bad taste, that blacklisting was designed to remove. Far 
from supervening, in the fashion of a false front (like those “fronts” for 
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essentially “straight dramatic story,” The Front’s “comedy aspect” brings 
to the surface and flaunts the very affront to mainstream taste that the 
blacklisters, and their sycophantic mass-cultural collaborators on both 
coasts, worked so hard to put down, or at least to cover up.
“It was a lot of fun during those days,” Bernstein’s friend and fellow 
blacklistee Abraham Polonsky reminisced, with a truth-teller’s perver-
sity, in the course of a 1997 panel discussion of the blacklist in televi-
sion.23 Polonsky—whose comic touch we have observed in his screenplay 
for Body and Soul, as well as in his wisecrack about Elia Kazan—went 
on to cite, as examples of the fun, the comical misunderstandings sur-
rounding the practice, adopted by some of the blacklistees, of continu-
ing to write for television and films by using “fronts”: a practice that both 
Bernstein and Polonsky engaged in, and that indeed gives Bernstein’s 
autobiographical film its title, its story, and its theme. For The Front, set 
in 1952, is about a television writer, modeled on Bernstein, who suddenly 
finds himself blacklisted, and who can survive as a television writer only 
with the help of some unblacklisted person who is willing to pose, at 
meetings with producers, directors, network executives, and sponsors, as 
the author of his scripts. In the film, the Bernstein character, here called 
Alfred Miller, and played by Michael Murphy, employs as his front an 
old friend named Howard Prince, a cashier, bookie, and all-around un-
derachiever, played by Allen. Once Howard recognizes the advantages 
of pocketing ten percent of what Miller earns for the scripts he now 
ghostwrites, he is more than happy to front for two of Miller’s friends 
as well: blacklisted writers who correspond to Polonsky and Arnold 
Manoff.
Working behind a series of fronts, Bernstein, Polonsky, and Manoff 
wrote most of the episodes of the legendary television series You Are 
There, before the show’s executive producer fired its producer for us-
ing blacklisted writers, and followed the industry-wide shift then in 
progress by moving the show to California.24 Forerunners of the genre 
we would now call docudrama, the You Are There scripts focused on a 
series of historical figures (Galileo, Milton, Joan of Arc, Michelangelo, 
Freud) whose stories the three blacklisted writers, engaging in what Bern-
stein describes as “a kind of guerilla war against McCarthyism,” turned 
into allegories of resistance that, thus equipped with fronts of their 
own, managed to evade network censorship. “In that shameful time of 
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McCarthyite terror, of know-nothing attempts to deform and defile 
history, to kill any kind of dissent,” Bernstein recalls, “we were able to 
do shows about civil liberties, civil rights, artistic freedom, the Bill of 
Rights.”25 As this characterization suggests, the dominant tone of this 
guerilla war was not a particularly comic one: for the most part, the You 
Are There episodes, which were introduced, by Walter Cronkite, in the 
pompous style of news telecasts, exemplify the strand of high-pedagogi-
cal earnestness in left-liberal entertainment, the strand recently repre-
sented by Good Night, and Good Luck.26 Indeed, it as though, in their war 
against “attempts to deform and defile history,” the undercover writers 
of You Are There had identified themselves so strongly with the straight 
version of history, or perhaps with the straightness of war itself, as to 
renounce the very “artistic freedom” that had got them into trouble in 
the first place: the freedom of the comic.27
Bernstein claims that he and Polonsky and Manoff “chortled over” the 
You Are There shows, but then, more plausibly, equivocates, saying, 
“chortle is really not the right word.”28 The “fun during those days,” 
it seems, resided less in the work itself than in the behind-the-scenes 
back story of the work. And it is this comic back story—the back story of 
working behind fronts—that The Front moves to the front. Where You 
Are There sought to recount history against those who would deform 
and defile it, The Front recounts the history in back of—both behind and 
before—the recounting of history. The guerillas who wrote the televi-
sion show tried to set the record straight; the guerilla who writes the 
movie about writing a television show starts out trying to “do a straight 
dramatic story,” but, finding that “we could never get anybody interested 
at all,” uncovers that story’s more interesting, and less straight, ur-story. 
Reinventing The Front as a comedy, Bernstein foregrounds that “aspect” 
of the blacklist story that a pious regard for history’s seriousness—a de-
sire to do history itself as a straight dramatic story—would have kept 
back, in the wings of anecdote, archive, and memoir: the comedy that 
provoked the drama of blacklisting. Bernstein’s film, that is, backs up Po-
lonsky’s perverse reminiscence by putting upfront the fun of the black-
listees: the fun they had during the blacklist, but also the fun that caused 
them to be blacklisted, and that blacklisting aimed precisely to render 
unimaginable.
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Even a certain liberal “sympathy,” for instance, might refuse to coun-
tenance this fun—discerning in Polonsky’s remark a pathetically wish-
ful rewriting of the past, as if, forty-five years later, the only way to deal 
with the trauma of having been blacklisted were to deny it: to insist, hys-
terically, on how hilarious it all was. Or, again: another “sympathetic” re-
sponse might accept Polonsky’s claim, but only on the condition that the 
fun stay grounded in pathos, in this case that of some brave little troup-
ers whistling past the graveyard. It is less easy, though, to patheticize a 
comment like the one Polonsky makes, in that same 1997 panel discus-
sion, apropos of the blacklist victims who did not survive: those, like 
Philip Loeb, who were blacklisted to death. Evoking his Second World 
War experience in the Office of Strategic Services, Polonsky says: “But 
I’m used to walking around among the dead. It’s so refreshing to walk 
among the dead.” And then, after a pause for extra comic effect: “Don’t 
tell ’em it’s a joke.”29 Flippant, tasteless, shocking—like Polonsky’s quip 
that he “wouldn’t want to be buried in the same cemetery with” Ka-
zan—this joke is not, however, an act of dancing on graves: its fun does 
not result from making fun of the dead, from taking their deadness as 
grounds for celebrating one’s survival. Walking among the dead, Polon-
sky—who would himself die two years later—does not necessarily sepa-
rate himself, or his listeners, from them. Who, after all, is not supposed 
to tell whom that “it’s a joke”? If it is the audience that is not supposed to 
tell and the dead themselves who must not be told—if there is still a pos-
sibility of telling or not telling them things—perhaps the dead are not so 
different from the audience, or the audience from the dead.
To a member of that “live” audience who asks Polonsky, a little ear-
lier in the discussion, whether he is bitter about how long it has taken 
Hollywood to apologize for the blacklist, Polonsky, speaking for his fel-
low “survivors,” answers: “We feel like the Jews in France, who went to 
the concentration camps. They’re dead now. But they just learned that 
six Catholic archbishops are apologizing for not helping.”30 Blurring the 
boundary between the living and the dead, between “we” and “they,” 
between the refreshed and the rotten, between gaiety and bitterness, this 
joke, like the one about walking among the dead, bears the disintegrat-
ing signature of the mimetic comedian, whose favorite place, as we know 
from our excursion into a room full of television writers in the previous 
170	 chap ter	f ive	
chapter, is a happy cemetery, site of the decomposition that is mimetic 
identification with the other. As opposed to the discipline of citizenship, 
which uses the threat of death to keep its subjects scared straight, not 
to say scared stiff, this mimetic identification becomes the ground of an 
undisciplined comicosmopolitanism, whereby the dissolution of the self 
into the other loses its power to terrorize, affording instead a luxurious 
escape from the regime of national rigor.
As a scene of comicosmopolitanism, in other words, the mimetic ce-
metery is not a graveyard one whistles past: more disconcertingly, it is a 
graveyard one whistles in. The fun to be had in it comes not despite the 
fact that it is a place of the dead, but, rather, because it is a place of the 
dead. For the fun depends upon the comicosmopolitan’s surrender of 
the proud selfhood that keeps him intimidated and thus in line—upon 
his willingness, say, to die into an identification with the dead French 
Jews who nonetheless “feel” and “learn” as if they were alive. The comi-
cosmopolitan “survivor” refuses the pathos of survival, and the nobility 
of death, tastelessly taking bitter pleasure in his resemblance to a talking 
corpse. Far more than just a ghoulish comedy about death, comicosmo-
politanism is a comedy of death: a comedy of the dead. To be blacklisted, 
therefore, was to undergo a second death: a “tragic” death, whose repel-
lent gravity was designed at once to punish and to conceal the transgres-
sion—from a patriotic point of view—of the comic death whose pleasure 
one had the bad taste to keep unhidden. Always a ghostwriter, Polonsky, 
for one, still performs his first death, more than thirty-five years after his 
second. The worst taste of all is that of the “survivor” who will not stop 
dying, for he thus reminds you why you had to kill him, or, rather, to kill 
him again, in the first place.
If Polonsky makes tasteless jokes about the blacklist, Bernstein makes 
an entire tasteless movie about it. The Front has the effrontery “to be a 
comedy rather than the dark history it really was.”31 Buhle and Wagner, 
whom I am quoting, presumably mean that the episode of the blacklist 
itself was really a dark history; but their conflation of history and story 
works against their apparent certainty about the distinction between the 
fictional and the real, pointing to how the comedy of The Front repre-
sents the dark reality of the blacklist as itself a struggle over fictions: 
comic fictions that, like the film about them, have the bad taste to mix 
light with dark, to make jokes out of matters of the utmost gravity. The 
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darkest part of the film, for example, centers on a character named Hecky 
Brown, an actor and comic played by Zero Mostel. Hecky, born Herschel 
Brownstein, is a composite of Mostel himself and Philip Loeb. Like 
Mostel, Hecky finds his career in ruins once he is blacklisted; one of the 
most powerful sequences in the film, in which Hecky is paid two hun-
dred and fifty dollars to perform in the same Catskills Hotel where, the 
year before, when he was still unblacklisted, he was paid three thousand, 
is based on an experience of Mostel’s.32 Like Loeb, Hecky is fired from 
the television show in which he appears, and ends up checking into a 
hotel where he commits suicide. Yet The Front refuses to do to Hecky 
what the blacklist did to Loeb: reduce him to a symbol of the comic Jew 
turned tragic. Even “darkened,” or rather, especially “darkened,” Hecky 
never ceases to be a comic figure. He stages even his suicide as a comic 
performance: laughing to himself, mugging in front of a mirror, sipping 
champagne—all before he disappears out the window. “Every little cloud 
has got a silver lining,” he sings to Howard in his penultimate scene, 
where, although Howard does not know it, Hecky is saying goodbye to 
him—and, as we shall see, preparing a decisive mimetic connection be-
tween them. In the light, or the dark, of Hecky’s suicide, the bouncy 
consolation in his swan song seems macabre, to be sure. But the mixing 
of the cheerful and the macabre is just the point. The point, in other 
words, is not to find the silver lining in every cloud: it is to recognize the 
mutual implication of the light and dark, and to tease out its comic pos-
sibilities—as Polonsky does when he makes jokes that, far from simply 
lording it over the dead, derive their funniness from his mimetic identi-
fication with the dead.
Like those tasteless jokes of Polonsky’s, Hecky’s comedy is a comedy of 
unseemliness: a comedy based on the violation of boundaries, especially 
the boundary between subjects suitable for comedy and subjects unsuit-
able for it, between what can be brought to the front and what must be 
kept in back. From the beginning of the film, Hecky is in trouble with 
the authorities: a cloud hangs over his head because he is one of those 
people—in the racially tinged term—who refuse to keep clouds and sun-
shine separate. In an early scene, he meets with one of the film’s villains, 
a Mr. Hennessy, from the “Freedom Information Service,” a “clearance” 
racket like the one run by the authors of Red Channels. Hoping to escape 
blacklisting and to keep his job as host of the popular television show for 
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which Miller, fronted by Howard, writes, Hecky explains to Hennessy 
why he attended a May Day rally six years earlier: “I was only trying 
to get laid. This girl, this Communist girl—she had a big ass.” Mixing 
up the class struggle with the ass struggle, as Ralph Ellison’s invisible 
man might put it, turns out not to be the best move on Hecky’s part.33 
Hennessy, indeed, could not be more chillingly unamused: “I am not 
interested in your sex life, Mr. Brown.” “Hecky,” replies Hecky, trying, 
unsuccessfully, to ingratiate himself. Hecky’s impudent comic charm 
is not just not working on the deadly serious Hennessy: it is working 
to antagonize him further, since—more than that May Day rally, or 
Hecky’s subscription to the Daily Worker, or a petition for loyalist Spain 
that he signed, or money that he gave for Russian war relief—it is this 
charm that has landed Hecky in Hennessy’s office in the first place. A 
desire to charm the authorities is of course one of the prerequisites of 
good citizenship: what is the sycophant, after all, without his charm? 
But Hecky’s particular kind of charm has this fatal defect: failing to be 
serious in the approved patriotic way, putting its own ass upfront, where 
the Symbolic Father cannot miss it, this charm bespeaks the “glamorous 
personality” ’s exemption from or resistance to the normalizing disci-
pline of fear. This is the charm, in short, of the joker and smart aleck: 
charm apparently lost on much of the audience in the changed show-
business environment of the early 1950s, to the point that, far from mol-
lifying them, it seems to strike them as an insult. As long as Hecky is 
cracking jokes about Communism and asses, he might as well take out 
some crackers and caviar and rub them in Hennessy’s face.
Nor does he help his case when he reminds Hennessy, “I’m a house-
hold name,” or when he says, “My whole life has been acting”; the com-
bination of celebrity and theatricality is not likely to appease the agents 
of ressentiment (masquerading as champions of “freedom”). Not that 
Hecky, obviously terrified, does not affirm his desire to do whatever it 
takes—short of naming names—to keep his job. But his docility is sabo-
taged by the mode in which he stages it. His balking at becoming an 
informer—an indispensable step, as we know, in the process of prov-
ing one’s Americanism—angers Hennessy less, in fact, than his gen-
eral tone: a tone too suggestive of Lindy’s patois, dialectic booby traps, 
and nitery asides—of a world that thinks itself beyond the demand that 
Americans speak in one voice only. Instructing Hecky to write a letter 
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renouncing Communism and declaring himself its dupe, Hennessy ad-
vises him: “Sincerity is the key, Mr. Brown. Anyone can make a mistake. 
The man who repents sincerely—” “I repent sincerely,” Hecky inter-
rupts, his manner not quite sincere enough. “Write me the letter, Mr. 
Brown. I’ll see what I can do,” Hennessy says coldly, as he turns away 
from Hecky and goes back to the papers on his desk. Ever the showman, 
Hecky tries one last gag before he leaves the room: “And I didn’t even 
get laid!” This time, Hennessy does not even look up to acknowledge the 
joke. As Hecky walks out of the office, his would-be winning grin having 
fallen from his face, he has the look of a condemned man. Having spent 
his whole life as an actor, he clearly knows when a crowd wants blood.
But while the film thus reveals Hecky’s place in the blacklist’s ma-
chinery of tragicization, it by no means collaborates in reducing him 
to that abject and dreary figure, the sad clown. When the producer of 
Hecky’s show—played by Herschel Bernardi, another of the blacklisted 
actors Bernstein and Ritt make a point of featuring in the film34—fires 
Hecky, he denies the truth that Hecky suspects, which is that his let-
ter to Hennessy has not been deemed sufficiently “sincere”; protecting 
the blacklist and the extortionate system around it, the producer fum-
blingly tells Hecky: “It’s . . . your personality is too dominant. You be-
long out front, like Berle. . . . In a dramatic series, you’re throwing the 
Zero Mostel in The Front
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whole show off balance.” Hecky may belong out front, but by the time the 
producer has finished covering his own and other people’s asses, Hecky 
is merely out. And yet, his diegetic expulsion has just the effect of put-
ting Hecky where he “belongs”: out front in the film’s performative 
space. “I thought Z [Mostel] was terrific in the film—incredibly himself, 
and unashamedly, fantastically theatrical,” Martin Ritt recalls.35 “Incred-
ibly himself ” indeed; exploding the distinction between actor and char-
acter, between history and fiction, between extradiegetic back story and 
diegetic show, Mostel-Hecky embodies comicosmopolitanism’s affront 
to “sincerity,” which cannot tolerate any contamination of reality’s seri-
ousness, or at least its credibility, by art’s frivolity. (After Mostel himself 
was named in Red Channels, he is reported to have said, “I am a man 
of a thousand faces, all of them blacklisted.”36) In the television show 
from which Hecky has been fired, he played a cabdriver-narrator named 
Hecky the hackie, already breaking down the wall between the inside and 
the outside of representation. Once removed from the frame of the dra-
matic series, once released from the imperatives of semi-naturalism 
and semi-respectability, he becomes even more dominant a figure (as 
Mostel himself, considered too theatrically big an actor for films, domi-
nated everything in which he appeared). Professionally humiliated and 
financially desperate, Hecky looms even larger in the film’s closely 
watched milieu—its ever more intensively policed cosmopolis—than he 
did as a star.
Because he is unable, or unwilling, to give Hennessy the names of his 
Communist associates, he reluctantly accepts Hennessy’s assignment 
to spy—in the name of patriotism—on the suddenly successful “writer,” 
Howard Prince, whose political past and associations Hennessy is busy 
investigating. Even reduced to sycophancy, however, Hecky still fails to 
perform with the sincerity required of what Hennessy calls “a true pa-
triot”: at the end of the scene in which Hecky agrees to spy on Howard, 
he erupts, indecorously and ill-advisedly, into spasms of almost alarm-
ingly lugubrious laughter. If this laughter expresses the clown’s self- 
disgust at having become implicated in the betrayal of the comic, it keeps 
faith, in its very indiscretion, its very theatrical bigness, with what he is 
betraying. “Unashamedly, fantastically,” it evinces Hecky’s fundamental 
incorrigibility: the comic “incredibility” that keeps him from acting like 
a good American—which is to say, like a credible informer. Once again, 
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he “throws the whole show off balance.” Hennessy and his fellow black-
listers would cut Hecky down to size, or fix him as a symbol of laughter 
congealed into pathos. In the face of this assault, Hecky puts up the 
front of The Front itself: the tastelessness that laughs when it should be 
keeping a straight face, that opts for comedy at the very moment when 
sycophantic pragmatism most calls for seriousness.
It is in the episode of Hecky’s return to the resort in the Catskills—
that borscht-soaked training ground of “vaudeo” comics—that his, and 
the film’s, “comedy aspect” acquires its most disturbing hypersalience. 
Making the trip in the company of Howard, the better to spy on him, 
Hecky gives a bravura performance to an adoring audience at the hotel; 
he ends the show with an over-the-top vaudevillian number in which he 
sings that he will do “anything for a laugh.” The bravura character of 
Hecky’s performance does not lack a considerable element of hysteria, 
induced, no doubt, by guilt and anger over what he is doing to Howard 
(“anything for a laugh,” indeed), rage at the humiliating circumstances 
under which he is performing (and barely eking out a living), and per-
haps a sort of seething, inarticulable amazement at the general horror 
that is taking over and devastating his world. After the show, as Hecky 
drinks and flirts with some of the guests, the hotel owner hands him the 
envelope containing his paltry fee, fifty dollars less than what the owner 
had said he would try to come up with—at which point a freshly humili-
ated Hecky stops the show again, only this time in the mode of disaster 
rather than of triumph. Starting out drunkenly, “playfully,” pawing at 
the owner’s pocket, Hecky is soon literally at his throat, until he is pulled 
off and thrown out of the hotel while the owner, equally enraged, snarls 
at him, “You’ll crawl in the gutter, you Red bastard, you Commie son of 
a bitch!”
That night, Howard takes Hecky back to his apartment in the city, 
and, as Howard makes coffee, Hecky mutters, “It’s all Brownstein’s 
fault. I wouldn’t be in this trouble if it wasn’t for Brownstein. . . . You 
can’t make a deal with him. That’s the trouble with him. He won’t listen 
to reason.” Then, in a renewed access of rage, Hecky screams out the 
window: “Brownstein! Lay off, do you hear me? Lay off, or I’ll kill you!” 
Yet, collaborate though he may with the prosecutors of the war against 
comicosmopolitanism, Hecky cannot divest himself of the unreason-
able Jewish pariah at the root—and at the back—of his trouble. For 
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Herschel Brownstein is not just Hecky Brown’s “real name,” as Howard 
puts it. Rather, “Herschel Brownstein” is another avatar of that radical 
Jewish comic drive—that cosmopolitanism sauvage—that we have en-
countered elsewhere in this book (it also goes by the name of “Shimen 
Rishkin,” for example). A name for the mimetic prehistory that “you 
can’t make a deal with”—for the primitive, desubjectifying, theatrical-
izing insincerity that one must “kill,” or at least put behind oneself, if 
one is to give a credible performance of good citizenship—“Herschel 
Brownstein” (characteristically breaking the diegetic frame to carry an 
echo of “Herschel Bernardi”) is the joker and smart aleck who subverts 
Hecky’s performance of his assigned role as a sycophant in the patri-
otic “drama series” captivating Americans from coast to coast. To be 
sure, we soon see Hecky, whom Howard has invited to spend the night 
at his apartment, rummaging through Howard’s papers, and he seems 
to provide Hennessy with enough information for Howard (who has 
blacklisted friends, and who was a bookie, after all) to be summoned 
before the House Un-American Activities Committee in the film’s cli-
mactic scene. The “trouble with” the irrepressible Herschel Brownstein, 
though, is that, when the superficially de-Judaized Hecky Brown tries to 
Americanize himself further by doing some patriotic spying, Brownstein 
refuses to let him play the good American with anything like the sincer-
ity and credibility that the role requires. As a spy, the Mostelian Hecky 
overplays to a point bordering, indeed, on the unbelievable. Just as he 
is too big for his television show, so there is always something “off- 
balance,” something improbably bombastic and self-defeating—some-
thing gauche—about his espionage; whenever he asks Howard about his 
friends and their politics, he seems to be doing everything he can to give 
the game away.
So it is not surprising that Hecky never gets his job back. He informs 
on Howard, of course, but informing, as we know, is never just a matter 
of giving information: it is also, above all, a matter of tone and style, in 
which, as Hennessy says, “sincerity is the key.” Not that the comedian is 
utterly lacking in conviction. In the scene just before his suicide, Hecky 
in fact shows up at Howard’s apartment, to apologize for “that terrible 
night” after his show in the Catskills. What Hecky is really apologizing 
for—although Howard cannot know it yet, and may never know it—is 
having spied on Howard for Hennessy and his accomplices; his suicide 
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will be his attempt to complete the apology. (Here, we must note the 
difference between Hecky and Philip Loeb, whose suicide has been at-
tributed in part to the fact that he “never forgave himself ” for accepting 
a cash settlement when he was fired from The Goldbergs, but who did not 
become an informer.37) Hecky’s apology, of course, does not preclude 
his continuing, “unashamedly, fantastically,” to clown around and make 
jokes. Nor, conversely—bearing out Bernstein’s claim about comedy’s 
compatibility with seriousness—do Hecky’s typically big histrionics pre-
vent him from mustering enough sincerity to leave Howard with these 
words of advice: “Take care of yourself. The water is full of sharks.”
Howard ends up taking this advice, but in a different way from the 
one in which his own sycophantic tendencies would have led him. “How 
many times have I told you? Take care of number one,” he scolds Miller 
at the beginning of the film, when the latter explains to him that he has 
been blacklisted. At the film’s end, Howard takes care of himself—and 
of the left that he has now joined—by refusing to swim with the sharks. 
Finally called as a friendly witness before huac (“What does it hurt if 
I’m friendly?”), the once-venal front finds himself radicalized—Brown-
steined, we might say—when the congressional sharks on the committee 
try to get him to name Hecky, now dead, as a Communist, as if in an 
exchange of treacheries. “They’re willing to make a deal,” Howard’s (or, 
rather, the network’s) lawyer reasons with him. “Look, they’re being very 
reasonable. You don’t have to give them more than one [name]. . . . If it 
bothers you, give them Hecky Brown. . . . He’s dead anyway. What dif-
ference does it make?” But when the committee members coach the wit-
ness by asking him repeatedly if he knows “Herschel Brownstein, also 
known as Hecky Brown,” Howard Prince, instead of letting them hector 
him into “being friendly,” responds as though he himself were being 
addressed as Herschel Brownstein—as though he had become the one “you 
can’t make a deal with,” the one who “won’t listen to reason.” One might 
say that H. B. had suddenly come back to “life” in the person of H. P.
Or perhaps not so suddenly. That the too-friendly frog is about to be-
come a spectacularly uncooperative prince (true to his last name) is in-
timated by the brash, almost insolently improvisational style that the 
front unexpectedly assumes in front of huac, from the beginning of 
the hearing. It is as though Hecky’s shameless, Borscht-Belt theatri-
cality had morphed into its younger, hipper version: a nightclub—or 
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nitery—performance idiom associated with such edgy stand-up comics 
of the fifties and early sixties as Mort Sahl, Lenny Bruce, and Woody Al-
len himself.38 Clearly, huac has been planning to conduct this hearing 
as one more sycophantic charade, one more demonstration of its power 
to command good citizenship by making witnesses name names; but 
Howard, his manner as comically “off-balance”—as frontal—in its own 
way, as Hecky’s, has changed his mind and is refusing to perform ac-
cording to the script, channeling Hecky when he was supposed to name 
him instead. Howard, in short, is doing exactly what Lillian Hellman’s 
lawyer warned her not to do: he is insulting the committee (“You’re get-
ting them mad,” the lawyer warns him) by “acting smart-aleck.” After a 
suspensefully prolonged pause, during which Howard has moved his 
hand over his forehead (in French, his front) in such a way as to signal a 
self-transformation, the would-have-been friendly witness rises from his 
chair, turns to his interrogators, and says, “Fellas, I don’t recognize the 
right of this Committee to ask me these kind of questions. And, further-
more, you can all go fuck yourselves.”
Whereupon he walks out of the room, as the committee members are 
frozen in place and the soundtrack begins to play Frank Sinatra sing-
ing “Young at Heart.” The song, with its opening lines, “Fairy tales can 
come true, it can happen to you,” is in fact being reprised here, since 
it also accompanies the film’s opening montage, a pseudonostalgic 
evocation of early-1950s culture (with newsreel footage of McCarthy, 
the Rosenbergs, Marilyn Monroe, Eisenhower, the Korean War, etc.). 
If the film thus frames itself belatedly as an act of belated comic wish- 
fulfillment—not even Lionel Stander showed his rear end to the state 
with as much front (French not only for “forehead” but also for “cheek”) 
as The Front’s front displays now—“belated” does not always mean “too 
late.” For there is a kind of timely belatedness, like the belatedness of the 
recognition behind this film: the recognition that the question of the 
comic was always behind blacklisting. Howard’s carnivalesque defiance 
of the committee represents more than just a happy anamnesis, whereby 
the blacklist survivor finally recognizes what his experience was all about; 
it represents more, even, than a jubilant exercise in esprit d’escalier. Like 
the tasteless punch line uttered by its unlikely Prince, the entire film 
makes good on the promise that, after all, fairy tales can come true. And 
what makes the realization of this particular fairy tale possible, indeed, 
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what makes it necessary, is that, while the film obviously arrives after the 
fact of the 1950s blacklist that it portrays, it shows up just in time for 
the long blacklist—the war against comicosmopolitanism—that is still 
in force in 1976, when the film appears, and in 2007, at the time of this 
writing.
The Front arrives, that is, not merely to remember the comicosmo-
politanism that the blacklist has forced into line, but to put it back into 
play. The film’s most striking (and most moving) demonstration of this 
performative end comes at the end: the very end, after Howard, in the 
best fairy-tale way, having done what every unfriendly witness wanted 
to do, leaves the huac members immobilized in their chamber as he 
walks into what the film projects as a happy ending that would not be an 
end. While “Young at Heart” continues to play, we see Howard embrac-
ing his leftist princess, while a crowd of supporters cheers him on.39 He 
is being led off to prison, presumably for contempt of congress, but he 
has thus become a new icon of the left, its yiddishe prince. And then, 
in what is effectively a punch line after the punch line, the hero in the 
film, or the hero in front of it, is aligned with the heroes behind it: Walter 
Bernstein, Martin Ritt, Zero Mostel, Herschel Bernardi, and two other 
actors in the cast, Lloyd Gough and Joshua Shelley, all of whose names 
now appear prominently on the screen, each name accompanied by the 
word “blacklisted,” and by the year in which each blacklisting began. 
At The Front’s end, the film puts its blacklisted, backlisted personnel in 
front. Advertising the rupture of the barrier between the diegetic and 
the extradiegetic that—especially around the destabilizing Hecky—it 
has been inducing all along, it identifies itself as the work not only of 
blacklist survivors but also of blacklist resisters: as an act of belated but 
also continuing resistance.
And yet, the final notation of the film’s back story has a remarkable 
effect: the names and dates of the blacklisted personnel suggest a necrol-
ogy, or a series of inscriptions on tombstones. As Polonsky’s jokes about 
the dead would remind us, surviving the blacklist does not necessarily 
mean that one is alive—which is to say, merely alive. Even more tasteless 
than Howard’s vulgar parting shot at huac is the way the film’s closing 
credits underscore its strategy of resistance as comic death—and as a 
comic death one refuses to stop performing. The song playing over the 
credits tells us: “You can go to extremes / With impossible schemes / You 
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can laugh as your dreams / Fall apart at the seams.” The film we have 
been watching shows us how the falling apart of our dreams—how the 
falling apart of ourselves—might be the very occasion for laughter. Or, to 
stay in the register of popular song, we could recite the line Hecky sings 
to Howard when he comes to say goodbye: “Every little cloud has got 
a silver lining.” Hecky is unable to kill Brownstein, but he succeeds in 
killing himself. His suicide, we have suggested, is an attempted apology 
for sycophantically betraying Howard, as well as Hecky himself, and the 
left to which he was once drawn, if only for the asses. But Hecky’s sui-
cide is not just an apology: killing himself, he dies into Howard, who, as 
we have seen, finds it in himself to become the mimetic comedian that 
Hecky—or, more radically, Brownstein—always was. When he moves 
his hand across his forehead, Howard turns into that shameless, vulgar, 
fantastic, incredible clown who, having informed on him, now informs 
him. Faced with huac’s desire, in its chairman’s words at the beginning 
of Howard’s hearing, to “keep America just as pure as we possibly can 
make it,” Howard revives Hecky’s “big ass” as “go fuck yourselves.” The 
dead Hecky “lives” in Howard, that is, as the dead French Jews “live” 
in Polonsky. What this “survival” also means, of course, is that Howard 
“dies” into Hecky as Polonsky “dies” into the French Jews. Out of this 
identification between the “living” and the “dead,” however, comes mi-
mesis, or comicosmopolitanism: an art of dying, a comedy of disintegra-
tion. Without the falling apart of and into dreams, without the collapse 
of silver linings into clouds, there can be none of that undisciplined 
laughter that this film, against the Hennessys of its own time and ours, 
has the bad taste to put out front.
“Front” has one other meaning that we have yet to consider, a mean-
ing not without pertinence to a film about the left. For a “front” can be a 
coalition, as in “Popular Front,” or Front populaire. As a title, The Front 
of course refers to Howard’s fronting for blacklisted writers. But the title 
also points to the front or coalition formed between Hecky and Howard, 
as they disintegrate into each other. Together, the two comic charac-
ters, seconded by the comic actors who play them, constitute a comi-
cosmopolitan front against the blacklisters’ heirs: the provincializing 
network of forces, and force of networks, that still occupy the pocket of 
un-Americanism that, unless vigilantly policed, New York City threatens 
to become, even after 9/11 and the ostensible advent of a sophisticated, 
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big-city patriotism, with flags flying from every apartment house. In the 
coalition forged by Howard-Allen and by Hecky-Mostel, or by Hecky-
Mostel-Brownstein, more than two, or even three, comic Jews are join-
ing forces. Insofar as Hecky is himself a coalition, that is, a composite of 
Mostel and Philip Loeb, the latter is also a member of The Front’s front. 
Loeb’s membership in it honors Kate Mostel and Madeline Gilford’s 
sense of him as “one of the funniest, dearest men we ever knew,” and 
helps to undo not only his tragicization but the whole mortifying project 
of patriotic ressentiment, which will not rest until every clown is an object 
of dread.
In this front, men indeed fall apart, and, as they fall, they fall into one 
another. In other words, the relations of these mimetic jokers differ radi-
cally from those of collaborators. Where the point of collaboration is to 
harden and to magnify the self, the point of the comicosmopolitan front 
is to dissolve it. And in dissolving the self, this front uncovers the ways 
in which a certain dissolution has always already begun within each of 
its members. Consider the effect of what happens between Mostel and 
Allen. When the man of a thousand faces and the younger comic actor 
and auteur melt into each other, we remember, for example, that Al-
len has his own history of 1950s comicosmopolitanism, having written 
for Your Show of Shows and Caesar’s Hour.40 Finding Mostel inscribed 
in Allen, we might resituate Allen’s own films in relation not only to 
The Front, but also to the broad front that could be unfolded out of it, 
with the result that, in Allen’s films too, we might begin to see comi-
cosmopolitanism’s ghosts making a stand against the hinterland, the 
back country, that never ceases advancing on every front.41 To go back to 
The Front, thirty years later, is to encounter a film that itself goes back, 
to events twenty-five years earlier. To revisit the film now, therefore, is 
to mark the erasure of a whole world of performance, at once real and 
fantastical: the world of Catskills hotels, Lindy’s patois, dialectic booby 
traps, nitery asides. But if we go back to The Front, The Front at the same 
time comes back to us. It might well be described, in fact, as a haunting 
comedy: its vanished world is an ever-encroaching graveyard. Happily, 
Bernstein’s film refreshes our sense of how refreshing it can be to walk 
among the dead.
❨ 6 ❩
Bringing Down the House
The Blacklist Musical
In the previous chapter, we turned from Hollywood to New York: more 
specifically, from the film industry to the television industry, before it, 
too, went Hollywood—before, that is, the disciplining of the comicos-
mopolis. This chapter continues the turn from Hollywood to New York, 
considering a mass-culture form that has proven somewhat more re-
sistant to discipline than did television. I am referring to the Broadway 
musical, or to the historically particular realization of it that I am calling 
the blacklist musical, whose long run, stretching approximately from 
1950 to 1964, or from Call Me Madam to Fiddler on the Roof, coincides 
with the Broadway musical’s “golden age.” But the next thing to say 
about the blacklist musical, and perhaps a reason why the golden age 
was golden, is that Broadway never had a blacklist—at least, not in the 
way that Hollywood and television did. To some extent, the lack of a 
blacklist on Broadway had to do with circumstances of reception: televi-
sion shows were broadcast from New York, but they were broadcast to 
a national audience—from coast to coast, in the medium’s old phrase. 
Like the film industry, the television industry is a mass medium whose 
claim to massness consists in its transcendence—or, at least, in its at-
tempted erasure—of its point of origin. Less advanced in its technology 
(despite the nation-wide dissemination, in its heyday, of its songs as 
popular standards), the Broadway musical, in contrast, is typically con-
sumed on its own ground: it does not go to the American mass audi-
ence; the American mass audience goes to it.
In accounting for Broadway’s lack of a blacklist, moreover, we could 
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invoke its archaism of production alongside its archaism of reception. 
According to the Broadway legend Arthur Laurents, “The blacklist . . . 
never would reach the theatre, not so much because theatre folk were so 
liberal but because the producers were self-employed individuals, not 
companies, and weren’t beholden to corporations or banks.”1 Unlike 
their Hollywood counterparts, who, in the words of Horkheimer and 
Adorno, had “to keep in with the true wielders of power”2—conducting 
an appeasement starting in the late 1940s and supposedly ending in 
the early 1960s, but in fact, as I and others would argue, still going on,3 
and entailing the systematic purge of leftist personnel and thus of leftist 
film content—Broadway producers, practitioners of an older, entrepre-
neurial capitalism, enjoyed the luxury of sheer economic anachronism. 
Doing business the old-fashioned way, they could pass along the profits 
of uneven development to the authors and performers of what we now 
recognize as the masterpieces of the postwar musical theater: authors 
and performers many of whom, when not in fact refugees, like Laurents 
himself, from Hollywood in the grip of the Red Scare, would never have 
been permitted to do the work there that they could legitimately attempt 
in the leathery embrace of old Broadway.
And yet, though left-leaning talent during the Cold War indeed found 
a warmer climate on Broadway than in sunny California, the chill dis-
ciplinary winds blowing from the West Coast could still be felt on the 
tropical island of Manhattan—which is why the term “blacklist musical” 
designates more than just musicals that happened to get written while 
the blacklist was in place three thousand miles away. Take, for instance, 
what is perhaps the most depressingly obvious case of a blacklist musi-
cal: Silk Stockings, Cole Porter’s 1955 adaptation of the film Ninotchka. In 
the show’s opening number, three Soviet commissars, sent to Paris only 
to succumb to its decadent pleasures, sing:
Too bad we can’t go back to Moscow.
Lenin, pity us, do!
Instead of counting chickens on each farm ev’rywhere,
In case a party member has a chicken to spare,
You’ll see us counting chickens at the Folies Bergère,
Too bad—ai!
Too bad—ai!
Too good to be true, hai! hai! hai!4
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There may be funnier examples of bourgeois-hedonistic self-congratula-
tion, but these lines are nothing if not hysterical. Counting chickens at 
the Folies Bergère no doubt beats counting them on each farm every-
where. Yet the compulsion to turn what-goes-without-saying into what-
must-be-said, like the compulsion to turn Ninotchka into a Broadway 
musical at just this moment, affirms the truth it would deny: that play 
itself has turned into work; that Western-style fun has come to resemble 
Soviet-style drudgery. “Aldous Huxley,” Adorno wrote, “has raised the 
question of who, in a place of amusement, is really being amused. With 
the same justice, it can be asked whom music for entertainment still en-
tertains?”5 If the joyless joie de vivre of a show like Silk Stockings shrinks 
the distance between Moscow and Paris with every desperate, clunky 
insistence that they’re poles apart—too good to be true, indeed—this is 
both cause and effect of the uneasy proximity of two other “opposite” 
cities: in an entertainment industry already fully bicoastal by the late 
forties, and in age when Broadway musicals, even not very successful 
ones—like Silk Stockings—were almost routinely made into movies, how 
could New York not have felt Hollywood (to say nothing of Washington) 
breathing down its neck? How surprising is it that, although the black-
list never reached the theater, it got close enough to play a decisive role 
in the shaping of the Broadway musical in its classic phase?
For Silk Stockings is only one example, and by no means the most dis-
tinguished one, of a postwar Broadway musical haunted by the menac-
ingly indeterminate presence, somewhere out there (around the corner, 
or whistling down the river) not just of the “true wielders of power” 
but also of the real Americans through whom they exercise that power, 
and who may be as near as the nearest tourist. Indeed, as I will show in 
discussing Fiddler on the Roof at the end of this chapter, the Broadway 
musical may be most American when it does go back to Russia, and it 
may reveal the blacklist’s imprint most clearly when it seems to have 
overcome the blacklist. I begin with Silk Stockings only because of its 
egregious eagerness to display its credentials as the good kind of “party 
member,” or as a member of the good kind of party: an eagerness even 
more egregiously modeled by one of the co-authors of its book, Abe 
Burrows, who, in his testimony before the House Un-American Activi-
ties Committee in 1952, a virtual dress rehearsal for Silk Stockings, gave 
the committee the names of suspected Hollywood Communists he had 
	 Br inging	Down	the	house	 185
known, and blamed these dangerous liaisons on his habits as a promis-
cuous life of the party:
In Hollywood, in those days, I was invited everywhere. I attended more 
parties, I guess, than anyone. The Saturday Evening Post, in 1945 or at the 
end of 1945 [1944?], did an article about me and the fact that I played at 
parties all over Hollywood. As a matter of fact, it got a little out of hand. 
I used to go to too many, and I began to quit going when I started to get 
asked by people I didn’t know. You know, people would say, ‘Come to the 
party,’ and you would sit, and then you would sit down to the party and go 
to work. So I attended parties, with all kinds of people, the right wing and 
the left wing, and the middle, and all down the line. I guess I never turned 
down an invitation to go to the piano. It was in a period before I became 
a performer, and I guess maybe I was hammy about it. I liked to sing. I 
played up these songs.6
Though, by 1952, Burrows may have kicked the habit of indiscriminate 
party-going, his abjectly informative testimony proves that he still liked 
to sing. And not just to sing, either, but to play the clown while doing 
so. When the committee’s lawyer remarks, “Our observations have been 
that ridicule is about one of the most effective weapons against mem-
bers of the Communist Party,” Burrows obligingly replies: “They can’t 
take it. . . . I know in Russia . . . they don’t like jokes, they don’t like 
funny stuff ” (567). As though someone were threatening to send him 
back to Moscow, Burrows, in his hammy way, performs a travesty of 
musical comedy as stoolpigeon fun: he stages both an out-of-town tryout 
of the mediocre Broadway show on which he’ll collaborate three years 
later and, even more drearily, an in-house demonstration, for an audi-
ence of representative Americans, of how to ruin a party by reducing it 
to the party line, of how to betray, along with your friends, the pleasure 
principle at the heart of entertainment itself.7
Performer as informer, court jester as good citizen, Abe Burrows, in a 
one-man orgy of sycophancy, does his bit for the Cold War hardening of 
entertainment into mere appeasement: a hardening that in turn supports 
the consolidation of American politics and American show business into 
one interminable patriotic reality show. If Burrows’s audience remains 
cool toward his performance, this is partly because, uninhibited in his 
fingering of others, he never exactly confesses to his own Communist 
186	 chap ter	s ix	
Party membership, but partly because his performance itself (“I guess, 
I guess, I guess”) is too darn hot: it conspicuously lacks the cool that 
was becoming the approved style, especially for friendly witnesses, at 
the dawn of both the television age and youth culture.8 For a state-of-
the-art performance of American sycophancy, which accordingly met 
with a much warmer reception, consider, once again, the 1953 huac 
testimony of Jerome Robbins, the choreographer and director who had 
done the dances for shows like Call Me Madam and The King and I and 
who would go on to stage such other canonical Broadway musicals as 
West Side Story, Gypsy, Bells Are Ringing, A Funny Thing Happened on the 
Way to the Forum, and Fiddler on the Roof. Robbins’s cooperative testi-
mony ends with this exchange between him and one of the committee 
members:
mr. doyle: Again, I want to compliment you. You are in a wonderful 
place, through your art, your music, your talent, which God blessed you 
with, to perhaps be very vigorous and positive in promoting American-
ism in contrast to Communism. Let me suggest to you that you use that 
great talent which God has blessed you with to put into ballets in some 
way, to put into music in some way, that interpretation.
mr. robbins: Sir, all my works have been acclaimed for its [sic] American 
quality particularly.
mr. doyle: I realize that, but let me urge you to put even more of that in 
it, where you can appropriately.
With which the committee chairman concludes: “Mr. Robbins, I do 
want to reiterate, you have performed a patriotic service to the Commit-
tee, and I am sure all Congress and the American people are very thank-
ful to you for it” (Bentley, 634).
In addition to informing, Robbins, to be sure, produces the confession 
of political sins that Burrows, for all his antic, frantic ass-kissing, can 
never quite cough up. But Robbins’s success before this tough crowd, like 
Burrows’s relative lack of it, depends as much on the showbiz savvy that 
God blessed him with as on the “patriotic service” that he “performs.” 
Or rather: Robbins succeeds because, theatrical genius that he was, he 
knew how to perform for the committee in such a way as to make patri-
otic service, or ideological servility, sound almost hip, so that even his 
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grammatical mistake, his putting “its” for “their,” plays not as a gaffe but 
as a piece of Brandoesque looseness. And just as Marlon Brando himself 
would redefine film acting one year later when he played the stoolpigeon 
hero of Elia Kazan’s On the Waterfront, becoming an American idol by 
showing his fellow citizens how to inhabit the adolescence humiliatingly 
imposed on them as an adolescence sexily chosen by them, so, when 
Jerome Robbins went on to direct and choreograph West Side Story in 
1957, would he conceive it as “the first Method musical” (Laurents, 357)—
toward which end, according to Arthur Laurents, who wrote West Side 
Story’s book, Robbins kept everybody on his toes, not only, for instance, 
by ordering the actors playing the Jets and the Sharks not to eat, sit, or 
talk together in or out of the theater (ibid.), but also by shouting “fag-
got!” over and over at the show’s male lead (ibid.,358), no doubt in the 
hope of eliciting from him a plausible impersonation of Brandoesque 
rough trade, for reasons as political as they were sexual.9 “Let me urge 
you to put even more of that in” your work: there can never be enough 
of “that,” of course, when “that” is “American quality particularly,” and 
“you” are a gay Jewish choreographer in 1953. Very smart, Maria. If, for 
Jerome Robbins, putting in even more of that meant subjecting others 
to the homophobic bullying implicit in the committee’s praise for his 
testimony, he thus applied all too diligently the civics lesson he had so 
shrewdly learned: a lesson in the wisdom of disguising docile subjects 
as juvenile delinquents—a method for, among other things, staying in 
the “wonderful place” where he could exercise the talent with which God 
blessed him.
Robbins understood that place—not so wonderful, perhaps, for the ac-
tors and dancers working under his direction—to be Broadway and Hol-
lywood together: Laurents and others have claimed that Robbins, like 
Kazan, named names because he wanted to work on both coasts (332).10 
But insofar as Robbins in fact ended up abandoning his plan to make 
West Side Story the first Method musical—not surprisingly, the result 
of all his would-be Methodizing was a lot of “labored acting” (Laurents, 
359)—insofar, that is, as something wonderful did come out of the show, 
that something has everything to do with the fantasy of a wonderful 
place. The protest of comicosmopolitanism under colonial control, this 
fantasy—this insistence on living in the city of one’s dreams—is what 
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grounds West Side Story in a place (call it Broadway, or the West Side, or 
Manhattan, or New York City) imagined to exist, rather like, say, Puerto 
Rico, both inside and outside “America,” and as yet incompletely ruled 
either by stoolpigeon fun à la Abe Burrows or by stoolpigeon serious-
ness à la Jerome Robbins.
“Just think,” writes D. A. Miller in Place for Us, his book on the Broad-
way musical that takes its title from West Side Story and that takes the 
genre as a place of gay fantasy:
The golden-age musical that best persuaded the general public of the artis-
tic “seriousness” of the form—and did so, naturally enough, on the basis 
of a virility so sure of itself, or at any rate, so truculently put forward, that 
it could even get away with the jetés of classical ballet, without anybody 
daring to say, though anybody might have seen, from their first cigarette, 
that the Jets were leaping straight out of the pages of Genet—this was 
entirely the conception of four gay men who must have been, in a strict 
sense of the phrase, nothing if not brilliant.11
Its “seriousness” somehow uncompromised, even promoted, by a cer-
tain conspiracy to keep it gay, West Side Story confronts a perhaps graver 
levity in its other artistic line of descent: its vexed relations with a dis-
tinctively Jewish world of musical comedy. Playing down the gay connec-
tion (with the usual not-so-convincing results), Arthur Laurents argues: 
“There is one sensibility all four of us share which is more important 
and really does inform the work. We’re all Jews. . . . West Side Story can 
be said to be informed by our political and sociological viewpoint; our 
Jewishness as the source of passion against prejudice.”12 But what if 
the “political and sociological viewpoint” of West Side Story derives as 
much from a relatively frivolous, and frankly commercial, Jewish theat-
rical background as from a perfectly respectable Jewish “passion against 
prejudice”?13 This is a question that the show’s four authors—along 
with Laurents and Robbins, composer Leonard Bernstein and lyricist 
Stephen Sondheim—took considerable pains to preclude, from the mo-
ment, early in its history, when West Side Story emerged from the ruins 
of East Side Story, a musical with a Jewish Juliet and a Catholic Romeo, 
rejected on the basis of its “old-fashioned” content—“ ‘Abie’s Irish Rose’ 
to music,” quipped one detractor—and, in Bernstein’s words, because of 
its “too-angry, too-bitchy, too-vulgar tone.”14
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Moving the story from the East Side to the West Side, and replacing 
its Jewish-Catholic conflict with one between Puerto Ricans and (mostly 
indeterminate) white ethnics, may well have afforded a more up-to-date 
expression of the show’s liberal theme, as well as a more pertinent set-
ting for it. Yet West Side Story’s distinction as a blacklist musical—its 
failure to sing entirely in tune with its illiberal time, Jerome Robbins’s 
“patriotism” notwithstanding—owes a great deal to the “old-fashioned” 
origins that it never entirely overcomes: not just to the archaic modes of 
reception and production that characterized Broadway in general, but 
to the stylistic repertoire bound up with it, the very stylistic repertoire 
whose obsolescence the show—the song titled “Cool” would say it all—
works so hard to accelerate. For the most progressive thing about this 
self-consciously modern, emphatically youth-oriented musical, even the 
most radical thing about it, is what I would like to call its geriatric delin-
quency. I am not thinking here of the kindly old druggist named Doc, 
the one recognizably Jewish character in the show, and also its comic-
sentimental spokesman for liberal tolerance (“Weapons. You couldn’t 
play basketball?”15)—a role, incidentally, played in the original Broadway 
cast by the blacklisted actor Art Smith, one of the “comrades” named 
by Elia Kazan. Rather, the show’s geriatric delinquency occurs in those 
moments when the teenage characters themselves drop their Cold War 
cool—which is to say, their good citizenship—just long enough to turn 
into vaudevillians, Broadway babies at least three times their age. Need-
less to say, these moments, when “musical tragedy,” as Laurents would 
have it (346), regresses to musical comedy, are the “flaws” in the show, 
according to its critics and its creators alike: songs like “I Feel Pretty,” 
with its alarmingly charming lyrics, too witty, too literate, too My Fair 
Lady by half;16 or like “America,” also too un-American for its own good; 
or like the trio “Kids Ain’t,” aborted out-of-town “because it was too 
much of a crowd-pleaser”;17 or—best example of all—like “Gee, Offi-
cer Krupke,” which the New York Times critic especially disliked for its 
“spectacle of ‘little ruffians’ relating their experience of mordant gang 
life with ‘a good cheer that would be suitable in a comic scene of a con-
ventional musical show.’ ”18
This return of the comic repressed is not to be confused with the 
“funny stuff ” that they can’t take in Russia but that Abe Burrows serves 
up so obsequiously for his Christian masters here. Rather, what returns 
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is the lightened-up version of a too-angry, too-bitchy, and too-vulgar tone: 
a tone that comes out brash, clever,19 and just-vulgar-enough, displaying, 
in short, the classic “qualities,” as Jerome Robbins might say, of musical 
comedy’s New York–Jewish accent, which it can’t seem to lose, no mat-
ter how many times it sings “ok by me in America” (Laurents et al., West 
Side Story, 167)—or even “God Bless America.” Drumming “God” and 
“bless” and “America” into Robbins, the committee member who “com-
pliments” him doesn’t just get “American quality” in return: he gets 
“American quality particularly” with the particular American quality of 
inarticulateness—in other words, without the Jewish lip that would call 
Robbins’s patriotic (lip) service into question, and that, as much as any 
alleged Communist subversion, provoked the vengeful, long-running 
counter-spectacle conceived, directed, and choreographed by the House 
Un-American Activities Committee. And yet, in the great American mu-
sical “conceived, directed, and choreographed by Jerome Robbins,” as 
he insisted his credit should read (Laurents, 363), “Gee, Officer Krupke” 
opens up a wonderfully Godforsaken place, if only by making room for 
West Side Story’s one eruption into vulgar Yiddish:
Dear kindly social worker,
They say go earn a buck,
Like be a soda jerker,
Which means like be a schmuck . . . (208).
But this isn’t just the song in which “little ruffians” revert to Yiddish. 
Even cleaned up for the cast album—“They say go earn some dough / . . . 
Which means like be a schmo”—this is the song that still in effect says 
“schmuck” to the police: the police who, as it happens, begin the show by 
attempting to recruit informers from the Sharks, asking, as though rhe-
torically: “Didn’t nobody tell ya there’s a difference between bein’ a stool 
pigeon and cooperatin’ with the law?” (139).20 Denying that difference as 
it refuses to join the chorus of stoolpigeons being heard throughout the 
land, mocking the various policing discourses of midcentury America, 
from the law to psychiatry to social work, “Gee, Officer Krupke” consti-
tutes a little allegory of noncooperation with huac and company. But 
let us not fixate on content, any more than huac did: let us consider the 
politics of tone, to use Leonard Bernstein’s word, and let us take our cue 
from Stephen Sondheim, who wrote the words for this song:
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There are very few times when you laugh out loud in the theater at a lyric 
joke. One laugh per score is a lot for me, and I think most of my shows 
have one laugh. In West Side there’s the section in “Gee, Officer Krupke” 
which uses a favorite technique of mine, parallel lines where you just 
make a list:
My father is a bastard,
My ma’s an S.O.B.
My grandpa’s always plastered,
My grandma pushes tea.
My sister wears a mustache.
My brother wears a dress.
Goodness gracious, that’s why I’m a mess!
That’s not exceptionally funny on its own, but it brought down the 
house every night because the form helps make it funny.21
You just make a list? Sondheim is too modest. In an age where list mak-
ing had become public policy and national mania, his lyric joke brought 
down the house every night thanks not only to the genius of form, but 
to a more local genius as well: to the smartass, brassy, and yet radically 
uncool tone that means “Broadway,” “musical comedy,” and “Jews” all 
at once, and that, however loudly it trumpets its “American quality,” still 
sets a lot of American teeth on edge. As well it might: bringing down the 
house isn’t the same thing as bringing down the House (of Representa-
tives), but Sondheim’s parallel lines, like the streets of some imaginary 
city, map out a wonderful place, in which singing need not mean “coop-
eratin’ with the law.”
The serious or “integrated” Broadway musical is thought to begin in 
1943, with Rodgers and Hammerstein’s Oklahoma!. Andrea Most ar-
gues that this founding text is also both an allegory and a vehicle of Jew-
ish assimilation. While much of Most’s argument depends on a read-
ing of the show’s villain, Jud Fry, as an encoded embodiment of the 
African American abjection on which Jewish American success sup-
posedly rests, Most eventually qualifies this reading, acknowledging the 
signs of Jewishness, as well as of blackness, clustered around the figure 
of Jud:
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He is associated not with “black” entertainment forms in the play but with 
elite European performance genres. . . . Jud is both uncivilized and too 
civilized. These contradictory negative characteristics are similar to those 
ascribed by antisemites to Jews, who were perceived as both poverty- 
stricken Communists and powerful bankers threatening to control the 
world. Jud is not specifically a black man in a white body but an un-
comfortable projection onto a “black” character of the nonwhite and un-
American traits that Jews feared being persecuted for.22
Feared with good reason, we might add, since, in 1943, a thoroughly ra-
cialized and unassimilably cosmopolitan European Jewry was undergo-
ing not just persecution but destruction. Indeed, the “European perfor-
mance genres” with which Jud is associated—in the “Dream Ballet,” for 
instance, he presides over a wicked Parisian dance hall, a horror-show 
Folies Bergère, complete with scary cancan dancers—evoke the “Jewish 
degeneracy” for which the Nazis attempted a final solution: the Jew-
ish degeneracy whose specter, back in America, would energize huac, 
McCarthy, and their collaborators well into the next decade. But to de-
scribe Jud as a “projection” of what Jews feared, as Most does, seems 
somewhat misleading in view of his name, on which Most does not 
comment. “Jud,” after all, virtually means “Jew,” as the German-Jewish 
Rodgers and Hammerstein would have known. Why allow a “ ‘black’ 
character” to retain such a transparently Jewish name?23 And why link 
this avatar of “nonwhite and un-American traits” specifically with the 
musical spectacles of the metropolis—in this case, Paris, but a Paris that 
might double for an entertainment capital better known, by 1943, for its 
large and culturally influential black and Jewish populations: namely, 
New York City?
Most is right to argue that, in Oklahoma!, it is Rodgers and Hammer-
stein themselves who cannot stop singing “we know we belong to the 
land.” In the person of their landsman Jud Fry, however, there arises 
the unsung counter-refrain, “we know real Americans don’t believe we 
do.” And while poor Jud’s fate—he really does end up dead, of course—
imbues the show’s assimilationist anthem with the strains of wishful 
thinking, so that “we know we belong to the land” begins to sound like a 
desperate mantra recited to drown out evidence to the contrary, this very 
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its Jewish fear of nonassimilation, suggests that fear may not be the only 
affect at work here. The musical theater may well have served as a means 
of Americanization for the Jews who, “since the 1920s,” according to 
John Bush Jones, have accounted for “at least 90 percent of the book 
writers, lyricists, and composers of Broadway shows.”24 But if nearly 
every Broadway musical thus claims to plant itself in Oklahoma, that 
claim originates from—and in a sense never leaves—a place as far as 
one can go, symbolically speaking, from any heartland or middle Amer-
ica whatsoever: the national margin of Manhattan, from whose literally 
or at least littorally insular perspective the most up-to-date Kansas Cities 
are imagined, and imagined, inevitably, to come up a little short: “They 
went and built a skyscraper seven stories high!”25 If not frankly superior, 
this perspective is not simply the space of anxious denial either. The 
seminal Broadway musical reassures itself that it belongs to the land, 
but never quite erases the site of not-quite-belonging that constitutes 
the transnational scene of its enunciation. Even in 1943, when American 
Jews had excellent reasons for feeling patriotic, the definitive Jewish-
American genre of the Broadway musical recognizes that, emotionally 
and aesthetically, if not quite geographically, it lives as close to Paris, or, 
for that matter, to Moscow, Vienna, and Budapest, as to Kansas City, 
Oklahoma City, and Omaha.
Twelve years later, when American Jews still had reasons, albeit less 
excellent ones, for feeling patriotic, a Broadway musical like Silk Stock-
ings would align itself much more explicitly with Paris, but not with Paris 
as a metonymy for New York’s own foreignness to the rest of the United 
States. On the contrary, far from signifying a locus of un-American, or 
at best unstably American, activities, the Cold War Paris of Silk Stock-
ings stands congealed in a geopolitical opposition to Moscow, frozen into 
place as the polar synecdoche for the Western “pleasure” bloc tout court, 
as the ego ideal of the American entertainment industry, of which Hol-
lywood is the center and New York is only one more colonial outpost. A 
similarly imperial logic of subsumption seems to inform West Side Story, 
when the Puerto Rican Anita’s “I like the island Manhattan” leads into “I 
like to be in America” (Laurents, 167). Standing for America, even as its 
towering symbol, Manhattan would suffer the dubious blessing—and 
how dubious recent history shows all too well—of merely being sub-
ordinated to it. But the segue from “Manhattan” to “America” is not in 
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fact uninterrupted. Before “I like the island Manhattan” gives way to “I 
like to be in America,” it meets its more immediate match in its rhym-
ing partner: “Smoke on your pipe and put that in!” (167). Might this 
“Latin” sassiness, as well as this wittily scrambled idiom, bespeak more 
than just the superpatriotism of one overeager to identify herself as “an 
American girl now” (166)? After all, the song “America” that Anita goes 
on to sing includes such impertinent Sondheimian lyric jokes as “Every-
thing free in America / For a small fee in America!” (167) and “Nobody 
knows in America / Puerto Rico’s in America” (168). Not exactly national 
anthem material. The irreverence that points out America’s repression 
of its own heterogeneity also points up, by exemplifying, the position of 
Manhattan as another insular, insolent national other—as “in” but not 
exactly of America, even the America for which it sometimes tropically 
substitutes. Perhaps less alienated than Jud Fry, but not necessarily less 
alien, the authors of “America” both know their place and like it.
In 1956 Judy Holliday starred in the musical comedy Bells Are Ringing, a 
show whose very title announces an essentially musical sensitivity to the 
politics of tone. In March 1952, Holliday, who, the year before, had won 
the Best Actress Oscar for Born Yesterday, but whose film and television 
career was being threatened by various anti-Communist groups—tele-
vision was blacklisting her, and groups like the American Legion were 
picketing her films—testified before the Senate Internal Security Sub-
committee in an executive or closed session. At the end of the hearing, 
the presiding senator, a Utah Republican named Arthur Watkins, took 
elaborate pains to impress upon Holliday the importance of preserv-
ing its confidential status: “You are not going to release anything about 
this?” She replied: “Release anything? I would rather die.”26 Six months 
later, the government would send the transcript of her testimony to the 
press. Even if, according to one of Holliday’s biographers, she and her 
lawyers and the movie studio that arranged the hearing knew from the 
outset that the transcript would be released in a matter of months, this 
assault on her fictitious privacy was no less violent for being expected.27 
Holliday’s career in film and television did not suffer permanent dam-
age, although the networks were slower to rehabilitate her than were the 
studios. Both the assault and her survival of it may be explained by Hol-
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privilege, since the only other witness to have exercised it, as far as I 
know, was Lucille Ball.28 I have in mind the finesse with which Holliday, 
assuming her Born Yesterday dumb blonde persona for her Washington 
inquisitors, which is to say, playing dumb like a fox, carved out a space, 
and performed a role, halfway between friendly witness and unfriendly 
witness: while repudiating the Communist Party and deploring her “stu-
pidity” and “irresponsibility” in supporting its “front” organizations, she 
persistently frustrated the subcommittee’s aggressive attempts to make 
her name names.
Holliday’s own name, moreover, occasioned a good deal of suspicious 
questioning. Here she is being interrogated by Richard Arens, the staff 
director of the subcommittee:
mr. arens: Your name is Judy Holliday as a stage name, is it?
miss holliday: Yes.
mr. arens: A professional name?
miss holliday: Yes.
mr. arens: What other name have you used in the course of your life?
miss holliday: Judy Tuvim, T-u-v-i-m.
mr. arens: Do you have a married name?
miss holliday: Yes.
mr. arens: What is your married name?
miss holliday: Mrs. David Oppenheim.
mr. arens: What was the occasion for the use of the name Judy Tuvim? 
Was that the name under which you were born?
miss holliday: Yes.
mr. arens: You subsequently adopted the name Judy Holliday as a stage 
or theatrical name? (1:2)
One aim of this line of questioning is obviously to fix Holliday in the nar-
rative of compulsory heterosexuality, pinning her down as “Mrs. David 
Oppenheim,” and to some extent pinning her political transgressions 
on Mr. David Oppenheim, who, the sexist reasoning seems to go, might 
have prevented them had he provided the proper husbandly supervi-
sion; whether aware or not of Holliday’s lesbian past—the interroga-
tion will in fact extend to the politics of her former female lover—the 
subcommittee never forgets that the personal is the political.29 Nor 
does it forget that the personal includes the racial as well as the sexual. 
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Interpellating the witness as “Mrs. David Oppenheim,” even better as a 
Mrs. David Oppenheim “born under” the name “Judy Tuvim,” has the 
by no means secondary advantage of bringing out the Jew behind the 
blonde. As another Holliday biographer observes, “translated liberally, 
[Tuvim] is Hebrew for ‘holiday.’ Arens asks as though Holliday were not 
a stage name but an alias. He seems especially eager to establish that she 
is Jewish.”30 His ear keenly tuned to the “Jew” in “Judy,” the interrogator 
is shrewd enough, at any rate, to pounce on the Hebrew surname, which 
“Holliday” liberally translates. Neither as wretched as Jud nor as heroic 
as Judith, Judy owes both her resilience and her vulnerability to the space 
of unholy holiday (“Are you a member of a church?” Senator Watkins 
disingenuously asks her [13:1]) that she almost synonymously represents: 
the comicosmopolis of New York City, typified, in the conservative imagi-
nary, not by the observance of the Jewish holy days, which might at 
least betoken a mitigating piety in the proto-Liebermanian vein, but, far 
worse, by the perpetration of the indecent, and indecently overlapping, 
carnivals of urban Jewish left-wing politics and urban Jewish show 
business.
Hence, for instance, the suspicion directed not only at Judy Holliday’s 
name but also at her place—the place of her birth and residence, the 
place that, she makes no effort to deny, she much prefers to Holly-
wood—as though the scene of her theatrical and political activities were 
an exotic and sinister foreign country:
mr. arens: In what area or what section or what segment of the Ameri-
can Labor Party did you register? Where were you at the time?
miss holliday: 1948 I was already married, but I don’t know whether I 
was living at my mother’s or down in the village then.
mr. arens: What do you mean by the “village”?
mr. rifkind [Holliday’s lawyer]: Greenwich Village.
miss holliday: It could have been either on Seventy-fifth Street or it 
could have been—
mr. arens: Manhattan or Brooklyn?
miss holliday: Everything is in Manhattan. (7:4)
Clearly, the witness is not the only one playing dumb. Even Senator 
Watkins of Utah confesses at one point, “I used to live in New York 
City for about five years,” taking care to add, “but I never had occasion 
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to go down to the piers” (3:3). Staff director Arens, bad cop to Senator 
Watkins’s good cop, knows very well what Holliday means by the “vil-
lage,” but he also knows that his own American credentials are rein-
forced by his pretending not to. Like the American tourist who insists on 
speaking English in Paris, the interrogator understands the power that 
comes from refusing to converse in the language of the other.31 Need-
less to say, conversation is exactly what must not happen here—which is 
why, when Holliday attempts to ask a question of her own, the bad cop 
hastens to remind her, “I do not want to be in a position of testifying, I 
want to be in the position of interrogating” (3:2). But if the hierarchy of 
juridical roles remains rigidly nonnegotiable, if Holliday fails to engage 
the state in conversation, she succeeds nonetheless in getting the state 
to say “I want”: she makes it speak its desire. Having done so, moreover, 
she proceeds to accentuate, since she cannot diminish, the difference 
between her own local dialect and the language of intimidation that is 
the would-be global discourse of the Law:32
senator watkins: A person would be expected to know the organiza-
tions to which he contributes money?
miss holliday: Yes.
senator watkins: You watch it now; do you not?
miss holliday: Ho, do I watch it now. (6:1)
Three years before, Holliday had played the comically vulgar defendant 
in the film Adam’s Rib. Here, on trial again, she revives the trick of 
talking back to the Law in the vernacular: her bitter iteration “Ho, do I 
watch it now” not only mocks the state that imposes such self-policing 
but also gives the official language of Americanism an ethnic and de-
motic inflection that it cannot wish to have. Holliday returns the sen-
ator’s message to him in a tone that—to echo Jack Warner—“doesn’t 
sound American.”
Hardly a “ho ho ho,” Holliday’s “ho” has nothing jolly about it. Insofar 
as it “humorously” affects a certain friendly informality, it enacts friend-
liness as hostility, its breach of decorum constituting a small but em-
blematic piece of civil impudence. In contrast with the fairy-tale version 
of disobedience at the end of The Front—Howard Prince’s carnivalesque 
defiance of huac—the comic resistance Holliday offers in her real tes-
timony may seem almost wan in its subtlety. Yet this very subtlety—the 
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deftness, for instance, with which Holliday blurs the boundary between 
cooperation and defiance—has its own tendency to offend. Along with 
brashness, cleverness, and similarly treacherous elements of the show-
biz vulgate of sophistication, it evokes the cultural capital that the arbi-
ters of Americanism helped to isolate in, precisely, the cultural capital. 
Consider the following exchange:
senator watkins: You hired people to investigate you?
miss holliday: I certainly did; because I had gotten into a lot of trouble.
mr. arens: What do you mean by you had gotten into a lot of trouble?
miss holliday: Yes.
mr. arens: Has anybody tried to prosecute you?
miss holliday: Yes.
mr. arens: Who?
miss holliday: Prosecute? No; I thought you meant persecute. (7:3)
Unlikely to get Holliday out of trouble, this kind of verbal wit minimizes 
it only by masquerading as feminine naïveté. But even this ruse sug-
gests the street-smart ways of the notoriously unfriendly town that Judy 
Holliday calls home. Unable to make the witness name names, the sub-
committee faces the additional problem of not knowing whether it is 
being insulted or apologized to or both. But how often does the state 
find itself immobilized by undecidability? In eventually releasing the 
transcript of Holliday’s testimony, the subcommittee may have been 
playing out an agreed-upon scenario; yet in subjecting her to public-
ity that, as kindly Senator Watkins prompted her to say at the end of 
that testimony, she regarded as a fate worse than death, the state—not, 
after all, without its own desire—managed to procure a little supple-
mentary fun for itself. As one of the more enduring blacklist musicals 
would be savvy enough to acknowledge, the Washington senators could 
hardly fail to avenge themselves on those damn Yankees. As the same 
blacklist musical would be savvy enough to deny, the senators are no 
underdogs.
Four years after her appearance in Washington, Judy Holliday would 
star in a blacklist musical of her own. Directed by Jerome Robbins, with 
music by Jule Styne, and with a book and lyrics by Betty Comden and 
Adolph Green, Holliday’s former partners in the cabaret act known as 
the Revuers—whose “Communist-front records” (5:1) Richard Arens 
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tried to make her confirm—Bells Are Ringing takes Holliday back, as she 
puts it in one of the show’s songs, “where I can be me”: not to the Bon-
jour Tristesse Brassière Company, but to the place that, like Holliday’s 
own name, itself figures as a promesse de bonheur. Like On the Town and 
Wonderful Town, the previous “New York musicals” of Comden and 
Green, Bells Are Ringing presents the city as a space of dreams come 
true. To call it a Cinderella story, in other words, is to touch on only one 
of its fairy-tale aspects. Instead of the dangerous, subversive hellhole 
constructed by right-wing fantasy, the New York of Bells Are Ringing is a 
helluva town, where, when the people ride in a hole in the ground, they 
end up breaking into song and dance. Comden and Green write in their 
preface to the published text of the show: “Somewhere in this seemingly 
cold and indifferent town there lurk unexpected pockets of warmth and 
love.”33 The liberal showbiz sentimentality—New York really is just a vil-
lage, as friendly as the rest of the country—covers a more radical image 
of the seemingly cold and indifferent metropolis as itself perhaps the 
only pocket of warmth and love in an authentically cold and indifferent 
Cold War America. Wonderful town, indeed.
Not that the cold cannot be felt in the show’s cozy rhizomatic Never-
Never-Land (to invoke another fifties Comden and Green lyric). Indeed, 
so deeply marked is Bells Are Ringing by Judy Holliday’s political perse-
cution that the entire show might be described as an attempt to rework 
and thus work through that trauma. A Cinderella story, to be sure—
where the bells that ring are finally, of course, wedding bells—but a 
Cinderella story for the age of McCarthyism: this is a fairy tale whose 
heroine is tormented not by two wicked stepsisters, but by two cops. Just 
as Holliday’s interrogation four years earlier was conducted by a good 
senator cop and a bad staff director cop, so she, or rather, her character, 
Ella (a Cinder-less Cinderella), is pursued here by a hard-nosed Inspec-
tor Barnes and a more lenient Officer Francis. Just as Holliday “got into 
trouble” for letting political subversives take advantage of her humani-
tarianism, so it is Ella’s desire to help people that allows her to become 
the instrument of an unsavory conspiracy. Just as the telephone played a 
crucial role in Holliday’s political drama—it was a principal means both 
by which “Communist-front” organizations solicited her support and by 
which the fbi kept tabs on her (making an anonymous call to her an-
swering service, for example, to find out if she was in California34)—so, 
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as the show’s title suggests, the aptly named Mr. Bell’s invention is of 
decisive importance in Bells Are Ringing, where Holliday plays an opera-
tor for an answering service, and where that answering service, itself 
suspected of being a front for the drug trade, for a group of counterfeit-
ers, for a prostitution ring, in short, for everything but the Communist 
Party, actually provides a cover, without Ella’s knowledge, for a group of 
bookies working for the mob. But while Holliday was made to suffer for 
her misguided humanitarianism, Ella is vindicated for hers. Not only is 
she vindicated, but she succeeds in winning over her nemesis, Inspec-
tor Barnes, who, after rescuing her from the mob’s henchmen, ends up 
apologizing to her. “Is it a crime for a man to have made a human mis-
take? I misjudged you” (Comden and Green, Bells Are Ringing, 279), he 
confesses, before assuming the role of her “butler” (283) and joining the 
rest of the cast in a finale celebrating her as “that wonder girl” (285).
Is it a crime? While staff director Arens contemptuously refused to 
speak Holliday’s language (“What do you mean by the ‘village?’ ”), In-
spector Barnes humbly echoes Ella’s. For she has tried earlier in the 
show to “ ‘con’ her way out of his clutches” (218), as the stage directions in-
dicate, by performing a number entitled, precisely, “Is It a Crime?” That 
the hitherto unmovable cop finally affirms her goodness and admits his 
mistake in persecuting her is already gratifying enough; that he does by 
adopting her, and Judy Holliday’s, and Broadway’s, New York–Jewish 
idiom (“Is it a crime?,” “so sue me”) makes clear as a bell the intensity of 
the wish-fulfillment underwriting this show.
But what if one of the wishes fulfilled is the wish never to have been 
political in the first place? What does it mean that gambling, counterfeit-
ing, drug-dealing, and prostitution all have to substitute for the unspeak-
able crime of leftist politics? Does Bells Are Ringing simply repress, rather 
than work through, Holliday’s political trauma? If the show’s recipe for 
mastering political trauma amounted to getting rid of the political, if 
Holliday’s fairy-tale victory over her oppressors required the exchange 
of her political commitments for a vacuously generalized philanthropy, 
and if the method of humanizing the state consisted not only in forget-
ting its crimes against her and other citizens but also in counting on its 
protection, then Bells Are Ringing would be a rather triste fairy tale after 
all, a self-congratulatory rehearsal of the more self-abasing moments in 
Holliday’s testimony, like her statement: “I don’t say yes to anything 
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now except cancer, polio, cerebral palsy, and things like that” (8:1). Holli-
day’s symbolic vindication might indeed seem predicated on her having 
said no to everything but a handful of platitudes:
Is it a crime to start each day
With a laugh and a smile and a song?
And is it a crime to end each day
With a laugh and a smile and a song?
Is it wrong?
. . .
If it’s a crime to help old ladies cross the street,
Then put me in jail!
Without bail!
Bread and water from an old tin pail
If that—if that’s a crime! ( 218–19)
Comden and Green’s notation that the song itself is a con job signals 
that its empty-headedness may be no less deceptive than Judy Holliday’s 
dumb blonde act. Like many of the songs in Bells Are Ringing, indeed 
like many Comden and Green songs in general, “Is It a Crime?” is in 
fact a kind of urbane neovaudeville number, an old-fashioned song-and-
dance routine reinvented for a modern, downtown crowd: for a certain 
“village vanguard,” to drop the name of the nightclub where the Revuers 
got their start, and which almost every number in Bells Are Ringing nos-
talgically re-creates. A song like “Is It a Crime?,” that is, itself constitutes 
not just a “pocket of warmth and love,” but a pocket of satire and bohe-
mia, a cabaret in miniature, a cultural cell (or cellar) whose language 
must remain partly opaque to, say, an Inspector Barnes, who can thus 
be counted on to take it at face value—as he does here, finding himself 
“completely dissolved in tears” (220), though not completely ready yet 
to stop his investigation.35 Playing dumb, the song fends off unfriendly 
outsiders, or prepares to enfold them in its space of friendly insiders, 
the “village” people united in their appreciation of the smartness of its 
subterfuge and the lightness with which it wears its literacy, as when 
Ella imagines how she might have saved Romeo and Juliet:
Hello. Veronaphone. Oh, yes Mr. Romeo. Juliet Capulet called. The mes-
sage is: “To avoid marriage with the other fellow am playing dead. Friar 
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Lawrence gave me great big sleeping pill. When I wake up, we’ll head for 
border.” Oh, don’t thank me. It’s all in the day’s work—
(She hangs up the imaginary phone and turns to barnes fiercely.)
See what I could have done?
Maybe I’m right!
Maybe I’m wrong!
But if I’d got that message through on time,
I’m telling you—
those two kids would be alive today! (219–20)
Faithful to its own fairy-tale logic, Bells Are Ringing, one year before 
West Side Story, recasts Romeo and Juliet as a comedy. (In the words of 
Senator Watkins, “That did ring a bell with you, did it not?” [8:3].) As we 
have seen, however, West Side Story itself is most radical when it is most 
comic, and comic in a vaudevillian mode of its own. As we have also 
seen, most commentary on the show, including commentary by its au-
thors, tends to regard this mode as an aesthetic defect, an embarrassing 
lapse into the prehistory that, like a second-generation American or a 
gawky teenager, West Side Story so much wants to have put behind itself. 
It comes as no surprise, therefore, to read in Arthur Laurents’s memoir 
that he was relieved when Betty Comden and Adolph Green declined 
Leonard Bernstein’s invitation to help him write West Side Story’s lyrics: 
“Fond as I was of both of them, I thought their strength was light satire, 
not exactly suitable for a musical tragedy” (Laurents, Original Story By, 
346). Nor is it surprising that Laurents praises West Side Story at the ex-
pense of Bells Are Ringing—Jerome Robbins’s previous show—dismiss-
ing the latter as nothing more than a “commercial success” (ibid., 351).
But Comden and Green’s light satire may not be as lightweight as 
it seems, just as the “merely” commercial may turn out to have unex-
pected underground appeal. With a criminally frivolous showbiz credo 
of a laugh and a smile and a song, the neovaudeville of Comden and 
Green proleptically explicates the radical anachronisms of West Side 
Story, developing more systematically the strategy of what might be 
termed a regressive avant-garde. Comden and Green’s stage directions 
frequently remark on the “corniness” of the numbers or the action being 
described, but this self-conscious “corniness” advances a technique of 
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pastiche and allusion ideally intended for a subcultural or minority audi-
ence, a comicosmopolitan audience defined by the promiscuity of its taste: 
by its preference for an eclectic mixture of highbrow, middlebrow, and 
lowbrow registers over the corporate homogeneity coming to distinguish 
postwar mass culture. Not only does Comden and Green’s ironically af-
fectionate citation of “corny” musical-comedy styles run counter to the 
oppressively cool youth culture everywhere in the ascendant in postwar 
America: it also opens up pockets of urbane intimacy, in which satire’s 
edge cohabits with a whole ethos of the light, opposed to the prevailing 
national heaviness, darkness, and cold. Not for nothing, perhaps, did the 
senate subcommittee’s suspicion fall on the Revuers, to whom Richard 
Arens insisted on referring as “that unit” (2:1). As elaborated in Bells 
Are Ringing, their cabaret sensibility conjures up a world sufficiently un-
American that, while indeed penetrated by the police, it remakes them 
on its own terms: a warm and bright world of ingenuous sophistication 
that might be called Showbiz Land, and that resembles nothing so much 
as an idealized New York City.36
The only-in-New-York dreamscape of Bells Are Ringing is thus a big-
city utopia of little performance spaces, of nightclubs and apartments 
and cafes; even the shabby subterranean office in which Ella works turns 
into a virtual boîte de nuit. Utopian and anachronistic at once, seeking 
to evade normative American space and time, Bells Are Ringing would 
exempt itself from stoolpigeon fun as much as from stoolpigeon seri-
ousness. And yet, if it evades the complicity that befalls a dismally au 
courant fifties musical like Silk Stockings, its utopia does not lack topi-
cality; Comden and Green may do light satire, but it is satire all the 
same. Take, for example, the scene in which Holliday’s character tries 
to help an unemployed actor named Blake Barton—one of America’s 
innumerable Marlon Brando wannabes—by persuading him to “turn 
Walter Pidgeon”:
ella: So you’re Barton, huh? Havin’ any luck?
barton (He takes from his pocket a white woolen mitten and pulls it on while 
speaking): Naah—thought I had a chance with that new show, The Midas 
Touch. I coulda been a contender—but—I—I—dunno—
guys (Doing the same with mittens): Uhhh—I dunno—
ella: D’j’ ever try wearing a suit?
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(All freeze, shocked)
barton: What? I can’t do that! What d’ya take me for? A traitor? We 
gotta name for actors dat wear suits. I ain’t turnin’ Walter Pidgeon for 
nobody.
ella: Sure! Be a punk imitation for the rest of your life! I’m tellin’ ya! If 
you want da job, you gotta cut da blue jeans action! Look around ya! 
You’re a glut on the market. You’re nothin’! (Comden and Green, Bells 
are Ringing, 238)
Turning Walter Pidgeon is in effect the opposite of turning stoolpigeon, 
since the star all these punks are imitating—the business with the mit-
ten mimics the famous glove scene from On the Waterfront—is the one 
whose adolescent surliness has glamorized the adolescent malleability 
of that new political creature, the citizen as informer, the most illustri-
ous of whom, the director of On the Waterfront, is mentioned later in 
Bells Are Ringing, when Ella learns at a party of show-business insiders 
not how to name that name but how to drop it. “Wearing flats and leather 
jacket and motorcycle cap” (238), affecting the verbal mannerisms and 
body language of the American wild one’s Method, Ella herself is doing 
Brando, of course, as she urges Barton to undo Brando. Like the politi-
cal subversives with whom she sympathized, like the agent of a foreign 
power, she infiltrates stoolpigeon America to turn it against itself. Even 
her Brando drag implies, in advance of “Gee, Officer Krupke,” the geriat-
ric delinquency of staging cinematic cool as vaudeville travesty: after she 
arrives on the scene, Barton and his fellow drugstore Brandos might as 
well start spraying one another with seltzer. But if Ella’s travesty makes 
Brando’s motorcycle cap look old hat, what previously seemed old hat—
to borrow Robert Hullot-Kentor’s characterization of Adorno’s Aesthetic 
Theory—begins to glitter with the promise of “what would be new if it 
were not blocked.” As Hullot-Kentor notes, “what is perceived as old hat 
masks the disappointment of what can no longer be hoped for,” which 
in turn figures “what is American that is not American, none of which 
could be put on a list of national character traits.”37 Ella’s satiric interven-
tion against the mechanical reproduction of the hipster-sycophant in-
deed inspires Barton to pursue squareness to its archaic or radical limit. 
Recognizing that she is right about why he is not “havin’ any luck,” he 
grasps that reversing the process of turning stoolpigeon means regress-
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ing so egregiously, putting on a conservatism so outré, that everything 
old becomes new again:
All right, come on fellas! On to Brooks Brothers! (They turn from him as 
from a leper) Okay! I’m not afraid of you. I’m going all the way! (In a 
strong British accent) Tennis, anyone?
(He does royal ballet leap and flies out the door.) (238)
With this flight of the Pidgeon, this leap of the leper, it seems as though 
Jerome Robbins were sending up—or is it fleeing?—the seriously 
American virility that he would “so truculently put forward” one year 
later, in West Side Story. Unsuitable for that musical tragedy, this comic 
gayness feels right at home in the lightly satirical world of Bells Are Ring-
ing, whose director and choreographer might well dream of flying out 
the door after the suddenly “British” Blake Barton, following him, like 
the children following Peter Pan, in turning back the clock to the time 
before turning stoolpigeon.
That Bells Are Ringing permits such fantasies—in which the disap-
pointment of what can no longer be hoped for ups and disappears—be-
tokens musical comedy’s commitment to happiness. As Bells Are Ring-
ing knows, however, happiness comes “just in time”: it is as much an 
accident of history as a necessity of genre. Happiness, linked etymologi-
cally and conceptually with happenstance, is inseparable from luck: the 
diegetic kind of luck that Blake Barton ultimately does have, thanks to 
information Ella just happens to pick up while taking messages from a 
Broadway producer; or the extradiegetic kind of luck that made it pos-
sible for Bells Are Ringing to sketch a comic alternative to stoolpigeon 
fun. How, one might wonder, did Comden and Green escape the fate 
of Abe Burrows, so that they could flourish both on Broadway and in 
Hollywood all through the fifties without having to name names? Betty 
Comden writes in her memoir: “Before and during World War II, having 
worked for Spanish War Relief and Russian War Relief as well as British 
War Relief, I wound up in a group lumped as ‘prematurely antifascist’ 
but by sheer luck never had my life blighted by the House Un-American 
Activities Committee.”38 Green seems to have enjoyed the same luck. 
Like Abe Burrows, Comden and Green were famous for performing at 
parties. Unlike Burrows, they never had to decide whether to renounce 
this practice, whether to replace the party principle with the party line. 
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Not only did they continue to perform at parties: when they performed a 
two-person Broadway show, in 1958 (and again in 1977), they titled it A 
Party with Betty Comden and Adolph Green. Indeed, the party, especially 
the party with entertainers, became the signature scene of the Comden 
and Green musical, nowhere more clearly than in Bells Are Ringing.
And yet, this is also the show whose most famous song is called “The 
Party’s Over.” If the show conspicuously goes on to prove this melancholy 
conclusion hasty and mistaken, it also understands, perhaps in part be-
cause Judy Holliday was not quite as lucky as Comden and Green, how 
easily the party could have ended—say, with a subpoena—and in fact 
could still end, as late as 1956.39 To keep the party going, this blacklist 
musical takes a flying leap back into the past before the blacklist. But the 
willfully escapist levity with which it executes the leap comes weighted 
with some baggage of its own: the Broadway cleverness (“turning Walter 
Pidgeon”) that risks getting one into trouble not only with the patriotic 
right but also, as Arthur Laurents’s disparaging comments suggest, with 
the creative and intellectual left.
Let us recall, from the beginning of this book, the advice Lillian Hell-
man’s lawyer gave her as she was about to testify before huac: “don’t 
make jokes. . . . Almost everybody, when they feel insulted by the Com-
mittee, makes a joke or acts smart-aleck. It’s a kind of embarrassment. 
Don’t do it.”40 We have seen by now how impolitic jokes and smart-
aleck behavior are in the context of a huac hearing—even when the 
congressional audience, like Abe Burrows’s, feeds the performer lines 
about Russian humorlessness. As Senator Watkins pointed out to Judy 
Holliday with unwitting wit, “We have several Moscows in the United 
States” (4:2). The show trials staged by huac and its fellow impresarios 
of terror had as little room for comedy as does any other sadism, state-
sponsored or not. But if it comes as no surprise that xenophobic reac-
tionaries can’t take a joke, the anticomic disposition is almost as deeply 
embedded among various lefts—including many that style themselves 
as cosmopolitan—for which the importance of being earnest takes pre-
cedence over the pursuit of happiness, with the result that jokes consti-
tute prima facie evidence of political irresponsibility, and that cleverness 
can never be anything more than mere cleverness. Though hardly un-
responsive to its political context, Bells Are Ringing makes a virtue of 
irresponsibility. Four years after Judy Holliday confessed and lamented 
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her own irresponsibility before the senate subcommittee, she starred in 
a blacklist musical about an overresponsible operator for an answering 
service, a woman who cares too much about the strangers on the phone. 
But any ethical respectability that might accrue from promoting Hol-
liday as the icon of a liberal counter-Momism—one of the show’s run-
ning jokes is that her Prince Charming calls her “Mom”—flies out the 
door with Blake Barton. For, the show is light not only of foot but also 
of heart. “What is lighthearted in art,” Adorno observes, “presupposes 
something like urban freedom.”41 Luck, that is, has a geographical di-
mension as well as a temporal one. Leaping back from fifties time, Bells 
Are Ringing also leaps away from American space, into that holiday world 
that, far more resoundingly than wedding bells, signifies art’s promise 
of happiness, Broadway musical–style: that impossible urban paradise 
where the freedom to make jokes and act smart-aleck, easy to condemn 
as bourgeois frivolity or smirking self-indulgence, implies a life free of 
fear—the very thought of which, after Auschwitz, and under huac, may 
be too embarrassing to tolerate.
For such an image of happiness evokes all too poignantly the disap-
pointment of what can no longer be hoped for. “Merely” commercial as 
it is “merely” clever, Bells Are Ringing tries in vain not to hear the bell 
toll. No matter how it pretends, it knows that the party’s over—that, with 
the disciplining of comicosmopolitanism, the time has come to say bon-
jour, tristesse. The show mixes its comedy with a certain pathos, a pathos 
often ascribed to the vulnerability shading Holliday’s brassiness. As we 
have seen, this vulnerability has a political prehistory. Though Holliday 
refused to name names before a senate subcommittee, she underwent 
a certain “cooperative” mortification nonetheless. In Bells Are Ringing, 
Holliday’s character hands over to the police a miscreant with an almost 
too-nameable name. J. Sandor Prantz, the ringleader of the bookies us-
ing the answering service as a front, a “suavely Middle-European” (205) 
con man, is not only the show’s most salient representative of the non-
American but also a bundle of Jewish musical comedy signifiers: the 
comedian as the letter J, the prancing Jew, the [S]and/or of treacherous 
middle-European sexual, racial, and political indeterminacy. If J. Sandor 
Prantz embodies a certain guilt of lightness, this is because he takes 
the fall for the guilty lightness of the show itself: a blacklist musical 
comedy that purchases its buoyancy by throwing inconvenient fellow 
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travelers overboard, by rewarding the law for “listening in” (213) on 
the party line. Blake Barton gets to fly out the door; Sandor, who would 
“fly . . . to” “Salzburg, lovely Salzburg” (269), lands in jail. What lands 
him there, or at least what seals the case against him, is in no small 
part the deliriously vaudevillian song in which he expresses that wish, a 
wish to go back both in time and in space to a city somewhere between 
Paris and Moscow and a little bit of both, “where”—speaking of impos-
sible urban paradises, far from Oklahoma—“the schnitzel is high as an 
elephant’s eye” (269).
Yet for all that the show seems willing to give him away, it keeps some-
thing of him in reserve. Something of suavely retrogressive J. Sandor 
Prantz lives, for instance, in the show’s final number, “I’m Going Back,” 
the song-and-dance routine in which Judy Holliday, camping it up in 
French, singing the blues, channeling Al Jolson, goes back, through 
the Bonjour Tristesse Brassière Company, to the brassier company of 
musical-comedy origins. Or consider Ella’s alias, the foreign-sounding 
“Melisande,” where part of “Sandor” finds itself reinscribed, reminding 
us that the show’s heroine is a bit of a con artist herself, as much a San-
dorella as a Cinderella. Or, for that matter, take the name “J. Holliday,” 
which now reads like a translation not just of “Judy Tuvim,” but also of 
“J’s and/or prance.”42 Like pieces of Jud Fry, pieces of Sandor, arrestable 
but incorrigible, survive at the very heart of the show, which betrays 
him in one sense, that of delivering him disloyally, only to betray him 
in another, that of revealing him within itself. Saying bonjour to tristesse 
but perversely clinging to bonheur, pushing the illusion that the party 
continues, Bells Are Ringing does something more: Sandor-like, it insists 
on modeling a levity that would rise above embarrassment, not to say 
terror. It would perform urban freedom shamelessly—that is, with a New 
York–Jewish accent, much like Judy Holliday’s.
As we leave Bells Are Ringing, consider this comic shamelessness in 
“Drop That Name,” a 1950s show business Who’s Who set to music, 
where the names dropped include, for instance, those of friendly wit-
nesses like Elia Kazan and José Ferrer. To appropriate a grimly self-
reflexive joke from Silk Stockings, the number might thus be called a 
“Who’s Still Who.”43 As if the whole sycophantic Cold War Zeitgeist, and 
Holliday’s particular encounter with it, did not make names and naming 
heavy enough, the whiff of danger is intensified by the setting: an elegant 
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showbiz party, where Holliday’s Cinderella, not ready for the ball, strikes 
what the stage directions call “the discordant note” (264). While the other 
guests rattle off a rhyming list of marquee names, punctuated by “Mary 
and Ethel,” a clueless Ella can only keep asking “Mary and Ethel who?” 
(answers: “Mary Martin and Ethel Merman,” “Mary Pickford and Ethel 
Barrymore”), and working dopey variations on the one celebrity name 
she knows, Rin-Tin-Tin. But if the song’s assault of names recalls the 
trauma of Holliday’s interrogation four years before, and if Ella is at first 
as intimidated by this brutal name game as Holliday was at her hearing, 
Ella’s fear gives way to a kind of vulgar exhilaration:
girl: My Christian Dior I wore then tore,
Got fitted for a new Balenciaga.
Then to Jacques Fath for just one hat—
Got something that will drive you ga-ga—
second girl: Valentina’s where I’ve been; I just adore Val—
third girl: Things with good lines—
ella: Like things from Klein’s!
(There is a shocked silence, then Ella continues grandly.)
I do all my shopping there with Mary and Ethel.
third girl: Mary and Ethel who?
ella (very flatly): Mary Schwartz and Ethel Hotchkiss. (265)
Bells Are Ringing opened in the same year as My Fair Lady, whose ethnic 
subtext it brings out as sharply as it anticipates the vaudeville of West 
Side Story.44 On Broadway, Cinderella’s faux pas are never just about 
class: they are also about the vulgarity that, on Broadway, especially in 
the fifties, meant Jewishness—the Jewishness that in some sense was 
Broadway. In My Fair Lady, vulgarity is of course transformed into gen-
tility. The magic of Bells Are Ringing works differently: here, in keeping 
with musical comedy’s New York–Jewish lineage, vulgarity recovers its 
nerve in a sister act with brashness and cleverness, and the smart aleck 
finds her own kind of smartness amid the smart set. This joking Cinder-
ella’s success in mastering her fear doubtless owes much to the fact that 
her discordant note fits right in at the lightly satiric party that is Comden 
and Green’s New York, where “shocked silence” never stops the show, and 
where the unfriendly might prove to be the best friends of all. If hap-
piness like this can happen only in musical-comedy New York, where 
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even Mary is a Schwartz, if the show constructs for its wonder girl the 
outlandish wonderland of an un-American American city, then Bells Are 
Ringing gives us an antinational holiday all the more worth celebrating.
In 1962 the Broadway-bound musical A Funny Thing Happened on the 
Way to the Forum was in trouble out of town, and the producer wanted 
to bring in Jerome Robbins to save the show. But the star, Zero Mostel, 
and one of the major supporting players, Jack Gilford, had both been 
blacklisted, and, as we saw in chapter 1, Madeline Gilford (of the “ridicu-
lous” question) had in fact been named by Robbins at his huac hearing. 
Mostel’s response when the producer nervously broached the question 
of hiring Robbins was the now-legendary line: “We of the left do not 
blacklist.”45 Not quite as legendary, but just as memorable, are the words 
with which Mostel reportedly greeted Robbins, as the latter was introduc-
ing himself to the cast: “Hiya, Looselips.”46 The show would of course 
be saved, and Robbins and Mostel would go on to even greater glory two 
years later, with Fiddler on the Roof, to which I will soon turn. But for 
now, let Mostel’s two lines epitomize the two principal strands of the 
blacklist musical: that of “Jewish moral and political seriousness,” more 
Sontag than Sondheim (recall Laurents on the Jewish “passion against 
prejudice” informing West Side Story); and, speaking of “Looselips,” that 
of “Jewish lip” (the Jew’s lip enjoying a prominence and an importance 
that put it just below the Jew’s famous nose).47 Like his cinematic avatar, 
Hecky Brown in The Front, Mostel, behind the scenes of Forum, sticks 
out his Jewish lip—sign of the joker and smart aleck—with a typically 
in-your-face comic shamelessness that puts him at a certain risk, despite 
the (tenuous) protections of time (by 1962, the blacklist is supposedly 
breaking up) and place (the context is the supposedly safe Broadway the-
ater).48 Hailing Robbins as “Looselips,” Mostel loosens his own lips with 
enough abandon to remind Robbins—and anyone else present—of the 
sycophantic tightness implicit in the director-choreographer’s sycophan-
tic volubility. Anything but loose, the patriotic Jerome Robbins of 1953, 
modeling the disciplined subject at his most tautly alert, snapped into 
action the minute the law snapped its fingers. In the face of this disci-
plined citizen, Mostel’s loosened lips perform what Horkheimer and 
Adorno have taught us to call undisciplined mimicry. When Mostel puts 
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his lips in the face of the powerful and notoriously terrifying Robbins—
when their lips speak together—the noble magnanimity of “We of the 
left” finds itself desublimated into a vulgar, clownish, carnivalesque 
transgression of the gentlemanly decorum (the stiff upper lip?) that 
would keep a face-saving distance, mask indignation, and let bygones 
be bygones.
The Irigarayan allusion in the previous sentence evokes, perhaps, the 
homoeroticism of mimesis. But if Mostel’s mimicry of Robbins has 
something homoerotic about it, it is hard to escape the suspicion that 
his particular way of getting in Robbins’s face bespeaks a certain homo-
phobia as well. To call Robbins “Looselips” is to call him on his syco-
phancy, of course; as we have seen, however—for instance, in Ernest 
Jones’s analysis of “quislingism”—hostility toward the sycophant can 
nourish itself, more or less openly, on hostility toward the homosexual. 
Issuing from Mostel’s mouth, “Looselips,” in other words, may sound 
a little like, say, “Cocksucker”—a name that this man of the left was not 
too righteous to hurl at Stephen Sondheim during the rehearsals for A 
Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Forum.49 Nor, apparently, did 
Mostel moderate his homophobia as his post-blacklist career continued 
to flourish, and as he and Robbins worked together again on Fiddler 
on the Roof. Remembering the bitter antagonism between the show’s 
star and its director-choreographer, one of Mostel’s fellow cast members 
says: “He called him ‘the Jewish fag.’ ”50 But the grammatical ambiguity 
here may be telling. Clearly, “he” refers to the heterosexual Mostel, and 
“him” to the homosexual Robbins. What makes the picture a little less 
clear, though, is that, instead of simply calling Robbins a “fag,” Mostel 
calls him a “Jewish fag”: with “fag,” Mostel seems to put Robbins at a dis-
tance; with “Jewish,” he seems to bring him closer to himself. Mostel’s 
use of “Jewish” here may betray as much self-hatred as Robbins’s shout-
ing “faggot!” at West Side Story’s leading man: it is as though, the sexual 
stigma seeming insufficiently disfiguring, Mostel required the added 
wound of the racial or ethnic one as well. But if Mostel’s slur against 
Robbins reveals his self-hatred, this would not be the first time that a 
self-hating projection betrayed an otherwise unavowable identification, 
bringing closer what it pushes away. And that identification need not 
stop at the ethnicity that Robbins and Mostel share: in calling Robbins 
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a “Jewish fag,” Mostel may be signaling his own history of comicosmo-
politanism, in which lippy Jewish back-talk becomes indistinguishable 
from the “fag” ’s sexual perversion.
In another back story of the blacklist, at any rate, Mostel himself bears, 
comically, the very double stigma that he will uncover in Robbins. Like 
other luminaries of Broadway’s golden age, Mostel had figured in the 
provincial melodrama of the huac hearings. Here, taken from the tran-
script of his testimony before the committee in 1955, is the exchange 
that ensues after a question about Mostel’s appearance at an anti-huac 
meeting:
mr. mostel: If I appeared there, what if I did an imitation of a butterfly 
at rest? There is no crime in making anybody laugh. I don’t care if you 
laugh at me.
mr. jackson: If your interpretation of a butterfly at rest brought any 
money into the coffers of the Communist Party, you contributed di-
rectly to the propaganda effort of the Communist Party.
mr. mostel: Suppose I had the urge to do the butterfly at rest some-
where?
mr. doyle: Yes, but please, when you have the urge, don’t have such an 
urge to put the butterfly at rest by putting some money in the Commu-
nist Party coffers as a result of that urge to put the butterfly at rest. Put 
the bug to rest somewhere else next time. (Bentley, Thirty Years, 722)
Anticipating Judy Holliday’s rhetorical question (“Is it a crime?”), Mostel 
says there is no crime in making anybody laugh, but what really bugs the 
committee, enough to keep Mostel blacklisted (he has been unable to 
work in film or television), is indeed his comic imitation of a butterfly at 
rest. As we know from Bells Are Ringing, lightheartedness is not always 
as innocuous as it pretends to be. Indeed, what image better suggests 
levity’s heft than that of the Falstaffian Zero Mostel as a butterfly at rest? 
And what image better exemplifies the mimetic “urge” that Horkheimer 
and Adorno have linked with the Jew? As we have seen, they theorize 
anti-Semitism as a malignant fascination with the Jew’s mimetic talent 
for dissolving himself in identification not only with “the Other,” but 
also “with earth and slime.”51 Relating this talent to the Freudian death 
drive and to Roger Caillois’s examples of le mimétisme in the animal 
world, Horkheimer and Adorno liken it as well to the regressive ten-
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dency represented by the kind of criminal rendered anachronistic by the 
state criminality of fascism: the “tendency to lose oneself in one’s sur-
roundings instead of actively engaging with them, the inclination to let 
oneself go, to lapse back into nature.”52 Mostel’s imitation not just of a 
butterfly but of a butterfly at rest embodies the forgotten mimetic side of 
cosmopolitanism, where mobility meets repose. More than his putting 
money into the Communist Party coffers or his refusal to cooperate with 
the committee, it is the perverse mock-insouciance with which this big 
Jewish butterfly flaunts his peculiar mimetic urge that guarantees his 
continuing exclusion from films and television, as well as, more gener-
ally, his continuing relegation to the status of a pariah.
To be sure, the committee puts on a show of making the Jew a criminal 
because of his “subversive” political affiliations. Yet, however authenti-
cally the committee members may loathe Communism, even these lunk-
headed American politicians are shrewd enough to use their highly ritu-
alized political aversion as a front for a more diffuse and less presentable 
constellation of motives, such as envy, contempt, and, perhaps most of 
all, resentment: resentment, in particular, of one whose insolent insis-
tence on performing shamelessness—whether or not he really is shame-
less—bespeaks an infuriating failure to be terrorized into the rectitude 
of good citizenship. Not, of course, that resentment precludes imitation 
of what is resented: indeed, as I have argued, imitation inheres in resent-
ment. Chasing Mostel’s imitation of a butterfly at rest, the committee 
members end up enacting the “mimesis of mimesis” that Horkheimer 
and Adorno see as one of anti-Semitism’s characteristic elements. Note, 
for instance, how the butterfly chase generates an almost surreal silli-
ness in the speech of Mostel’s interrogators, who—as though forgetting 
to be unamused, like Hennessy freezing out Hecky Brown—seem to be 
following Mostel’s flirtatious lead, and whose would-be straight-faced 
admonitions begin to resemble the loopy prose of Gertrude Stein as re-
written by, say, Comden and Green.53
We encountered a version of this comicosmopolitan travesty in chap-
ter 1, where we saw Lionel Stander turning huac’s chairman into his 
straight man—which is to say, into a comically indignant dowager. 
Perhaps the prototype of the unfriendly witness as campy comedian 
is the screenwriter Ring Lardner Jr., who, when asked by a previous 
huac chairman, “Are you now or have you ever been a member of the 
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Communist Party?,” replied: “I could answer [the question], but if I did, 
I would hate myself in the morning” (Bentley, ed., Thirty Years of Trea-
son, 187). Lardner was one of the non-Jewish unfriendly witnesses, but 
his impudent “answer” helps us to understand why Samuel Goldwyn 
accused him of “writing like a Jew”: brash, bitchy, vulgar, this joker 
and smart aleck shows that you don’t have to be Jewish to represent en- 
Jewment—or to get yourself blacklisted, not to mention imprisoned, like 
Lardner, one of the Hollywood Ten, as a result.54 Lardner’s friend and 
fellow blacklistee Zero Mostel proves no less brilliantly epicene as an un-
cooperative comic. Like Stander and Lardner, he refuses to “act like a wit-
ness in a reasonable and dignified manner,” as one huac chairman artic-
ulated the committee’s theatrical imperative. Refusing to play their role 
straight, moreover, all of these witnesses compromise the straightness 
of the spectacle around them, where straightness is at once seriousness 
and heterosexuality: seriousness as heterosexuality, heterosexuality as se-
riousness. The comedy of the unfriendly witnesses—the un-witnesses— 
introduces a disturbing levity into the proceedings, but what is espe-
cially disturbing about that levity, that lightness, is that its comic effect 
is also an erotic one. Comicizing the hearings, that is, these witnesses 
homoeroticize them as well. Or, rather, in view of huac’s all-male cast, 
let us say that these witnesses demonstrate the normal, already-existing 
homoerotics of the congressional inquisition with unnerving stylistic 
inappropriateness, with a flamboyance that, resembling Hecky’s in The 
Front, “throws the whole show off balance.”
For the purpose of maximum pedagogical exemplarity, huac—imitat-
ing show business as much as investigating it—imposes an aesthetic re-
gime derived from such genres as the courtroom melodrama and the es-
pionage thriller. Against this regime, the unfriendly witnesses—gauche 
in more than one sense of the term—insist on performing, and on mak-
ing their interrogators perform, in the wrong genres: in Stander’s case, 
the Marx brothers movie; in Lardner’s, the sex farce; and in Mostel’s, 
the light-hearted, light-footed genre of which he would emerge as one 
of the giants. Chasing after Mostel’s butterfly, the congressional heav-
ies sound as dizzily self-parodic as if they were performing on a Broad-
way musical-comedy stage. Unlike the more conventionally sexy Judy 
Holliday, Mostel seduces his persecutors into speaking his language 
despite themselves: “I suggest we put this hearing butterfly to rest” (Bent-
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ley, 722), concludes Congressman Jackson. For this seduction, Mostel 
of course remained blacklisted: huac was not about to let radical butter-
flies forget that they were just bugs, especially not when those butterflies 
exercised a certain embarrassing comic charm over their would-be cap-
tors and exterminators.
In Cosmopolitan Style, Rebecca L. Walkowitz discusses Adorno’s cri-
tique of Jean-Paul Sartre’s claim, in 1947, that “it is a matter of knowing 
what one wants to write about, whether butterflies or the condition of 
the Jews.”55 “Butterflies,” for Sartre, represent the decadence and fri-
volity of style, while “the Jews” stand for moral and political weighti-
ness: the value of a properly engagé cosmopolitanism. Using Adorno’s 
acid analysis of Sartrean “commitment” to break down this opposition, 
Walkowitz proposes that “refusing to think about butterflies may only 
hurt the Jews.”56 Mostel allows us to glimpse the danger of that refusal, 
for he undoes the opposition between butterflies and Jews in his very 
person. A Jewish butterfly himself, Mostel would be the emblem of a 
suppler cosmopolitanism than Sartre’s either-or formula would allow. 
But, more than cosmopolitanism’s mascot, he is also one of its most 
prodigiously versatile practitioners. From the nineteenth century until 
the institution of the blacklist (and the nearly simultaneous founding 
of the state of Israel), Jews, through their enforced rootlessness, were 
closely, almost proverbially linked, of course, with cosmopolitanism; the 
Jewish butterfly—Mostel’s “Jewish fag” makes explicit the impulse to 
“hurt” such a beautiful creature—embodies that version of cosmopoli-
tanism that we have been calling comicosmopolitanism. He embodies 
it, moreover, as at once seduction and insult: as the all-too-charming 
quality—the unbearable lightness—of those who remind others how 
much pleasure they give up in exchange for the virile privileges of citi-
zenship, how much they lose in standing up straight. For if the cosmo-
politan is a citizen of the world, the comicosmopolitan wears his worldly 
citizenship so lightly that it ceases to be anything as grounded and re-
sponsible as citizenship, even of a transnational kind, and so loosely that 
worldliness sheds its connotations of urbane conformism, becoming a 
kind of restful floating or floating rest. Blacklisting, I have been arguing, 
is the attempt both to punish and to conceal—lest anyone think to imi-
tate—the offense of enjoying a permanent holiday from citizenship. The 
Jewish “homeland” put an end to Jewish cosmopolitanism; the blacklist 
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put an end to Jewish comicosmopolitanism. Mostel’s huac testimony 
shows how a certain campaign to “hurt the Jews”—in this case, the com-
mittee’s, although Sartre’s and Adorno’s Europe offers far more hideous 
examples—is provoked by the very butterfly lightness of which certain 
Jews, or certain “Jews” (like Lardner), make a spectacle, rendering light-
ness so “unashamedly, fantastically theatrical” (as Martin Ritt described 
Mostel’s acting) that it assumes the enormity of a crime.
Jews have been persecuted, then, not despite their resemblance to 
butterflies but because of it. Far from diminishing the Jews’ status as 
objects of ethicopolitical seriousness, in other words, the dismantling of 
the butterfly-Jew opposition enhances it, as it would enhance the Jews’ 
traditional role as spokespersons of ethicopolitical seriousness. Comi-
cosmopolitanism, however, goes beyond the ethicopolitical seriousness 
of which Jews conspicuously remain both subjects and objects. Mostel’s 
“We of the left do not blacklist” belongs in the long line of Jewish ethico-
political seriousness; his “Hiya, Looselips” interprets that seriousness. 
For the reasons that I have suggested, the virtuoso Jewish butterfly does 
a better job than the virtuous Jewish moralist of explaining why Jews 
get hurt. But he also explains why the virtuous Jewish moralist wants to 
be a virtuous Jewish moralist. Separating “Jewish” from “fag,” aligning 
himself with the former and repudiating the latter—in short, disown-
ing the butterfly—the serious Jew accords himself a moral rectitude, 
a reasonable, dignified, manly verticality, that can almost pass for the 
straightness of American citizenship. Even proudly gay Jews can suc-
cumb to this heterosexualizing, naturalizing temptation. Accounting for 
West Side Story by rejecting gay sensibility in favor of “Jewishness as the 
source of passion against prejudice”—as if “Jewish” and “gay” were as 
distinct from each other as, say, Jets and Sharks—Arthur Laurents, for 
one, constructs a straightened-out Jewishness that, notwithstanding its 
merits (including the merit of respectability), could never by itself have 
produced West Side Story.
Once the blacklist was “broken,” Zero Mostel would work again in 
television and movies (The Front would be his last film); but it was on 
Broadway, fittingly, where he would achieve his greatest success. Star-
ring in the blockbuster hit, Fiddler on the Roof, in 1964, the larger-than-
life Mostel would seem not just to have survived the blacklist, but to 
have triumphed over it, so monumentally as to dwarf any mere fairy-tale 
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happy ending. As Jared Brown, Mostel’s biographer, relates, “Perhaps 
the ultimate confirmation of Zero’s superstar status came not from the 
awards and medals and honorary degrees he was given, but when he and 
[his wife] Kate, both of whom had been treated as political pariahs for 
so long, were invited to a reception at the White House in June 1966.”57 
This caterpillar-like metamorphosis of pariah into superstar—into presi-
dentially certified American superstar—no doubt marks a larger change 
in the weather of the Cold War. That the bug who was being put to rest 
by huac in 1955 could end up in the White House eleven years later in-
deed betokens a warming of the American political and cultural climate. 
But Mostel’s triumphant return to our nation’s capital, from which he 
had been symbolically cast out eleven years earlier, was made possible 
less by that (temporary) warming trend under two liberal Democratic 
presidents than by the chill that had been taking hold of our nation’s cos-
mopolis—by the Americanization of New York City that had been under 
way since the early 1950s.58 And the musical vehicle that made Mostel 
a superstar did a great deal in its own right to facilitate his comeback: it 
might even be said to have met Washington halfway. If, in the historical 
arc I am sketching here, Fiddler in the Roof figures as the last blacklist 
musical, this is not, as one might like to think, because its phenomenal, 
star-making success represents the end of the blacklist, or a victory over 
it. Nor is it the last blacklist musical for the humbler reason that it is 
the last major Broadway show in which important players in the huac 
melodrama were centrally involved. Rather, Fiddler on the Roof is the last 
blacklist musical because its iconic triumph, and that of its star, testify 
to the triumph of the blacklist itself, which had done such a good job of 
turning Jews into Americans—the process that Fiddler allegorically re-
hearses—that, like all successful disciplinary operations, it could simply 
disappear into the subjects it had colonized.59
Although it was not the first Broadway musical with a Jewish theme—
and although Funny Girl arrived in the same year, giving spectacular 
prominence to Barbra Streisand’s deviant nose—Fiddler on the Roof is 
justly credited with being the first Broadway musical to make explicit 
the Jewishness of the genre itself. As Pauline Kael commented, “it is a 
show that reveals . . . what has made American Jewish show business.”60 
And what has made American Jewish show business, or at any rate what 
has caused it, this show reveals, is Russia: both the Communist Russia 
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of Silk Stockings and the Tsarist Russia from which Jews like those in 
Fiddler on the Roof fled at the turn of the last century. At the beginning 
of the show, someone asks the rabbi, “Is there a proper blessing for 
the Tsar?” The rabbi replies: “A blessing for the Tsar? Of course. May 
God bless and keep the Tsar—far away from us!”61 By 1964 “the Tsar” 
has become an overdetermined signifier: it points not just to the Tsar 
but to such other Judeophobic tyrants—varying, of course, in the de-
grees, modes, and consequences of their Judeophobia—as Hitler, Stalin, 
Joseph McCarthy, the members of huac, and the contemporary leaders 
of the Soviet Union. American Jewish show business, as revealed by Fid-
dler on the Roof, is a response to all of these “Tsars” and their “Russias” 
and their “Cossacks.” Or, more precisely, the once-vital part of American 
show business to which the show belongs—the Broadway musical—is 
two responses to these “Tsars.” The first response is of course Jewish 
moral and political seriousness: we will keep the Tsar far away from us 
by expressing our passion against prejudice, thus proving ourselves not 
only good Jews but upstanding Americans as well. And despite our anti-
authoritarianism, we will indeed ask God to bless the Tsar, because our 
very rectitude implies our respect for the principle of authority—not for 
nothing is the speaker a rabbi—if not for all of its representatives. The 
second response to the “Tsars” is the comicosmopolitan lip, the smart-
aleck nerviness, that turns rabbis into geriatric delinquents capable of 
delivering one-liners like the one we are discussing. Fiddler on the Roof 
does not just “reveal” the disciplining of comicosmopolitanism: it contin-
ues the disciplining of comicosmopolitanism. As we saw in the previous 
chapter, though, this disciplinary project—so well internalized, by 1964, 
as to have become a self-disciplinary project—requires that something of 
comicosmopolitanism remain undisciplined, all the better to be “forced 
into line.” In its brassy, wisecracking tone, as well as in a certain mi-
metic, improvisational back-and-front-story to which we will soon turn, 
Fiddler on the Roof  keeps in reserve, and sometimes sets loose, a butterfly 
that has yet to be put to rest.
Diegetically, Fiddler on the Roof does not lack a radical Jewish voice: 
that voice belongs to the revolutionary student, Perchik, who becomes 
the second son-in-law of Mostel’s character, Tevye the milkman, and 
who is given to saying things like: “In this world, it’s the rich who are 
criminals. Some day their wealth will be ours” (Stein et al., Fiddler on 
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the Roof, 29), and “the Bible clearly teaches us, you must never trust 
an employer” (55). For beliefs such as those Mostel himself might once 
have endorsed, though not for any of Mostel’s butterfly style—as though 
proving Abe Burrows right, the Bolshevik intellectual is utterly humor-
less—Perchik ends up imprisoned in Siberia, and there is no indication 
that he and his wife will be joining the rest of the family in America 
upon his release.62 Fiddler promotes the safer politics of a Kennedy-
Johnson liberalism, whereby Tevye, the patriarch, learns to moderate 
his commitment to Tradition by “bending,” within reason, to accommo-
date the changes brought about by Modernity: in particular, by “modern 
children” (69), like Tevye’s three oldest daughters, who indeed are mod-
ern enough to accord themselves the hitherto-unheard-of right to choose 
their own husbands. The whole narrative of Fiddler on the Roof system-
atically undermines Tevye’s claim in the opening hymn to “Tradition” 
that the “master of the house” gets “to have the final word at home” (3). 
Yet Tevye can accept with wry resignation this feminist “subversion” of 
his mastery, because the “subversion,” like a strong-willed but more or 
less filiopious modern child, never really loses touch with certain fun-
damental orthodoxies: that of heterosexual desire, without which there 
can be no Broadway-musical narrative, and that of the responsible, self- 
determining citizen, without whom there can be no America.63 For while 
Fiddler on the Roof tells the story of the Jews just before they left Russia 
to come to the United States—it ends with Tevye and his family prepar-
ing to emigrate—the patriarch and his daughters start turning into good 
Americans almost from the beginning of the show, in fact with its sec-
ond musical number, when the daughters begin to appoint themselves 
their own matchmakers.
If the Americanization of the daughters begins early in the show, from 
the moment when they articulate their desire—their passion, against 
prejudice—the Americanization of the father must wait until the end 
for its confirmation. But the confirmation arrives resoundingly when, 
faced with the local constable, who has come to evict Tevye and his fel-
low Jews from their shtetl, Tevye says: “Get off my land! . . . This is still 
my home, my land. Get off my land!” (141). In the play’s ostensible time 
and place, Jews would not have been permitted to own land.64 As I have 
suggested, however, the Jews of Fiddler in the Roof are already living in 
America even before they get on the boat: their Jewish passion against 
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prejudice proves distinctly proprietary, and thus entirely compatible with 
liberal American norms of freedom. While the daughters claim a right 
to control their own bodies, the father proudly defends his “own land,” 
the seductive butterfly having turned into a thoroughly respectable (not 
to mention impeccably religious) suburban family man. Why not invite 
him to the White House? After West Side Story says “Krup you!” (Laurents 
et al., West Side Story, 209) to Officer Krupke, and after Bells Are Ringing 
gets Inspector Barnes to talk New Yorkese, Fiddler on the Roof rewrites 
history by showing that, even before they set foot on American soil, Jews 
learned to speak to the American constables in a language the latter can 
understand. The definitive Jewish Broadway musical may still be per-
formed in Manhattan, but its true home is the family-oriented bedroom 
community to which much of its audience has emigrated.
And yet, even amid the comfort of that pale settlement, the Pale of 
Settlement—the name for the region in which Jews under the Tsar were 
increasingly ghettoized—may not be far away: “Russia” may seem to 
lie hidden within the most snugly bourgeois Westchester shtetl. This 
threat, after all, would explain the show’s embrace of an “America” 
strong enough to protect it from the Tsar: its embrace of a good Tsar 
who would protect it from the bad one. If the very existence of an explic-
itly Jewish Broadway musical bears witness to, and celebrates, the de-
gree to which, by the middle of the 1960s, Jews in America have “made 
it,” having made it—after Auschwitz, after the blacklist—by no means 
precludes the fear that it will be taken away. But the same terrifying 
possibility may also account for a certain perverse comicosmopolitan 
persistence in the show, and for the audience’s evident delight in that 
persistence. In the show, this persistence nonetheless struck the show’s 
authors as coming from outside of it, and as disrupting it. The agent of 
this perverse comicosmopolitanism, not surprisingly, was Zero Mostel, 
whose notorious way of “throwing the whole show off balance” began 
to manifest itself early in its run. Indeed, many of those involved in the 
show report that, after opening night, Mostel began taking increasingly 
outrageous and exasperating liberties with his performance and thus 
with the show as a whole—mugging, interpolating incongruous ad libs 
and other bits of shtick, playing tricks on the other actors, throwing in 
Yiddish phrases in a manner that, to the show’s authors, recalled the 
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pandering of a nightclub comedian.65 Richard Altman, the show’s as-
sistant director, relates, for instance, how Mostel would embellish the 
“good-bye-and-good-riddance gesture” he was supposed to make at the 
back of the constable, who has just warned him that there will be a po-
grom against his fellow Jews:
One night, before making this gesture, Zero reached up to his own 
neck and maniacally began to “strangle” himself—though obviously it 
was the constable he was pretending to strangle. He got a big laugh. He 
strangled and strangled, crossing his eyes for good measure. . . . On sub-
sequent nights he embellished the routine even more. After strangling 
the constable, he threw the body to the ground and kicked it—also to roars 
of laughter. Eventually, the routine consisted of strangling the constable, 
throwing the body down and kicking it, picking up an imaginary shovel, 
digging an imaginary hole, picking up the body and tossing it into the 
hole and then covering the hole with dirt.66
Of this and other shameless extravagances on Mostel’s part, Altman 
observes: “The years of repression had left their mark; he was now irre-
pressible.”67 Not quite irrepressible, perhaps. Put this bug to rest, Mostel 
indeed seems to say, to all the constables who kept him blacklisted and 
out of work. But self-vindication and self-mortification are never far from 
each other in the age of the congealed subject, which is to say, in the 
Cold War, even during a brief interlude of relatively mild weather. If, in 
his pantomime of overkill, Mostel enacts his revenge against the black-
listers, he is also “strangling” himself: he is dramatizing not only his 
“repression” by the blacklist but also his subjection to the discipline en-
forced by the very Broadway musical that is completing his recovery from 
it. What Mostel is miming, in other words, is precisely the disciplining 
of comicosmopolitanism: a project that began long before Fiddler on the 
Roof, but that Fiddler on the Roof advances and refines. In Mostel’s hands, 
however, the miming of disciplined comicosmopolitanism is also an act 
of undisciplined comicosmopolitanism. Performed voicelessly, Mostel’s 
increasingly elaborate mimetic excesses evoke the continuing censorship 
imposed upon lippy butterflies in postwar America. Yet the pantomime, 
like Mostel’s infamous impression of a butterfly at rest, displays the ge-
nius of the mimesis of which it is a version: a genius for uncovering 
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the affinities between joke (lip) and body (lip), between speech and si-
lence, between language and its gestural prehistory, between the human 
and the animal, between laughter and the grave.
Even Zero Mostel can be forced into line; yet this does not prevent 
him from “writing” his own “lines,” in the margins of the show, but 
also effectively in front of it. And while this sort of incorrigible fiddling- 
around infuriated Fiddler’s authors, Mostel’s deviations are not exactly 
extraneous. He is not simply obtruding his own back story on the pro-
duction, but, rather, revealing the back story both of that Jewish genre, 
the Broadway musical as a whole, and of this, its most openly Jewish 
self-representation. Mostel is bringing out, that is, the Broadway mu-
sical’s geriatrically ancient origins in the refusal of seriousness that 
enrages every Tsar—that, neither blessing him nor cursing him, in-
stead takes him as a mere occasion for the disintegration of the self in 
laughter. Not that Mostel’s mimesis lacks its own element of what we 
have learned to call deadly seriousness: the mimetic resemblance, to the 
point of identification, between the mimed killing of the constable and 
the mimed suicide of the Jew symptomatizes an underlying connection 
between constable and Jew in the disciplined world, where the subject 
is constituted through its aggressively anticomic (self-)policing. Obvi-
ously, both the “killing” of the constable and Mostel’s “suicide” express 
a violent desire to punish the Tsar whose murderous policies drove 
Jews out of Russia, as well as the more recent Tsars of American anti- 
Communism, who would have strangled into silence Mostel and others 
of his kind. The fantasy of punishing the Tsar is at the same time a fan-
tasy of becoming the Tsar. And the “roars of laughter” that greet Mostel’s 
pantomime bespeak more than a mere soupçon of vengeful violence in 
the law-abiding, middle-class, suburban audience as well: an audience 
still, perhaps, fleeing its own private Russia. Still, Mostel’s success in 
bringing down the house points beyond both his and the audience’s self-
vindication: toward their shared joy in losing themselves and their Tsars, 
however briefly, in their return to a rapidly disappearing city—a city to 
be found neither in Russia nor in America, but only in the “New York” 
of the Broadway musical.
Coda
Cosmopolitan States
“Truly contemporary states or countries are always cosmopolitan, per-
fectly indistinct in their identitarian configuration.” So writes Alain 
Badiou in reply to his rhetorical question: “Israel: the Country in the 
World where there are the Fewest Jews?” Unlike the “Jewish state,” truly 
contemporary states, he continues, “assume the total contingency of 
their historical constitution, and regard the latter as valid only on condi-
tion that it does not fall under any racialist, religious, or more generally 
‘cultural’ predicate. Indeed, the last time an established state in France 
believed it should call itself the ‘French state’ was under Pétain and the 
German occupation.”1 Thus ignominiously linked with Vichy France, Is-
rael, sometimes characterized as the only democracy in the Middle East, 
instead enjoys the distinction, in Badiou’s polemic, of figuring as a rogue 
state. And yet, the polemic is nuanced enough that Badiou can acknowl-
edge, if only in passing, the fictionality of those truly contemporary, 
cosmopolitan states from whose company Israel egregiously sets itself 
apart. If Israel is “a country where there are ever fewer Jews,” this is be-
cause it exemplifies, with more painfully obvious irony than any other, 
what Badiou calls “l’Antisémitisme essential des États”: their “hostility 
to wandering, to minorities, to the universal, to revolutions.”2
For reasons this book has tried to explain, the United States would 
have to come out near if not at the top of any current list of countries 
with ever fewer Jews. Of course, it is not hard to imagine why, after 
Auschwitz, Jews in any country might have wished to de-Judaize them-
selves: to stop being wanderers, minorities, representatives of the uni-
versal and of revolutions. What began, at any rate, in the immediate 
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postwar period, in the aftermath of the genocidal rage directed at Eu-
rope’s cosmopolitan Jews, was a large-scale, transcontinental project of 
uncoupling Jews and cosmopolitanism. One name for that project, of 
course, is “Israel”; another is the blacklist. At the same moment when 
the Jewish state was being founded, the decosmopolitanizing of the Jew, 
and the de-Judaizing of cosmopolitanism, were also taking place—in 
the most aggressive sense of the term—in the United States, as a stun-
ningly successful campaign of postwar Jewish assimilation: a campaign 
launched in 1947, just one year before the founding of the state of Israel, 
by Hollywood’s studio heads—all but one Jewish—in collaboration with 
the House Un-American Activities Committee. As we have seen, the 
movie-industry (and eventually television) blacklist constituted an expul-
sion of the Jews—the wanderers, the minorities, the revolutionaries, the 
believers in the universal—not just from the Jewish empire of American 
show business but from the national imaginary that it is the function of 
that Jewish empire to promulgate. Hollywood’s purge of Jewish Com-
munists, and its parade of Jewish informers, taught every Jew in Amer-
ica how to become that model citizen, the cooperative witness. Starting 
with the blacklist, and continuing to this day, the Jewish-controlled me-
dia in the United States stage nothing less than the Jew’s disappearance: 
the Jew’s disappearance, that is, into just another American.
Along with the disappearance of Jews from Israel, then, this Jewish-
American success story might well testify to the “basic anti-Semitism of 
all states”3: to the impossibility of the cosmopolitan state that Badiou 
simultaneously posits. No more than Badiou do I invoke the basic anti-
Semitism of all states to excuse, as if by generalizing away, the particular 
brutality and arrogance with which Israel and the United States keep on 
prosecuting their wars on cosmopolitanism. If the basic anti-Semitism 
of all states prevents there from ever being such a thing as a cosmo-
politan state, the fantasy of a cosmopolitan state nonetheless helps us to 
think about how some states might at least be less anticosmopolitan than 
others. This is in some sense Amanda Anderson’s project in her reading 
of Daniel Deronda, a notable exception to the tendency of the new cos-
mopolitanisms—the recent academic theories of cosmopolitanism—to 
repeat the general dissociation of the cosmopolitan and the Jew.4 Ander-
son uses Eliot’s novel to imagine an Israel, and thus any state, in which 
“openness to otherness and radical particularity need not be seen as fa-
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tally compromised” by that state’s formal political organization.5 Even 
for the more radical Badiou, as we have seen, the cosmopolitan state 
may be impossible, but it is not implausible. For despite his acknowl-
edgment of “the basic anti-Semitism of all states,” he can still write, both 
confidently and convincingly, about how truly contemporary states are 
“always cosmopolitan,” about how “they assume the total contingency of 
their historical constitution,” and so forth—as though there were, or at 
least might be, a whole bunch of them out there in the world.
Cosmopolitan states? Why not? Let’s go! But what makes these uto-
pias seem curiously accessible is not just our desire for them: they also 
owe their verisimilitude to what we might call cosmopolitanism’s dirty 
little secret. For all the often-violent incompatibility of cosmopolitanism 
and the state, for all the murderous anticosmopolitanism of so many 
states in particular, there is something in cosmopolitanism that likes a 
state. There is, in other words, a principle of self-preserving hardness 
within cosmopolitanism: to quote one of the cosmopolitan characters 
in an Iris Murdoch novel, “a sheer concern for one’s dignity, a sense of 
form, a sense of style”;6 in short, a commitment to looking good, where, 
as that expression suggests, goodness is at once morality stylized and 
style moralized. Which is why it has not been so difficult, in the acad-
emy, to produce and to promote a thoroughly responsible cosmopolitan-
ism. To the extent that the cosmopolitan is indeed a citizen of the world, 
cosmopolitanism lends itself almost naturally to the process of being 
made respectable, its potentially scandalous aesthetico-erotic promiscu-
ity submitting, without much trouble, to the discipline of ethico-political 
seriousness.
In the previous chapter, I cited Rebecca L. Walkowitz’s critique of Sar-
tre’s claim that cosmopolitan writing should focus on Jews, not butter-
flies—where “Jews” signifies the heaviness of politics, and “butterflies” 
the lightness of style. If, as Walkowitz proposes “refusing to think about 
butterflies may only hurt the Jews,” this may be, I suggested, because 
sometimes butterflies are Jews.7 There are tragic figurations of the Jew 
as butterfly, as in the poem “The Butterfly,” written by a child in a con-
centration camp.8 But, as the case of Zero Mostel shows, there are comic 
Jewish butterflies as well, and the impulse to hurt them arises precisely 
from their being comic. Mostel interprets mimesis as the joy of what we 
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might call becoming-zero. Against this unbearable image of happiness, 
anti-Semitism at its genocidal extreme exacts its revenge by turning joy-
ful self-loss into horrifying self-loss.
Already disappearing well before the recent academic transformation 
of cosmopolitanism into a rigorous cosmopolitics, the soft Jewish un-
derbelly of cosmopolitanism is what got not just lost but repudiated in 
the postwar decosmopolitanizing of the Jew. More specifically, this Jew-
ish underside is the Jewish side that could not be assimilated. Much less 
able to pass, anyway, than the sleeker, more reasonable Jewish cosmopol-
itanism of enlightenment, modernity, and progress, Mostel’s mimesis 
exemplifies a primitive cosmopolitanism that resembles the criminal’s 
inability, as Horkheimer and Adorno put it, to “take the detour through 
the current forms of labor.”9 What makes this ridiculous Jewish cosmo-
politanism offensive, in today’s academy, is that it has nothing explicitly 
to do with such approved contemporary practices as anti-imperial in-
tellectual work, postcolonial agency, diplomatic negotiation, and trans-
national citizenship, but everything to do with the disreputable desire 
to be something and somewhere else.10 Like that “early craving for foreign 
words” which Adorno evokes in another essay—and which might once 
have seemed cosmopolitanism’s very élan vital—this mimetic cosmo-
politanism wants nothing more, as Adorno puts it, than “to escape from 
the sphere of what is always the same, the spell of what one is and knows 
anyway.”11 As Zero Mostel and others have discovered, one cannot in-
dulge this mimetic urge without enraging the professionally righteous, 
any more than one can speak foreign words with impunity. “Since lan-
guage,” Adorno explains, “is erotically charged in its words, at least for 
the kind of person who is capable of expression, love drives us to foreign 
words. In reality, it is that love that sets off the indignation over their 
use.”12
The new cosmopolitanisms—the most approved of the current forms 
of academic labor—have little room for the oldest cosmopolitanism, 
whose longing for expressive imitation, whether by saying French words 
or by doing the butterfly at rest, must give way to the dignifying impera-
tive of good form. What drove some of us into literary studies, perhaps, 
was a certain “Jewish” impulse to rest, butterfly-like, in permanent mi-
mesis. Throughout this book, I have theorized that impulse as comicos-
mopolitanism, and practiced it as the unseriousness of sycoanalysis. I 
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began this coda with Badiou’s account of why Israel is a country where 
there are ever fewer Jews. It is not ethico-political seriousness alone that 
compels me to end with an image of Israel’s de-Judaization: an imitation 
of a butterfly at rest. But where Mostel’s imitation of a butterfly at rest 
was intended to make people laugh, there is no comedy in the image of 
Israel as resting butterfly—as the quintessential figure of lightness, mo-
tion, and wandering finally grounded, landed, identified, immobilized. 
Mostel’s imitation exemplifies mimesis; Israel’s, what Horkheimer and 
Adorno call “the mimesis of mimesis,” by which, as we have seen, they 
mean a vengeful mockery of mimetic behavior.13 Here, rest is cruelly 
parodied as arrest. Imitating an imitation of a butterfly at rest, the Jew-
ish state becomes a butterfly pinned to a wall by its own hostility toward 
the very wanderers for whom it would have made a home, but whom, 
instead, it has fixed in a state of fear, while it fixes others in a state of 
siege. Given this state of affairs, it might be best to begin imagining how 
colorful, how funny, and, in a sense of the term that does not merely ap-
plaud the sufferer for his suffering, how moving Zero Mostel’s imitation 
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age of thirty-nine, the second and third still in their forties. The actor Philip 
Loeb, blacklisted and desperate, committed suicide.
29. The phrase appears in Sullivan’s Red- and gay-baiting article in the 
Philadelphia Inquirer in 1951; the article bore the headline “Tip to Red Probers: 
Subpena [sic] Jerome Robbins.” Quoted in Lawrence, Dance with Demons, 167. 
For more on Robbins, see chapter 6 of the present book.
30. Bentley, Are You Now or Have You Ever Been, 102. This text is Bentley’s 
dramatization—it has been performed as a play—of the material he had se-
lected and annotated for the first edition (1971) of Thirty Years of Treason. The 
passage I have just quoted differs from the transcript as represented in Thirty 
Years of Treason, mostly in its condensation of the more repetitious version of 
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Robbins’s testimony offered in the much longer scholarly text of the previous 
year. The latter, less dramatically structured, includes no indication of laugh-
ter after Robbins’s remark about dialectical materialism, but it is clear from 
the context that Robbins has been coached to go for a laugh with this line, and 
that he is milking it for all it is worth:
mr. tavenner: Now, that [question] was as to how dialectical materialism 
influenced you in the production of Fancy Free—
mr. robbins: That’s right.
mr. tavenner:—which had been a huge success?
mr. robbins: That’s right. I had prepared Fancy Free before attending any 
meetings of the [Communist Political] Association, and I found the ques-
tion a little ridiculous and a little outrageous.
(Thirty Years of Treason, 627)
In its tortured repetitions, the excerpt in Thirty Years of Treason is, if anything, 
an even better example of pseudocomedy’s “deadly seriousness.” I quote from 
the more condensed version for the sake of brevity.
31. According to his sister and other family members, Robbins may have 
cooperated with huac because Ed Sullivan, then a gossip columnist as well 
as the host of his own television variety show, had threatened to publicize 
Robbins’s homosexuality unless he “cleared” himself of the taint of Com-
munism. On this question of homophobic blackmail, see Lawrence, Dance 
with Demons, 156–60. Whether or not Robbins was in fact being gay-baited by 
Sullivan, huac and its journalistic accomplices presupposed and exploited a 
generalized terror of exposure among both the witnesses it interrogated and 
the public it thus policed.
32. Robbins names Lee in Thirty Years of Treason, 632. Lee and her hus-
band, Jack Gilford, who were both blacklisted, along with their friend Zero 
Mostel, will figure again in chapter 6 of this book. With Kate Mostel (Mostel’s 
widow), and with secondary contributions from their husbands, Lee pub-
lished a memoir, 170 Years of Show Business.
33. Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 152.
34. I have cited Ring Lardner Jr.’s “writing like a Jew” in note 20, above. 
Lardner tells the story that, after he was asked by the producer Samuel Gold-
wyn to write the script for a film about anti-Semitism, Goldwyn rejected it, 
saying, “One of the reasons I hired you for this particular script was that you 
are a Gentile. But you betrayed me by writing like a Jew.” Strugatz and McGil-
ligan, “Ring Lardner Jr.: American Skeptic,” 208.
35. The best account of the racial or ethnic politics at stake in huac’s inves-
tigation of Hollywood remains Gabler, An Empire of Their Own, 311–86.
36. On the term “the blacklist era” (rather than “McCarthyism”), and on 
the periodization that posits 1960 as that era’s terminal point, see Ceplair and 
Englund, The Inquisition in Hollywood, xv.
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37. Here is some of the context of Polonsky’s remark: “I went through more 
or less 17 or 18 different kinds of [film] proposals of one kind or another, and 
suddenly I realized I was just as blacklisted even when they wanted to hire me 
as when they didn’t want to hire me, so I had to assume that there is a kind 
of aesthetic and social blacklist which I create, which I carry around me, like 
a halo on my head, you know, and when they see that halo on my head, they 
say not him.” “Dialogue with Martin Ritt and Abraham Polonsky,” in Gabriel 
Miller, ed., Martin Ritt, 40–41.
38. Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 96. The phrase 
about “a series of purges” is in fact from the 1947 version of the text. Already 
in the 1944 version, however, the authors deserve credit for remarkable pre-
science; in that earlier version, the phrase at the end of the sentence reads: 
“expropriated even before fascism” (269).
39. The four-paragraph-long text of “The Waldorf Statement” can be found 
in Ceplair and Englund, The Inquisition in Hollywood, 455. I quote its final 
paragraph:
We will not knowingly employ a Communist or a member of any party or 
group which advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States 
by force or by illegal or unconstitutional methods. In pursuing this policy, we 
are not going to be swayed by hysteria or intimidation from any source. We 
are frank to recognize that such a policy involves dangers and risks. There is 
the danger of hurting innocent people. There is the risk of creating an atmo-
sphere of fear. Creative work at its best cannot be carried on in an atmosphere 
of fear. We will guard against this danger, this risk, this fear. To this end 
we will invite the Hollywood talent guilds to work with us to eliminate any 
subversives, to protect the innocent, and to safeguard free speech and a free 
screen wherever threatened.
40. I am alluding to the subtitle of Gabler’s book.
41. Hellman, Scoundrel Time, 68.
42. Ibid., 40–41.
43. Litvak, “Adorno Now,” 33–39.
44. Adorno, “Commitment,” in Notes to Literature, vol. 2, 93. For an incisive 
discussion of alternatives to the norm of critical seriousness—for a “critique 
of critique”—and for an adroit analysis of the Adorno essay from which I have 
quoted, see Walkowitz, Cosmopolitan Style, 1–27.
45. See “Is Art Lighthearted?,” in Adorno, Notes to Literature, vol. 2, 247–53.
46. On the Jewish inflection, see Silbermann, Grovelling and Other Vices; on 
the homosexual coloring, see Ernest Jones, “The Psychology of Quislingism,” 
4–5. I discuss Jones’s homosexualizing of sycophancy in chapter 4.
47. My use of the word “essentially” here should not give the impression 
that I am promoting an essentialist view of Jewishness (or of homosexual-
ity). The quotation marks in the previous sentence are meant to signal that 
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“Jewishness and “homosexuality” are functioning in this book not as trans-
historical essences but, rather, as signifiers for what Horkheimer and Adorno 
see as disavowed mimetic impulses, whose return in the contemporary world 
can be so disturbingly uncanny as to cause blacklists and other reactions of 
a kind that have become even more oppressive, at least in the United States, 
since 2001.
48. Badiou, Polemics, 233, 230.
49. The notion of a “cosmopolitan underworld” figures in the Nazi-era dis-
course around Jews in the French film industry. Le Roy, “Quand les nazis 
pillaient dans le cinéma français,” 2, quotes a 1941 article on “Le Juif et le 
cinéma” that speaks of films by Jewish artists in France as “d’autant plus 
dangereux qu’ils étaient parfois de qualité, où l’on assistait invariablement 
à l’apologie de la pègre cosmopolite des capitales” (all the more dangerous 
insofar as they were sometimes of quality, where one invariably witnessed 
the apologia of the cosmopolitan underworld of the capitals). The Hollywood 
blacklist would be a pale imitation of the Nazi occupiers’ eradication of this 
criminally cosmopolitan Jewish presence in French cinema.
50. Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet, 149. See 141–50 for a discussion of 
ressentiment in relation to sentimentality and antisentimentality.
51. For examples of the “new cosmopolitanisms”—variously rigorous, re-
sponsible, anticomic cosmopolitanisms—see the essays collected in Robbins 
and Cheah, eds., Cosmopolitics.
52. Marcus, “Anne Frank and Hannah Arendt, Universalism and Pathos,” 
90–91.
53. Walkowitz, Cosmopolitan Style, 5.
54. Ibid., 2, 4. “Apparent abnegation of agency” is a quotation from Warner, 
“Uncritical Reading,” 18.
55. Agamben, Means without End, 20.
56. Ibid., 25.
57. For a survey of “the revulsion with which our country, our culture, and 
the entire Judeo-Christian tradition view the informer,” see Navasky, Naming 
Names, x–xiii.
58. Butler, The Psychic Life of Power, 6. The entire book elaborates the prin-
ciple that there is no self apart from what the author calls “self-beratement.”
59. The French apatride (person without nationality) is less pathos-laden 
than “refugee.” For a firsthand account of the experience of the apatrides 
blacklistees in French exile, see Barzman, The Red and the Blacklist.
60. Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 151.
61. Ibid., 189, 152. On “colonial mimicry,” see Bhabha, “Of Mimicry and 
Man,” 85–92. From the vast theoretical literature on mimesis, I would cite, 
along with Bhabha, the politically and psychoanalytically astute essay by Ruth 
Leys, “The Real Miss Beauchamp,” 167–214.
62. Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 148.
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63. Ibid., 151.
64. Navasky, Naming Names, 314–29. Navasky borrows the term from the 
sociologist Harold Garfinkel.
65. Bentley, Thirty Years of Treason, 644.
66. Here is Arendt’s formulation: “the main actors of the Affair some-
times seem to be staging a huge dress rehearsal for a performance that had 
to be put off for more than three decades” (The Origins of Totalitarianism, 45). 
The Disney reference is not merely metaphorical. Walt Disney, whose anti-
Semitism was well known in Hollywood, helped to instigate the blacklist by 
railing publicly against the “Communistic agitation” of labor unions at his 
studio. See Ceplair and Englund, The Inquisition in Hollywood, 155–56. On 
Disney’s anti-Semitism and anti-Communism from the perspective of one 
of the blacklistees, see the interview with the writer (and “front”) Joan Lacour 
Scott in Tender Comrades, McGilligan and Buhle, eds., 585–606. Schwartz, 
The Hollywood Writers’ Wars, 288, refers to the blacklist as “the Hollywood 
Holocaust.”
67. See the discussion of Communism and “Momism” in Rogin, “Kiss Me 
Deadly,” 236–271.
68. Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 154.
69. On the Jew’s nose, see Gilman, The Jew’s Body; on the fetor judaicus, see 
Reizbaum, James Joyce’s Judaic Other.
70. See Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 109. On Kraus 
and the dialect comedians, see Adorno, “Morals and Criminality.”
71. Charles Dickens, Oliver Twist, 177–78.
72. Ibid., 110.
73. Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 152.
74. D. A. Miller, The Novel and the Police. See 2–10 for a discussion of Oliver 
Twist. Whereas Miller, taking off from Foucault, locates the novel’s communi-
cation with the police under the rubric of “discipline”—that is, of discipline as 
opposed to an older, frankly terroristic mode of power, where discipline may 
be defined as communication with the police that does not typically look like 
communication with the police—the present study finds in the Hollywood 
blacklist an apparently anachronistic, but perhaps strangely timely, example 
of modern power as at once disciplinary and terroristic.
75. Dickens, Oliver Twist, 178.
76. Ibid., 471. I discuss this passage in “Bad Scene,” 33–49. My comments 
here elaborate on my observation that “Brownlow, subjecting Oliver to what’s 
good for him, knows that, as a ‘sight,’ the painful and frightening encounter 
with Fagin will be its own best cure” (42).
77. Cited in Collins, ed., Charles Dickens, 471. I discuss this remark, and the 
novelist’s identification with Fagin, in “Bad Scene,” 41.
78. On “Jewissance,” see note 7 above. As a “drive,” what Horkheimer and 
Adorno call mimesis has important affinities with Freud’s death drive. Indeed, 
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Horkheimer and Adorno acknowledge these affinities when, speaking of “the 
inclination to let oneself go, to lapse back into nature,” they add, “Freud called 
this the death impulse, Caillois le mimétisme” (Dialectic of Enlightenment, 189). 
For a lucid discussion of mimesis that attempts to differentiate it from certain 
ecstatic or “masochistic” versions of the Freudian death drive, see Jay, “Mi-
mesis and Mimetology,” 29–53, esp. 44–45. On the queerness of the death 
drive and the mortification that passes for normative vitality, see Edelman, 
No Future.
79. Barthes, The Eiffel Tower and Other Mythologies, 40. Barthes is discuss-
ing “the phenomenon of participation” whereby we identify with the hero 
of On the Waterfront, a film written and directed by friendly witnesses, and 
committed not merely to justifying but to glorifying their friendliness. On this 
film, see chapter 4 of the present book.
80. Dickens, Oliver Twist, 186. I have commented on this passage in “Bad 
Scene,” 36–37, and in an unpublished essay, “Unctuous,” a version of which I 
presented at the English Institute at Harvard University in September 2004.
81. Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 149.
82. On Fagin as both Jewish and homosexual, see Litvak, “Bad Scene,” 
42–43.
83. Other pertinent Victorian novels would include, for example, George 
Eliot’s Daniel Deronda and Anthony Trollope’s The Way We Live Now and The 
Prime Minister.
84. Because this book is a work of cultural theory and cultural criticism, 
not a work of history, it does not pretend to anything like comprehensiveness. 
Throughout the book, my aim is to provide models that suggest where future 
scholarship might go, rather than to cover all of the relevant cases. While, 
for example, there are other notable “blacklist musicals” besides those I dis-
cuss in chapter 6 (I am thinking, for example, of the Lillian Hellman-Leonard 
Bernstein-Richard Wilbur-Dorothy Parker-John Latouche collaboration, Can-
dide), the reader may imagine the directions that analyses of other musicals 
might take. The book’s focus on mass culture, moreover, prevents it from 
considering such subjects as, say, the novels of Abraham Polonsky.
85. Quoted in Ceplair and Englund, The Inquisition in Hollywood, 376.
86. The lines about “government by stoolpigeon” are spoken by two of the 
Hollywood Ten, John Howard Lawson and Edward Dmytryk (later a stool-
pigeon himself; see chapter 3); Lawson and Dmytryk use the phrase in a film 
made to raise funds for the legal defense of themselves and the other Ten. Ex-
cerpts from that film are shown in the documentary Hollywood on Trial (see 
note 27 above). The anti-Semitic and Nazi canard claiming that Roosevelt 
was a Jew—his family name a variant, supposedly, of “Rosenfeld”—is dis-
cussed by Berman in his Foreword to Kaplan’s Reproductions of Banality, xii. 
Quoting from an article entitled “Roosevelt Rules America,” World-Service 
(Welt-Dienst) No. V/22 (November 15, 1938), 3, Berman notes: “World-Service 
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was a Nazi press service with a viciously anti-Semitic character. It was pub-
lished in Erfurt in several languages” (xxiii). How tactical, partial, and reluc-
tant was the wartime suspension of hostilities against the left is suggested by 
Polan on Hollywood’s projection of “wartime unity,” in Power and Paranoia, 
45–99.
87. Roth’s novel, The Plot against America, plausibly imagines a scenario 
in which an isolationist United States would in fact have stayed out of the 
Second World War; the anti-Semitism, anticosmopolitanism, and nativism 
grounding this “counterhistorical” scenario are especially chilling, in Roth’s 
nightmare vision, because they also seem so uncannily at home in U.S. cul-
ture at the beginning of the twenty-first century.
88. On this paradox, see, for example, Golsan and Schoolcraft, “National-
isms,” 299–304, esp. 301–2; see also Rousso, “Collaborators, Those ‘Patriotic 
Traitors,’ ” 157–59.
89. Contrast this animal with the similar-looking sycophantic beast evoked 
by Gilles Deleuze, after Nietzsche: “The man of ressentiment is like a dog, a 
kind of dog which reacts only to traces (a bloodhound).” Deleuze, Nietzsche 
and Philosophy, 115.
90. Navasky, Naming Names, xv. References to morality occur with polemi-
cal frequency in Navasky’s prose. For a critique of Navasky’s emphatically 
moral approach, and for an argument that the problem of the blacklist is 
fundamentally political rather than moral, see Andersen, “Red Hollywood,” 
238–43.
91. Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus. See also Deleuze and Guattari, 
Kafka.
92. For the reference to Proust’s “black humor,” see Deleuze and Guattari, 
Anti-Oedipus, 318. The reference to “interpretative examination” occurs on 322.
93. Ibid., 362.
94. “Undisciplined mimicry” appears in Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic 
of Enlightenment, 149.
95. Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 334.
96. Lewis, Hollywood v. Hard Core; Naremore, More than Night; Sklar, City 
Boys; Doherty, Cold War, Cool Medium. A work that lies in the background of 
the present book is Carr, Hollywood and Anti-Semitism.
97. See, for example, Brown, States of Injury. Brown demonstrates the per-
sistence and pervasiveness of ressentiment in the contemporary scene, and 
proposes to overcome this ressentiment in the name of a “radically democratic 
political culture” (75).
98. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 119.
99. “If you could see her through my eyes, she wouldn’t look Jewish at 
all,” sings the master of ceremonies of Cabaret, a musical about the rise of 
the Nazis in Germany, as he dances with his beloved, an actor in a gorilla 
costume.
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100. “Israel: the Country in the World where there are the Fewest Jews?” 
is the rhetorical question that provides the title of an article that Badiou first 




1. Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 164–65. The chapter 
in which this passage appears is entitled “Elements of Anti-Semitism.”
2. Ibid., 149–50.
3. See Klein, “Envy and Gratitude,” 176–235, esp. 183–90.
4. Indeed, the “neurotic” comedian, in a not so happy development, has 
become in effect the only permissible face of the Jew in American mass en-
tertainment over the past fifty years. For their part, despite their undeniable 
reservations about jokes and laughter, Horkheimer and Adorno themselves 
invoke the figure of the comedian, not yet neurotic but nonetheless a virtuoso 
of the grimace, in theorizing the apparent Jewish escape from seriousness. 
They particularly reprehend the “organized laughter” of the anti-Semitic mob 
(Dialectic of Enlightenment, 152). But here, for example, in a passage that echoes 
the one I have just been discussing, is Adorno on Karl Kraus: “The sympathy 
that Kraus showed many dialect writers and comedians, in preference to so-
called high literature and in protest against it, is inspired by complicity with 
the undomesticated mimetic moment. It is also the root of Kraus’ jokes: in 
them language imitates the gestures of language the way the grimaces of the 
comedian imitate the face of the person he parodies” (Adorno, “Morals and 
Criminality,” 55). I discuss this passage at greater length in chapter 3.
5. Sartre, Anti-Semite and Jew, 46. Earlier in the same text, Sartre writes: 
“The first thing the Germans did was to forbid Jews access to swimming 
pools; it seemed to them that if the body of an Israelite were to plunge into 
that confined body of water, the water would be completely befouled. Strictly 
speaking, the Jew contaminates even the air he breathes” (34).
6. On the anti-Semitic history of this linkage, see Birnbaum, Anti-Semitism 
in France, esp. 147–77. For examples of the Jewish- and queer-affirmative uses 
of this linkage, see, most programmatically, the essays collected in Boyarin, 
Itzkovitz, and Pellegrini, eds., Queer Theory and the Jewish Question.
7. Gilman, The Jew’s Body.
8. In Performance Anxieties, Pellegrini has written, “All Jews are womanly; 
but no women are Jews” (18), by which she means that the womanly Jew is 
nonetheless normatively male. My discussion of Barbara Streisand suggests a 
different reason why “no women are Jews.”
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9. This advertisement has appeared, for instance, in the New York Times 
Sunday Magazine, Sunday, January 29, 2006, 11.
10. The canonical text, in this regard, is the chapter on the Jew’s nose in 
Gilman, The Jew’s Body, 169–93.
11. For a more upbeat reading of Streisand as an embodiment of a Jewish-
female queerness—a reading that centers on the early, expansive phase of her 
career rather than on its late, ironic contraction—see Wolf, “Barbra’s ‘Funny 
Girl’ Body,” 246–65.
12. Crossfire, produced by Dore Schary, directed by Edward Dmytryk, screen-
play by John Paxton (rko Pictures, 1947).
13. Horkheimer had in fact advised Schary on Crossfire, of which he was 
critical. On this background, see Koch, Die Einstellung ist die Einstellung, 94– 
102.
14. In Happiness, McMahon argues that “the pursuit of happiness” “had a 
harder meaning” for eighteenth-century readers than it does today. Linking 
“pursuit” “with its cognates ‘prosecute’ and ‘persecute,’ ” and citing Johnson’s 
Dictionary, which defines “pursuit” as “the act of following with hostile in-
tention,” he observes: “If one thinks of pursuing happiness as one pursues 
a fugitive . . . the ‘pursuit of happiness’ takes on a somewhat different cast” 
(320).
15. See, for example, Gabler, An Empire of Their Own, 319–86, and Lewis, 
Hollywood v. Hardcore, 17–32.
16. See, for example, Dinnerstein, Uneasy at Home, 178–96, and Ginsberg, 
The Fatal Embrace, 119–25.
17. Doctorow, The Book of Daniel, 32.
18. The derivation of “envy” from invideo is briefly discussed in Klein, “Envy 
and Gratitude,” 181.
19. Aspects of Jewish Power in the United States, vol. IV of “The International 
Jew,” 66. The volume has the further designation, “A Fourth Selection of Ar-
ticles from ‘The Dearborn Independent.’ ”
20. Ibid., 47–48.
21. See Garber, “Gentility,” 75–105, for a discussion of how the 1945 Danny 
Kaye film, Wonder Man, reflects the mid-century American division of Jewish 
symbolic labor between the academy and show business. In the film, Kaye 
plays twin brothers: “And the two brothers, Edwin, the timid ‘genius’ in wire-
rimmed glasses who is most at home in the library, and Buzzy, the ebullient 
comic who is most at home on the stage, are both fantasmatic avatars of the 
20th-century Jew in culture” (100).
22. I am alluding to the book by the Fox News anchor John Gibson, The 
War on Christmas. For a witty discussion of the explicit anti-Semitism of this 
fantasy, see Frank Rich, “I Saw Jackie Mason Kissing Santa Claus,” New York 
Times, 25 December 2005, “The Week in Review”: 8.
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23. On the readership of the Dearborn Independent and the audience for 
anti-Semitism in the 1920s more generally, see Ginsberg, The Fatal Embrace, 
95–96.
24. To be the envy of someone: the expression suggests how envy may secretly 
project a fantasy in which imitation leads to reciprocity, so that, because I envy 
you, you envy me back.
25. See Klein, “Envy and Gratitude,” 182, for a brief discussion of this image 
from Othello.
26. See Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 151–52, on anti-
Semitism as an imitation of the Jew. On anti-Semitism and semi-erudition, see 
Adorno, The Stars Down to Earth and Other Essays on the Irrational in Culture.
27. Boyarin, Unheroic Conduct, 256–58.
28. Rogin, Blackface, White Noise.
29. For a discussion of representations of “Jewish fluidity” as both “envi-
able” and frightening in early-twentieth-century texts by African American 
and white American authors, see Itzkovitz, “Passing Like Me,” 35–57.
30. Cather, The Professor’s House, 36–37.
31. Sontag, “Notes on ‘Camp,’ ” 280.
32. Ibid., 290.
33. Cather, The Professor’s House, 38. Of the figurative relation between Out-
land and Marsellus, Jonathan Goldberg writes: “Louie is the flaming version 
of Tom, easy enough to be scorned; he is the protective flare that draws off 
from Tom the signs of a flamboyance that might otherwise be all too legible.” 
“Strange Brothers,” 470.
34. Schulberg, What Makes Sammy Run?, 4. Subsequent references will be 
included parenthetically in the text.
35. In the original German text of the passage from Horkheimer and Adorno 
cited at the beginning of this chapter, “happiness without power” appears as 
Glück[ . . . ] ohne Macht. Dialektik der Aufklärung, 208.
36. The description of Sammy as an “all-American heel” comes from Mor-
decai Richler, quoted on the back of the Vintage paperback edition of the 
novel.
37. Sammy himself points to this symbiosis when, in Schulberg’s 1959 
adaptation of his novel for television, Sammy turns to Manheim and asks: 
“What about the other question, the real question? What makes you and all 
the rest of you keep running after me?” What Makes Sammy Run?, nbc Sun-
day Showcase, script by Budd Schulberg and Stuart Schulberg, directed and 
produced by Delbert Mann (available in the archive of the Museum of Tele-
vision and Radio, New York City).
38. Hellman, Scoundrel Time, 93. Subsequent references will be included 
parenthetically in the text.
39. Here is an example of Hellman’s homophobic wit (one of the comic 
modes that seriousness allows): “We were not shocked at the damage 
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McCarthy had done, or the ruin he brought on many people. Nor had we been 
surprised or angered by Cohn and Schine playing with the law as if it were 
a batch of fudge they enjoyed after the pleasure of their nightly pillow fight” 
(151). For a discussion that situates Hellman in the larger company of Cohn’s 
left-liberal gay-baiters, see Cadden, “Strange Angel,” 94–104.
❨3❩ Petrified Laughter
1. Gabler, An Empire of Their Own, 301. Gabler cites as his source Swindell, 
Body and Soul. Although the story seems too good to be true, I have seen no 
refutation of it. Sklar, in City Boys, 81, notes simply, but eloquently, that “when 
Warner Bros. signed [the actor then known as Jules Garfield], Jack Warner 
rechristened him ‘John.’ ”
2. On the irony of Warner’s complicity with huac, see Garber, “Gentility,” 
84–85. Garber relates the same anecdote about the naming of John Garfield.
3. Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 96. Although the 
book’s first printed edition appeared in 1947, it had in fact been published in 
a limited edition, as a hectographic typescript, three years earlier. On the gene-
sis of the book, see Noerr’s editor’s afterword, “The Position of ‘Dialectic of 
Enlightenment’ in the Development of Critical Theory,” 217–47.
4. For an argument that the effects of the blacklist continue to manifest 
themselves in U.S. mass culture, see Lewis, Hollywood v. Hard Core.
5. I am alluding here to the sense of “minor” elaborated by Deleuze and Guat-
tari in Kafka, esp. 16–27. For them a certain radicalism attaches to the minor 
itself—miner in French means, among other things, “to undermine”—with 
the result that it is no longer automatically necessary to lament the margin-
ality to which Jewish characters and actors are typically assigned by Holly-
wood. For an example of this tendency, see Spiegel, “The Vanishing Act,” 262: 
“The Victimized Jew was not only as ethnically ill-defined as the Nominal Jew, 
but in both Crossfire and Gentleman’s Agreement he was still essentially a sup-
porting player (Sam Levene in the former, and John Garfield and Sam Jaffe 
in the latter), fading off behind either the character of the bigot (Robert Ryan 
in Crossfire) who would proceed to nail him to his ethnic cross, or his Gentile 
benefactor (Peck in Gentleman’s Agreement, Robert Young in Crossfire) who, 
like Ivanhoe for Rebecca, would frequently make speeches on his behalf.”
6. Naremore, More than Night, 115–16: “To avoid potential objections from 
censors, Scott and Paxton eliminated all references to homosexuality, empha-
sizing instead the theme of race hatred.” Naremore, 98, cites specific stric-
tures against “pansy” characters and behavior in other films of the forties 
besides Crossfire (e.g., The Maltese Falcon and Farewell, My Lovely). On the 
Production Code’s continuing vigilance against homosexuality in the fifties, 
see Lev, “Censorship and Self-Regulation,” 91–94. Ever since its inception 
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in 1930, the Production Code had prohibited “inferences of sex perversion.” 
Documentation can be found in the appendix to Lewis, Hollywood v. Hard 
Core, 301–15.
7. On the politics and history of modern Jewish masculinity, see Breines, 
Tough Jews.
8. Sam Levene would in fact assume his most famous role three years later, 
when he played Nathan Detroit in the Broadway musical Guys and Dolls.
9. Horkheimer’s critique of the film, published as “Anmerkungen zu Cross-
fire,” in Gesammelte Schriften 12:213–19, is discussed in Koch, Die Einstellung 
ist die Einstellung, 98–101. This discussion is part of Koch’s extensive account 
of Horkheimer and Adorno’s dealings with the Hollywood studios, includ-
ing their involvement in the planning for Below the Surface, a film that was 
never made but that was conceived in relation to the research project on anti-
Semitism in which the authors participated. See Koch, Die Einstellung ist die 
Einstellung, 54–120.
10. Rogin, Blackface, White Noise, 241.
11. On the charge of Jewish propaganda, see Naremore, More than Night, 
120, and Scott, “Some of My Worst Friends,” 408.
12. On Schary’s involvement in the film, see Naremore, More than Night, 123; 
Dick, Radical Innocence, 130–31; and Schatz, The Genius of the System, 442–46. 
According to Dick, Schary inflated the importance of his work on the film.
13. Robert Osborne, Introduction, Crossfire (videocassette), Turner Broad-
casting System, 1996.
14. “Levene” derives from “Levite”: a member of the tribe who assisted the 
priests in the temples. I would emphasize here the assisting—that is, the sec-
ondary character of the role—as much as the quasi-ministerial status.
15. Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 60. The original 
text reads: “vielleicht sind die Namen nichts als versteinerte Gelächter.” Hork-
heimer and Adorno, Dialektik der Aufklärung, 85.
16. Abraham Polonsky invokes this “magic” when he says: “There’s some-
thing extraordinary about seeing someone on a screen, and if you don’t under-
stand that it’s extraordinary, then you don’t understand how films are made 
or the strange effect that film has on people—that is to say, film’s ‘magic.’ ” 
Buhle and Wagner, interviewers, “Abraham Polonsky,” 493.
17. Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 148, 151. The inter-
polated phrases in German are from Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialektik der 
Aufklärung, 216.
18. Adorno, “Morals and Criminality,” 55.
19. Gilman, Jewish Self-Hatred; Freud, Jokes and Their Relation to the Un-
conscious, 36. This paragraph reproduces material that I have published in 
“Adorno Now,” 33–39.
20. Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 109.
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21. Philip Kemp has argued (in “From the Nightmare Factory,” 266–70) 
that huac was much less interested in interpreting allegedly subversive films 
than in investigating the political affiliations of the figures involved in them. 
While the political content of a film like Body and Soul may seem so obvious 
as not even to need interpreting, the film has both a political content and, as 
I argue, a political form that may well have interested huac without huac’s 
knowing it: it may not be possible, in other words, to distinguish so sharply 
between the diegetic politics of the film and the extradiegetic politics of its 
personnel.
22. Rogin, Blackface, White Noise, 211–12.
23. Sklar, City Boys, 186.
24. “The Anti-Kazan” is the title of a short article by Atkinson on Polon-
sky, on the occasion of Kazan’s being awarded a Lifetime Achievement Os-
car. In an interview (Buhle and Wagner, “Abraham Polonsky,” 486), Po-
lonsky characterizes Rossen in terms similar to those he uses to describe 
Kazan (see the next chapter’s epigraph), and explicitly compares the two 
“friendly” witnesses: “You wouldn’t want to be on a desert island with Ros-
sen, because if the two of you didn’t have any food, he might want to have 
you for lunch tomorrow. . . . He was talented like Elia Kazan was talented, 
but like Kazan he also had a rotten character. In the end they both became 
stool pigeons. I figured all along that Rossen couldn’t be trusted, but no one 
asked me.”
25. There is an extensive literature on the politics—particularly the leftist 
politics—of film noir. In addition to the titles by Naremore and Kemp cited 
above, see Buhle and Wagner, Radical Hollywood, 321–68; May, The Big To-
morrow, 215–56; Lipsitz, Rainbow at Midnight, 279–302; Neve, Film and Poli-
tics in America, 112–70; Andersen, “Red Hollywood,” 141–96.
26. Buhle and Wagner, “Abraham Polonsky,” 485.
27. Pechter, “Abraham Polonsky and Force of Evil,” 52.
28. Ibid., 47.
29. Ibid., 52; on Garfield and Golden Boy, see Sklar, City Boys, 82.
30. This dialogue is reproduced from the 1980s version of the videotape 
of Body and Soul. In the 1993 reissue of the videotape, and in the 1999 digi-
tal video disk version, Shimen’s speech has been edited so that it no longer 
includes the lines: “over in Europe the Nazis are killing people like us, just 
because of their religion. But here, Charley Davis is champeen. So you win 
and retire champeen.” I have yet to determine how and on whose authority 
this change (which I discuss below) was made, although it is not hard to imag-
ine why it was made. That it was made, as late as 1993, nevertheless remains 
perplexing. It is as though someone in Hollywood, carrying appeasement to 
its paranoid extreme, had not been told that the Germans lost the war.
31. Rogin, Blackface, White Noise, 214–15.
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32. Ibid., 307, n.12. In his insistence on a Jewish masterplot, a plot of Jewish 
cultural mastery, Rogin suppresses the more radical possibilities of Jews in 
film, here embodied by the minor character whose role he makes even more 
minor. In Rogin’s influential account, Jewish “success” in American mass 
culture seems to involve the evacuation of Jewishness, its construction as an 
entirely negative identity. For Rogin, that is, Jews succeed only insofar as they 
manage to define themselves as not-black.
33. Bartelt and Bergeron, eds., Variety Obituaries (5 May 1976; unpaginated).
34. Pechter, “Abraham Polonsky and Force of Evil,” 53. The parallel between 
the blacklist and the Nazi period has also been drawn by, among others, 
Mann, in his foreword to Kahn, Hollywood on Trial, v; Trumbo, The Time of the 
Toad; Ornitz, huac testimony, quoted in Kahn, Hollywood on Trial, 98–99. 
The parallel is anticipated by Scott, “Some of My Worst Friends,” 408–19. 
He would soon, of course, have the dubious opportunity to assess it through 
personal experience.
35. In A Very Dangerous Citizen, 129, Buhle and Wagner propose that “these 
Jews [New York intellectual immigrants from Eastern Europe] were popular 
culture.”
36. Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 149. The inter-
polated German phrase appears in Dialektik der Aufklärung, 214.
37. Buhle and Wagner, A Very Dangerous Citizen, 126.
38. For other examples of the tendency I am associating with Rogin’s work, 
see Melnick, A Right to Sing the Blues, and Most, Making Americans.
39. For obvious reasons, the term “tender comrade”—which furnished the 
title of a 1944 Ginger Rogers vehicle directed by Edward Dmytryk and writ-
ten by Dalton Trumbo—has acquired left-wing resonances, but, as befits its 
homoerotic associations here, it comes from a translation of Sappho. For a 
trenchant analysis of the film Tender Comrade, which places it in the context 
of U.S. affectivity from the Second World War to the George W. Bush admin-
istration, see Berlant, “The Epistemology of State Emotion.”
40. Buhle and Wagner, A Very Dangerous Citizen, 127.
41. Quoted in Hamilton, Writers in Hollywood, 1915–1951, 299.
42. How the un-American might inhere in the American is suggested 
by the following reminiscence of Polonsky’s (quoted in Buhle and Wagner, 
“Abraham Polonsky,” 491–92): “I heard from my mother’s mother all the 
stories that I would someday need. She used to get the stories out of the [ Jewish 
Daily] Forward, stories that were translated into Yiddish to educate the Social-
ist readers. Later on in life, I realized that I had learned from her the stories 
of Tom Sawyer and Huck Finn, who happened, according to her version, to 
be Jewish boys on the Volga, with a Russian serf in the role of Jim, instead of 
gentiles on the Mississippi.”
43. Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 151.
44. Ibid.
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45. Rogin, Blackface, White Noise, 215.
46. Ibid., 216.
47. Especially after his portrayal of a Jewish barber in the film The Great Dic-
tator (1940), Chaplin was thought to be a Jew (as well as—or is it, and there-
fore?—a Communist). For Arendt, Chaplin, “even if not himself a Jew, . . . 
epitomized in an artistic form a character born of a Jewish pariah mentality” 
(The Jew as Pariah, 69; see also 79–81). On Chaplin’s place in progressive 
Hollywood, and on his interactions with huac, see Ceplair and Englund, 
The Inquisition in Hollywood, esp. 384–85. In her typology of the pariah, 
Arendt points out that Heine’s schlemihl takes his name from “Shelumiel ben 
Zurishaddai mentioned in the Book of Numbers as the leader of the tribe of 
Simeon” (70). It seems appropriate that Shimen’s name (which derives from 
a Hebrew word meaning “harkening”) should hark back to the tribe led by a 
schlemihl.
48. Rogin, Blackface, White Noise, 220.
49. For a reading of the film under this rubric, see Garber, “Gentility,” esp. 
79–88.
50. Quoted in Baer, ed., Elia Kazan, 131.
51. Quoted in Bentley, ed., Thirty Years of Treason, 493.
52. Sklar, City Boys, 187.
53. On the “integrationist” ideology of the film (versus the “segregationist” 
ideology of Pinky, directed by Kazan two years later), see Rogin, Blackface, 
White Noise, 220–28.
54. The description of the film is from Sklar, City Boys, 188.
55. Jaffe reappears in I Can Get It for You Wholesale (1951), the last film 
Polonsky wrote before he was blacklisted. Polonsky remarks: “The Sam Jaffe 
character was my invention—the voice of experience. That character came 
from my own life. I had a grandmother like that; we all had grandmothers like 
that” (Buhle and Wagner, “Abraham Polonsky,” 491).
56. Kazan, A Life, 334.
57. Quoted in May, Big Tomorrow, 202.
58. Paraphrased in Sayre, Running Time, 40. The wittiest of the Hollywood 
Ten, Lardner himself “turned out to be a gentile.”
❨4❩ Collaborators
Chapter epigraph: Abraham Polonsky, on the occasion of Elia Kazan’s receiv-
ing a Lifetime Achievement Oscar; quoted in Atkinson, “The Anti-Kazan.”
1. Truffaut, The Films of My Life, 113.
2. Ibid., 113, 115.
3. In a book of interviews with Michel Ciment, Kazan says: “The film was 
in advance of its time. It foretells Nixon. I don’t think it was about McCarthy 
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particularly.” Ciment, Kazan on Kazan, 115. The quotation from the review 
appears in Kazan, A Life, 566. Kazan claims that he found the review “stupid” 
(567), though he does not explain why. According to Sayre, in Running Time, 
166, “Budd Schulberg told me that they . . . had Joseph McCarthy in mind—as 
a man who had ‘used television to destroy others until it helped to destroy 
him.’ ”
4. In Brando and Lindsay, Brando, cited in Beck, Budd Schulberg, 144. Pauline 
Kael’s review of On the Waterfront is entitled “The Glamour of Delinquency.” 
See Kael, I Lost It at the Movies, 44–62.
5. Barthes, “A Sympathetic Worker,” 39, 40.
6. Treating his imagined reader to a demonstration of his defiant individu-
alism, Kazan writes in his autobiography: “If you expect an apology now be-
cause I would . . . name names to the House Committee, you’ve misjudged 
my character. The ‘horrible, immoral’ thing I would do, I did out of my true 
self ” (Kazan, A Life, 460).
7. What this chapter, and this book as a whole, propose, then, is a theory of 
the American citizen as adolescent. Lauren Berlant has elaborated a “theory of 
infantile citizenship” focused on the “strong and enduring belief that the best 
of U.S. national subjectivity can be read in its childlike manifestations and in 
a polity that organizes its public sphere around a commitment to making a 
world that could sustain an idealized infantile citizen” (The Queen of America 
Goes to Washington City, 28; for a fuller account of this theory, see 25–53).
8. In his Naming Names, 209, Navasky notes the transformation of the 
stoolpigeon that takes place between The Informer—one of the favorite films, 
by the way, of the moralizing narrator of Schulberg’s What Makes Sammy 
Run?—and On the Waterfront.
9. Kael, 5001 Nights at the Movies, 177.
10. As the example of Barthes reminds us, of course, not everyone is se-
duced. Roger Tailleur perhaps best characterizes a line of critics, particularly 
on the left, who have resisted the film’s charms, finding in it precisely the 
stridency usually ascribed to its less successful sibling: “Sur les Quais est 
ainsi l’affreux de la famille, le film mauvais, ce dernier mot compris davantage 
dans le sens moral de méchant que dans celui de dénué de qualités, le bouc 
émissaire sur lequel déverser sa bile une fois pour toutes et pour tous” (On 
the Waterfront is thus the monster of the family, the bad film, “bad” being un-
derstood more in the moral sense of evil than in the sense of being denuded 
of qualities—the scapegoat onto which one can spill one’s bile once and for 
all). Tailleur, Elia Kazan, 83.
11. In a penetrating discussion of Brando’s performance in On the Water-
front, James Naremore situates the film alongside A Face in the Crowd in a 
context of naturalistic fifties “social problem” films with Actors Studio per-
sonnel. See Acting in the Cinema, 200.
12. Ciment, Kazan on Kazan, 116–17.
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13. Writing only a few years after the heyday of the blacklist, Richard 
Hofstadter observed: “Had the Great Inquisition been directed only against 
Communists, it would have tried to be more precise and discriminating in 
its search for them: in fact, its leading practitioners seemed to care little for 
the difference between a Communist and a unicorn” (Anti-intellectualism in 
American Life, 41). Hofstadter argues that the real target of the inquisition was 
New Deal–style intellectualism.
14. On the “Jewishness” of Roosevelt, the New Deal, and the Second World 
War, see chapters 1 and 2 of the present book.
15. “Screwball” and “crackpot” are McCarthy’s terms, quoted from Emile de 
Antonio’s 1964 documentary film, Point of Order.
16. On “Hollyweird,” see chapter 2.
17. The phrase cited in this sentence could be found in countless places, but 
this particular quotation comes from a letter written in Schulberg’s defense 
by his wife, Geraldine Brooks, quoted in Navasky, Naming Names, 242. The 
apparent symmetry of the formulation is already belied, of course, by the fact 
that “fascism” gets a lower-case f while “Communism” gets a capital C.
18. Ibid., 246.
19. Ibid., 244. Schulberg continues: “I think it would be very hard to get 
Lillian [Hellman] to criticize the death of a Soviet writer. They could be 
stretched on the rack at Lubianka Prison and Lillian would go back on the ferry 
to Martha’s Vineyard. I think they have been toads. They have been unwilling 
to attack [Russia].” “Hellman” is my interpolation; “Russia” is Navasky’s.
20. Ibid., 245.
21. Both Kazan and Schulberg have insisted, although both have been chal-
lenged on this point, that the people whose names they gave huac had already 
been named by others. It might be easier to fire bullets into an already-dead 
body than to kill someone outright; either way, however, one is serving the 
“eternal boss.”
22. See Navasky, Naming Names, 314–19. In his elaboration of the concept 
of the degradation ceremony, Navasky builds on the work of the sociologist 
Harold Garfinkel.
23. Kazan, A Life, 487.
24. Mattison and Abribat, Psychanalyse de la collaboration, 202. The phrase 
may be translated: “to subjugate others, while (or by) making themselves ser-
vants of that obscure big Other who does not exist.” I attribute the phrase to 
Abribat, because he introduces it in the context of a dialogue with Mattison.
25. In Original Story By, 242, Arthur Laurents writes: “The House Un-
American Committee didn’t subpoena Budd Schulberg; he sent a telegram 
offering to testify and literally chased the Committee from one city to another 
before he caught up and could inform on his friends.” We will soon see how 
eagerly Kazan, too, undertook the project of collaboration, once he committed 
himself to it. Let us note for now that, just as the figure of the informer played 
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a prominent role in his work both before and after his own naming of names, 
so, too, did the figure of the assassin continue to loom large in his career, 
well after the period of the blacklist. In an interview with Michel Ciment, he 
says of his 1971 novel, The Assassins: “The book is about the various kinds of 
assassination that are going on in this country: character-assassination, actual 
assassination, the frustrations of young people as they face the way authority 
is manipulated and put down.” See Ciment, Kazan on Kazan, 172. On the vari-
ous informer figures recurring in Kazan’s work as a playwright, director, and 
novelist, see Navaksy, Naming Names, 200–22.
26. Kazan, A Life, 41. In the notes he kept during the making of A Face in 
the Crowd, Kazan, addressing himself, wrote: “You are falsely aggressive in 
the most adolescent way. Stop being a nigger or a Jew. Look at things without 
fear of threat. You are so old and nothing can happen to you. You are the only 
person who can hurt you.” (This material can be found in the Wesleyan Uni-
versity Cinema Archives.) The present chapter argues that the kind of “Jew” 
Kazan and Schulberg most dread (becoming) is not the resentful adolescent 
that they already are but, rather, the self-dissolving comedian.
27. I am echoing here the phrase “the mimesis of mimesis” in Horkheimer 
and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 152. This chapter, like the book as a 
whole, owes a much larger debt to Horkheimer and Adorno’s analysis of mi-
mesis and antisemitism, as will become evident.
28. Beck, Budd Schulberg, 123. Unlike Bentley, ed., Thirty Years of Treason, 
this book contains the complete transcript of Schulberg’s huac testimony.
29. Schulberg, Moving Pictures. Schulberg’s father was B. P. Schulberg, the 
head of production at Paramount.
30. Beck, Budd Schulberg, 123.
31. Caillois, Le Mythe et l’homme, 103. Here is more of the context: “On a 
donc affaire à un luxe et même à un luxe dangereux, car il n’est pas sans 
example que le mimétisme fasse tomber l’animal de mal en pis: les chenilles 
arpenteuses simulent si bien les pousses d’arbuste que les horticulteurs 
les taillent avec un sécateur; le cas des Phyllies est encore plus misérable: 
elles se broutent entre elles, se prenant pour de véritables feuilles, en sorte 
qu’on pourrait croire à une sorte de masochisme collectif aboutissant à 
l’homophagie mutuelle, la simulation de la feuille étant une provocation au 
cannibalisme dans cette manière de festin totémique” (We are thus dealing 
with a luxury and even with a dangerous luxury, for it is not unheard-of for 
mimeticism to cause an animal to go from bad to worse: surveyor caterpillars 
so well simulate shrub shoots that gardeners cut them down with shears; the 
case of leaf insects is even more wretched: they graze on each another, tak-
ing each other for real leaves, so that one could believe in a sort of collective 
masochism ending in mutual homophagy, the simulation of the leaf being a 
provocation to cannibalism in the manner of a totemic feast). First published 
in 1938, Caillois’s book is one of the sources for Horkheimer and Adorno’s 
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theory of mimesis in Dialectic of Enlightenment. As Horkheimer and Adorno 
point out, Caillois’s “mimétisme” resembles Freud’s death drive (Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, 189).
32. I borrow the term “chameleonism” from Mattison and Abribat, who use 
it in Psychanalyse de la collaboration to describe the Vichy mentality.
33. I am alluding again to Hellman’s remark about the collaboration of the 
Hollywood moguls with huac: “It would not have been possible in Russia or 
Poland, but it was possible here to offer the Cossacks a bowl of chicken soup.” 
Hellman, Scoundrel Time, 68. When the parvenu is a cooperative witness, he 
deflects the Cossacks not only by singing to them, but also by tossing them 
the bodies of Jewish pariahs.
34. Just before the passage from his testimony quoted above, Schulberg 
says: “The problem [of Communist influence] to me falls into two parts. One 
is to check in every way the manipulators and conspirators of this, who do use 
these other people who are, I would call, innocents. I think personally the best 
way to do that is to tighten up in every way the laws on espionage and sabo-
tage, which probably is being done.” Beck, Budd Schulberg, 123.
35. The other friendly witness was Richard Collins. According to Maurice 
Rapf (interviewed in McGilligan and Buhle, ed., Tender Comrades, 534), 
Schulberg “named [Richard] Collins, because he wanted to get even with 
Collins.” (The interpolation is the editors’.) An opponent of the blacklist, and 
Schulberg’s sometime friend, Rapf makes a number of valuable observations 
about Schulberg and his testimony (530–34).
36. Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 151–52. I discuss 
this passage briefly in “Glad to Be Unhappy,” 525. Some of that discussion is 
reworked in these pages.
37. Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet, 149. In a disappointing book enti-
tled Grovelling and Other Vices, Alphons Silbermann suggests that “the simul-
taneity of enforced adaptation and necessary arse-licking . . . affects all Jews 
as a result of their Jewishness.” This claim for the universality of Jewish syco-
phancy needs to be contextualized in relation to Horkheimer and Adorno’s 
anatomy of anti-Semitism.
38. Schulberg, “Introduction to the Modern Library Edition,” What Makes 
Sammy Run?, xiv.
39. I invoke again a passage I alluded to in chapter 1: “The man of ressenti-
ment is like a dog, a kind of dog which only reacts to traces (a bloodhound).” 
Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, 115.
40. On the way in which the Red Scare afforded the pretext for a regime 
of permissible sadism, see Roth, I Married a Communist, 262: “Every soul its 
own betrayal factory. For whatever reason: survival, excitement, advancement, 
idealism. For the sake of the damage that can be done, the pain that can be in-
flicted. For the cruelty in it. For the pleasure in it. The pleasure of manifesting 
one’s latent power. The pleasure of dominating others, of destroying people 
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who are your enemies. You’re surprising them. Isn’t that the pleasure of be-
trayal? The pleasure of tricking somebody. . . . When before had betrayal ever 
been so destigmatized and rewarded in this country?” In chapter 1, I quote 
from a passage two pages later that extends this theme.
41. Bentley, ed., Thirty Years of Treason, 436. I am quoting from Schulberg’s 
telegram to huac and from the first page of his testimony, a veritable riot of 
sir-vility.
42. Ciment, Kazan on Kazan, 87.
43. Kazan grew up in the New York City suburb of New Rochelle.
44. Ciment, Kazan on Kazan, 88.
45. See, for example, Kazan, A Life, 137–38.
46. Ciment, Kazan on Kazan, 86–87.
47. Bentley, ed., Thirty Years of Treason, 489.
48. Ibid., 493. For an analysis of Kazan’s cooperative testimony, and his use 
of the traumatic memory that motivated it, as a triumph of Method acting, see 
Hoberman, “A Snitch in Time,” 6.
49. Bentley, ed., Thirty Years of Treason, 493.
50. Ibid., 483, 482.
51. But see Kazan, A Life, 450–56, for an account of the pressure exerted 
upon him by Spyros Skouras and Darryl Zanuck, the heads of Twentieth 
Century-Fox.
52. Ibid., 459.
53. On his resentment of his college classmates: “Every time I saw privilege 
from then on, I wanted to tear it down or to possess it. During those cold, dark 
years at Williams, the emotional groundwork for me to join the Communist 
Party was laid down.” Ibid., 44.
54. Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 151.
55. Ciment, Kazan on Kazan, 83.
56. See, for instance, Hoberman, “A Snitch in Time,” 7.
57. “According to a familiar crasis, physical plenitude establishes a kind of 
moral clarity: only the strong can be frank. As we can imagine, the essence 
common to all these powers is virility.” Barthes, The Eiffel Tower and Other 
Mythologies, 131. “These powers” are the attributes of the “lieutenants” of the 
anti-Semitic demagogue Pierre Poujade (mentor of Jean-Marie Le Pen).
58. In a review of Silbermann’s Grovelling and Other Vices (whose German 
title is Von der Kunst der Arschkriecherei), Thomas M. Kemple, drawing on 
Freud, calls for “a consideration of ‘ass-licking’ practices that have more to 
do with pleasure and love than grovelling and sycophancy.” “Editorial,” 2. 
The interest of the present study is indeed in how ass-licking and its variants 
reveal sycophancy as a form of pleasure and love.
59. Kazan, A Life, 138.
60. In Kazan’s view, sycophancy is by no means limited to the Communist 
Party. Indeed, he displays the sycophant’s talent for diagnosing sycophancy 
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everywhere (except in himself ). In his introduction to the published screen-
play of A Face in the Crowd, he recalls, for instance, his first day at lunch in the 
Twentieth Century-Fox commissary: “The center tables were taken by the stars. 
They were surrounded by their favorites and sycophants: make-up men, hair-
dressers, stand-ins, agents, girl- or boyfriends.” Kazan, “Introduction,” viii.
61. Kazan’s language echoes that of Schulberg, who, having preceded Ka-
zan in his huac testimony, in some sense served as the model for the latter. 
“I was comforted by something Budd Schulberg wrote me; his experience 
paralleled my own. ‘The person in my difficulty,’ he said, ‘since he cannot 
please all his old friends, must settle for pleasing himself.’ ” Kazan, A Life, 471. 
That one’s capitulation to the state must be called “pleasing oneself ” makes 
clear how “wretched” the sycophant’s “parody of fulfillment” is. Not that the 
informer’s dividend of sadism is in doubt. But “pleasing oneself ” leaves out 
both the considerable political coercion and the considerable aggression to-
ward others that are involved in this supposedly autonomous pleasure. (It 
is not just that Schulberg “cannot please all his old friends”: “pleasing him-
self ” has required that he actively harm old friends.) In his recent Elia Kazan, 
xxviii, Richard Schickel calls attention to a passage in Kazan’s autobiography, 
in which Kazan departs from his stance of persistent defiance (“If you expect 
an apology”; see note 6 above) and expresses remorse about the human cost of 
his testimony. Imagining apologizing to Tony Kraber, one of those he named 
before huac, Kazan writes (A Life, 685): “I felt that no political cause was 
worth hurting another human for. What good deeds were stimulated by what 
I’d done? What villains exposed? How is the world better for what I did? It had 
just been a game of power and influence, and I’d been taken in and twisted 
from my true self. I’d fallen for something I shouldn’t have, no matter how 
hard the pressure and no matter how sound my reasons. The simple fact was 
that I wasn’t political—not then, not now.” Kazan’s words here are compel-
ling. It is still worth noting, however, that, even in the mode of apology, he 
promotes the heroism of the “true self ” over and against the political—while 
maintaining the “soundness” of his political reasons. It doesn’t take too much 
perspicacity to see that being true to oneself (instead of “being political”) may 
be another move in the “game of power and influence.”
62. Truffaut, The Films of My Life, 114.
63. Ciment, Kazan on Kazan, 118–19.
64. The title of Kazan’s most autobiographical film and, according to him, 
“my favorite of all the pictures I’ve made.” Quoted in Young, Kazan, 288.
65. Quoted in Ceplair and Englund, The Inquisition in Hollywood, 376. In 
his Life, 451, Kazan has this to say about Spyros Skouras, the president of 
Twentieth Century-Fox at the time of the huac hearings, and his brothers: 
“Like most immigrants then, they would defend themselves by flaunting their 
patriotism. [paragraph break] I do not altogether exclude myself from this 
characterization.”
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66. Kazan, A Life, 40.
67. Ciment, Kazan on Kazan, 114.
68. Although Kazan took pride in despising Hollywood (along with so 
much else), and although A Face in the Crowd was produced by his own com-
pany, Newtown Productions, the film was distributed by Warner Brothers. 
Regardless, then, of its aura of “independence,” of hailing from a new town, 
it was still a Hollywood film, as any film that wished to enjoy any viability or 
visibility in the fifties had to be. For a discussion of A Face in the Crowd that 
places it in the context of the competition between film and television, and 
in the larger 1950s discourse about mass culture, see Maloney, “The Faces in 
Lonesome’s Crowd,” 251–77. Despite Kazan’s claim that the film was ahead of 
its time, Maloney argues that it participates in an “on-going controversy about 
the value and danger of ‘mass culture,’ ” and that “by the time A Face in the 
Crowd came out, the terms of this debate were about as familiar to the gen-
eral reader (and film and television viewer) as were the modalities of popular 
culture itself ” (255).
69. Ibid., 115. Kazan means Nixon the president rather than Nixon the for-
mer huac member—although, as Lillian Hellman, for example, has pointed 
out (see Scoundrel Time, 152–55), Watergate was in many ways a continua-
tion of the blacklist. Foretelling Nixon future, and repressing, which is to say, 
thoroughly shaped by, the trauma of Nixon past, A Face in the Crowd explicitly 
refers to Nixon present—or at least to the Nixon of the “Checkers” speech, 
which Lonesome invokes in his praise of “a pitch with a hound.” The claim 
for the film’s prescience has been diligently updated by Schickel, Elia Kazan, 
343: “When I spoke with Kazan about the film in 1990 he laughed: ‘It antici-
pates Ronald Reagan. And I can’t say anything better than that . . . ’ We can. It 
also anticipates George W. Bush’s manipulations of the crowd.”
70. Indeed, Eric Smoodin goes so far as to characterize A Face in the Crowd 
as a “remake” of Capra’s Meet John Doe (among such other “reinventions” of 
the Capra film as Stephen Frears’s Hero [1992] and Spike Lee’s Bamboozled 
[2000]. See Smoodin, Regarding Frank Capra, 238. With its closer source in 
Schulberg’s short story, “Your Arkansas Traveler” (see note 73 below), A Face 
in the Crowd, it seems to me, is less a remake of Meet John Doe than a reinter-
pretation of it—but, in any case, a far more retrograde film than it imagines 
itself to be.
71. The pinkish hue is underscored by Kazan’s notes in the Wesleyan Uni-
versity Cinema Archives. Likening Senator Fuller to such “unphysical types” 
as Adlai Stevenson and Robert Taft, Kazan writes: “The son of a bitch is a 
bachelor and the American public can only think one thing: he’s queer!”
72. Young, Kazan, 238.
73. Arthur Godfrey’s own Lonesome-like on-air self-betrayal occurred when 
he fired Julius LaRosa, a popular singer on his show, by announcing to the 
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television audience that LaRosa had just “sung his swan song.” On the rather 
improbable secularization of Lonesome, see Glenn Erickson’s online review 
of A Face in the Crowd:
What Schulberg and Kazan don’t dare touch is the role of revivalist religion 
in the real-life trends behind A Face in the Crowd. Televangelists became ex-
tremely popular in the early 1950s and often tried to parlay their fame into 
political power, with mostly middling results. Lonesome Rhodes is strictly a 
secular, Hee Haw kind of demagogue. The born-again minority would even-
tually find influence way beyond their numbers, eventually arriving at their 
present ability to warp and steer public policy.
It should be noted, however, that in “Your Arkansas Traveler,” Schulberg’s 
short story on which the film was based, Lonesome is not completely de-
Christianized: in one of his broadcasts, he asserts that “what we need is a little 
more good old-fashioned Christianity and a whole lot less of this new fangled 
bee-you-rock-racy”; later, the narrator (the precursor of Patricia Neal’s char-
acter), says, “I had toned down the views that would have made him sound 
like a sweet-talking Father Coughlin.” Schulberg, “Your Arkansas Traveler,” 
29, 38. In the film, Lonesome’s religiosity has been toned down to the afore-
mentioned snatch of hymn, to the nondenominational platitude, “The family 
that prays together stays together,” and to a passing reference to the “ol’ Bible 
my daddy give me.” Discussing the film with Ciment (Kazan on Kazan, 118), 
Kazan claims that Billy Graham (along with Huey Long and Arthur Godfrey) 
was a “model [ . . . ] for the character.”
74. In a scene that appears in Schulberg’s published screenplay but not in 
the film, Lonesome tries to fire the writer, Mel Miller (the Schulberg figure), 
for insubordination. After Mel beats him to the punch with a bravura rendi-
tion of “You can’t fire me—I quit!,” Lonesome says, “You won’t work any 
show on this network. I’ll get you blacklisted from hell to Honolulu” (Schul-
berg, A Face in the Crowd, 118). It is as if the blacklist could be acknowledged—
and, even here, the disappearance of this scene from the film might exem-
plify the rigor with which Hollywood censorship censors itself—only on the 
following terms: that blacklisting take place in the world of television rather 
than in the movie business; that its agents be associated with what Schulberg 
considers the fascist left (Stalin, Lillian Hellman) rather than with the fascist 
right (huac and McCarthy); and that the Schulberg figure be its victim rather 
than its accomplice. A similar policy of displacement governs references to 
“sycophancy.” Like Kazan, Schulberg finds sycophancy everywhere except in 
himself, and when he names it, he is careful to imply that it has nothing to do 
with him. In the text of the screenplay, he describes Lonesome’s “success with 
its accompanying sycophancy” (124). In his preface, he persists in his admira-
tion for the film The Informer (ibid., xx).
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75. Roth, I Married a Communist, 284.
76. Kazan, cited in Navaksy, Naming Names, 210. In “Facing the Past,” 
the documentary that accompanies the recently released dvd of A Face in 
the Crowd, Leo Braudy comments on how the co-authors’ huac testimony 
resulted in the film’s richness and ambiguity. This view is consistent with 
the larger argument about Kazan’s films that Braudy elaborates in his essay, 
“‘No Body’s Perfect,’ ” 191–215. Schickel, Elia Kazan, 344, has observed that the 
film’s mainstream reviewers failed to appreciate it because “they were dead 
set against ambiguity.”
77. A few years later, John Frankenheimer’s The Manchurian Candidate 
will propose, in the service of the same sycophantic, anti-Communist agenda, 
that the right is really the left, and therefore even more pernicious than we 
thought.
78. The words The Assassins, at any rate, are scribbled below the title, A 
Face in the Crowd, on an envelope found in one of the many versions of the 
shooting script; this material is housed in the Wesleyan University Cinema 
Archives.
79. Schulberg has written extensively about boxing, perhaps most notably 
in his novel, The Harder They Fall.
80. Comparing Kazan to the sorcerer’s apprentice, Tailleur writes: “Or dé-
passer, c’est doubler, et doubler c’est trahir, et le film trahit Kazan et Schulberg 
en révélant plus qu’ils n’ont voulu dire” (To transcend is to get ahead of [dou-
bler], and doubler means to betray, and the film betrays Kazan and Schulberg 
by revealing more than they want to say). Tailleur, Elia Kazan, 102.
81. I have discussed Agamben’s distinction between the citizen and the 
refugee in chapter 1; here, I would merely cite a pertinent passage from his 
Means without End, 20: “If the refugee represents such a disquieting element 
in the order of the nation-state, this is so primarily because, by breaking the 
identity between the human and the citizen and that between nativity and 
nationality, it brings the originary fiction of sovereignty to crisis.”
82. In “Polonsky and Kazan,” 262, Butler writes: “In Force of Evil [1948] . . . 
Polonsky diagnosed American society as conducive to the informer even as 
huac was barely under way.” Nine years later, well into huac’s “parade of 
stoolpigeons,” A Face in the Crowd reveals American society as not just con-
ducive to the informer but as requiring the informer. Despite, or because 
of, the greater deference with which Kazan and Schulberg treat American 
power—Polonsky, of course, was blacklisted for refusing to answer huac’s 
questions—A Face in the Crowd shows American society as essentially a society 
of informers. Butler comments acutely on how Kazan buys into the fantasy of 
individualism, tracing his investment in part to his Greek-American identity: 
“in flight from the experience of poverty, the ethnic group is driven to as-
similate into American society by the promise of eventual wealth and success, 
yet seeks to obscure the extent of its conformism by clinging to notions of 
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patriarchal individualism, redolent of past traditions” (ibid., 263). Butler also, 
however, relates Kazan’s conformist individualism to an impulse in postwar 
America that is not necessarily limited to immigrants (by which I mean re-
cent immigrants): “in Viva Zapata and On the Waterfront the affirmations of a 
familiar American commitment to individualism would have appealed to an 
America needing to hide from its mob mentality” (ibid., 263).
83. Ciment, Kazan on Kazan, 114.
84. In Young, Kazan, 235–36, the director is describing his work with the 
then-inexperienced Andy Griffith: “I showed him what I wanted a lot. Take 
for example the early scene in jail when the sheriff wakes Lonesome. I knew 
from my own experience that a lot of animals fight on their backs. It’s their 
favorite position because they fight with their claws.” The black prisoner’s 
refusal to be turned into a “minstrel,” and perhaps his mere presence, are 
consistent with the film’s general “progressivism” where African Americans 
are concerned. Nevertheless, it is almost as evasive around questions of race 
as it is around questions of religion. In keeping with the overall pattern of his 
corruption, Lonesome Rhodes seems to start out as an enemy of antiblack rac-
ism, and to end as one of its agents. What this trajectory overrides is a more 
candid appraisal of racist resentment in American “populism” itself.
85. “Pygmalion in reverse” is Kazan’s phrase (Young, Kazan, 115). In his re-
view of the film Bosley Crowther, bypassing Marcia, writes that “Mr. Schulberg 
and Mr. Kazan spawn a monster not unlike the one of Dr. Frankenstein”(New 
York Times, 29 May 1957: 33). Truffaut gives Marcia full credit for her crea-
tion; referring to how she names him Lonesome, Truffaut writes: “A small 
journalistic trick starts the whole machinery. The girl is honest and sensitive; 
nevertheless, all the fraudulence of the journalistic world is fully expressed in 
that little trick” ( The Films of My Life, 114).
86. The becoming-fascist of Lonesome’s racial politics has its equivalent in 
the perversion of his gender politics: he starts out speaking up for oppressed 
housewives, and ends up complaining that there are no longer any “unliber-
ated” women.
87. Kazan, A Life, 568–69.
88. Truffaut, for his part, subscribes to the fiction of innocence corrupted—
although, in classic fifties fashion, he blames the mother herself for the cor-
ruption: “From this point on [the point at which Marcia gives Lonesome his 
name], whatever may happen, whatever his crimes and however innocent she 
may be, we are unable to pity the good girl; she represents corruption, he is 
the corrupted. It’s he who has the right to complain right up to the end.” The 
Films of My Life, 114.
89. See note 25 above for the full quotation.
90. In an earlier version of the screenplay (housed in the Wesleyan Univer-
sity Cinema Archive), Lonesome does, however, end up jumping, or at least 
falling, to his death.
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91. One of those Kazan named before huac was Art Smith, his Group The-
atre colleague and co-author, with him, of the agitprop drama Dimitroff; in 
Kazan’s eight-hundred-page autobiography, there is one reference to Smith, 
and it appears in a letter that Kazan quotes (A Life, 467).
92. Kazan, “Paean of Praise for a Face Above the Crowd,” New York Times, 
Sunday, 26 May 1957: 2:5.
93. In A Life, 469, Kazan reports that, after his cooperative testimony, the 
Daily Worker “predicted the loss of my manhood. Actually I’d heard of a fellow 
film director, Bob Rossen, who’d confessed that for a year after he’d testified 
cooperatively he’d been unable to maintain a satisfactory erection.” Kazan im-
plies here, and in A Face in the Crowd, that he had no such problem—even 
that testifying was something of a turn-on. Abraham Polonsky, an uncoopera-
tive witness, points out that “one informs not only to escape punishment and 
regain acceptance but to share once again in the authority of the state” (Pech-
ter, “Abraham Polonsky and Force of Evil,” 53). Sharing in the authority of the 
state, Kazan and Schulberg seem to suggest, can make a man hard. They also 
suggest, however, the extent to which that excitement can be bound up with 
fear (of losing one’s share in the state’s authority).
94. On connotation versus denotation (in relation to male homosexuality 
rather than to Jewishness, though, as I have suggested, the two identities can 
overlap or even coincide), see D. A. Miller, “Anal Rope.”
95. Schulberg, A Face in the Crowd, 30.
96. “Melvin” comes from a Celtic word meaning “chief.” In other words, it 
is a typical Jewish man’s name of its period.
97. Schulberg, What Makes Sammy Run?, xiv (introduction).
98. Ibid., 42. In the film, “softest” becomes “easiest.”
99. The date of Mel’s graduation—why was he still in college in 1944?—
might contribute to the impression of his initial softness. Although both 
Kazan and Schulberg served in the armed forces during the Second World 
War, they seem to suggest that Mel is in greater need of being toughened up. 
I thank Caroline Levine for calling my attention to this point.
100. Could “Abe Steiner” stand in for “Art Smith”? The character somewhat 
resembles the actor, not only nominally and physically but also experientially 
(in having been “thrown off the train”).
101. In one of the notebooks that he kept during the period of A Face in the 
Crowd (and which is available in the Wesleyan University Cinema Archives), 
Kazan indicates that Marcia is of Irish descent.
102. Marcia, or her literary precursor, is the narrator of “Your Arkansas 
Traveler.” Staging the process of Marcia’s marginalization, the film of course 
demonstrates Hollywood’s sexism, as well as the more general (though his-
torically specific) timidity of which that sexism is a symptom.
103. Schulberg, A Face in the Crowd, 153.
104. Ibid., 170.
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105. Mel’s manly and yet heimish predecessor, that earlier Schulberg surro-
gate Al Manheim, the narrator of What Makes Sammy Run?, is in fact the son 
of a rabbi, to whom he gratefully attributes the moral seriousness underlying 
his Broadway pizzazz. See What Makes Sammy Run?, 25.
106. Schulberg, A Face in the Crowd, 42. Mel of course comes from a long 
pop culture line of mild-mannered Jewish (or crypto-Jewish) superheroes.
107. Jones, “The Psychology of Quislingism,” 4–5. If we put Silbermann’s 
suggestion (see note 37 above) that all Jews are sycophants together with 
Jones’s suggestion that all sycophants are homosexual, we arrive at the syllo-
gistic conclusion that all Jews are homosexual. I have no quarrel with this con-
clusion, although I do object to the logic by which it is reached. Let me repeat 
and amplify what I have just said in the text: the problem with sycophants—
that is, what makes them sycophants—is that they aren’t homosexual or Jew-
ish enough. I have addressed the putative Jewishness and homosexuality of 
sycophancy in chapter 1.
108. Kazan, A Life, 27. The book jacket congratulates the author for his 
“almost outrageous honesty.” On the use of “the feminine” by male collabora-
tors, see Koestenbaum, Double Talk.
109. Sayre, Running Time, 166. In addition to being reborn as a redneck, 
Sammy—that Schulbergian archetype, the office boy on the make, the Satanic 
avatar of the Horatio Alger hero—gets split into a second, secondary character 
in the film. Roger Tailleur writes: “Le monde satirique de Schulberg est là tout 
entier, tout au long de cette odyssée si semblable à celle de ses héros roman-
esques, dont le personnage de Joey De Palma semble en outre ressusciter le 
fameux Sammy Glick” (The satirical world of Schulberg is here in its entirety, 
throughout this odyssey so similar to that of his novelistic heroes; the char-
acter of Joey De Palma seems, moreover, to resuscitate the famous Sammy 
Glick). Tailleur, Elia Kazan, 100.
110. Sammy Glick at one point calls himself “Uncle Sammy.” See Schulberg, 
What Makes Sammy Run?, 81.
111. I am of course alluding here to the erotic triangle theorized by Eve 
Kosofsky Sedgwick in Between Men.
112. Sweet Smell of Success is about a sycophantic press agent in the ser-
vice of a gossip columnist based on Walter Winchell. One of its producers 
(Harold Hecht) and one of its screenwriters (Clifford Odets) were cooperative 
witnesses before huac.
113. The film’s portrait of the American public has been judged “elitist” by, 
for instance, Maloney, “The Faces in Lonesome’s Crowd,” and Yates, “Smart 
Man’s Burden,” 19–28.
114. Schulberg, A Face in the Crowd, 144.
115. In the documentary “Facing the Past,” Braudy comments on how the 
portrait of Mel comes out of Schulberg’s experience and previous treatment 
of the Hollywood writer’s hatred of himself for “selling out.”
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116. But see Nietzsche on the real artist the sycophantic hack longs to be-
come: “Let us, first of all, eliminate the artists: they do not stand nearly in-
dependently enough in the world and against the world for their changing 
valuations to deserve attention in themselves! They have at all times been valets 
of some morality, philosophy, or religion; quite apart from the fact that they 
have unfortunately often been all-too-pliable courtiers of their own followers 
and patrons, and cunning flatterers of ancient or newly arrived powers. They 
always need at the very least protection, a prop, an established authority: art-
ists never stand apart; standing alone is contrary to their deepest instincts.” 
Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, 102.
117. Ciment, Kazan on Kazan, 116.
118. Young, Kazan, 233.
119. It is of course entirely consistent with the rules of this game that the 
players reverse roles, or—which comes to the same thing—that each of them 
contain both roles within himself. About A Face in the Crowd, Roger Tailleur 
writes: “La méchanceté de Schulberg, sa verve, sa misanthropie, son impé-
tuosité, sa noirceur, son humeur, on n’en finirait pas d’alterner.” In fact, 
Tailleur considers Schulberg too much the bad cop, from whose influence 
Kazan must liberate himself: “Il faudra que Kazan quitte Schulberg, et surtout 
l’actualité, il faudra qu’il regarde vingt-cinq, trente et cinquante ans en arrière, 
pour qu’il délaisse une si radicale indignation et retrouve, sans émousser bea-
coup sa virulence critique, quelque tendresse et quelque espoir” (Schulberg’s 
nastiness, his eloquence; his misanthropy, his impetuosity; his darkness, his 
humor—one will never finish with these oppositions. Kazan will have to leave 
Schulberg, and especially the present; he will have to look back twenty-five, 
thirty, and fifty years, in order to abandon so radical an indignation and to re-
discover, without excessively softening his critical virulence, some tenderness 
and some hope). Tailleur, Elia Kazan, 100, 102–3. Kazan’s notes on A Face in 
the Crowd in the Wesleyan Cinema Archives seem to support this view both of 
his collaborator and of his collaborator’s primary surrogate in the film. Kazan 
schematizes (and “assassinates”) the character of Mel as follows: “Seems rea-
sonable, is pigheaded; Seems bold, is hysterical; Seems fair, is rigid; Seems 
moral, is puritanical.” Of Mel’s resemblance to Schulberg, Kazan writes: “Mel: 
Budd Schulberg—his little looks away—the disgust and violence deep down 
behind the compliance and the ‘gentleness.’ In fact he’s much tougher and 
much more business like than anyone else. (Budd, that is.)”
120. What Lacan actually says is “A casser l’oeuf se fait l’Homme, mais 
aussi l’Hommelette.” “Position de l’inconscient,” 845.
121. Place this final image of the glittering Coca-Cola sign next to the final 
image of the candy store sign in Body and Soul. One film ends with a pseu-
domockery of capitalism; the other, true to its dialectical ancestry, points to a 
way out of its capitalist hell.
122. Barthes, The Eiffel Tower and Other Mythologies, 40.
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123. Ibid. To reinforce the point about Coca-Cola as American icon, the 
camera captures, just beyond the “Coca-Cola” sign, a neon sign reading: “Ho-
tel Empire.”
124. Funny Face is of course the title of another film of 1957—about, among 
other things, Franco-American relations.
125. Although, in the aftermath of the recent presidential election in France, 
that renewed friendship threatens to take a dismaying form. In a New York 
Times article, Elaine Sciolino quotes Nicolas Sarkozy’s victory speech: “Ad-
dressing his ‘American friends,’ Mr. Sarkozy said, ‘I want to tell them that 
France will always be by their side when they need her, but that friendship is 
also accepting the fact that friends can think differently.’ ” Some consolation 
might be derived from Sarkozy’s reserving the right to think differently. Less 
consolingly, however, the article goes on to quote a liberal Democratic U.S. 
Senator, Charles E. Schumer of New York, as saying, “It would be nice to have 
someone who’s head of France who doesn’t have a knee-jerk reaction against 
the United States” (“An Admirer of America Sets a New Course for France.” 
New York Times, 8 May 2007: a8).
126. From The Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed., vol. 17, 442: “The origin 
of the Gr. Word, lit. = ‘fig-shower,’ has not been satisfactorily accounted for. 
The explanation, long current, that it orig. meant an informer against the un-
lawful exportation of figs cannot be substantiated. It is possible that the term 
referred orig. to the gesture of ‘making a fig’ or had an obscene implication.” 
A quotation from North’s Plutarch (1595) follows: “Wee may not altogetehr 
discredite those which say, they did forbid in the olde time that men should 
carie figges out of the countrie of Attica, and that from thence it came that 
these picke thankes, which bewray and accuse them that transported figges, 
were called Sycophantes.”





132. On Rapf ’s long and complicated relationship with Schulberg, see the 
interview with him in McGilligan and Paul Buhle, eds., Tender Comrades, as 
well as his memoir, Back Lot.
❨5❩ Comicosmopolitanism
1. Zurawik, The Jews of Prime Time, 72.
2. Ibid., 71.
3. For a lucid account of the Loeb affair, see Doherty, Cold War, Cool Me-
dium, 37–48. Also helpful is Hoberman, “The Goldbergs,” 124–27.
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4. Ibid., 72–73.
5. Kate Mostel et al., 170 Years of Show Business, 117.
6. Doherty, Cold War, 43.
7. Red Channels (http://www.authentichistory.com/images/1950s/red_
channels/redch001.html). On Red Channels and the blacklist in general as a 
“classic protection racket,” see Doherty, Cold War, 36.
8. Doherty, Cold War, 47. Others who have noted this shift include Marc, 
Comic Visions and Buhle and Wagner, Hide in Plain Sight.
9. Apart from one anodyne reference to cbs producer Fred Friendly’s Jew-
ishness, Clooney’s well-meaning film simply ignores the ethnic politics of 
the showdown between Murrow and McCarthy: a showdown as ethnically 
charged and overdetermined as everything else in McCarthy’s career, not to 
mention in the much longer and more successful career of McCarthyism. 
For a subtler and wider-ranging analysis of the Murrow-McCarthy confronta-
tion, see Doherty, Cold War, 161–88. On William Paley’s vexed relation to his 
Russian-Jewish background, and on how that relation affected the content of 
cbs programming well beyond the 1950s, see Zurawik, Prime Time, 62–77.
The existence of a marked pro-Israel bias in American network news cov-
erage of Middle-Eastern politics might suggest that the anxiety of which I 
speak above has finally subsided. I would argue, however, that the relatively 
undisguised identification with Israel on the part of the mainstream U.S. me-
dia reflects the extent to which Israel has ceased to be “Jewish,” that is, comi-
cosmopolitan, becoming instead an extension of the American imperial (and 
fundamentalist-Christian) imaginaire. On the de-Judaization of Israel, see, for 
example, Badiou’s article “Israël,” originally published in 1982, and reprinted 
in his Circonstances, 3, 21–28; see also, in the same volume, Winter, “Signifiant- 
maître des nouveaux aryens,” 101–24. These texts have been translated by Steve 
Corcoran in Badiou, Polemics. For more on Badiou, Israel, and Jewishness, 
see the Coda to the present volume.
10. This account of comicosmopolitanism is informed by the writings of 
Lefebvre, The Production of Space, and de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday 
Life,. On de Certeau as a theorist of cosmopolitanism, see Walkowitz, Cosmo-
politan Styles, 26–27, 134.
11. The first two examples are cited in Zurawik, Prime Time, 24; “Molly,” 
Zurawik remarks, “had her own version of the malapropism that came to be 
know as the Mollypropism” (24). The third example is related by Abraham 
Polonsky (who, early in his show-business career, wrote for Berg) in Writing 
for Television: Television and the Blacklist, a videotaped 1997 panel discussion 
featured in the Museum of Television and Radio Seminar Series, and avail-
able for viewing at the Museum of Television and Radio in New York City.
12. In “Our Show of Shows” (in Hoberman and Shandler, Entertaining Amer-
ica, 144), Hoberman and Shandler cite “one reviewer in the New York Journal-
American [who] wrote that producer Max Liebman’s ‘years of dipping into 
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entertainment borscht gives [Your Show of Shows] a definite flavor, experience, 
adaptability, and taste.’ ” The persistence of the borscht tint or taint—Your 
Show of Shows ran from 1950 to 1954, and Caesar’s Hour from 1954 to 1957—
might suggest that Abel Green’s warning was not being fully heeded, or the 
hinterland’s intolerance fully respected. I offer an alternative reading below.
13. Caesar (with Friedfeld), Caesar’s Hours, 66. I have not yet “found any-
thing” myself to substantiate this claim—which, given the secrecy and duplic-
ity with which McCarthy, huac, and company operated, hardly invalidates it. 
Lucille Ball’s case, however, was not entirely parallel to Caesar’s; on her better- 
documented encounter with huac—Ball had registered as a Communist in 
the thirties—see Kanfer, Ball of Fire, 152–154, 167–175.
14. Caesar, Caesar’s Hours, 115.
15. Buhle and Wagner, Hide in Plain Sight, 1.
16. From Max Leibman Presents, a 1976 television special consisting of a 
compilation of sketches from Your Show of Shows, in the archive of the Mu-
seum of Television and Radio, New York City.
17. For an analysis of The Dick Van Dyke Show, with particular attention 
to how it manages the problems of New York City and Jews presented by its 
ur-text, Head of the Family, in which Reiner himself starred, see Marc, Comic 
Visions, 84–120.
18. For a discussion of Seinfeld in terms of its greater or lesser degree of 
overt Jewishness, see Zurawik, Prime Time, 200–17.
19. Siegel, “The Insignificance of Larry David,” 4.
20. Buhle and Wagner, Hide in Plain Sight, 1, discuss the film in relation to 
their point about the pedagogical and disciplinary project of “forcing New York 
into line”; for them, however, the importance of the film’s setting has to do 
not with comicosmopolitanism but, rather, with “the loss of New York’s role 
as the leading forum for the Popular Front culture of the 1930s and 1940s.”
21. “Walter Bernstein,” in McGilligan, Backstory 3, 108.
22. Ibid., 108.
23. Polonsky, Writing for Television (see note 11). Polonsky’s remark occa-
sions a certain amount of consternation in one of the other panelists, black-
listee and screen- and television writer Joan LaCour Scott. Scott, whose hus-
band, Crossfire producer Adrian Scott, figured in the Hollywood Ten, and was 
one of those driven to an early death by huac, takes exception to Polonsky’s 
comment, and to fellow panelist Robert Lees’s suggestion that a book should 
be written about the “funny side” of the blacklist. Polonsky finally apologizes 
to Scott—but only after making a series of “tasteless” jokes about the blacklist 
in relation to death, murder, and the Holocaust. I will have more to say about 
“tastelessness” in the course of this chapter.
24. For an account of the work that Bernstein, Polonsky, and Manoff did 
on You Are There, see Bernstein, Inside Out, 216–37. In his interview with 
McGilligan in Backstory 3, 96, Bernstein explains that, while he, Polonsky, 
262	 Notes	to	Chap ter	F ive	
and Manoff sometimes helped each other with scripts, they wrote them more 
or less independently, each author having his own historical and thematic 
interests and talents. The process of writing You Are There, in other words, 
appears to have been some combination of the semi-collaborative and the 
semi-autonomous.
25. Ibid., 222.
26. An anecdote by Bernstein, ibid., 222, suggests the aesthetic continuity 
between You Are There and Clooney’s film, with Edward R. Murrow as media-
tor. Bernstein relates an encounter between Murrow—the McCarthy-slayer 
hero of Good Night, and Good Luck—and the producer of You Are There: “Rus-
sell encountered Edward R. Murrow one day and Murrow pulled him aside, 
told him he watched You Are There every week and admired it and then, lower-
ing his voice, asked Russell how he got away with it.”
27. Most of the You Are There scripts written by Polonsky are collected in 
Schultheiss and Schaubert, ed., To Illuminate Our Time.
28. McGilligan, Backstory 3, 96. On the same page, Bernstein describes the 
You Are There scripts as “a strange combination of camp and closely reasoned, 
dramatic stuff.” Insofar as the camp element of the scripts, perhaps like camp 
in general, is not-quite-fun, or not-quite-funny, it might explain the authors’ 
not-quite-chortling.
29. Polonsky, Writing for Television (see note 11).
30. Ibid.
31. Buhle and Wagner, Hide in Plain Sight, 1.
32. Bernstein describes this experience in Inside Out, 190–93.
33. Ellison, Invisible Man, 418. Ellison’s phrase is actually “confusing the 
class struggle with the ass struggle.”
34. Bernardi replaced Mostel in the role of Tevye in Fiddler on the Roof on 
Broadway. As we shall see in the next chapter, this starring role in a hugely 
successful show constituted a triumphant vindication of the once virtually 
untouchable performer, but that vindication came at a price: Tevye’s respect-
ability, his profound Americanness, reflects the efficiency with which the black-
list had disciplined not just the blacklisted actor but perhaps American Jews 
in general.
35. Cited in Jared Brown, Zero Mostel, 300.
36. Ibid., 92.
37. On the circumstances leading to Loeb’s suicide, see Kate Mostel et al., 
170 Years of Show Business, 116–17, and Doherty, Cold War, 37–48.
38. Allen’s performance, particularly in this scene, closely resembles his 
performances in his own films, and those performances in turn closely re-
semble Allen’s performances as a stand-up comedian in the sixties. Mostel 
had also worked as a stand-up comedian, and the film suggests a peculiar 
continuity, of an almost genealogical kind, between his highly presentational 
style and Allen’s.
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On Allen’s acting in the film, Bernstein recalls:
It was a very happy experience for all of us. Whether he would acknowledge 
it or not, Woody got a great deal from Marty in terms of his acting. He was 
on the film purely as an actor. He didn’t write anything. He only contributed 
a couple of jokes. The one time he tried something on he picture was the 
sequence at the end [of the film] where he’s testifying before the committee. 
We shot the scene and looked at the dailies, then decided we should make it 
funnier than it was. Woody said, “Let’s shoot it again, and let me improvise.” 
Marty set up the camera, and Woody improvised. He was hilarious. Only it 
had nothing to do with the picture. It was like ten minutes of stand-up com-
edy. Reluctantly, we couldn’t use it. (Backstory 3, 109)
Although Allen’s improvisation was cut from the scene, the effect of stand-
up-comic improvisation persists in Allen’s performance throughout the film, 
but especially here in the film’s climax, where it assumes a strategic and even 
polemical salience. By no means does Allen’s style have “nothing to do with 
the picture.” On the contrary, its pseudoextraneousness is what makes it so 
integral to the film. Like Hecky-Mostel’s style, which throws the drama “off 
balance,” Allen’s acting is characterized by a comic theatricality—a frontal ap-
proach—that is not easily assimilated to naturalistic conventions.
39. The supporters are holding signs, in a tableau that recalls a well-known 
photograph of the Hollywood Ten and their supporters. One of those signs 
reads: “Howard Prince, the Real American.” We have seen other instances 
of the left’s attempt to appropriate American identity (see the discussions of 
Stander and Paul Robeson in chapter 1). That The Front pictures this attempt 
does not, however, mean that it also endorses it, or merely endorses it. As I 
have been arguing in this chapter, the film’s interest consists in its staging of 
a resistance in no way reducible to a reclaimed (or even, more ambitiously, a 
resignified) Americanism.
40. Buhle and Wagner, Hide in Plain Sight, 195, point out that “Allen had 
broken into big-time comedy writing in the 1950s . . . thanks in part to con-
nections made for him by a distant cousin, Abe Burrows, at a moment when 
Burrows was a celebrity writer but also one of the nastier friendly witnesses.” 
(We will look at Burrows’s testimony in the next chapter.) Buhle and Wagner 
argue (195–96) that Allen’s participation in The Front represents one of the 
ways in which the apparently apolitical actor and auteur “made amends” for 
his debt to Burrows, and expressed a broader affinity, throughout his career, 
with the old left.
41. Discussing the careers that the most adventurous of Caesar’s writers 
pursued after the fifties, Marc, Comic Visions, 100, writes: “Allen, with his 
shiksas and poetesses, became the bard of the uptown condominium cosmo-
politans.” Modified by “condominium,” “cosmopolitans” clearly has a pejora-
tive ring here. It is this sort of bad press that, as I have argued in chapter 1, 
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the new, ethicopolitically serious cosmopolitanism is especially eager to put 
behind itself.
❨6❩ Bringing Down the House
1. Laurents, Original Story By, 285. Subsequent references to this work will 
be included parenthetically in the text.
2. Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 96.
3. Lewis, Hollywood v. Hard Core, 11–49. Lewis argues that today’s Holly-
wood is the direct result—and the extension—of practices instituted during 
the blacklist period.
4. Porter, The Complete Lyrics of Cole Porter, 311.
5. Adorno, “On the Fetish Character in Music and the Regression in Listen-
ing,” 30.
6. Bentley, ed., Thirty Years of Treason, 548. The interpolation, “[1944?],” is 
Bentley’s. Subsequent references to this work will be included parenthetically 
in the text.
7. Burrows had previously written the book for the musical Guys and Dolls. 
In his memoir, Cy Feuer, one of the show’s producers, cites the following 
reason why the show was denied the Pulitzer Prize for drama in 1951: “they 
wouldn’t honor Abe Burrows because he refused to cooperate with the House 
Committee on Un-American Activities” (Feuer, I Got the Show Right Here, 151). 
Burrows would not be the first (or the last) uncooperative witness to change 
his mind.
8. For a discussion of cool as a mode of social control—though the author 
posits the 1920s as the pivotal decade—see Stearns, American Cool.
9. According to Garebian, The Making of “West Side Story,” 142–43, Brando 
reportedly wanted to play Tony in the film version.
10. There is also the persistent but unproven claim—a staple of blacklist 
lore—that Robbins named names because Ed Sullivan (or the fbi, or huac) 
was blackmailing him by threatening to reveal his homosexuality. Sullivan 
did in fact publish an article “suggesting” that Robbins be subpoenaed by 
huac; instead of explicitly referring to Robbins’s homosexuality, the article 
adopts the standard practice of using anti-Communism as a front for gay- 
baiting. Sullivan’s article is quoted in Lawrence, Dance with Demons, 167–69. 
On the interactions with Sullivan and other agents of anti-Communism that 
led to Robbins’s testimony, see ibid., 155–60, 165–72.
11. D. A. Miller, Place for Us, 39.
12. Cited in Kaiser, The Gay Metropolis, 1940–1996, 93.
13. Not that this passion for justice could not raise eyebrows. Garebian 
points out that the State Department balked at the idea of taking the show 
to Moscow: “Washington was afraid that the Soviets would politically exploit 
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the show’s grim picture of slum life and gang violence” (The Making of “West 
Side Story,” 142).
14. Ibid., 31.
15. Laurents et al., West Side Story, 179. Subsequent references to this work 
will be included parenthetically in the text.
16. See, for instance, Sondheim as quoted in Garebian, The Making of “West 
Side Story,” 124: “Well, when rhyme goes against character, out it should go, 
and rhyme always implies education and mind working, and the more rhymes 
the sharper the mind.”
17. Ibid., 122.
18. Ibid., 136.
19. But see Sondheim’s disparaging remarks about cleverness in relation to 
“Gee, Officer Krupke,” quoted in Zadan, Sondheim & Co., 235.
20. According to Kate Mostel and Madeline Gilford, Zero Mostel, whose 
Broadway career and huac testimony we will be considering later in this 
chapter, had the same choice word for the police: “when Zero pointed at the 
Committee chairman [during his huac hearing] and, in a loud stage whisper, 
said, ‘That man is a schmuck,’ they deleted that.” Kate Mostel et al., 170 Years 
of Show Business, 108.
21. Zadan, Sondheim & Co., 235.
22. Most, Making Americans, 116. On the Broadway musical as a distinc-
tively Jewish American art form, see also Whitfield, In Search of American 
Jewish Culture, 59–87.
23. In Green Grow the Lilacs, the play on which Oklahoma! is based, the 
equivalent character is named “Jeeter”; “Jud” thus becomes all the more in-
sistent as a signifier of Jewishness.
24. Jones, Our Musicals, Ourselves, 205.
25. Rodgers and Hammerstein, Oklahoma!, 48.
26. Transcript of Judy Holliday’s Testimony, in fbi Files, on The Judy 
Holliday Resource Center, http://www.wtv-zone.com/lumina/fbi/testimony-
13.html. 13:3. Subsequent references to this document will be included paren-
thetically in the text; the first numerical reference is to the transcript page, the 
second to the section of the page as printed out.
27. Carey, Judy Holliday, 143.
28. In her statement for huac, Ball made a point of dismissing her reg-
istration as a Communist in 1936 as “weak and silly and corny” (quoted in 
Kanfer, Ball of Fire, 168). Lillian Hellman might appear to belong in this small 
company insofar as she also managed to testify about her own beliefs while 
refusing to inform. But though Hellman evaded a citation for contempt of 
congress, unlike Holliday and Ball she did not evade the blacklist. That Hell-
man lacked the “attractiveness” of Holliday and Ball only partly explains why 
she could not play the gender card with the same results. See chapter 2 for 
discussion of Hellman’s testimony.
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29. On Holliday’s female lover, see Carey, Judy Holliday, 43–45, and 146.
30. Holtzmann, Judy Holliday, 10. Holtzmann talks about Arens’s “growing 
reputation for anti-Semitism” (164) at the time of Holliday’s hearings.
31. See Sedgwick, Tendencies, 23: “If M. Mitterand knows English but Mr. 
Reagan lacks French, it is the urbane M. Mitterand who must negotiate in an 
acquired tongue, the ignorant Mr. Reagan who may dilate in his native one.”
32. “The language of intimidation” is inspired by the example of Roland 
Barthes’s fantasized, never-written book on the Linguistics of Intimidation. 
(Many books that Barthes did write might well have had this title.) See Barthes, 
Roland Barthes, 149–50.
33. Comden and Green, Bells Are Ringing, 190. Subsequent references to 
this work will be included parenthetically in the text. Italicized quotations are 
taken from stage directions.
34. “Back Story: The New York Report,” The Judy Holliday Resource Cen-
ter, http://www.wtv-zone.com/lumina/fbi/newyorkbs.html, 1. The Web site 
includes the accompanying fbi file documenting the anonymous telephone 
call.
35. I am indebted here to D. A. Miller’s Place for Us, not only for its elabora-
tion of the importance of place in the Broadway musical, but also in particular 
for its evocative emphasis on underground places, the basement and the piano 
bar, as stages leading up to, and down from, the Broadway stage itself. See 
esp. 1–64.
36. It is interesting, in this regard, to consider Betty Comden’s answer to a 
question about whether the scripts she and Green wrote for Hollywood films 
were “too subtle for other directors” than Gene Kelly and Stanley Donen: 
“I wouldn’t say subtle so much as foreign to other directors. Possibly they 
wouldn’t know what we were talking about.” Daniell and McGilligan, inter-
viewers, “Betty Comden and Adolph Green,” 81.
37. Hullot-Kentor, “Translator’s Introduction,” xx.
38. Comden, Offstage, 263.
39. Arthur Miller, for instance, was called to testify, and found in contempt 
of congress, in 1956. In Thirty Years of Treason (791), Bentley points out: “it 
should not be forgotten that Miller was cited for contempt. He received a 
thirty-day suspended sentence and a five-hundred-dollar fine. In 1958 he was 
exonerated by the courts, but the time, trouble, and money the process cost 
must be charged—with a thousand other such bills—to the House Commit-
tee on Un-American Activities.” As we shall see, Zero Mostel had testified, 
and remained blacklisted as a result of his testimony, in 1955.
40. Hellman, Scoundrel Time, 203. Hellman was herself involved (as libret-
tist) in a noteworthy blacklist musical: Candide (1956), which “drew implicit 
parallels between the McCarthy era in postwar America and the Spanish In-
quisition” (Knapp, The American Musical and the Formation of National Iden-
tity, 153).
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41. Adorno, “Is Art Lighthearted?,” 250.
42. In an obituary for the former switchboard operator Mary Printz (New 
York Times, March 2, 2009, A16), Margalit Fox writes: “If the long, helpful 
career of Mrs. Printz, who died on Feb. 21 at 85, sounds a great deal like that of 
the Judy Holliday character in the hit Broadway musical ‘Bells Are Ringing,’ it 
is no accident. One of Mrs. Printz’s clients was Adolph Green, who, inspired 
by her extraordinary ministrations, wrote the show’s book and lyrics with his 
frequent collaborator, Betty Comden.” Hearing “Printz” in “Prantz,” we sense 
an even greater affinity between Ella/Holliday and Sandor.
43. John B. Jones (Our Musicals, Ourselves, 171) observes that “the show con-
trasted Eastern and Western bloc mores and made America’s popular notions 
of Soviet political methods the object of comedy (a bestselling Russian book 
is Who’s Still Who).”
44. That My Fair Lady is an allegory of Jewish assimilation has been noted 
by the film historian Lester Friedman, in the documentary (based on Gabler’s 
An Empire of Their Own) entitled Hollywood: An Empire of Their Own.
45. Quoted in Jared Brown, Zero Mostel, 178.
46. Quoted in Lawrence, Dance with Demons, 311.
47. On Jewish moral seriousness, see Sontag, “Notes on ‘Camp,’ ” 290.
48. Stephen Sondheim evokes some of the risk for Mostel when he recalls 
how Mostel was offered the lead in Forum (after it had been turned down by 
Phil Silvers and Milton Berle): “ ‘He [Mostel] gave out stories years later that 
he hadn’t wanted to do it, but it wasn’t true at all. He needed the work very 
badly and took it like that,’ he said, snapping his fingers.” Quoted in Secrest, 
Stephen Sondheim, 151.
49. On this incident, see ibid., 155. Secrest quotes Sondheim’s account of 
how, during rehearsals for the show, he repeatedly corrected one of Mostel’s 
lines, at which point Mostel exploded: “Well, maybe if you’d write me a funny 
line, you cocksucker!” According to Secrest, Sondheim “believed he was be-
ing made the scapegoat for the anger Mostel really wanted to direct against 
Robbins” (ibid., 155). I am suggesting that Mostel did direct his anger against 
Robbins: even in the context of the anecdote—it is Robbins who corrects 
Mostel the third time, after which he explodes—it is possible that Mostel’s 
“cocksucker” is meant for Robbins as well as for Sondheim. At the same time, 
I do not doubt that Mostel was capable of making Sondheim a scapegoat for 
Robbins. Mostel was not so undisciplined or so carnivalesque in his mimicry 
as to lose his sense of just how far out it was safe to stick his lip. Sondheim, 
while clearly formidable in his own right, even at that early stage of his career, 
must have seemed a much less dangerous target than Robbins—as anyone 
would have.
50. Julia Migenes, quoted in Lawrence, Dance with Demons, 341.
51. Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 151.
52. Ibid., 189.
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53. An observer at Bentley’s 1972 dramatization of the huac hearings, Are 
You Now or Have You Ever Been, remarked that Mostel disliked the play be-
cause, as represented in it, he “flirted with the Committee and was cute and 
coy,” while “[Lionel] Stander slapped their face” (Jared Brown, Zero Mostel, 
279). I am about to suggest that both Mostel and Stander, like Ring Lardner 
Jr., outrage huac precisely by flirting with it—by assaulting it with various 
butterfly effects.
54. Quoted by Lardner in Strugatz and McGilligan, “Ring Lardner Jr.,” 
208.
55. Sartre, “What Is Literature?,”40, quoted in Walkowitz, Cosmopolitan 
Style, 24.
56. Walkowitz, Cosmopolitan Style, 24.
57. Brown, Zero Mostel, 233.
58. Symbolically cast out, because Mostel’s appearance before huac actu-
ally took place in Los Angeles. See ibid., 125.
59. Fiddler on the Roof would thus be one more example of the enterprise of 
“making Americans”—that is, of making Jews Americans—which, as Andrea 
Most argues in Making Americans (see note 22 above), defines the Jewish genre 
that is the Broadway musical. The only difference between Fiddler on the Roof 
and its predecessors would be the former’s thematization of this enterprise, 
although, as my reference to allegory suggests, even this finally uncloseted 
Jewish musical—its very existence the sign of a certain Jewish-American 
“success”—does not entirely dispense with the mechanisms of protective 
opacity.
60. Kael, “A Bagel with a Bite out of It,” 397.
61. Stein et al., Fiddler on the Roof, 6–7. Subsequent references to this work 
will be included parenthetically in the text.
62. On the question of Mostel’s politics, see Jared Brown, Zero Mostel, 41–
48.
63. On the oppressive inevitability of the heterosexual narrative in the 
Broadway musical, see D. A. Miller, Place for Us. Concerning Fiddler’s “femi-
nism,” Knapp, The American Musical and the Formation of National Identity, 
219, observes: “The show projects a cultural transformation from feminine to 
masculine from within, as the community is debased and destroyed by the 
outside world, a plot structure easily correlated with the emergence of the 
State of Israel in the wake of the Holocaust, and resonant with the fact that, 
late in the show’s original run, Israel’s leader was a particularly strong-willed 
woman (Golda Meir, prime minister from 1969 to 1974).”
64. See Rogger, Jewish Policies and Right-Wing Politics in Imperial Russia, 
60–61.
65. Sheldon Harnick is quoted in Altman and Kaufman, The Making of a 
Musical, 118, as saying: “When we were working on the show . . . the question 
of using Yiddish words had come up, and we decided not to. I remember see-
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ing too many nightclub comics, including Lenny Bruce, get cheap laughs by 




1. Badiou, Polemics, 163. One might place Badiou’s critique of Israel in rela-
tion to the work of, for instance, Jacqueline Rose. See her States of Fantasy, 
The Question of Zion, and The Last Resistance.
2. Badiou, Polemics, 169. The French phrase occurs in the original version 
of Badiou’s text, published under the title, Circonstances, 3, 27. The second 
English phrase is from the translation of this text in Polemics, 170.
3. Badiou, Polemics, 170.
4. This dissociation has been observed, and in some sense resisted, by 
Sharon Marcus in “Anne Frank and Hannah Arendt, Universalism and Pa-
thos,” 89–131.
5. Anderson, “The Power of Distance,” 145.
6. Murdoch, The Black Prince, 116.
7. Walkowitz, Cosmopolitan Style, 24.
8. The poem, by Pavel Friedmann, appears in Volavkova, ed., I Never Saw 
Another Butterfly.
9. Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 189.
10. Examples of the dominant contemporary forms of cosmopolitan labor 
are well represented in Cosmopolitics, edited by Robbins and Cheah. See, in 
particular, Robbins, “Comparative Cosmopolitanisms,” 246–64, and Cheah, 
“Given Culture,” 290–328. See also Balibar, We, the People of Europe?.
11. Adorno, “Words from Abroad,” 1:187.
12. Ibid.
13. Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 152.
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